REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ANDREW J. PECK, United States Magistrate Judge:

To the Honorable William H. Pauley, III, United States District Judge:

Pro se plaintiff Berton Saint-Fleur has brought this § 1983 action against the City and State of New York, his wife Betty E. Saint-Fleur, and the Jewish Child Care Association, for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and defamation, claiming,inter alia, that an Assistant District Attorney coerced his wife to falsely accuse plaintiff and convince their child to accuse plaintiff of sexual abuse.

The State of New York has moved to dismiss all claims against it on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. For the reasons set forth below, the State's motion should be granted.

SAINT-FLEUR'S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Berton Saint-Fleur ("Saint-Fleur") was arrested on December 22, 1996 and charged with sexual abuse of his six-year old son, Jermaine. (Cplt. ¶ IV at p. 5.) The charges were based on accusations by plaintiff's wife, defendant Betty E. Saint-Fleur, that he had forced her to have sex with Jermaine. (Id.) After Saint-Fleur's wife tried to recant her story, Assistant District Attorney ("ADA") Rose Mary Harlem threatened her with "immigration, losing the children and prison" if she continued to maintain her husband's innocence. (Id.) "The ADA did not investigate to find out what the truth was" and Saint-Fleur was brought to trial. (Id.) Betty Saint-Fleur testified against her husband but has admitted "in letters from jail" that her testimony was false. (Cplt. ¶ IV at p. 6.)

Saint-Fleur was acquitted of criminal charges but "found guilty" in Family Court. (Cplt. ¶ IV at p. 7; see also Saint-Fleur Br. at 3.) The Family Court judge stated "on records [sic] while making his decision" that Saint-Fleur was "found guilty" because he "didn't take the stand on [his] behalf." (Cplt. ¶ IV at p. 7; see also Saint-Fleur Br. at 1-2.)

Defendant "Jewish Child Care Association had sessions with Jermaine Saint-Fleur once a week making him live a lie and repeating sexual experiences which he never had and which he couldn't remember at time of trial, changing the story drastically. They also conspired with the ADA in their vindictiveness to get a judge to not allow [Saint-Fleur] any visits, phone calls nor mail with any of [his] kids up to date, regardless of [Saint-Fleur's] acquittal by a jury trial who reached a verdict in thirty minutes." (Cplt. 6 IV at p. 6.)

The complaint appears to allege that Saint-Fleur was "falsely imprisoned, wrongly accused, maliciously prosecuted [and] defamed." (Cplt. ¶ IV at p. 7; see also Saint-Fleur Br. at 3.) Saint-Fleur's "sufferings are a direct proximate of the aforementioned corruption of the defendants ADA Rose Mary Harlem for the City of New York, John Doe for Jewish Child Care Association, Betty St. Fleur and the State of New York's appointed judges from family court and from criminal court." (Cplt. ¶ IV at p. 7; see also Saint-Fleur Br. at 3-4.) Saint-Fleur seeks damages and injunctive relief to terminate Court-ordered separations from his children, discontinue Betty Saint-Fleur's custody and award custody to the children's grandmother. (Cplt. ¶ V at pp. 5, 8.)

ANALYSIS

I. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT BARS SAINT-FLEUR'S CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST THE STATE AND ITS COURT SYSTEM

Defendant State of New York has moved to dismiss the complaint on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds insofar as Saint-Fleur attempts to allege claims against the State, the state court system and state judges. (State Br. at 4-6.)

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity Generally

The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. Amend. XI. As the Second Circuit has explained:

The Supreme Court has consistently held that the federal courts lack jurisdiction not only over suits against a state brought by citizens of other states, as the literal language of the Amendment provides, but also over suits against such states brought by their own citizens. Thus, it is clear that, with few exceptions, federal courts are barred from entertaining suits by a private party against a state in its own name.

The result would be no different if the Court were to liberally construe the pro se complaint and find that Saint-Fleur intended to sue the State Courts. (See, e.g., Saint-Fleur Br. at 1-2, 5.) "For Eleventh Amendment purposes, governmental entities of the state that are considered 'arms of the state' receive Eleventh Amendment immunity." Fields v. Walthers, No. 94-CV-1659, 1997 WL 204308 at *2 (N.D.N.Y. April 5, 1997) (Pooler, D.J.); accord, e.g., Posr v. Court Officer Shield No. 207, 180 F.3d 409, 414 (2d Cir. 1999) ("An official arm of a state enjoys the same Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court as is enjoyed by the state itself. The State Office of Court Administration is an arm of the state and therefore immune.").

State courts, as arms of the State, are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. See, e.g., Gu v.Municipal Gov't of New York, No. 96-2857, 113 F.3d 1229 (table), 1997 WL 280056 at *2 (2d Cir. May 23, 1997) ("the Eleventh Amendment bars the action against the New York criminal court, which is a state agency"); Zuckerman v. Appellate Div., 421 F.2d 625, 626 (2d Cir. 1970) (Appellate Division is "part of the judicial arm of the State of New York"); Vishevnik v. Supreme Court, 99 Civ. 3611, 1999 WL 796180 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1999) ("agencies, such as the state courts, are absolutely immune from suit [in federal court], regardless of the relief sought"); Carp v. Supreme Court, No. 5:98-CV-201, 1998 WL 236187 at *2 (N.D.N Y May 5, 1998) (Pooler, D.J.) ("the State Supreme Court and the Appellate Division are . . . immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment"); Casaburro v. Giuliani, 986 F. Supp. 176, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (criminal court of New York City is a state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity).

The State and its agencies are protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity "whether the relief sought is legal or equitable."Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. at 276, 106 S.Ct. at 2939; accord, e.g., Pennhurst State School Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. at 100, 104 S.Ct. at 908; Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 27, 54 S.Ct. 18, 21 (1933) ("Expressly applying to suits in equity as well as at law, the [Eleventh A]mendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and prosecuted by an individual against a state."); Dube v. State University of New York, 900 F.2d at 594; DiNapoli v. DiNapoli, 95 Civ. 7872, 1995 WL 604607 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1995) (Sotomayor, D.J.).

Thus, absent an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity (and none is applicable here, see Point I.B below), the State and the State courts are immune from Saint-Fleur's suit, both for damages and injunctive relief. Even if Saint-Fleur were to amend to seek damages from a named state official, his claim could not stand. "To the extent that a state official is sued for damages in his official capacity, such a suit is deemed to be a suit against the state, and the official is entitled to invoke the Eleventh Amendment immunity belonging to the state." Ying Jing Gan v.City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 529 (2d Cir. 1993); accord, e.g., Minotti v. Lensink, 798 F.2d 607, 609 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906,, 107 S.Ct. 2484 (1987); Samuels v. Stone, 98 Civ. 776, 1999 WL 624549 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1999) (Pauley, D.J.); Jackson v. Johnson, 30 F. Supp.2d 613, 618 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1998) (Kaplan, D.J. Peck, M.J.) ("It is black letter law that a suit against a state official in his official capacity seeking damages is barred by the Eleventh Amendment absent the State's waiver or consent . . .") (citing cases); Dean v. Abrams, 94 Civ. 3704, 1995 WL 791966 at *4 n. 5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 1995) (Kaplan, D.J. Peck, M.J.).

B. No Exception to Eleventh Amendment Immunity Exists Here

While [ Eleventh Amendment] immunity from suit is not absolute, we have recognized only two circumstances in which an individual may sue a State. First, Congress may authorize such a suit in the exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment — an Amendment enacted after the Eleventh Amendment and specifically designed to alter the federal-state balance. Second, a State may waive its sovereign immunity by consenting to suit.

Neither exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity applies in this case.

First, it is well-settled that "the civil rights statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not override the eleventh amendment." Minotti v. Lensink, 798 F.2d 607, 609 (2d Cir. 1986); see, e.g., Quern v.Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1145 (1979); Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675-77, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1361-62 (1974); Dube v. State University of New York, 900 F.2d 587, 594 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Although Congress is empowered under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment to override Eleventh Amendment immunity and 'to enforce "by appropriate legislation" the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, which themselves embody significant limitations on state authority,' . . . it is well-settled that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not constitute an exercise of that authority.").

"Second, the State of New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal suit." Estes-El v. New York State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 95 Civ. 3454, 1997 WL 342481 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 1997); accord, e.g., Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 39-40 (2d Cir. 1977) (leading case); DiNapoli v. DiNapoli, 95 Civ. 7872, 1995 WL 604607 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1995) (Sotomayor, D.J.) ("New York has not consented to be sued in federal court.").

As discussed above, the Eleventh Amendment applies to the State and its agencies, including State courts, regardless of the relief sought. Neither exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity applies in this case. Accordingly, Saint-Fleur's claims for damages and injunctive relief against the State (and its courts) are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The State's motion to dismiss should be granted.

II. ADDITIONALLY, TO THE EXTENT SAINT-FLUER'S CLAIMS AGAINST THE STATE ARE INTENDED AS CLAIMS AGAINST PARTICULAR STATE JUDGES OR COLLATERAL ATTACKS ON FAMILY COURT DECISIONS, THE CLAIMS WOULD BE BARRED BY ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY AND THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE

A. Claims Against State Judges Are Barred By Absolute Judicial Immunity

The common law rule of absolute judicial immunity protects judges from civil damage suits under § 1983 relating to the exercise of their judicial functions. See, e.g., Mireles v.Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 287-88 (1991); Stump v.Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1104 (1978);Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217-18 (1967) ("Few doctrines were far more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction," and this doctrine was not abolished by § 1983); Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999) ("It is . . . well established that officials acting in a judicial capacity are entitled to absolute immunity against § 1983 actions, and this immunity acts as a complete shield to claims for money damages."); Tucker v.Outwater, 118 F.3d 930, 933 (2d Cir.) ("Since the seventeenth century, the common law has immunized judges from damage claims arising out of their judicial acts. . . . The Supreme Court has specifically applied the doctrine of judicial immunity to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983."), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 997, 118 S.Ct. 562 (1997); Fields v. Soloff, 920 F.2d 1114, 1119 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Judicial immunity is by now a well-established doctrine. . . . A judge defending against a section 1983 suit is entitled to absolute immunity from damages for actions performed in his judicial capacity."); Abrams v. Sprizzo, 98 Civ. 5838, 1998 WL 778001 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1998) (Rakoff, D.J. Peck, M.J.), aff'd mem., 201 F.3d 430 (2d Cir. 1999).

Absolute judicial immunity exists "however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff." Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871); accord, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. at 11, 112 S.Ct. at 288; Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-200, 106 S.Ct. 496, 499 (1985); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S.Ct. at 1218 (judicial "immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly"); Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1102, 118 S.Ct. 1837 (1995); Carp v. Supreme Court, No. 5:98-CV-201, 1998 WL 236187 at *1 (N.D.N.Y. May 5, 1998) (Pooler, D.J.). Indeed, as the Supreme Court has made clear, judicial "immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances. First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. at 11-12, 112 S.Ct. at 288 (citations omitted).

Saint-Fleur has not alleged any facts suggesting that either exception to judicial immunity applies. Thus, to the extent that Saint-Fleur's claim against the State is, in reality, an attempt to sue State judges for damages, his claims are barred.

As to Saint-Fleur's claim for injunctive relief, in October 1996, as part of the Federal Courts Improvement Act ("FCIA"), Congress amended § 1983 to provide that "in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, § 309(c), Pub.L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847, 3853 (1996) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see, e.g., Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d at 761; Hili v. Sciarrotta, 140 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 1998); Jones v. Newman, 1999 WL 493429 at *6; Ackerman v. Doyle, 43 F. Supp.2d 265, 272 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Kampfer v. Scullin, 989 F. Supp. 194, 201 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).

Saint-Fleur has not alleged that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable, and thus the 1996 amendments to § 1983 would bar Saint-Fleur's claims against state judges for injunctive relief. See, e.g., Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d at 761 (dismissing claim for injunctive relief against judicial officer where plaintiff alleged neither violation of declaratory decree nor unavailability of declaratory relief); Malizia v. Westchester County Dist. Attorney's Office, No. 98-7043, 164 F.3d 618 (table), 1998 WL 712424 at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 1, 1998); Ackerman v. Doyle, 43 F. Supp.2d at 272.

B. Collateral Attacks on Family Court Decisions Are Barred By the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Moreover, to the extent Saint-Fleur's complaint appears to be collaterally attacking the judgment of the Family Court, the action additionally is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits federal district courts from reviewing final state court decisions arising out of judicial proceedings absent a federal statute (such as 28 U.S.C. § 2254 governing habeas corpus) authorizing such review. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1317 (1983) (federal district courts lack jurisdiction "over challenges to state court decisions . . . arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court's actions were unconstitutional"); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-16, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150 (1923); see, e.g., Pollack v. Nash, 58 F. Supp.2d at 305 n. 3; Ackerman v. Doyle, 43 F. Supp.2d at 272-73; George v. Letren, 97 Civ. 5991, 1998 WL 684857 at *3 n. 5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1998) (district court lacked jurisdiction over action challenging perceived errors in paternity and child support actions); Pal v. Garvey, 98 Civ. 4900, 1998 WL 427677 at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1998) (no jurisdiction over action alleging constitutional errors in Family Court proceeding resulting in termination of plaintiff's visitation rights with granddaughter); Sanchez-Preston v. Judge Luria, 1996 WL 738140 at *3 ("Because plaintiff's § 1983 claim arises out of an allegedly erroneous or unconstitutional judicial proceeding in the New York Family Court, no valid predicate for jurisdiction lies with this Court."); Brooks-Jones v. Jones, 916 F. Supp. 280, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("A plaintiff . . . 'may not seek a reversal of a state court judgment simply by casting her complaint in the form of a civil rights action.'"); Fariello v.Campbell, 860 F. Supp. at 67 (no jurisdiction over § 1983 claim alleging constitutional error committed by Family Court in father's contempt proceeding); Rogers-Fink v. Cortland County Dep't of Social Servs., 855 F. Supp. 45, 47 (N.D.N.Y. 1994);Levine v. County of Westchester, 828 F. Supp. at 242 ("Plaintiff's claims [regarding child custody and sexual abuse proceedings] . . ., to the extent that they arise out of or are based upon allegedly incorrect or erroneous decisions in the state courts, are not properly within the jurisdiction of this Court.").

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Saint Fleur's complaint should be dismissed as to New York State, its courts and its judges, and leave to amend should not be granted. In addition, the claims that Saint-Fleur purports to bring on behalf of his son Jermaine should be dismissed as to all defendants.

FILING OF OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from service of this Report to file written objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6. Such objections (and any responses to objections) shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable William H. Pauley, III, 40 Centre Street, Room 234, and to my chambers, 500 Pearl Street, Room 1370. Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Pauley. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466 (1985); IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1054 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 822, 115 S.Ct. 86 (1994); Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993); Frank v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 298, 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1038, 113 S.Ct. 825 (1992); Small v. Secretary of Health Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989); Wesolek v. Canadair Ltd., 838 F.2d 55, 57-59 (2d Cir. 1988); McCarthy v.Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1983); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a), 6(e).

Copies to: Berton Saint-Fleur Charles F. Sanders, Esq. Judge William H. Pauley, III