DURHAM, J.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The order of the Workers' Compensation Board is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the Board for further proceedings.

Graber, J., concurred in part and dissented in part and filed an opinion in which Carson, C.J., and Gillette, J., joined.

This workers' compensation case presents two issues: (1) When the three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals issued a majority opinion, a concurring opinion, and a dissenting opinion, did that court comply with ORS 2.570 (4), which requires the "concurrence of two judges * * * to pronounce judgment"? (2) Does ORS 656.386 (1), set out below, allow an award of attorney fees when an employer or insurer denies a claim for medical services, but does not deny expressly the compensability of, or its responsibility for, the claimant's injury or condition? We hold: (1) The Court of Appeals complied with ORS 2.570 (4); and (2) ORS 656.386 (1) allows an award of attorney fees when an employer or insurer denies a claim for medical services, but does not deny expressly the compensability of, or its responsibility for, the claimant's injury or condition.

Claimant injured her back in 1988 while employed at a restaurant. Her employer's insurer, Safeco, accepted her workers' compensation claim for the injury.

In 1989, claimant went to work for a different restaurant, which was insured by SAIF Corporation (SAIF). Thereafter, claimant experienced back pain and neck pain. She filed an aggravation claim with Safeco and a new injury claim with SAIF.

The insurers agreed that claimant's 1989 injury was compensable but disagreed as to responsibility. In 1990, a workers' compensation referee held that Safeco remained responsible for claimant's lower back condition, but that SAIF was responsible for her upper back and neck condition. That order was not appealed.

Meanwhile, claimant had moved to Rhode Island. She submitted various medical bills to SAIF from providers in Rhode Island. SAIF paid some bills but not others.

Claimant's lawyer wrote a letter to SAIF on March 14, 1991, asking SAIF to pay four unpaid bills that SAIF had received on October 31, 1990. After making adjustments for charges that SAIF contended were excessive under Oregon's workers' compensation medical fee schedule and for charges related to claimant's back condition for which Safeco was responsible, SAIF paid one of the bills on May 1, 1991, and two more on May 3, 1991.

On July 25, 1991, claimant filed a form Request for Hearing and checked the following boxes on the form:

"REQUEST IS MADE FOR A HEARING CONCERNING ONE OR MORE OF THE REASONS CHECKED BELOW:

"* * * * *

"H X MEDICAL SERVICES ORS 656.245

"* * * * *

"Q X OTHER — EXPLAIN AND CITE ORS[.] Failure to pay medical bills; penalties and attorney fees pursuant to ORS 656.262 (10), 656.268, 656.382."

Claimant did not check the boxes relating to "DENIAL," "COMPENSABILITY," or "AGGRAVATION."

SAIF filed a form Response to Request for Hearing. In it, SAIF erroneously stated that "[t]he medical bills have been paid on a timely basis." SAIF also checked the box on the form stating that "[t]here is no known basis for an award of penalties/attorney fees." SAIF did not check the box asserting that a denial should be affirmed or any other box relating to entitlement to compensation.

In fact, one bill remained unpaid at the time SAIF filed its response. With respect to that bill, SAIF contended that thermography was not reimbursable without prior authorization. Nonetheless, after making adjustments for allegedly excessive charges, SAIF paid the fourth and last medical bill on September 23, 1991.

The referee convened a hearing to determine whether claimant was entitled to an attorney fee under ORS 656.386 (1), because her attorney was instrumental in obtaining compensation for claimant before the hearing. The referee awarded claimant an attorney fee under the third sentence of ORS 656.386 (1), "for her efforts in obtaining payment of medical bills." The referee found: "It is doubtful that the bills would have been paid if it had not been for claimant's attorney's efforts."

SAIF appealed the attorney fee award to the Workers' Compensation Board (Board). The Board affirmed.

SAIF then sought judicial review. The Court of Appeals reversed the award of attorney fees under ORS 656.386 (1). SAIF v. Allen, 124 Or. App. 183, 861 P.2d 1018 (1993). The court held that "[a] claimant is entitled to attorney fees under ORS 656.386 (1) only in an appeal `from an order or decision denying the claim for compensation.'" 124 Or App at 185 (quoting Shoulders v. SAIF, 300 Or. 606, 611, 716 P.2d 751 (1986)). The court explained that, "`where the only compensation issue on appeal is the amount of compensation or the extent of disability[,] * * * ORS 656.386 (1) is not the applicable attorney fee statute.'" Id. at 186 (quoting Short v. SAIF, 305 Or. 541, 545, 754 P.2d 575 (1988)).

Judge De Muniz concurred, because, in his view, "the Supreme Court has indicated that an insurer's failure to timely respond to a claim for compensation may not be construed as a de facto denial." Id. at 187. He also said:

"[T]he Supreme Court has indicated that `[a]n insurer's failure to respond to a claim [as required by ORS 656.262 (6)] is neither acceptance [n]or denial.' Johnson v. Spectra Physics, 303 Or. 49, 58, 733 P.2d 1367 (1987). The issue in that case was whether an insurer's inaction could be construed as acceptance of a claim. The conclusion that inaction does not constitute denial is therefore dictum. I question whether the Supreme Court really intended claimants to languish while insurers failed to obey the law that requires them to accept or deny claims in a timely fashion." Id. at 189 (emphasis in original).

He also said:

"In my view, an insurer's failure to timely accept or deny a claim ought to be considered a denial, and that should entitle the claimant to attorney fees under ORS 656.386 (1) * * *." Id. at 187.

Judge Rossman dissented. He asserted that ORS 656.386 (1) provides for insurer-paid attorney fees whenever the lawyer is instrumental in obtaining compensation. Id. at 189-90.

Claimant petitioned for review. We allowed the petition and reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Claimant's first contention is that the majority opinion and the concurring opinion in the Court of Appeals do not, taken together, satisfy ORS 2.570 (4). That statute provides, in part:

"The presence of three judges is necessary to transact business in any department [of the Court of Appeals], except such business as may be transacted in chambers by any judge. The concurrence of two judges is necessary to pronounce judgment."

In interpreting a statute, the court's task is to determine the intent of the legislature. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610-11, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). The starting points in that determination are the text and context of the statute; the latter includes related statutes on the same subject. Words of common usage typically should be given their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning. Ibid.

The text of ORS 2.570 (4) suggests that "concurrence" is required only as to the result reached in a case and not as to the reasoning leading to that result, because it describes the limited purpose for which "concurrence" is required: it is "necessary to pronounce judgment." The term "concurrence" is not defined in the pertinent statutes. "Concurrence" generally means "agreement or union in action"; "agreement in opinion: union in design"; "CONSENT." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 472 (unabridged ed 1993). See also Black's Law Dictionary 291 (6th ed 1990) (same). The term "concurrent" is defined, in part, as "marked by accord, agreement, harmony, or similarity in effect or tendency." Webster's, supra, at 472 (emphasis added). Those ordinary meanings of "concurrence" support the inference stated above.

The context of the provision — another subsection of the same statute relating to operation of the Court of Appeals — also supports that inference. ORS 2.570 (6) provides, in part:

"When the [C]ourt [of Appeals] sits in banc, the concurrence of a majority of the judges participating is necessary to pronounce judgment, but if the judges participating are equally divided in their view as to the judgment to be given, the judgment appealed from shall be affirmed." (Emphasis added.)

In that sentence, the word "concurrence" and the phrase "view as to the judgment to be given" are used interchangeably. In turn, the "judgment" of the Court of Appeals is the final determination of that court as to the rights and obligations of the parties — that is, the result. Cf. ORCP 67 A (as used in the rules of civil procedure, a judgment is "the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action").

We conclude that ORS 2.570 (4) requires only that two judges of a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals concur in, that is, agree to, the result. Agreement as to the reasons leading to that result is not required.

Here, two judges agreed to the result, that is, concurred in the judgment. That being so, the Court of Appeals complied with ORS 2.570 (4).

We turn next to the parties' dispute concerning ORS 656.386 (1), the statute under which claimant seeks fees in this case. In workers' compensation cases, an award of attorney fees can be made only pursuant to statutory authorization. Forney v. Western States Plywood, 297 Or. 628, 632, 686 P.2d 1027 (1984); SAIF v. Curry, 297 Or. 504, 510-11, 686 P.2d 363 (1984).

ORS 656.386 (1) provides:

"In all cases involving accidental injuries where a claimant finally prevails in an appeal to the Court of Appeals or petition for review to the Supreme Court from an order or decision denying the claim for compensation, the court shall allow a reasonable attorney fee to the claimant's attorney. In such rejected cases where the claimant prevails finally in a hearing before the referee or in a review by the board itself, then the referee or board shall allow a reasonable attorney fee. If an attorney is instrumental in obtaining compensation for a claimant and a hearing by the referee is not held, a reasonable attorney fee shall be allowed. Attorney fees provided for in this section shall be paid by the insurer or self-insured employer."

Again, in interpreting a statute, the court's task is to discern the intent of the legislature. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, supra, 317 Or at 610. The best evidence of the legislature's intent is the text of the statute. Id. at 610-11. Also, at the first level of analysis, the court considers the context of the statutory provision at issue, including other provisions of the same statute and other statutes relating to the same subject. Ibid. If the intent of the legislature is not clear from the text and context, the court considers the legislative history of the statute. Id. at 611-12.

Claimant, the referee, and the Board relied on the third sentence of ORS 656.386 (1) — providing for fees when no hearing is held — to support the fee award in this case. The Legislative Assembly added that sentence to the statute in 1991. Or Laws 1991, ch 312, § 1. This court has not previously construed that sentence.

We first analyze the text of the relevant statutes. The third sentence of ORS 686.386 (1) requires an attorney fee award "[i]f an attorney is instrumental in obtaining compensation for a claimant and a hearing by the referee is not held." The parties assume that the right to fees created by that sentence is predicated on the existence of a "claim for compensation," which is a phrase that appears in the statute's first sentence. We agree. The term "claimant" in the third sentence of ORS 656.386 (1) indicates that a "claim" is a prerequisite to the recovery of a fee award. ORS 656.005 (6) provides:

"`Claim' means a written request for compensation from a subject worker or someone on the worker's behalf, or any compensable injury of which a subject employer has notice or knowledge." (Emphasis added.)

ORS 656.005 (8) provides:

"`Compensation' includes all benefits, including medical services, provided for a compensable injury to a subject worker or the worker's beneficiaries by an insurer or self-insured employer pursuant to this chapter." (Emphasis added.)

The term "claim" is defined in the disjunctive to refer to either "a written request for compensation," which includes a request for medical services, ORS 656.005 (8), or any compensable injury." The text indicates that the phrase claim for compensation" refers equally to a written request for medical services and to any compensable injury of which an employer has notice or knowledge.

Insurer makes two arguments in support of its view that the phrase "denying the claim for compensation" in the first sentence refers to denial of a condition or injury, but not to denial of a written request for medical services. First, it claims that the use of the article "the" in the phrase "the claim for compensation" is a reference to the sentence's introductory phrase, "[i]n all cases involving accidental injuries." Insurer argues that the article "the" was intended to indicate that the claim that the insurer denies must concern the compensability of an injury. Claimant responds that insurer's argument ignores the fact that "cases involving accidental injuries," ORS 656.386 (1), commonly involve both kinds of claims listed in the definition of "claim" in ORS 656.005 (6). We agree with that proposition. She also argues that insurer's argument is not supported by the legislative history behind the insertion of the article "the" in ORS 656.386 (1).

Nothing in the text or context of ORS 656.386 (1) explains why the article "the" appears in the phrase under consideration. Because the intention of the legislature in using the article "the" in that phrase is not clear, we resort to the legislative history behind that word. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, supra, 317 Or at 611. Prior to 1981, ORS 656.386 (1) referred to "his claim for compensation." In 1981, the legislature changed that phrasing to the present form in an effort to employ gender neutral terminology. Or Laws 1981, ch 854, § 25. We find no evidence, and the parties offer none, to suggest that the legislature used the article "the" in this context to exclude from the fee statute any claim that is a "claim for compensation," within the statutory definitions of those terms.

Insurer also argues that other statutes recognize the distinction between a dispute over the compensability of an injury and one over the level of benefits owed on a compensable injury. It cites ORS 656.245 (1)(a) and argues that a denial of a claim for medical services may, but need not, include a dispute over the compensability of the injury.

The distinction between a dispute over the compensability of an injury or condition and a dispute over the amount of a claimant's benefits is a familiar one. However, we fail to see how the existence of that distinction supports insurer's argument. The legislature has shown that it can draft statutes to address the denial of particular kinds of claims for compensation when that is its intention. For example, ORS 656.245 (2) provides:

"When the time for submitting a claim under ORS 656.273 has expired, any claim for medical services referred to in this section shall be submitted to the insurer or self-insured employer. If the claim for medical services is denied, the worker may submit to the board a request for hearing pursuant to ORS 656.283. In the event the worker cannot locate the insurer or self-insured employer, if the worker does not know who the insurer or self-insured employer is, or if the insurer or self-insured employer has ceased to exist, the claim shall be submitted to the director." (Emphasis added.)

The legislature made no similar effort to confine ORS 656.386 (1) to claims in which the insurer or employer disputes the compensability of an injury or condition. We assume that the legislature's choice of terminology in the fee statute was purposeful. That assumption is particularly relevant here because, in the fee statute, the legislature used terms that it specially defined in ORS 656.005 (6) and (8).

We are bound to follow the legislature's special definitions of terms used in the Workers' Compensation Law. ORS 656.003 provides:

"Except where the context otherwise requires, the definitions given in this chapter govern its construction."

In Astleford v. SAIF, 319 Or. 225, 233, 874 P.2d 1329 (1994), the court held that ORS 656.003 calls for use of the definitions specified in ORS chapter 656 unless

"the context — including the structure and purpose of the workers' compensation scheme as a whole — demonstrates that the use of that given definition would be inappropriate, because the result of such use would conflict with one or more aspects of that structure or purpose."

Applying the Astleford standard, we find nothing in the context of ORS 656.386 (1) that requires that we apply definitions of the terms "claim" and "compensation" that are different than those specified by ORS 656.005 (6) and (8). Insurer's argument amounts to a request that we judicially nullify one-half of the definition of "claim" in ORS 656.005 (6). We cannot do that. Under those definitions, a claim for medical benefits is a "claim for compensation" under ORS 656.386 (1).

Insurer argues that claimant's reading of the statute renders ORS 656.386 (2) superfluous. That statute provides:

"In all other cases attorney fees shall continue to be paid from the claimant's award of compensation except as otherwise provided in ORS 656.382."

We disagree. ORS 656.386 (2) would still control the payment of attorney fees in cases in which the referee awards additional compensation for permanent partial disability under ORS 656.214 and 656.216. See OAR 438-15-040 (1). We do not purport to list all potential cases in which ORS 656.386 (2) would control payment of fees. We note only that the example that we cite establishes that claimant's reading of ORS 656.386 (1) does not render ORS 656.386 (2) superfluous.

Insurer also argues that this court's cases have limited the phrase "denying the claim for compensation" in ORS 656.386 (1) to disputes over the compensability of an injury or condition and have excluded disputes over the amount of benefits. Claimant disagrees and argues that, even under the cases on which insurer relies, this claim qualifies for a fee award under ORS 656.386 (1). Because the latter assertion, if correct, would dispose of insurer's argument, we address it first. In doing so, we are mindful that our authoritative interpretations of a statute implicate the rule of stare decisis and become a part of the statute as if written into it at the time of enactment. Stephens v. Bohlman, 314 Or. 344, 350 n 6, 838 P.2d 600 (1992). We also are aware that this court has declined to apply the doctrine of stare decisis to dictum in earlier statutory construction cases. See Cutright v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 299 Or. 290, 301, 702 P.2d 403 (1985) (court declined to rely on dictum that was a "questionable pronouncement" in an earlier case about the meaning of a repealed workers' compensation statute); Safeway Stores v. State Bd. of Agriculture, 198 Or. 43, 81, 255 P.2d 564 (1953) (dictum in prior cases construing a statute is "not within the doctrine of stare decisis").

Several cases cited by insurer do not address or decide the issue whether a denied claim for medical services, unaccompanied by a challenge to the compensability of the injury or condition, is a denied claim for compensation under ORS 656.386 (1). Peterson v. Compensation Dept., 257 Or. 369, 477 P.2d 216 (1971), held that the claimant was not entitled to fees, because he had not prevailed over the employer's denial. Instead, he had won only the right to a hearing on his claim. In Cavins v. SAIF, 272 Or. 162, 536 P.2d 426 (1975), the insurer denied a claim for medical services on the ground that it was unrelated to work. The court held that a medical services claim was a "claim for compensation" within the meaning of ORS 656.386 (1) and that employer's assertion that the services were unrelated to a work injury was a denial that fell within the ambit of the statute. Ohlig v. FMC Marine Rail Equipment, 291 Or. 586, 633 P.2d 1279 (1981), followed Cavins in holding that a lawyer's request for disability and medical services for a client's back condition was a claim for compensation and that the insurer's contention that the back condition was not caused by an injury at work was a denial of a claim for compensation under ORS 656.386 (1).

Insurer cites Shoulders v. SAIF, supra, which held that the claimant was not entitled to fees under ORS 656.386 (1), because the insurer, not the claimant, initiated review by the Board from an order accepting the claim. The court said that the first sentence of ORS 656.386 (1)

"creates three prerequisites for attorney fees:

"1. Claimant must initiate the appeal, because neither an insurer nor an employer would appeal from an order or decision denying the claim for compensation;

"2. The decision must be from an order or decision denying, rather than allowing, the claim for compensation; and

"3. Claimant must finally prevail on the issue of compensation.

"* * * * *

"[T]he claimant must initiate the appeal and prevail on the compensability issue." 300 Or at 611-12 (emphasis added).

Insurer argues that the emphasized phrase means that the "claim for compensation" must concern the compensability of the claimant's condition rather than a claim for benefits. We disagree, because it appears that the emphasized phrase was an attempt to paraphrase the third prerequisite set forth above. None of the listed prerequisites is inconsistent with the Board's fee award here. We conclude that Shoulders v. SAIF does not aid insurer.

Insurer draws our attention to the following statement in Forney v. Western States Plywood, supra:

"Claimant's only claim was for the amount of compensation due on her aggravation claim. Where responsibility is not an issue and the only question is the amount of compensation due, ordinarily attorney fees are not authorized under ORS 656.386 (1) and can only be recoverable from the award under ORS 656.382 (2)." 297 Or at 632 (emphasis added).

Insurer also relies on this statement in Short v. SAIF, supra, 305 Or at 545:

"ORS 656.386 (1) provides for attorney fees on review of denied claims. The claimant did not appeal to the board or to the Court of Appeals from a decision denying her claim. Both the referee and the board concluded that claimant's condition was compensable. Where the only compensation issue on appeal is the amount of compensation or the extent of disability, rather than whether the claimant's condition was caused by an industrial injury, ORS 656.386 (1) is not the applicable attorney fee statute and the ORS 656.388 (2) route to the circuit court is not available." (Emphasis added.)

After analyzing the statements in Forney and Short, on which insurer relies, we conclude that, notwithstanding our concerns about whether they are correct, they are inapplicable here. They purport to apply "[w]here the only compensation issue on appeal is the amount of compensation or the extent of disability, rather than whether the claimant's condition was caused by an industrial injury." Short v. SAIF, supra, 305 Or at 545. As discussed below, we conclude that insurer's conduct was a claim denial and that the denial did not confine the issue to the amount of compensation or extent of disability. As a result, the cases on which insurer relies do not render ORS 656.386 (1) inapplicable to this claim.

We turn to the Board's conclusion that, on this record, insurer's response to the claim was a denial. Insurer argues that whether it accepted or denied a claim is a question of fact and that its conduct here is not a denial, de facto or otherwise.

ORS 656.262 (6) provides, in part:

"Written notice of acceptance or denial of the claim shall be furnished to the claimant by the insurer or self-insured employer within 90 days after the employer has notice or knowledge of the claim."

The Board has adopted OAR 436-60-140 (3), which restates the substance of the first sentence of ORS 656.262 (6). The rule provides:

"The insurer shall give the claimant written notice of acceptance or denial of a claim within ninety (90) days of the employer's notice or knowledge of a claim."

Insurer did not give the notice required by the statute and rule. Instead, it paid some bills, but not others. When claimant requested a hearing on the unpaid bills, insurer responded in writing that the "medical bills have been paid on a timely basis." That statement was not correct. The Board concluded that insurer had denied the claim:

"SAIF contends, on review, that this case involves untimely processing, rather than a denial or a `de facto' denial of medical services. However, we find that at least one of claimant's medical services claims was in `de facto' denied status at the time claimant requested a hearing, as SAIF had not accepted or denied the claim within 90 days of notice or knowledge of the claim. ORS 656.262 (6). Moreover, SAIF had previously paid several of claimant's medical services bills but we find no indication in the record that SAIF intended to pay claimant's last bill. Rather, SAIF's August 30, 1991 response to claimant's request for hearing stated that claimant's `medical bills have been paid on a timely basis.'"

The Board's determination that insurer's response to the claim is a denial within the meaning of ORS 656.262 (6) is a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact. Accordingly, we review the Board's conclusion for error of law.

No statute or rule cited by the parties or discovered by us defines "denial" for purposes of ORS 656.262 (6). In reviewing the Board's construction and application of the term "denial," we follow the methodology described in Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., 290 Or. 217, 233, 621 P.2d 547 (1980). See England v. Thunderbird, 315 Or. 633, 638, 848 P.2d 100 (1993) (applying Springfield analysis to statutory term "earning capacity"); Tee v. Albertson's, Inc., 314 Or. 633, 637, 842 P.2d 374 (1992) (applying Springfield analysis to statutory term "gainful occupation").

In Springfield, this court recognized three categories of statutory terms: exact terms, inexact terms, and delegative terms. The term "denial" in ORS 656.262 (6) is an inexact term, which means that "the legislature has expressed its meaning completely, but that meaning remains to be spelled out in the agency's rule or order." England v. Thunderbird, supra, 315 Or at 638. England v. Thunderbird, supra, also states:

"An inexact term gives the agency interpretive but not legislative responsibility. See Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., supra, 290 Or at 233 (so holding for terms `employment relations' and `conditions of employment'). With respect to an inexact term, the role of the court is to determine whether the agency `erroneously interpreted a provision of law,' ORS 183.482 (8)(a), and the ultimate interpretive responsibility lies with the court in its role as the arbiter of questions of law. Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., supra, 290 Or at 234." Id.

In addressing whether the Board erroneously interpreted ORS 656.262 (6), the dispositive question of law on review, under ORS 183.482 (8)(a), is

"whether the agency action is within the legislative policy which inheres in the statutory term. An agency interpretation may be given an appropriate degree of assumptive validity if the agency was involved in the legislative process or if we infer that it has expertise based upon qualifications of its personnel or because of its experience in the application of the statute to varying facts. Judicial deference, however, is not automatic or unreasoning. If a statute must be interpreted to determine its applicability to the facts of a contested case, then, it is necessary for the agency to express in its order, to the degree appropriate to the magnitude or complexity of the contested case, its reasoning demonstrating the tendency of the order to advance the policy embodied in the words of the statute. Explicit reasoning will enable the court on judicial review to give an appropriate degree of credence to the agency interpretation." Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., supra, 290 Or at 227-28.

We must interpret ORS 656.262 (6) in order to decide whether the Board's action "coincides with the legislative policy which inheres in the meaning of the statute." Id. at 228.

In construing the statute, the legislature's words are the best evidence of its intention. Ordinarily, we give words of common usage their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, supra, 317 Or at 611. The dictionary defines the word "denial" as follows:

"1. refusal to grant, assent to, or sanction: rejection of something requested, claimed, or felt to be due * * * 2a. refusal to admit the truth of a statement, charge, or imputation * * *." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 602 (unabridged 1993).

We also consider, at the first level of analysis, the context of the statutory provision at issue, including other provisions of the same statute. ORS 656.262 (1), (2), (8), (9), and (10)(a) provide:

"(1) Processing of claims and providing compensation for a worker shall be the responsibility of the insurer or self-insured employer. All employers shall assist their insurers in processing claims as required in this chapter.

"(2) The compensation due under this chapter shall be paid periodically, promptly and directly to the person entitled thereto upon the employer's receiving notice or knowledge of a claim, except where the right to compensation is denied by the insurer or self-insured employer.

"* * * * *

"(8) If an insurer or any other duly authorized agent of the employer for such purpose, on record with the Director of the Department of Consumer and Business Services denies a claim for compensation, written notice of such denial, stating the reason for the denial, and informing the worker of the Expedited Claim Service and of hearing rights under ORS 656.283, shall be given to the claimant. A copy of the notice of denial shall be mailed to the director and to the employer by the insurer. The worker may request a hearing pursuant to ORS 656.319.

"(9) Merely paying or providing compensation shall not be considered acceptance of a claim or an admission of liability, nor shall mere acceptance of such compensation be considered a waiver of the right to question the amount thereof.

"(10)(a) If the insurer or self-insured employer unreasonably delays or unreasonably refuses to pay compensation, or unreasonably delays acceptance or denial of a claim, the insurer or self-insured employer shall be liable for an additional amount up to 25 percent of the amounts then due. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the director shall have exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings regarding solely the assessment and payment of the additional amount described in this subsection. The entire additional amount shall be paid to the worker if the worker is not represented by an attorney. If the worker is represented by an attorney, the worker shall be paid one-half the additional amount and the worker's attorney shall receive one-half the additional amount, in lieu of an attorney fee. The director's action and review thereof shall be subject to ORS 183.310 to 183.550 and such other procedural rules as the director may prescribe."

In the text of ORS 656.262 (6), the legislature has afforded two options to an insurer who receives notice or knowledge of a claim for compensation. The insurer may accept or deny the claim. The text does not provide the insurer with the option to take no position on acceptance or denial of the claim. The text supports the Board's conclusion that insurer's conduct was a denial.

The context of ORS 656.262 (6) also supports the Board's result. ORS 656.262 (1) makes the insurer or self-insured employer responsible for "[p]rocessing of claims and providing compensation for a worker." ORS 656.262 (2) obligates the insurer or employer to pay compensation due under the law "to the person entitled thereto upon the employer's receiving notice or knowledge of a claim, except where the right to compensation is denied by the insurer or self-insured employer." (Emphasis added.) ORS 656.262 (6) promotes certainty and promptness in the execution of those responsibilities by requiring the insurer to provide

"[w]ritten notice of acceptance or denial of the claim * * * within 90 days after the employer has notice or knowledge of the claim."

ORS 656.262 (8) requires the insurer to include in the written notice the reason for the denial and information about the claimant's hearing rights under ORS 656.283. The insurer must give the notice of denial to the claimant and mail copies to the employer and the Director of the Department of Consumer and Business Services.

The notice of a denial is a key procedural component of the claim adjudication system. ORS 656.262 (8) entitles a claimant who receives notice of a denial to request a hearing under ORS 656.283. The claimant or the director must request a hearing within the time limits specified in ORS 656.319. Because the notice of denial includes the insurer's reasons for the denial, it enables the claimant, the Board, and the director to determine the scope of any disputed issues and the proper forum for resolution of those issues. For example, an insurer's assertion that the underlying injury or condition is not related to work would ordinarily lead to a hearing under ORS 656.283 (1). A denial of vocational assistance requires the dissatisfied claimant to apply to the director for administrative review under ORS 656.283 (2). A denial that raises an issue of responsibility covered by ORS 656.307 (1) requires the director to designate who shall pay the claim. In these examples, and probably others, compliance by insurers with the statutory duty to provide timely written notice of a denial furnishes important information to affected parties, the Board, and director that permits them to guide the dispute to the proper decision-making body within the compensation system, narrows the issues on which the parties must prepare for litigation, and expedites disposition of claims through hearing or settlement. The legislature underscored the importance of compliance by making an insurer liable to the worker for an additional amount of money if the insurer "unreasonably delays acceptance or denial of a claim." ORS 656.262 (10)(a).

Insurer's argument, that it merely was late in paying bills, disregards its statutory obligation to furnish written notice of acceptance or denial of a claim within 90 days. ORS 656.262 (6). That argument also ignores the importance to the claim adjudication process of an insurer's compliance with that obligation. Without question, the Board has significant experience in applying procedural statutes, such as ORS 656.262 (6), to claim proceedings before it, and knows the deleterious effects that can result to the administrative scheme when an insurer disregards its duty to timely accept or deny a claim.

With those considerations in mind, we turn to the Board's conclusion that insurer denied this claim. The Board applied the term "de facto denial" to insurer's failure to accept or deny the claim within 90 days, as required by ORS 656.262 (6). The Board's application of the statute coincides with the legislative policy, embodied in the statute, to compel insurers to timely declare whether they accept or deny claims. The Board's construction of the statute tends to advance the legislature's generally expressed policies promoting the prompt delivery of medical benefits and compensation to injured workers, and a fair and just administrative system that reduces litigation and eliminates the adversary nature of compensation proceedings to the greatest extent practicable. ORS 656.012 (2)(a)-(c).

The Board also drew attention to insurer's response to the request for a hearing, in which insurer said that claimant's "medical bills have been paid on a timely basis." The Board was entitled to construe that statement as a denial because, in context, it asserted that claimant was not entitled to anything on his claim for unpaid medical bills.

Insurer relies on Johnson v. Spectra Physics, supra, but that case does not aid insurer. The issue in Johnson was whether an insurer's notice or knowledge of a condition, coupled with the passage of 60 days, ORS 656.262 (6), could serve as an acceptance of the condition under the rule in Bauman v. SAIF, 295 Or. 788, 790, 670 P.2d 1027 (1983). This court held that it could not, because

"an insurer's silence regarding one aspect of a claim is neither acceptance nor denial of that aspect of the claim. Silence is neutral. One could argue that if an insurer's silence regarding a condition implies anything, it would imply denial, not acceptance." Johnson v. Spectra Physics, supra, 303 Or at 55.

That passage is inapplicable here. Johnson concerned the requirements for an acceptance to trigger the application of the Bauman backup denial rule. It did not concern the requirements for a denial of a claim for compensation, as in this case. For that reason, the statement in Johnson about whether an insurer's silence can constitute a denial is dictum. We do note that the Board's result here carries the import of this court's last sentence in Johnson, quoted above, to its logical conclusion. Furthermore, unlike in Johnson, the issue here did not concern only the effect of insurer's silence in response to a claim.

The Board's conclusion that insurer denied the claim is supported by the text and context of ORS 656.262 (6) and is consistent with the legislative policy exemplified by that statute, the other statutes cited above that concern claim adjudication, and the legislature's generally expressed objectives for the Workers' Compensation Law. Because the Board's action is within the legislative policy behind ORS 656.262 (6), the Board did not err. Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., supra, 290 Or at 227.

The parties dispute the effect of insurer's denial for purposes of ORS 656.386 (1). Insurer argues that it never asserted that it was refusing to pay the medical bills because of a decision not to pay them or because it intended to challenge the compensability of claimant's injury. Claimant responds that insurer failed to timely accept or deny the claim, as required by law, and failed to make clear that it was not going to contest the compensability of claimant's injury. She argues that insurer's conduct left it free to contest all aspects of the claim, including the compensability of the injury for which she sought medical services. Insurer acknowledges that a benefit claim is an opportunity for an insurer to deny the injury or condition for which the claimant seeks benefits but argues that, unless the insurer refuses payment on the basis that the condition is not compensable, there is no denial within the meaning of ORS 656.386 (1).

We addressed a similar argument from an insurer in the Ohlig case and rejected it. In Ohlig, the insurer accepted an ankle injury in 1975. Two years later, the claimant's lawyer submitted a request for surgery for a back condition, asserting that it was connected to the 1975 injury. 291 Or at 588-89. A Board administrative rule, OAR 436-83-125, provided, in part:

"Every notice of partial denial shall set forth with particularity the injury or condition for which responsibility is denied and the factual and legal reasons therefor. The notice shall be in the form provided for in [OAR 436-]83-120. Hearing and appeal rights and procedures shall be as provided for claim denials in ORS 656.262(6) and (7), 656.319 and these Rules."

In violation of the rule, the insurer gave no notice of a denial of the back condition and the factual and legal reasons therefor. When the claimant prevailed on the back claim and sought attorney fees under ORS 656.386 (1), the insurer asserted that the statute was inapplicable, because it had never denied the back condition in writing and had accepted the ankle condition in writing. This court rejected that argument, and the court's analysis of the effect of the insurer's failure to make clear its reason for denying the back condition is relevant here. This court said:

"The statutes to which reference is made in the [administrative] rule concern the denial of claims and the procedure for a claimant to contest a denial. The reference to OAR 436-83-120 refers to the Board rule which fleshes out statutory duties of employers who would deny claims.

"The employer here failed to follow the administrative rule despite the fact the worker's lawyer filed a claim for the back condition and the employer refused to accept responsibility for that condition. * * * Certainly the employer should be in no better position for failure to give the written notice of denial required by the rule than would have been the case had there been compliance." Ohlig v. FMC Marine Rail Equipment, supra, 291 Or at 597 (emphasis added).

Following that reasoning, we decline to allow insurer to take advantage of its unlawful failure to timely accept or deny the claim. Unless an insurer makes clear that its denial does not dispute the compensability of the injury or condition, the claimant remains subject to a statutory burden to prove that the injury is compensable. ORS 656.266. Late payment of the medical bills did not operate to accept the claim or admit liability. ORS 656.262 (9). In the light of the policy underlying ORS 656.262 (6), permitting insurer to profit from its ambivalence concerning the basis for its refusal to pay the claim would, in the words of this court in Ohlig,

"elevate form over substance and involve the worker's compensation system in semantic gymnastics." Id. at 595.

Because compensability was not conceded by insurer's denial here, it remained a contested issue. It follows from the foregoing that insurer's denial did not confine the issue on the claim to the amount of compensation or the extent of disability, rather than the compensability of claimant's injury or condition, within the meaning of the statements quoted above in Forney v. Western States Plywood and SAIF v. Short. Insurer does not argue that the Board erred in concluding that claimant's counsel was instrumental in obtaining compensation, within the meaning of ORS 656.386 (1). We conclude that the lawyer was instrumental in obtaining compensation and overcame a denied claim for compensation, within the meaning of ORS 656.386 (1), in doing so.

Finally, insurer contends that the Board erred in awarding a fee under ORS 656.386 (1), because insurer's conduct amounts to unreasonable delay in paying compensation, for which claimant's lawyer can receive only one-half of a penalty under ORS 656.262 (10), in lieu of an attorney fee. ORS 656.262 (10) provides:

"(a) If the insurer or self-insured employer unreasonably delays or unreasonably refuses to pay compensation, or unreasonably delays acceptance or denial of a claim, the insurer or self-insured employer shall be liable for an additional amount up to 25 percent of the amounts then due. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the director shall have exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings regarding solely the assessment and payment of the additional amount described in this subsection. The entire additional amount shall be paid to the worker if the worker is not represented by an attorney. If the worker is represented by an attorney, the worker shall be paid one-half the additional amount and the worker's attorney shall receive one-half the additional amount, in lieu of an attorney fee. The director's action and review thereof shall be subject to ORS 183.310 to 183.550 and such other procedural rules as the director may prescribe.

"(b) When the director does not have exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings regarding the assessment and payment of the additional amount described in this subsection, the provision for attorney fees provided in this subsection shall apply in the other proceeding."

The text of ORS 656.262 (10) and 656.386 (1) indicates that those statutes address distinct subjects. ORS 656.386 (1) requires a reasonable attorney fee award when a claimant prevails over a denial of a claim for compensation, either on judicial or administrative review, or if the lawyer is instrumental in obtaining compensation prior to a hearing. ORS 656.262 (10) makes an insurer or self-insured employer liable for a penalty if those parties unreasonably delay or unreasonably refuse to pay compensation, or unreasonably delay acceptance or denial of a claim. If a represented worker seeks a penalty for one of those unreasonable acts, the lawyer receives one-half of the additional penalty "in lieu of an attorney fee." ORS 656.262 (10)(a).

The Board awarded a reasonable attorney fee under ORS 656.386 (1), because claimant's lawyer was instrumental in obtaining compensation prior to a hearing. Claimant did not seek that fee as a sanction for an unreasonable delay in paying compensation, or an unreasonable delay in acceptance or denial of his claim. It appears, under our examination of the text of the two statutes, that the claim for reasonable attorney fees is unrelated to the phrase "in lieu of an attorney fee" in ORS 656.262 (10)(a). Although that reading appears to be the most reasonable construction of the statutes, the legislative intention is not clear. Accordingly, we proceed to an examination of the legislative history behind the two statutes.

The legislature added the third sentence to ORS 656.386 (1) in 1991 to permit recovery of a fee where the insurer denies the claim, but agrees to pay compensation prior to hearing. The legislature intended the amendment to reverse the holding of Jones v. OSCI, 107 Or. App. 78, 810 P.2d 1318, mod 108 Or. App. 230, 814 P.2d 558 (1991), which ruled that under the former version of ORS 656.386 (1), the claimant does not prevail in the hearing if the insurer agrees to pay compensation, even on the eve of the hearing. Or Laws 1991, ch 312, § 1; see Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Labor (SB 540), March 20, 1991, (testimony of Chris Moore) Tape 40, Side A; Tape Recording, Senate Floor Debate, March 27, 1991, (statement of Senator Grattan Kerans) Tape 50, Side A; Tape Recording, House Committee on Labor, May 29, 1991, (remarks of Representative Kevin Mannix) Tape 154, Side B. Nothing in the legislative history behind the 1991 amendment to ORS 656.386 (1) suggests that it was linked to the subject of sanctions under ORS 656.262 (10)(a) for unreasonable insurer conduct.

The legislature added the words "in lieu of an attorney fee" to ORS 656.262 (10)(a) in 1990. Or Laws 1990 (Spec Sess), ch 2, § 15. Prior to the amendment, two statutes addressed the problem of an insurer's refusal or resistance to payment of compensation. At that time, ORS 656.382 (1) provided:

"If an insurer or self-insured employer refuses to pay compensation due under an order of a referee, board or court, or otherwise unreasonably resists the payment of compensation, the employer or insurer shall pay to the claimant or the attorney for the claimant a reasonable attorney fee as provided in subsection (2) of this section. To the extent an employer has caused the insurer to be charged such fees, such employer may be charged with those fees."

The other statute was ORS 656.262 (10).

As a result of those two statutes, claimants were entitled to both an attorney fee award under ORS 656.382 (1) and a sanction under ORS 656.262 (10) for similar unreasonable conduct by an insurer. To remedy the seeming overlap of those statutes, the legislature adopted the "in lieu of an attorney fee" wording in ORS 656.262 (10)(a) at the recommendation of a task force assembled by the Governor. The following is the only pertinent legislative history for the amendment to ORS 656.262 (10)(a) that we have discovered. Annette Talbott, legal counsel to the Joint Interim Special Committee on Workers' Compensation, explained the purpose of the amendment to a joint session of the legislature, as follows:

"This was an issue the Governor's group wanted to clarify, that in cases where there is a penalty, as described in subsection 10, for unreasonable delay or an unreasonable refusal to pay compensation, that the penalty that's spelled out in subsection 10 is the sole — and particularly in regard to the attorney fee — attorney fee which is one half of the additional amount is the sole attorney fee that will be awarded on this type of penalty, even if this issue is combined with other issues at the referee or the Board level." 1990 Joint Special Session, Committee on Workers' Compensation (SB 1197), May 4, 1990, (statement of Annette Talbott) Tape 20, Side B at 40.

After Ms. Talbott spoke, Representative Kevin Mannix made this statement:

"It says that if the worker wants to write a letter to the director to get a penalty, he can get it. If his attorney does it for him, the attorney gets half of the penalty instead of some add on fee. If the attorney throws in the penalty issue along with a bunch of other issues in a request for hearing, that that penalty issue doesn't lead to a separate attorney fee, but that half the penalty is the fee. And that's a policy question. You just answer it the way you think you ought to. And we all have our war stories. But I've seen the piggyback penalty and fee issue where the attorney fee, and, literally, in one of my cases, was $250 and the penalty was $7 to the worker. No other relief to the worker. I had another one that came down last week where the attorney fee was $300 and the penalty was $10.25. And I think that's ridiculous. That's my policy issue." 1990 Joint Special Session, Committee on Workers' Compensation (SB 1197), May 4, 1990, (remarks of Representative Kevin Mannix) Tape 20, Side B at 99.

The most plausible construction of those statements is that the amendment of ORS 656.262 (10) was designed to authorize the Board to award a penalty for unreasonable insurer conduct and to prevent the Board from awarding a separate attorney fee for the same unreasonable conduct. The history of the amendment does not indicate that the amendment was intended to nullify Board authority to award attorney fees under statutes that do not address penalties for unreasonable conduct. For example, ORS 656.386 (1) requires a fee award if the claimant prevails or obtains benefits on a claim for compensation. It has nothing to do with penalizing unreasonable insurer conduct. We think that such a significant change in the attorney fee scheme would be accompanied by legislative history demonstrating such an intention. However, the testimony regarding the amendment to ORS 656.262 (10)(a) does not discuss ORS 656.386 (1).

We conclude that the 1990 amendment to ORS 656.262 (10) was not intended to prevent the Board from awarding a reasonable attorney fee under ORS 656.386 (1). The 1991 amendment to the latter statute authorizes the Board to award a fee if the lawyer is instrumental in obtaining compensation prior to a hearing. A fee award under ORS 656.386 (1) is not subject to the "in lieu of an attorney fee" limitation in ORS 656.262 (10)(a).

To summarize, the claim for medical services was a "claim for compensation" within the meaning of ORS 656.386 (1) and the definitions in ORS 656.005 (6) and (8). The Board's conclusion that insurer denied the claim is not erroneous. The denial did not concede that the underlying injury was compensable and, for that reason, the amount of compensation was not the sole issue raised by the denial. Finally, the Board's authority to award a fee under ORS 656.386 (1) is not affected by ORS 656.262 (10)(a). The Board's order awarding an attorney fee under ORS 656.386 (1) was correct. If the Board order effects an inequitable result for insurers who fail to timely pay requests for medical services, that inequity must be corrected by the legislature, not by this court. Stovall v. Sally Salmon Seafood, 306 Or. 25, 39, 757 P.2d 410 (1988); Forney v. Western States Plywood, supra, 297 Or at 634.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The order of the Workers' Compensation Board is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the Board for further proceedings.