Summary
concluding that the defendants properly objected to an RFA asking them to admit that the curb ramp at issue was not compliant with federal accessibility design standards on the ground that it sought a purely legal conclusion
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Case No. 2:03-CV-1132.
January 19, 2006
OPINION AND ORDER
This is a disability discrimination action brought by Carl Reichenbach ("plaintiff"), purportedly on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, against the City of Columbus and Franklin County (collectively "defendants"), in connection with injuries he allegedly sustained when his wheelchair tipped over on a wheelchair ramp. Third Amended Complaint, at ¶ 9. Plaintiff asserts claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 12132 et seq. ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the laws of Ohio. Id., at ¶¶ 14-36. This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel Discovery and for Sanctions. Doc. No. 67. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 4, 2004, Plaintiff served upon defendants a second request for admissions, request for production of documents and interrogatories. Defendants objected to certain requests for admissions and interrogatories contending that certain requests and/or interrogatories called for legal conclusions and were therefore improper. Thus, plaintiff filed Plaintiff's First Motion to Compel and for Sanctions with the Court. Doc. No. 33. This Court denied plaintiff's motion to compel, concluding that the requests, as formulated, were "properly objectionable because they focus exclusively on legal questions and contain no factual components." Doc. No. 55, at 4.
On June 18, 2005, plaintiff served his fifth request for admissions, request for production of documents and interrogatories. In that request, plaintiff reformulated the questions that were the subject of Plaintiff's First Motion to Compel and for Sanctions. In response, defendants objected to certain requests for admission and interrogatories, contending, once again, that the request and/or question calls for a legal conclusion and is therefore improper. Thus, plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel and for Sanctions with the Court. Doc. No. 67. That motion is fully at issue and now before the Court.
II. STANDARD
Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows for a motion to compel discovery when a party fails to answer interrogatories submitted under Rule 33 or to provide proper response to requests for production of documents under Rule 34. Similarly, Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure addresses the remedy available when a party fails to provide a proper response to a request for admission. Rule 37(a) expressly provides that "an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response is to be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond." Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(3). The burden of proof falls on the objecting party to show in what respect the discovery requested is improper. Trane Co. v. Klutznick, 87 F.R.D. 473 (D.C. Wisc. 1980).
Rule 37 reads in pertinent part:
If . . . a party fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance with the request.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(2)(B).
Rule 36 provides in relevant part:
The party who has requested the admissions may move to determine the sufficiency of the answers or objections. Unless the court determines that an objection is justified, it shall order that an answer be served. If the court determines that an answer does not comply with the requirements of this rule, it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be served.
Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 36(a).
Discovery may relate to any matter that can be inquired into under Rule 26(b). Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(b); Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(a); Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a). Rule 26(b) authorizes discovery regarding any non-privileged matter relevant to the subject matter of the pending action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b). The information sought need not be admissible at trial so long as it appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Id. These discovery provisions are to be liberally construed. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964); Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 418 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1969).
III. APPLICATION
Requests for Admission Nos. 3 and 4 and Interrogatory Nos. 6 and 7 ask defendants to either admit that the curb ramp at issue was not compliant with current federal accessibility design standards or to state the basis of compliance. Defendants object to these requests on the basis that each seeks only a conclusion of law.
Rule 36(a) permits requests for admission that "relate to statements or opinions of fact or the application of law to fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a). However, "a request for admission which involves a pure matter of law, that is, requests for admissions of law which are related to the facts of the case, are considered inappropriate." Lakehead Pipe Line Company, Inc. v. American Home Assurance Co., 177 F.R.D. 454, 458 (D. Minn. 1997).
The challenged discovery requests ask if defendants are in compliance with 28 C.F.R. 35.150(d). That regulation requires that certain public entities develop a transition plan setting forth the steps necessary to achieve structural changes, such as curb ramps, as required by the ADA. Each plan must include specific elements and particular groups of individuals must be offered the opportunity to be involved in the development of the transition plan. See id. Plaintiff's requests make no reference to facts nor do they seek factual information. The requests, as currently formulated, seek only legal conclusions. These requests are therefore properly objectionable because, once again, they focus exclusively on legal questions and contain no factual components. WHEREUPON, Plaintiff's Second Motion to Compel and for Sanctions, Doc. No. 67, is DENIED.
Plaintiff might, for example, propound the following request for admission: Defendants adopted a transition plan within six months of January 26, 1992, as required by 28 C.F.R. 35.150(d)(1). Admit or deny.