Zarlengo, Mott & Zarlengo, John C. Mott, Denver, for defendant-appellee.

         COYTE, Judge.

         In this malpractice action, following a jury trial and verdict for defendant, the trial court granted plaintiff a new trial. Subsequently, plaintiff, upon motion, was granted permission to file an amended complaint and an answer to defendant's counterclaim for his fee and was granted a continuance. The amended complaint was filed, and defendant filed his answer on June 7, 1971. During the succeeding year, neither party took any action of record in the case.

         Thus, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 41(b)(2) and Denver District Court Rule 21, notice was sent to the attorneys of record on June 20, 1972, informing them that the case would be dismissed for lack of prosecution unless good cause was shown prior to July 21, 1972. On July 3, 1972, plaintiff's attorney filed an affidavit in opposition to dismissal of the action stating as his reasons therefor:

'1. That the case is being diligently pursued.

'2. That the matter is not presently set for trial but a Notice to Set for trial is being filed with the court at the same time as this Affidavit.'

         Following a hearing on July 12, 1972, and a subsequent rehearing of the matter, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion to remove the case from the operation of Rule 21 and the case was dismissed without prejudice.

         Plaintiff appeals this ruling of the trial court contending that it constituted an abuse of discretion, particularly in light of the fact that the statute of limitations had run. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

          The reason stated by plaintiff's attorney as justification for not dismissing the action constitutes a bare conclusion that is insufficient to establish why there had been no action during the preceding year. At the two hearings held by the court no facts were presented which would explain or justify the delay and lack of progress in the case for over a year. As observed by the trial court, this case could very well have gone on year after year if the notice under Rule 21 had not been served on the respective attorneys for the parties.

          Plaintiff argues that, by filing the notice to have the case set for trial before July 12th, he had taken action and that therefore the case was not subject to dismissal. The case became subject to dismissal on June 20, 1972, and the subsequent filing of the notice to set for trial did not operate to prevent dismissal of the action.

         The rule to be followed is well stated in Rudd v. Rogerson, 152 Colo. 370, 381 P.2d 995:

'It is a well established rule in Colorado that a trial court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute. Yampa Co. v. Velotta, 83 Colo. 235, 263 P. 717 (1928). This inherent power rests in the sound discretion of the trial court but it is not an unlimited authority. Where there are facts that serve as mitigating circumstances for the delay, they should be considered by the court and dismissal denied upon a proper showing.'

         Here there was no cause shown and no mitigating circumstances offered as a basis for not dismissing the action, and accordingly the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in dismissing the case.

          Plaintiff further argues that both parties had a duty to have the above case set for trial, which they both neglected to do, and that defendant should not be allowed to take advantage of his own lack of diligence. The action of the trial court applies equally to both parties to this proceeding. Defendant's counterclaim for services was also dismissed.

          The case was dismissed because of plaintiff's failure to show good and sufficient cause why it should not be dismissed. The fact that the dismissal may result in the barring of the action by the statute of limitations is only one factor to be considered by the trial court and does not prevent dismissal where there is no good and sufficient cause shown why it should not be dismissed in the first instance.

         Judgment affirmed.

         SILVERSTEIN, C.J., and PIERCE, J., concur.