OPINION

PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE.

The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant Nashville Electric Service in this lawsuit arising from an accident that occurred when an NES truck malfunctioned and came to a sudden stop on the interstate. Because NES conclusively demonstrated that no driver negligence caused the accident and resulting injury, and because the plaintiff failed to provide evidence disputing NES's evidence that it used reasonable care in its maintenance of the truck, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment.

This lawsuit arises from a traffic accident involving a truck owned by Nashville Electric Service ("NES") and operated by one of its employees, Jeffery Layhew. Because NES is a local governmental entity, its potential for liability is governed by the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act ("GTLA"). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-102(3)(A).

I. THE GTLA

The GTLA provides general immunity from suit for personal injury and property damage for governmental entities while acting in the exercise of their functions and duties "except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter." Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201. Two of those statutory exceptions are involved in this appeal: (1) negligent operation by an employee of a motor vehicle, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-202(a), and (2) negligent act or omission of any employee, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205.

When applied literally, the language of the statutory provisions ("immunity from suit . . . is removed") results in a cumbersome explanation of any analysis. Essentially, the statutes provide the governmental entity is immune if no negligence is shown. Thus, unlike other types of immunity that apply based on status or activity, GTLA immunity can be determined as to the specific statutory exceptions at issue in this case only after a determination is made as to negligence. That is what the legislature intended, and it instructed the courts as follows:

The court, before holding a governmental entity liable for damages, must first determine that the employee's or employees' acts were negligent and the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, that the employee or employees acted in the scope of their employment and that none of the exceptions listed in § 29-20-205 are applicable to the facts before the court.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-310(a). Because this case was decided below on summary judgment, the question is whether NES demonstrated it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the negligence issues. If so, it is immune from suit.

II. BACKGROUND

On January 22, 2001, Mr. Layhew was driving the NES truck on Interstate 40 in Davidson County on his way to a job site. Suddenly, the drive shaft of the truck became dislodged or broke apart, rupturing the airlines for the airbrakes, causing the airbrakes to engage and the truck to come to a sudden and complete stop in the roadway. Although truck parts or debris were seen coming from the bottom of the truck approximately a half mile before the truck's sudden stop, Mr. Layhew had no warning of the mechanical problem.

There were three vehicles behind the truck at the time. The first was a GMC pickup truck pulling a 15 foot trailer which was driven by Mr. Mark Nodini, who is not a party to the lawsuit. Mr. Nodini was able to bring his truck and trailer to a stop without hitting the NES truck.

The next vehicle was a truck driven by Terry Potts, the plaintiff in this lawsuit, and his son Jonathan was riding as a passenger. Mr. Potts also brought his truck to a complete stop. The third vehicle, a 2000 KIA sportage SUV driven by Jason Whinnery, did not stop and struck Mr. Pott's truck, propelling it into the back of the trailer on Mr. Nodini's truck. In turn, Mr. Nodini's truck struck the NES truck. That impact was slight enough that Mr. Layhew did not feel it and became aware of the collision of the four vehicles only after he got out of his truck.

Mr. Potts, on behalf of himself and as next friend on behalf of his son, brought suit against NES, Mr. Layhew, and Mr. Whinnery. Before us in this appeal is the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of NES.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment enjoys no presumption of correctness on appeal. Scott v. Ashland Healthcare Ctr., Inc., 49 S.W.3d 281, 284 (Tenn. 2001); Penley v. Honda Motor Co., 31 S.W.3d 181, 183 (Tenn. 2000). This court's role in reviewing the grant of summary judgment is to review the record and make a fresh determination of whether the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have been met. Staples v. CBL Associates, Inc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Tenn. 2000); Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tenn. 1998).

The requirements for the grant of summary judgment are that the filings supporting the motion show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04; Fruge v. Doe, 952 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tenn. 1997); Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993); Consequently, summary judgment should be granted only when the undisputed facts, and the inferences reasonably drawn from the undisputed facts, support one conclusion — that the party seeking the summary judgment is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Webber v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 49 S.W.3d 265, 269 (Tenn. 2001); Brown v. Birman Managed Care, Inc., 42 S.W.3d 62, 66 (Tenn. 2001); Staples, 15 S.W.3d at 88.

A court must determine first whether factual disputes exist and, if so, whether the fact is material to the claim or defense upon which the summary judgment is predicated and whether the disputed fact creates a genuine issue for trial. Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 214; Rutherford v. Polar Tank Trailer, Inc., 978 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998). A court must review the evidence presented at the summary judgment stage in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, afford all reasonable inferences to that party, and discard all countervailing evidence. Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997); Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 870 (Tenn. 1993); Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 210-11. "If there is a dispute as to any material fact or any doubt as to the conclusions to be drawn from that fact, the motion must be denied." Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 211. Summary judgment procedure and burdens have been explained many times.

To properly support its motion, the moving party must either affirmatively negate an essential element of the non-moving party's claim or conclusively establish an affirmative defense. If the moving party fails to negate a claimed basis for the suit, the non-moving party's burden to produce evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue for trial is not triggered and the motion for summary judgment must fail. If the moving party successfully negates a claimed basis for the action, the non-moving party may not simply rest upon the pleadings, but must offer proof to establish the existence of the essential elements of the claim.

Staples, 15 S.W.3d at 88-89 (citations omitted). Thus, if, but only if, the moving party presents evidence sufficient to justify grant of the motion if the facts remain uncontested, the nonmoving party is required to come forward with probative evidence which makes it necessary to resolve a factual dispute at trial. In that situation, the nonmoving party has the burden of pointing out, rehabilitating, or providing new evidence to create a factual dispute as to the material element in dispute. Staples, 15 S.W.3d at 88-89; Rains v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580, 587-88 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2003). A nonmoving party who fails to carry that burden faces summary dismissal of the challenged claim.

IV. NEGLIGENT OPERATION OF A MOTOR VEHICLE

Mr. Potts has alleged that NES employee Mr. Layhew was negligent in his operation of the NES truck. This allegation is limited to the time after the mechanical problems occurred or became apparent. Witnesses agree that because of traffic flow it was impossible for Mr. Layhew to change lanes to get to the side of the highway. Very little time elapsed between the drive shaft malfunction and the truck coming to a stop.

The only omission in Mr. Layhew's operation of the vehicle after it malfunctioned that Mr. Potts points to was Mr. Layhew's failure to turn on flashing emergency lights or otherwise (such as by hitting his brake pedal) signal an emergency. Essentially, Mr. Potts's claim is that Mr. Layhew failed to take "any actions to indicate to the drivers behind him that he was coming to a stop on the interstate." Mr. Layhew testified that he did hit his brakes at some point and did not remember whether he turned on his emergency flashers although he frequently uses them. On summary judgment, resolution of this factual dispute is not appropriate. However, it is also not necessary to the determination of whether NES is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim.

One of the essential elements of any negligence claim is causation. That is, the defendant's conduct must be shown to be a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injury. Burroughs v. Magee, 118 S.W.3d 323, 327-28 (Tenn. 2003); McClung v. Delta Square Partnership, 937 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tenn. 1996). In GTLA cases, causation is also statutorily required. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-310(a).

NES has provided evidence showing that Mr. Layhew's use of flashing emergency signals or brake lights would not have prevented or lessened the consequences of the accident. NES presented affidavit or deposition testimony from the people involved in the accident that establishes the following. Mr. Nodini, the driver immediately following the NES truck, was able to stop his truck before hitting the NES truck. Mr. Potts was also able to stop safely. Mr. Whinnery, who actually ran into Mr. Potts's stopped truck and triggered the chain reaction, did not know an NES truck was three vehicles in front of him. He did see "debris flying down the road" and, most significantly, he saw the vehicles in front of him braking. Even though he saw these things, he was unable to stop. We conclude this evidence negates the claim that any failure by Mr. Layhew to use flashing emergency signals or to engage his brake lights (assuming he did fail to use them) in the extremely short time between the mechanical problem and the accident was a cause of Mr. Whinnery's failure to stop and the resulting crash in to Mr. Potts's truck.

Additionally, Mr. Potts admitted in a response to request for admissions that "The collision between Plaintiffs' vehicle and the vehicle that Jason Whinnery would not have occurred if Jason Whinnery had operated his vehicle safely and used reasonable care under the circumstances."

V. EMPLOYEE NEGLIGENCE

The remaining claim is based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205, which removes immunity for injuries caused by a negligent act or omission of any employee. Mr. Potts alleges that NES employees failed to properly maintain the truck so as to avoid the malfunction that resulted in the accident herein.

To establish a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must show the existence of a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff and conduct by the defendant that amounts to a breach of that duty. Burroughs, 118 S.W.3d at 327-28. In the law of negligence, duty is simply a legal obligation owed by a defendant to conform to a reasonable person standard of care for the protection of the plaintiff against unreasonable risks of harm. Burroughs, 118 S.W.3d at 328; Staples, 15 S.W.3d at 89; McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995).

The proper analytical framework for determining the existence or non-existence of duty is a balancing approach based on principles of fairness and justice. Burroughs, 118 S.W.3d at 329; Staples, 15 S.W.83 at 89; Coln v. City of Savannah, 966 S.W.2d 34, 39 (Tenn. 1998); Turner v. Jordan, 957 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Tenn. 1997). Because every person has a duty to act reasonably under the circumstances to protect others against unreasonable risks of harm, the purpose of the balancing is to determine whether the risk of harm to the plaintiff was unreasonable in the circumstances. "A risk is unreasonable and gives rise to a duty to act with due care if the foreseeable probability and gravity of harm posed by defendant's conduct outweigh the burden upon defendant to engage in alternative conduct that would have prevented the harm." McCall, 913 S.W.2d at 153.

In keeping with the general obligation to protect others from an unreasonable risk of injury, an owner of a vehicle has a duty to see that the vehicle is in a reasonably safe condition before driving it, or allowing it to be driven, on a public highway. Alexander v. Walker, 15 Tenn. App. 388, 393 (1932). That includes the duty to maintain the vehicle in a reasonably safe condition, sometimes described as good mechanical condition.

An owner may be liable for injuries caused by defects about which he or she has knowledge as well as those the owner should have known about through the exercise of ordinary care. Alexander v. Walker, 15 Tenn. App. at 393; Coppedge v. Blackburn, 15 Tenn. App. 587, 595 (1932). An owner or operator is not liable for injuries that occur in accidents caused by some latent defect unknown to the owner or driver "which could not have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable care and reasonable inspections." Parker v. Prince, 656 S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1983).

NES acknowledges that it has a duty to use reasonable care to maintain its vehicles so as to avoid injury to persons using public roadways. It asserts that it used reasonable measures to maintain the truck involved in the accident in this case in a safe operating condition and that Mr. Potts has failed to come forward with any proof that its maintenance activities were negligent or not reasonable.

In support of its motion for summary judgment, NES submitted an affidavit from Doug Mangrum, an NES employee whose responsibilities included overseeing the "Fleet Maintenance Inspection" program for NES's large trucks, which applied to the truck involved in this accident. He explained the types of inspections that are done and stated that the inspection cycle is approximately 120 days. He also stated that the truck involved in this case was inspected on November 14, 2000, which inspection lasted for approximately 3.5 hours. "The truck passed this inspection and was found to be in good mechanical condition." Specifically, the affidavit states that at that time the drive shaft was examined both visually and physically, and no problems with the drive shaft or related parts were found. Additionally, Mr. Mangrum's affidavit stated:

I have reviewed all of the relevant records of the NES Fleet Department relating to this truck, including the NES Fleet Maintenance Inspection Form for this truck that is attached to my Affidavit, to determine whether NES was aware of any problems with the drive shaft or any related parts before the subject accident. If there were any problems with the drive shaft of this truck, it would have been reflected in the records that I reviewed. There is no indication in any of those records or from anything else that, prior to the accident on January 22, 2001 that is the subject of this action, that there were any problems with the drive shaft or related parts of this truck.

NES also submitted an affidavit of Otto Horton, who was an experienced truck mechanic for NES and who had performed the maintenance inspection of the truck on November 14, 2000, approximately two months before the accident. In explaining his physical check of the drive shaft, Mr. Horton stated that he

. . . grabbed the drive shaft and jiggled the crowbar-like device in the drive shaft joints to see if there was any play and found none. Specifically, I checked the locks and bolts of the u-joints for play and checked the slip joint and yoke nut for any problems. I did not find any problems with the drive shaft or any of its related parts.

At their depositions, both Mr. Mangrum and Mr. Horton described in some detail the type of inspection that is routinely done and was performed on this truck in November of 2000. Referring to an inspection checklist, they identified those parts of the inspection that would relate to the drive shaft and associated parts. Both testified the November 2000 inspection did not disclose any problems that could account for the later malfunction.

Mr. Mangrum testified, based upon the condition of the truck and its parts after the accident, that the drive shaft did not break, but was intact after the accident. Apparently, the drive shaft came out of a joint at one end, continued rotating, and broke other parts and disconnected the airbrake lines. He could not definitively say what may have caused the failure of the joint that allowed the drive shaft to become dislodged.

Thus, NES argues the truck was in good mechanical condition and that its maintenance of the truck was reasonable. It also asserts that the accident was caused by a latent defect that was not discoverable through reasonable maintenance activities including reasonable inspections. The assertion that the malfunction and resulting accident were caused by a latent defect is an affirmative defense, and NES has the burden of proof on that issue. Parker v. Prince, 656 S.W.2d at 398.

Mr. Potts argues that whether or not NES properly maintained the truck is a disputed issue of fact and, consequently, summary judgment should not have been granted. As to the affidavits regarding the maintenance and inspection of the truck, Mr. Potts argues, ". . . the basis of Mr. Potts' claims against NES for improper maintenance is that had NES properly maintained the vehicle, it would have discovered the defect that caused the drive shaft to become dislodged which caused the brakes to lock causing injury to the Plaintiff."

NES argues that Mr. Potts's real complaint is that the inspections performed by NES employees on the truck were inadequate or were negligently performed and that NES enjoys immunity for such a claim under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205(4). That subsection provides that the removal of immunity for the negligence of employees does not apply if the injury arises out of "the failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property."

We disagree with NES's contention that this provision immunizes it from liability in this case. To construe the provision as argued by NES would grant immunity for negligent maintenance simply because a regular or necessary part of that maintenance is routine inspection. Roberts v. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, No. 89-179-II, 1989 WL 119443 (Tenn.Ct.App. Oct. 13, 1989) (holding, in the context of premises liability, that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205(4) was not intended and does not relieve a governmental liability from liability for negligent maintenance even though failure to inspect or defective inspection may be involved in the negligent maintenance).

The Tennessee Supreme Court has clarified the limitations on the applicability of the inspections provision, holding that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205(4) provides immunity from suit "when a governmental entity fails to discharge an existing duty to inspect property not owned by the City and, thereafter, injuries arise from dangerous or defective conditions on such property which would have been discovered had the governmental entity conducted an adequate inspection." Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 16 (Tenn. 1997). In other words, the provision applies where the governmental entity has a separate or independent ( e.g., in the course of its regulatory responsibilities) duty to inspect, but not where the entity has a duty to maintain. It does not apply to grant immunity where the underlying action is based on allegations of negligent maintenance of the entity's own vehicles that are operated on the public roadways.

Under the applicable standard of review and the allocation of burdens for summary judgment, we must first determine whether NES has provided evidence that affirmatively negates an element of Mr. Potts's claim of employee negligence in maintaining the truck or that establishes an affirmative defense to that claim.

NES provided evidence that the truck was in good mechanical condition on November 14, 2000, about two months before the accident. It has also provided a thorough description of the type and frequency of inspection it performs and the type that was performed on this truck. It also provided evidence that this 3.5 hour inspection did not reveal any problems that could account for the drive shaft's later dislocation. Mr. Potts does not claim that NES employees had actual knowledge of any defect in the truck that would have led to the accident.

We find that NES came forward with evidence that it used reasonable care to maintain the truck in good mechanical and safe operating condition, including reasonable inspections. Consequently, NES shifted the burden to Mr. Potts to provide evidence to create a genuine issue for trial so as to avoid summary judgment. That would include evidence that NES's maintenance, including inspections, were not reasonable or fell below an acceptable standard. Mr. Potts has not done so, and his conclusory allegations are not enough to meet his burden and avoid summary judgment.

VI. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment to NES is affirmed. Costs are taxed to the appellant, Terry Wayne Potts, for which execution, if necessary, may issue.