This case involves a prosecution for nonsupport. Plaintiff in error, Arnold Ray Poole, hereinafter defendant, married Joan Steele in Nashua, Iowa, on December 24, 1959. He had formerly been a resident of Richland county, Wisconsin, and his wife a native of Boscobel, Wisconsin. Four children were born to the couple who lived in 17 different places between the wedding and 1967, both within and without the state of Wisconsin. In November, 1967, the Poole family moved to Phoenix, Arizona, with hopes of defendant's establishing a painting business with his brother-in-law, Thomas Steele. When this plan did not work out defendant occasionally found work but nothing on a regular basis.

With financial assistance from the Phoenix Welfare Department, Mrs. Poole returned to Boscobel in May, 1968, with her four children and began receiving ADC payments from Grant county in the amount of $213 per month. Approximately six weeks after his wife returned to Wisconsin defendant obtained Arizona employment which paid him gross earnings of approximately $800 per month. Defendant did not, however, make any attempt to support his family.

On August 22, 1969, defendant was charged with willfully neglecting and refusing to provide for the support and maintenance of his wife and four minor children contrary to sec. 52.05(1), Stats. A warrant was issued and defendant, after waiving extradition and being returned to Wisconsin, was bound over to the circuit court for Grant county. On February 4, 1970, defendant entered a plea of guilty, was convicted, and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not more than two years. Sentence was stayed and defendant placed on probation on condition that he pay all costs of his conviction and pay $120 per month for the support of his four children. Further conditions included his not leaving the state without permission of the trial court and the obeyance of all federal, state and municipal laws.

Defendant made one payment of $164.25 and, on March 27, 1970, returned to Arizona without permission of the court. Defendant was again extradited to Wisconsin on August 26, 1970, and, after a hearing held on August 31, 1970, the trial court revoked probation, vacated the stay of execution, and reinstituted the original sentence.

A writ of error was issued from this court to review the judgment of conviction.

WILKIE, J.

The sole issue on this appeal is whether the trial court properly had jurisdiction over the instant prosecution of the defendant.

Sec. 52.05, Stats. is Wisconsin's version of the Uniform Desertion and Nonsupport Act which, as of 1967, was adopted in 24 states and the Virgin Islands. Initially enacted by ch. 576 of the Laws of 1911, and effective July 7, 1911, the Wisconsin statute is virtually identical to the Uniform Act with the exception of a refusal to include three minor sections. Essentially, the statute provides that any person, man or woman, may be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned for not more than two years for the willful abandonment of or refusal to support a wife or children who are under the age of eighteen. The statute further provides that a complaint thereunder may be filed by any person, including a wife, child, officer in charge of public welfare agencies, secretary of the department, casework supervisors, or others.

One of the deficiencies of the Uniform Act and like statutes is the failure to include any specific provisions concerning the residence of the parties, especially the nonresidence of the father or children in the place of prosecution, and the relevance of such factor to the jurisdiction of a prosecution thereunder. In the instant case, defendant contends the trial court was without jurisdiction to convict him because his residence and the residence of his family at the time of the alleged act of abandonment and nonsupport was Arizona and not Wisconsin. His family's subsequent removal to Grant county, Wisconsin, defendant argues, did not confer jurisdiction upon the courts of that county for an act not committed within its borders.

Defendant's contention is without merit. Since sec. 52.05, Stats., does not itself define the limits of its jurisdiction, the more general statute governs. The general criminal jurisdiction statute is sec. 939.03, and provides that a person is subject to prosecution and punishment under the laws of this state if: "(c) While out of this state, he does an act with intent that it cause in this state a consequence set forth in a section defining a crime . . . ." Since the statute defendant was charged and convicted of violating proscribes the willful refusal to support one's wife and children and authorizes such persons, among others, to institute a complaint therefor, it is clear that defendant may be proceeded against in this state. The cases cited by defendant for the proposition that it is improper to prosecute a person for an act not committed within the state are not in point. They uniformly recite that their criminal courts have no jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of conduct for one not within the state's borders. While such may be the law of those states, it is not the law in Wisconsin where, as outlined in sec. 939.03, Stats., a person may be prosecuted for doing an act outside this state which has a criminally proscribed consequence within the state.

This court has already ruled adversely to defendant's contention. In Adams v. State, a case remarkably similar to the instant case and interpreting the same statute shortly after its adoption, this court held a defendant's residence in Racine county did not invalidate a prosecution's venue in Waukesha county. According to the court,

"We are satisfied that this contention cannot be sustained. The place where the children were, not where the father was, during the period complained of, fixes the venue of a prosecution for nonsupport of children. . . ."

While the Adams case is distinguishable in that it involved the question of intrastate venue rather than interstate jurisdiction, it is clear from Adams that this court has regarded sec. 52.05, Stats., as enforceable in the locale of those persons required to be supported rather than where the father is located. The preponderance of cases in other states hold that the crime of nonsupport is a continuing offense that follows the children. By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.