GREEN, J.

The former wife appeals an order changing the primary residential custody of two of the parties' three minor children from her to the former husband. She essentially maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the former husband's petition for modification of custody where the evidence relied upon by the trial court failed to establish a substantial change in circumstances and that the best interests of the two minor children would be served by the modification. We agree and reverse.

The parties were divorced in 1995. Pursuant to the terms of their marital settlement agreement, which was later incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution of marriage, the former wife was named the primary residential parent of the parties' three minor children. The marital settlement agreement also provided that "neither Party shall remove the permanent residence of the minor children from Dade, Broward or Palm Beach Counties, Florida, without the express written permission of the other Party or in the absence of an order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction."

After entry of the final judgment of dissolution, the former wife expressed a desire to relocate from Miami with the minor children to Park City, Utah. The parties had vacationed there on occasion with the children during the course of their marriage. In September 1996, the former husband agreed to the former wife's request to relocate with the children to Utah. It was further agreed that the relocation would take place on or about June 2, 1998. Their agreement was duly reduced to writing entitled "Addendum and Modification to the Separation and Marital Settlement Agreement". This addendum agreement was approved by the court and incorporated as an order of the court.

In reliance upon the addendum agreement, the former wife sold her Miami home, purchased 18 acres of land in Park City, Utah and commenced construction of a 12,000 square foot home thereon for herself and the three minor children. The former wife oversaw the construction of her Utah home and thus had numerous occasions to travel to and from Utah. During her travels to Utah, the minor children remained in Miami with the former husband, usually from Wednesdays through Mondays. According to the former husband, it was during this time that the children began to express their desires to remain in the Miami area. Thereafter, the former husband had the minor children, then ages 15, 12 and 9, write a letter stating their preference to remain in Miami and had his secretary present for the purpose of attesting to and notarizing the letter. The former husband then turned this letter over to his legal counsel.

There is no record evidence that this letter or its contents was ever disclosed to the former wife by the former husband prior to the commencement of this proceeding. Rather, approximately two weeks prior to the agreed upon departure date for the former wife and children, the former husband filed a petition for modification of custody and sought an emergency injunction enjoining the former wife from relocating the children to Utah. The trial court denied the emergency motion for an injunction. The former wife and children then moved to Utah as scheduled in 1998.

After their relocation to Utah, the evidentiary hearing on the former husband's petition for modification of custody came on for hearing by the trial court in the spring and summer months of 1999. Although both the former wife and former husband presented evidence as to shortcomings in each other's parenting skills, the trial court essentially discounted the same for purposes of the petition. Indeed, both parties acknowledged and the record fully supports that both of them are very decent, loving, and caring parents who are each capable of providing these children with a very stable, nurturing and fit home environment. Moreover, the evidence unequivocably established that the former husband's primary motivation for seeking a change in custody was the children's preference and his belief that an urban area such as Miami offered a better cultured environment for the children than rural Utah. At the final hearing, however, the guardian ad litem reported that the parties' daughter (age 16) had changed her mind and had expressed a desire to remain with the former wife in Utah while the parties' two younger sons (ages 15 and 11) had maintained their preference of returning to Miami to reside with the former husband. The guardian ad litem ultimately recommended that the petition for modification be granted and that all three of the children be returned to Miami to reside with the former husband. Because the trial court deemed the guardian's recommendation and report to be based upon inadmissible hearsay,see Scaringer v. Herrick, 711 So.2d 204, 204-05 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998), the court decided to interview each of the children separately, in camera, with the permission of both parents.

At the conclusion of the hearing and the court's in camera interview with each of the children, the court issued its order on the former husband's petition for modification of custody that is the subject matter of this appeal. After finding the children to be extremely articulate and intelligent and praising the parties for doing an excellent job in raising them, the trial court granted the former husband's petition as to the parties' two sons, but denied the petition as to their daughter. The court's decision was overwhelmingly based upon the articulated preference of each of the children. The court found the children's intelligence and maturation level to be sufficient enough for it to modify custody in accordance with their respective preference. The only other finding of the court to support its decision was that the children had always resided in Miami and that there had been a decline in the academic grades of the parties' oldest son since moving to Utah. The former wife's motion for rehearing of this order as well as a stay were both denied by the lower court. We granted a stay of the order pending our appellate review.

A parent seeking to modify a prior custody award bears the extraordinary burden of demonstrating a substantial change in circumstances since the entry of the initial custody decree and that the child's best interest or welfare will be promoted by the change. See Sullivan v. Sullivan, 736 So.2d 103, 105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Young v. Young, 732 So.2d 1133, 1134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Chant v. Chant, 725 So.2d 445, 447 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999);Schweinberg v. Click, 627 So.2d 548, 551 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). In applying this two-prong test for modification, it is insufficient that the petitioning parent may possess the superior financial resources or that the child may be "better off" with the petitioning parent. See Young, 732 So.2d at 1134; Chant, 725 So.2d at 447. For that reason, for purposes of a modification of custody, Florida courts have required proof that a child's continuing residence with the custodial parent would be detrimental to or have an adverse impact upon the child. See Kilgore v. Kilgore, 729 So.2d 402, 406-07 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (modification order to father reversed where trial court made no findings that mother's relationships with several men had affected children in any way or any finding that mother's parenting skills had deteriorated since entry of the final judgment of dissolution); Enyeart v. Stull, 715 So.2d 320, 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (holding that "The petitioner must prove both that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since the last permanent custody order, and that the custody modification would `so clearly promote or improve the child's well-being . . . that maintaining the status quo would be detrimental to the child's overall best interests.'") (citation omitted, emphasis in the original); Metcalfe v. Metcalfe, 655 So.2d 1251, 1252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (evidence supported modification where "this evidence tended to show that there has been a substantial and material change of circumstances since the final judgment of marriage dissolution of such a magnitude that it would be detrimental for the children to remain in the custody of the husband, and that the best interests of the children would be promoted if the wife, who was since remarried, obtained custody of the children"); Elkins v. Vanden Bosch, 433 So.2d 1251, 1253 (modification order reversed where "there is no finding that the mother is any less fit a parent than she was when given custody of the children in 1977 and no finding that the children will be detrimented if custody is not changed").

Despite the special concurrence's protestations to the contrary, the requirement that the non-custodial parent demonstrate that a child will suffer detrimental harm if custody is not changed, does not somehow convert the well-established two-prong test for modification of custody into a three-part test. Specially concurring opinion at 19. Rather, a showing of detriment or inadequacy of care has consistently been required by the courts of this state to effectuate a modification of custody and indeed has clarified for both the bench and the bar what actually constitutes a "substantial change in circumstances." See e.g., Hunter v. Hunter, 540 So.2d 235, 237 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (stating that: "the trial court erred in awarding sole parental responsibility to be mother absent a specific finding that `shared parental responsibility would bedetrimental to the children,'") (quoting § 61.13(2)(b)2, Fla. Stat. (supp. 1986); and Hicks v. Hicks, 511 So.2d 628 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Nichols v. Nichols, 432 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983);Holland v. Holland, 458 So.2d 81 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)). Indeed, we have located no Florida cases which have upheld a modification of custody in the absence of a showing of detriment and none of the cases relied upon by our colleague in the specially concurring opinion supports a contrary conclusion.

Moreover, the special concurrence's assertion that the detriment requirement would somehow encourage acrimony, is simply wrong. In fact, the opposite is true. "Unlike proceedings to modify awards of child support or alimony, the non-custodial parent seeking to modify a prior award of custody `carries an extraordinary burden.'" Zediker v. Zediker, 444 So.2d 1034, 1035 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (quoting McGregor v. McGregor, 418 So.2d 1073, 1074 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); and citing Elkins v. Vanden Bosch, 433 So.2d 1251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)). The requirement that the non-custodial parent demonstrate detriment or harm to the child is the basis for this enhanced burden and is in accord with sound policy recognition that after a divorce and an initial award of custody, it is in the best interests of children to have as much stability in their lives as possible. A modification proceeding involving an otherwise fit custodial parent does not promote such stability. If, as in this case, the custodial parent remains perfectly fit and able to continue to provide for the needs and welfare of the minor children, the non-custodial parent should not be permitted to entice the children with certain benefits and advantages not readily accessible to the custodial parent. By eliminating the detriment requirement, as the concurring opinion seemingly suggests, we would actually be lowering the burden of proof for a modification petition and encouraging more modification proceedings between two otherwise fit parents in the process. This we will not do. As poignantly stated by our sister court, a change of custody is appropriate only when, having considered all of the factors listed in section 61.13(3), Florida Statutes:

[T]he trial court finds that a change in custody will so clearly promote or improve the child's well-being to such an extent that any reasonable parent would understand that maintaining the status quo would be detrimental to the child's overall best interests. This test involves more than a decision that the petitioning parent's home would be `better' for the child, and requires a determination that there is some significant inadequacy in the care provided by the custodial parent.

Young, 732 So.2d at 1134 (citing Gibbs v. Gibbs, 686 So.2d 639, 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)). We fully agree.

In this case, without question, the former husband's petition for modification of custody was motivated solely by his change of heart about the former wife's decision to relocate the children to Utah. In the absence of compelling circumstances, however, a custodial parent's move to a foreign state is not itself a substantial change of circumstances which would support a change of custody. See Zugda v. Gomez, 553 So.2d 1295, 1296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Hence, the mere fact that the custodial parent in this case was relocating the children from the city in which they had always resided is insufficient to sustain a modification of custody. Thus, in order to prevail on his petition for modification of residential custody, the former husband bore the dual burden of demonstrating that the Utah move was somehow detrimental to the children and that their best interests would somehow be served by a change in custody to him. Id.

After carefully reviewing the trial court's detailed order, it is abundantly clear to us that the court based its order primarily upon the articulated preferences of the parties' children. The trial court made no factual determinations that the former wife's agreed upon relocation to Utah posed any detrimental or adverse effects upon the children other than the fact that there had been a decline in the grades of the parties' eldest son. Although the record evidence did reflect a significant decline in the older boy's grades during the second quarter of the academic year, both parents acknowledged at the hearing below that their son's grades had gone up by the third quarter of the academic school year. Thus, the lower court's finding that the move to Utah had an adverse effect upon the parties' oldest son was simply not supported by competent substantial evidence and thus could not support its modification order. DeLapouyade v. DeLapouyade, 711 So.2d 1202, 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Ward v. Ward, 742 So.2d 250, 254 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

We therefore turn our attention to the lower court's primary and remaining cited reason for the modification order — the stated preference of the children. Generally speaking, the stated preference of a child in a modification proceeding is entitled to some weight if the child possesses sufficient maturity and understanding to make an intelligent choice. See Greene v. Kelly, 712 So.2d 1201, 1202 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Holmes v. Greene, 649 So.2d 302, 305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Gaber v. Gaber, 536 So.2d 381, 381-82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Berlin v. Berlin, 386 So.2d 577, 579 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Pollak v. Pollak, 196 So.2d 771, 772 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967); see also § 61.13(3)(i), Fla. Stat. (1997). However, under Florida law, the stated preference of a child who possesses the requisite maturity to make an informed decision, without more, has never been found to be sufficient to sustain a change in primary residence. See Chant, 725 So.2d at 447 (holding that "[s]tanding alone, a child's reasonable preference is not enough to justify a court ordered change of residence."); Heatherington v. Heatherington, 677 So.2d 1312, 1314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (a child's preference, without more, will not justify a change in custody); Holmes, 649 So.2d at 305 (concluding that "[e]ven if the evidence were sufficient to establish that the [10 year old twin] girls possessed the necessary character traits to make such a choice, a child's wishes, alone, can never be sufficient to sustain a change in primary residence."); Schweinberg, 627 So.2d at 551-52 (holding that "[t]he children's wishes alone, however, cannot support a change in custody."); Elkins v. Van den Bosch, 433 So.2d 1251, 1252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (reasoning that "Even assuming, arguendo, that twelve and fifteen-year-old children possess sufficient intelligence, understanding and experience to make a mature choice between their parents, their stated preference to live with a particular parent, while a factor to be considered and weighed, cannot control the disposition of custody.") (citations and footnote omitted). As we explained in Elkins:

The law does not give children the unfettered discretion to choose the parent with whom they will live, or gratify the wishes of children at the expense of the rights of a parent. Were it otherwise, the law would encourage manipulation by both children and parents and foster a breakdown in discipline, neither of which is in the best interests of children.

433 So.2d at 1253 (citations omitted). The reasonable preference of a child is indeed but one of many factors to be considered by a court pursuant to § 61.13(3), Fla. Stat. (1997). Clearly then, the children's stated preferences in this case, without more, could not support the trial court's modification of custody order. Since there was no other viable or compelling reason relied upon by the court in this case, we find the court's modification order with regards to the parties' two sons to be an abuse of discretion. We therefore reverse this order as it pertains to the parties' two sons and remand with directions that the court reinstate the former wife as their primary residential parent and we affirm the lower court's denial of the modification as it pertains to the parties' daughter.

Reversed and remanded in part with directions and affirmed in part.

FLETCHER, J., concurs.

COPE, J. (specially concurring).

I agree with the result and with much of the reasoning of the majority opinion, but disagree with that part of the opinion which indicates that in order to obtain a change of child custody, it is necessary to show that the present placement is detrimental to the child.

I.

I agree that at bottom this change of custody order is based on the stated preference of the two boys and that reversal is required under Elkins v. Vanden Bosch, 433 So.2d 1251, 1252-53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).

II.

I agree with the majority opinion that there is a two-part test for modification of child custody: the movant must demonstrate "[1] a substantial change in circumstances since the entry of the initial custody decree and [2] that the child's best interest or welfare will be promoted by the change." Majority opinion at 7 (citations omitted); see Spradley v. Spradley, 335 So.2d 822 (Fla. 1976).

I disagree with that part of the opinion which says "for purposes of a modification of custody, Florida courts have required proof that a child's continuing residence with the custodial parent would be detrimental to or have an adverse impact upon the child." Majority opinion at 7 (citations omitted). The majority opinion goes on to state that a showing of detriment is a legally required element in every case: "in order to prevail on his petition for modification of residential custody the former husband bore the dual burden of demonstrating that the Utah move was somehow detrimental to the children and that their best interests would somehow be served by a change in custody to him. Majority opinion at 11-12 (citation omitted).

The requirement that the moving party demonstrate "detriment" converts the two-part test for change of child custody into a three-part test: (1) substantial change of circumstances, (2) best interest of the child, and (3) detriment in the present placement. The only Florida jurisdiction to routinely apply that three-part test is the Second District. See Gibbs v. Gibbs, 686 So.2d 639, 641-45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Neither the Florida Supreme Court nor this court have held that a showing of detriment is a required element in a motion for change of child custody.

A fair summary of the Florida case law is as follows:

In order to warrant uprooting a child, there must be competent substantial evidence that there has been a material change in the circumstances and that the best interest and welfare of the child will be promoted by the change of primary residential responsibility. Gutierrez v. Medina, 613 So.2d 528 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Buttermore v. Meyer, 559 So.2d 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Sanders v. Sanders, 376 So.2d 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), cert. den. 388 So.2d 1117. See also Jones v. Jones, 156 Fla. 524, 23 So.2d 623 (1945); Brush v. Brush, 414 So.2d 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Adams v. Adams, 385 So.2d 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). But see Goodman v. Goodman, 291 So.2d 106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). . . .

In Grumney v. Haber, 641 So.2d 906 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), and Kelly v. Kelly, 642 So.2d 800 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), rev. den. 651 So.2d 1194, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, applied an even more demanding standard for modification than the extraordinary burden expressed in previous cases such as Jablon [v. Jablon, 579 So.2d 902 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)]. In Gramney, the court held that the "parent seeking the transfer [of custody] bears the `extraordinary' burden to prove a change in circumstances so substantial that the child's continued presence in his current home will be detrimental to him, and that placing him with his other parent is in his best interests." 641 So.2d at 907. The Kelly court similarly required an additional finding of detriment. In other words, the parent seeking a modification was required to prove three matters instead of two: a substantial or material change in circumstances, that the best interest of the child would be promoted by a change of custody, and that a failure to change custody would be detrimental to the child. This stricter standard can be traced back to a line of cases decided long before the advent of shared parental responsibility when one parent, usually the mother, was given "care, custody, and control" of the children. See, e.g., Hutchins v. Hutchins, 220 So.2d 438 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969), cert. den. 229 So.2d 869 (modification requires showing that not only welfare of children will be served by change, but that it will be detrimental to children if custody is not changed).

Other districts have not followed Grumney and Kelly, and the detriment-to-the-child standard is disfavored in the Second District. See Allan v. Allan 666 So.2d 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). The District Court of Appeal, First District, consistently applies the two-part standard (substantial and material change in circumstances that promotes child's best interests) announced in Zediker v. Zediker, 444 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). See Harp v. Null, 658 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). See also Good v. Good, 664 So.2d 329 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).

The detriment-to-the-child standard obviously conflicts with Florida's shared parenting law, which extends to both parents the same rights, interests, and control in the upbringing of their minor children. Moreover, it appears to turn the best interests standard on its head. One clearly could demonstrate that a change of custody would promote the child's best interest, thereby helping the child, while not having evidence that the current situation would be detrimental to the child. Furthermore, the detriment-to-the-child standard appears to encourage more acrimony in an already contentious area of child custody litigation, because an additional element of proof, in essence, would require evidence and testimony that the custodial parent was doing and would continue to do a poor job raising the child.

The Florida Bar, Florida Dissolution of Marriage § 11.192, at 11-111 through 11-113 (5th ed. 1998) (emphasis added).

I wish to reemphasize the last sentence: " the detriment-to-the-child standard appears to encourage more acrimony in an already contentious area of child custody litigation, because an additional element of proof, in essence, would require evidence and testimony that the custodial parent was doing and would continue to do a poor job raising the child ." Id. (emphasis added). That has happened in this case, where the husband asks that if this order is reversed, that it be remanded for further proceedings before the trial court in which the court will be asked to make findings that the existing placement is detrimental to the boys.

The majority opinion cites three cases for the proposition that this court has already endorsed the "detriment" standard, but the cited cases do not stand for that proposition. The majority opinion cites Metcalfe v. Metcalfe, 655 So.2d 1251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), and Elkins v. Vanden Bosch, 433 So.2d 1251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), see majority opinion at 8, as well as Zugda v. Gomez, 553 So.2d 1295 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). See majority opinion at 11. None of the three cases states that a showing of "detriment" is required in every modification proceeding. In Metcalfe and Elkins the discussion of "detriment" was in the context of what the evidence had shown under the facts of that specific case. In Zugda there is no discussion of the issue of "detriment" at all. Both Elkins and Zugda repeat the traditional two-part test for change of child custody, see Elkins, 433 So.2d at 1252; Zugda, 533 So.2d at 1296, and the Metcalfe decision states the two-part test inferentially. See 655 So.2d at 1253.

By contrast, there are numerous Third District cases which have repeatedly stated that the test for change of child custody is the traditional two-part test — and make no reference to detriment. See Teller v. Richert, 744 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Skirko v. Skirko, 677 So.2d 885, 887 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Good v. Good, 664 So.2d 329 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Cardelle v. Cardelle, 645 So.2d 22 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Gutierrez v. Medina, 613 So.2d 528 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Hill v. Hill, 611 So.2d 618 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Sherman v. Sherman 558 So.2d 149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Hunter v. Hunter, 540 So.2d 235 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Gaber v. Gaber, 536 So.2d 381 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Delgado v. Silvarrey, 528 So.2d 1358 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Bragassa v. Bragassa, 505 So.2d 556 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Hussain v. Hussain, 493 So.2d 1062 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Brush v. Brush, 414 So.2d 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Adams v. Adams, 385 So.2d 688 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Berlin v. Berlin, 369 So.2d 434 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Jacobs v. Ross, 304 So.2d 542 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Wilner v. Wilner, 167 So.2d 234 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964); Avery v. Heermance, 138 So.2d 775 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). Plainly a showing of "detriment" is not a required element of a motion for modification in this district.

III.

The fact is that under our existing case law and the existing two-part test, we are obliged to reverse under Elkins. The discussion in the majority opinion regarding "detriment" is entirely unnecessary for the disposition of this case.

The injection of the concept of "detriment" into the law of this district, however, is quite harmful. The correct criterion is "best interest," not "detriment." To say it now for the third and final time, the requirement of a showing of detriment will encourage additional acrimony in child custody modification contests, because that element will "require evidence and testimony that the custodial parent was doing and would continue to do a poor job raising the child." The Florida Bar, Florida Dissolution of Marriage § 11.92, at 11-113.

We should adhere to the traditional two-part test for a change in child custody, and decide the case on that basis.