Summary
In People v West (On Remand), 82 Mich. App. 195; 266 N.W.2d 761 (1978), rev'd 406 Mich. 941 (1979), defense counsel, on the basis of his own experience, relayed the false impression that the defendant would receive a sentence of fifteen to twenty years.
Summary of this case from In re Oakland ProsecutorOpinion
Docket No. 26536.
Decided April 3, 1978.
Appeal from St. Clair, Ernest F. Oppliger, J. Submitted October 15, 1976, at Detroit. (Docket No. 26536.) Decided April 3, 1978.
Jeffrey A. West was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of armed robbery and assault with intent to commit rape. Defendant appeals. The Court of Appeals remanded for an evidentiary hearing. On remand the defendant's plea was upheld. Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Peter E. Deegan, Prosecuting Attorney, and Peter R. George, Chief Appellate Attorney, for the people.
Burgess Burgess (by Barbara A. Schwartz), for defendant on appeal.
Before: M.J. KELLY, P.J., and J.H. GILLIS and BEASLEY, JJ.
AFTER REMAND
Defendant pled guilty to armed robbery, MCLA 750.529; MSA 28.797, and assault with intent to commit rape, MCLA 750.85; MSA 28.280. He was sentenced to terms of from 20 to 40 years for the armed robbery and from 6 to 10 years for the assault. Defendant appealed as of right from the denial of his motion to withdraw his pleas. We remanded this case to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing in order to determine if the trial judge made a statement that could have been fairly interpreted by the defendant to be a promise of leniency that went unfulfilled. We also retained jurisdiction.
Upon remand, the circuit court found no such promise and denied the motion to withdraw the pleas.
Defendant claims that his pleas were given in exchange for the promise not to sentence him for a term of greater than 20 years. Defendant's argument must be rejected for two reasons.
First, the record does not support defendant's contention. Defense counsel admitted that the trial judge would not state a specific number of years as a maximum sentence. In response to defense counsel's request, the trial judge stated that normally someone convicted of armed robbery would receive a sentence of 15 or 20 years. It was defense counsel's impression that if defendant pled guilty, he would receive a similar maximum sentence. This was a conclusion based on defense counsel's own experience rather than a representation by the trial judge. He relayed this false impression to the defendant who relied upon it. A defendant's mistaken belief that the trial court is going to be lenient in sentencing him upon acceptance of defendant's plea of guilty is not sufficient reason to set aside the guilty plea. People v Bolden, 78 Mich. App. 120; 259 N.W.2d 389 (1977), People v Michael Williams, 36 Mich. App. 188; 193 N.W.2d 387 (1971).
Secondly, when a defendant pleads guilty to a criminal charge and then appeals claiming that the plea was based on the defendant's belief that he had been promised a lesser sentence than the one actually received, the Court of Appeals should not substitute its judgment for that of the circuit court where the circuit court has held an evidentiary hearing and has decided that the plea should be upheld. People v Hall, 399 Mich. 288; 249 N.W.2d 62 (1976), People v Bolden, supra.
Affirmed.
BEASLEY, J., concurred.
I respectfully dissent.
I believe the record does support defendant's contention and I further find that this is not a case of bad advice or mistaken impression only. The defense attorney swore on his oath that he told the defendant he would get a 20-year maximum sentence. He supported that with the recitation of conversations which took place below. I do not stand on either side of the question as to who was mistaken about those conversations. Somebody was, and lawyers and sometimes even judges make mistakes. The defendant made no mistake. He relied on what appeared to him to be a bargain and he was misled. People v Bolden, 78 Mich. App. 120; 259 N.W.2d 389 (1977), quoted in the majority opinion was a case of mistaken belief and is easily distinguishable. People v Hall, 399 Mich. 288; 249 N.W.2d 62 (1976), is not so easily distinguishable. Having written the opinion which was reversed in Hall it would be unseemly for me to defend it but I can only reiterate that that was a sentence recommendation case and this case is somewhat different.
I have a nagging doubt or a reasonable belief that the defendant's plea was essentially coerced. I would grant the motion to set aside the plea and would remand on the original charges.