OPINION

NICHOLSON, J.

On September 2, 2003, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Sacramento Police Officer Barry Lee responded to a reported stabbing. Upon arrival, he found the victim Andrey Tsurkanu already dead, with six men surrounding the body. Several days later, defendant Gagik Karapetyan walked into a sheriff's department substation and confessed to killing Andrey. He was tried and convicted of second degree murder.

Defendant appeals contending the trial court erred: (1) when it instructed the jury that an aider and abettor to assault could be liable for murder if death was a natural and probable consequence of the assault, (2) when it admitted evidence of a prior incident, (3) when it admitted defendant's statement that he used a knife, and (4) by not instructing the jury on imperfect defense of others. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

On September 2, 2003, Andrey Tsurkanu and his cousin Sergey Melnichuk went to Pavel Tveretinov's auto auction to pick up a friend who worked there. The friend was not there when they arrived, so Andrey and Sergey waited. Defendant, his son-in-law Ararat Manakyan, and Isaak Ambaryan were barbequing in the area. Sergey peeked into defendant's motor home, which was near the barbeque, and defendant became upset, telling him not to look in. Isaak told Sergey to tell Andrey, "[W]ho does he think he is to let you look inside." Sergey did as instructed, and Andrey confronted Isaak about the statement. They argued and, shortly thereafter, defendant joined in. Pavel told everyone if they wanted to fight they would have to leave the auction.

Andrey and his friends left and went to a lot near the auto auction. Andrey called Kolya Bagdasaryan, a friend of his, so that he could witness the ensuing confrontation between Andrey and defendant. Kolya arrived, and about five minutes later, Isaak, Ararat, defendant, and defendant's two sons, arrived in three different cars. Ararat greeted Kolya. About the same time, Isaak ordered defendant's sons to hit Andrey and a fight ensued.

Defendant, his sons, and Isaak chased Andrey, who ran after he saw that none of his friends were going to help him. Andrey was not armed. Defendant and his son Yegi were carrying sharp metallic items. Defendant, both his sons, and Isaak all struck Andrey. Ararat testified that he remembered making statements to the police that defendant told him he stabbed Andrey, that Ararat had seen defendant hitting Andrey with the metallic object, and that defendant had both a gun and a knife. He also remembered telling police that defendant had done something really bad, was the only one to chase Andrey across the street, and told everyone to leave after Andrey fell. Andrey died on the scene from a fatal stab wound to the chest. He also had a possibly fatal wound to his back, as well as some more superficial stab wounds and other smaller puncture wounds caused by a screwdriver.

About a week after the stabbing, defendant approached a public counter of a Sacramento County Sheriff's Department substation, placed his driver's license on the counter, and told the security officers he killed Andrey. Followup questions from a security officer revealed that defendant used a knife.

Defendant testified he is a "peaceful person." He stated he had a hernia when he turned himself in at the sheriff's substation. The hernia kept him from being able to run more than a few steps. Defendant took Andrey to defendant's mother's house for dinner on more than one occasion and considered him a friend. The day of the incident, he warned Andrey and Sergey not to go into the motor home because he had meat marinating inside and was afraid that they would spill it.

Defendant further testified that Pavel convinced him to go to the lot where Andrey was by telling him he would be safe and informing him that defendant's sons were already there. Defendant stayed in the car because he was afraid they would attack him. He got out after the fight began and tried to separate Andrey and his son but fell to the ground. Defendant denied chasing Andrey, stabbing him, or hitting him with a gun. He stated he got up and returned to the barbeque at the auction.

Defendant went to the river, where he stayed for five or six days, looking for his sons. He learned his sons were fugitives from the community. In an attempt to protect them, he went to the sheriff's department substation and turned himself in for the murder. Because of language difficulties he felt that he could not explain the whole situation. Defendant maintained he did not kill Andrey.

The jury convicted defendant of second degree murder, but found the firearm enhancement to be false. The trial court sentenced him to state prison for 15 years to life.

DISCUSSION I Instruction on Aider and Abettor Liability

Defendant contends the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that an aider and abettor to assault could be liable for murder if death was a natural and probable consequence of the assault. While the jury instructions included several theories of liability, defendant presumes, because of a question asked by the jury during deliberations, that the jury probably found him guilty based upon this theory. Whether or not this is true, the argument fails.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The natural and probable consequence theory of liability requires a finding by the jury that death was reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances. ( People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 531 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 323].) Defendant contends the instruction was given in error because there was insufficient evidence that death was a reasonably foreseeable result of the assault. We conclude there was sufficient evidence that death was reasonably foreseeable and, therefore, reject this assertion.

On the issue of foreseeability, the "question is not whether the aider and abettor actually foresaw the . . . crime, but whether, judged objectively, it was reasonably foreseeable." ( People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1133 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735], original italics.) Assuming the jury believed that defendant aided and abetted his sons in assaulting Andrey, the jury also could have believed it was reasonably foreseeable that death was a natural and probable consequence of that assault.

The evidence showed a group of men challenging a single unarmed victim with an assortment of weapons available for their use. Furthermore, the assailant stabbed Andrey with a knife, a deadly weapon. The assailant did not stab Andrey in an insignificant area of his body; instead, the assailant stabbed Andrey in his heart. Defendant denies that this attack on Andrey was a fight to the death. This, however, was an argument for the jury. The jury could infer from the circumstances of the fight that Andrey's death was a foreseeable consequence of the assault.

B. Ireland Rule

Defendant contends that the finding of murder based on aiding and abetting an assault is really just felony murder, which is barred by People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580] ( Ireland). Defendant's argument fails, as these facts do not trigger application of the Ireland rule.

In Ireland, supra, 70 Cal.2d 522, the court held that felony-murder instructions were improper when they were based upon a felony that was an integral part of the homicide. To allow otherwise "would effectively preclude the jury from considering the issue of malice aforethought in all cases wherein homicide has been committed as a result of a felonious assault — a category which includes the great majority of all homicides." ( Id. at p. 539.) Because a homicide generally results from the commission of an assault, every felonious assault ending in death would be elevated to murder, relieving the burden of the prosecutor to prove malice in most cases. ( People v. Hansen (1994) 9 Cal.4th 300, 311-312 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 885 P.2d 1022].) This would frustrate the Legislature's intent to punish certain felonious assaults resulting in death more harshly than other assaults that happened to result in death but were committed without malice aforethought. ( Ibid.)

The facts of this case do not implicate the merger doctrine discussed in Ireland. As the Attorney General points out, defendant's argument would be viable if the law stated that anyone who aided and abetted an assault that ended in death would be guilty of murder, whether or not the death was a natural and probable consequence of the assault. That would be a merged felony murder based on assault and would be prohibited by Ireland. ( Ireland, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 539.) However, the natural and probable consequences doctrine operates independently of the second degree felony-murder rule. ( People v. Culuko (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 307, 322 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 789].) The natural and probable consequences doctrine does not merge all assaults into the felony-murder rule. Rather, it is a theory of liability for murder that applies when the assault has the foreseeable result of death. For aider and abettor liability, it is the intention to further the acts of another that creates criminal liability and not the felony-murder rule. ( People v. Brigham (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1039, 1052-1054 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 486].)

"An aider and abettor's derivative liability for a principal's criminal act has two distinct prongs: First, the aider and abettor is liable for the particular crime that to his knowledge his confederates are contemplating. Second, the aider and abettor is also liable for the natural and probable consequences of any criminal act he knowingly and intentionally aids and abets. . . . [¶] . . . The law's policy is simply to extend criminal liability to one who knowingly and intentionally encourages, assists, or influences a criminal act of another, if the latter's crime is naturally and probably caused by (i.e., is the natural and probable consequence of) the criminal act so encouraged, assisted, or influenced." ( People v. Brigham, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1052-1053, italics omitted.) Accordingly, the logical and legal impediments to felony-murder liability discussed in Ireland are inapplicable and do not limit the liability of an aider and abettor. (See People v. Luparello (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 410, 438 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 832].)

II-IV

III

Defendant's Statement at the Sheriff's Substation Defendant contends his statement at the sheriff's substation regarding use of a knife should have been suppressed because he was not advised prior to being questioned of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694] (hereafter Miranda). We disagree. On September 10, 2003, about one week after Andrey was killed, defendant walked into a sheriff's substation where security officers Debbie Lissy and Alvin Lynch were on duty as front lobby security. Defendant put his driver's license on the counter. Defendant spoke with an accent and said, "I want to turn myself in for killing Andrey." Officer Lissy asked when this occurred. Defendant said, "Five days ago." Officer Lissy told defendant to wait with Officer Lynch and that she would be right back. Officer Lissy went to the back of the station. Meanwhile, Officer Lynch asked defendant if he had any weapons and defendant said he did not. Officer Lynch patted defendant down for weapons. Officer Lynch asked, "Where did you kill this person?" Defendant replied, "At an auction." Officer Lynch asked where the auction was but he was unable to understand defendant's response. Officer Lynch asked, "How did you kill him?" Defendant replied, "With a knife." A detective, a deputy sheriff, and a sergeant then arrived and escorted defendant to another area of the station. At the first trial, the court excluded the knife statement, finding defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes and that the statement was in response to interrogation. Testimony that defendant walked in and volunteered that he had killed Andrey was not excluded. At the second trial, the court, another judge presiding, reviewed the police reports and admitted the entire exchange. After a mistrial, a new judge assigned to the case may overrule the previous judge's pretrial ruling on the defendant's motion to suppress, as long as (1) the defendant is given notice and opportunity to be heard and (2) the revised ruling is not arbitrary or made without reason. ( People v. Riva (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 981, 992.) Defendant contends he was in custody and that Officer Lynch's question, "How did you kill him," was interrogation. Because defendant was not in "custody" for Miranda purposes, his argument fails, and we need not determine whether a custodial interrogation occurred. Even though "[a]ny interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, . . . police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. . . . Miranda warnings are required only when there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him `in custody.'" ( Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) 429 U.S. 492, 495 [ 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 719].) That is, "[t]he procedural safeguards set forth in Miranda `come into play only where "custodial interrogation" is involved, and by "custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."' [Citation.]" ( In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 527.) To determine whether a person is "in custody" for Miranda purposes, courts make two discrete inquiries. "`[F]irst, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. . . . [T]he court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry: was there a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.' [Citation.]" ( Yarborough v. Alvarado (2004) 541 U.S. 652, 663 [158 L.Ed.2d 938].) "`In considering a claim that a statement or confession is inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of a defendant's rights under [ Miranda], we accept the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluation of credibility, if supported by substantial evidence.' [Citation.]" ( People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 299.) "`[T]he trial court's ruling on a Miranda issue may not be set aside by us unless it is " palpably erroneous." A ruling palpably erroneous is one lacking support of substantial evidence.'" ( In re Eric J., supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 527, italics in original.) Substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that defendant was not in custody. Defendant voluntarily walked into the sheriff's substation. Defendant voluntarily placed his driver's license on the counter between himself and the two security officers, neither of whom had authority to arrest. Defendant initiated contact with the officers. The officers were not aggressive, confrontational, or accusatory, and the officers did not use interrogation techniques to pressure defendant into speaking. The officers never told defendant he was under arrest, in custody, or not free to leave. When defendant made the statement about the knife, he stood unrestrained, in the same front lobby that he had voluntarily entered just moments before. Further, only one of the officers was present when defendant made the statement about the knife. There was no probable cause to arrest defendant, regardless of his apparent "confession," because the security officer was unaware that an actual crime had been committed or when it may have occurred. Under these circumstances, a reasonable man would objectively believe that he was not under arrest. Thus, defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes. Defendant argues that no one would feel free to leave in these circumstances and that when Officer Lissy said she would be right back, this "obviously" implied a statement that defendant should not leave. A conclusion defendant was not free to leave is not obvious. Defendant entered the substation seeking to talk about an incident about which the security officers apparently had no previous knowledge. The security officer was simply obliging defendant by going to get someone to whom defendant could talk. Although we independently determine whether the challenged statements were illegally obtained, we give great weight to the conclusions of a lower court that has previously reviewed the same evidence. ( People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 235-236.) The trial court's ruling was supported by substantial evidence and cannot be disturbed on appeal unless "palpably erroneous." Defendant also argues we should find he was in custody because "it would be a dereliction of duty" if defendant's license had been returned and he had been allowed to leave. However, an officer's unarticulated plan is not relevant to whether a suspect was in custody. The only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable person in defendant's position would have understood his situation. ( Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 442 [ 82 L.Ed.2d 317, 336].) "[A]n officer's evolving but unarticulated suspicions do not affect the objective circumstances of an interrogation or interview, and thus cannot affect the Miranda custody inquiry." ( Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 325 [ 128 L.Ed.2d 293, 300].) Accordingly, we find the trial court properly concluded defendant was not in custody and appropriately admitted defendant's statement.

IV

Failure to Instruct on Imperfect Defense of Others Defendant argues the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on defense of others when the defendant has an actual but unreasonable belief in the need to defend another from great bodily harm or death. We reject this argument because no evidence in the record supports his claim he had an actual belief in the need to defend another from great bodily harm or death. ( People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 715 [no duty to instruct on theories not supported by substantial evidence].) Defendant did not testify that he believed Andrey would inflict great bodily injury or use deadly force, or that he believed either of his sons was in danger. His testimony was limited to the fact that he remained in the car because he was personally afraid of being attacked and he joined the fight to divide Andrey and his sons. Thus, we reject this assignment of error.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

Scotland, P. J., and Hull, J., concurred.

Appellant's petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied October 11, 2006, S145529.