OPINION

BIRD, C.J.

This appeal presents the question whether an individual who fraudulently obtains aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) in violation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 11483 may also be prosecuted for perjury (Pen. Code, § 118).

I.

On April 10, 1975, respondent Margie Jenkins went to the Sacramento County Welfare Department to request AFDC benefits for her daughter. (See Welf. Inst. Code, § 11200 et seq.) She was given a lengthy document, a WR-2 form, which she was instructed to fill out in order to establish her child's eligibility for the AFDC program.

On April 15, respondent returned to the welfare department with the completed WR-2 form, and an eligibility worker reviewed the form with her. Respondent then signed the form in the space provided, underneath the sentence "I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements on this form are true and correct." Respondent reported on the WR-2 form that her gross income for April was $278. Evidence adduced at her preliminary hearing below indicated that respondent and her daughter together earned $471 gross ($412 net) for that month.

The eligibility worker explained to respondent her "reporting responsibilities," which included the requirement that respondent fill out, sign, and mail back to the welfare office each month a "Monthly Income Report," a WR-7 form. Evidence at the preliminary hearing indicated that respondent filled out WR-7 forms and obtained AFDC benefits for her daughter for some of the 13 months following her meeting with the eligibility worker. During that period, respondent and her daughter had a total gross income from various jobs of about $1,770. In her WR-7 forms for May 1975 and March 1976, respondent either underreported or failed to report her earnings. The errors in the WR-2 and WR-7 forms resulted in an overpayment of more than $200 in benefits.

Based on this evidence, the district attorney filed a two-count information in superior court. In count I, respondent was accused of a felony violation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 11483 (AFDC fraud) during the period from April 1, 1975, to May 31, 1976. Count II alleged that respondent committed perjury in violation of Penal Code section 118 when she signed the WR-2 form on April 15, 1975. Respondent moved to dismiss count II on the ground that the Welfare and Institutions Code statute proscribing AFDC fraud was a specific statute which precluded the state from prosecuting her under the more general perjury statute in the Penal Code. The superior court granted the motion, and the prosecution has appealed.

II.

In the 13 chapters constituting part 3 of division 9 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the Legislature has provided for public assistance programs for certain needy persons in this state. (§§ 11000-15520.) Chapter 1 of part 3 contains "General Provisions" pertaining to those programs (§§ 11000-11175); chapter 2 sets forth the AFDC program (§§ 11200-11489).

Among the general provisions in chapter 1 are statutes relating to applications for public aid or assistance. (§§ 11050-11063.) Section 11054 requires each applicant to file an "affirmation" of eligibility before aid or assistance may initially be approved. Such "statements" shall be on prescribed forms and " in the case of applicants for aid to families with dependent children, shall contain a written declaration that the affirmation is made under penalty of perjury." ( Ibid., italics added.) If a person signs "a statement containing such declaration" and willfully and knowingly with intent to deceive states as true any material matter which he knows to be false, he is "subject to the penalties prescribed for perjury in the Penal Code." ( Ibid.) Once an applicant has begun to receive aid, he or she may be required to fill out "new statements" at any time for purposes of continuing assistance. ( Ibid.)

Chapter 2 of part 3 specifically sets forth the AFDC program. The chapter prescribes (inter alia) the eligibility requirements for AFDC benefits (§§ 11250-11268) and requires the county to "redetermine eligibility annually" (§ 11265, subd. (a).). The county must at the time of such redetermination, and may monthly or at such other intervals as may be deemed necessary, require the family to complete a "certificate of eligibility containing a written declaration of such information as may be required to establish the continuing eligibility and amount of grant. . . ." ( Ibid.) Each adult member of the family must provide, "under penalty of perjury," the information necessary to complete the certificate of eligibility. (§ 11265, subd. (b).)

Two provisions in the "Enforcement" portion of chapter 2 make AFDC fraud illegal: sections 11482 and 11483. Both sections prohibit the obtaining of aid by means of "false statement or representation." (See People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 480-481 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 724, 462 P.2d 580].) Section 11482 also prohibits unsuccessful attempts to obtain aid. A violation of section 11482 is punishable as a misdemeanor, whereas a prosecution under section 11483 may proceed either as a misdemeanor or as an alternative felony-misdemeanor, depending upon whether or not the amount of aid illegally obtained exceeded $200. Both now and at the time of respondent's alleged crime, the punishment prescribed for a felony violation of section 11483 has been less than that prescribed for perjury under the Penal Code.

Unlike section 11054 in chapter 1, none of the AFDC statutes in chapter 2 contains language which expressly authorizes an individual's being "subject[ed] to the penalty prescribed for perjury in the Penal Code."

(1) In dismissing the perjury charge below, the superior court impliedly ruled — and respondent reasserts on appeal — that since section 11483 is a "special" statute dealing with AFDC fraud, the more "general" perjury provisions of section 118 do not apply. Reference is made to "'the general rule that where the general statute standing alone would include the same matter as the special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will be considered as an exception to the general statute whether it was passed before or after such general enactment.'" ( In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651, 654 [ 276 P.2d 593], citations omitted; People v. Gilbert, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 479.)

The Attorney General responds by relying on People v. Isaac (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 679 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 872], in which the Court of Appeal held that a prosecution for perjury under section 118 was not precluded by the misdemeanor provisions of section 11482. The Court of Appeal noted that "[a] special statute does not supplant a general statute unless all of the requirements of the general statute are covered in the special statute." (56 Cal.App.3d at p. 683.) The court then compared the elements of section 118 with those contained in section 11482. Since section 118 applies only to false statements under oath or affirmation whereas section 11482 (like § 11483) covers any false statements, the court concluded that "the rule articulated in Williamson is inapplicable. ( Ibid.)

However, this analysis is defective for it is incomplete. It is true, as the Isaac court divined from Gilbert, that the Williamson rule is applicable when each element of the "general" statute corresponds to an element on the face of the "specific" statute. However, the converse does not necessarily follow. It is not correct to assume that the rule is inapplicable whenever the general statute contains an element not found within the four corners of the "special" law. Rather, the courts must consider the context in which the statutes are placed. If it appears from the entire context that a violation of the "special" statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the "general" statute, the Williamson rule may apply even though the elements of the general statute are not mirrored on the face of the special statute.

Two cases underscore this point. In People v. Swann (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 447 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 830], the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing indicated that the defendant had made two purchases of goods using a stolen credit card. The prosecution charged the crime of forgery, a felony. (Pen. Code, § 470.) The accused moved under Penal Code section 995 to dismiss the forgery count on the ground that the Penal Code provisions relating to credit card use precluded a conviction for the more general crime of forgery. (See Pen. Code, § 484a, subd. (b)(6).) The superior court granted the section 995 motion, and the Court of Appeal affirmed.

The Court of Appeal stated that "the People do not have the power to prosecute under the general felony statute in a case such as this where the facts of the alleged offense parallel the acts proscribed by a specific statute." (213 Cal.App.2d at p. 449.) The court noted that the crime of forgery contained as an element a requirement that the accused "sign" the credit instrument, whereas the offense of credit card use applied on its face to any "use" of the credit card. ( Id., at p. 451.) Nevertheless, the court held the credit card use law was a special statute precluding prosecution for forgery, because "the Legislature in enacting section 484a . . . contemplated false or unauthorized signatures on credit invoices by parties engaged in the misdemeanor use of credit cards under subsection (6) of subdivision (b) of the statute since such signatures are required of credit card users in the customary use of such cards." ( Ibid.)

A similar holding was recently rendered by this court in People v. Ruster (1976) 16 Cal.3d 690 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 153, 548 P.2d 353, 80 A.L.R.3d 1269]. In Ruster an individual had used a false name and a false social security number to obtain unemployment insurance benefits. Convicted of grand theft and 14 counts of forgery, the defendant argued that these convictions were barred by section 2101 of the Unemployment Insurance Code, which makes it "a misdemeanor to willfully make a false statement or representation . . . to obtain . . . any benefit or payment. . . ." The court agreed.

The reasoning employed by the court in precluding the forgery convictions is particularly relevant here. The court observed that forgery contained one element — "signing the name of another, or of a fictitious person" to a document — which was not a requirement on the face of the unemployment insurance fraud statute. (16 Cal.3d at p. 698.) Nevertheless, the court held that section 2101 was a special statute which barred a conviction under the general forgery statutes. The court discussed Swann, supra, with approval, and concluded, "[h]ere, too, the Legislature unquestionably contemplated that the special statute might be violated by means of forgery. Indeed, applying for aid under a false identity, which entails signing eligibility questionnaires and pay certification cards with a false name, is apparently one of the most common forms of unemployment insurance fraud." (16 Cal.3d at p. 699.)

In the present appeal, it is true that the assertedly "general" crime of perjury requires as an element of the offense that a false statement be made under oath or affirmation whereas the crime of AFDC fraud applies on its face to any false statement made to obtain benefits. However, this fact does not per se render the principles of Williamson inapplicable. Consideration must be given to the entire context surrounding the "special" statute to determine the true overlap of the statutes and to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. To the extent that Isaac, supra, holds to the contrary, it is hereby disapproved.

Respondent argues that although section 11483 contains on its face no requirement that a person's false statement to obtain AFDC benefits be made under oath or penalty of perjury, reference to other portions of the Welfare and Institutions Code reveals that in fact a person cannot obtain AFDC benefits without making such a statement. Thus, an initial application for AFDC benefits must contain an affirmation of eligibility, including "a written declaration that the affirmation is made under penalty of perjury." (§ 11054.) Moreover, both the annual redeterminations of eligibility and the monthly income reports require the family to complete a certificate of eligibility "under penalty of perjury." (§ 11265.)

The Attorney General suggests two factual situations in which an individual assertedly could be guilty of AFDC fraud without violating the perjury provision of section 118. The first assertedly would occur "when the applicant is detected as making a false application prior to the initial declaration of eligibility." However, this example erroneously assumes that an applicant can "mak[e] a false application" and obtain aid without completing the application under penalty of perjury. That assumption is squarely refuted by the plain terms of section 11054, requiring all AFDC applications to be completed under penalty of perjury "before approval of assistance. . . ."

The Attorney General's second example relates to an AFDC applicant who has lawfully obtained AFDC benefits but who subsequently has a "material change of circumstance which lowers the amount of benefits he should receive. If the applicant does not notify the appropriate authorities pursuant to his WR-2 certification, he will continue to receive benefits until the next WR-7 form arrives. If the applicant then terminates his receipt of benefits, and never completes the WR-7 form, no perjury is committed."

However, the facts set forth in this example would not result in criminal liability either for perjury under section 118 or for fraud under section 11483 Initially, it is not at all obvious that a failure to report income under the postulated circumstances would amount to a "false statement or representation or . . . impersonation or other fraudulent device. . . ." But even assuming this element of section 11483 to be present, the manner in which the AFDC program is administered would preclude the applicant from actually obtaining benefits to which he or she is not entitled. Therefore, there would be no violation of section 11483

It would appear that there are no situations in which an individual can violate section 11483 without also committing perjury. The specific-versus-general rule of Williamson, Swann, Gilbert, and Ruster would therefore seem to be applicable.

(2a) However, due to the unique circumstances of the present case, this conclusion does not end the inquiry. (3) The doctrine that a specific statute precludes any prosecution under a general statute is a rule designed to ascertain and carry out legislative intent. The fact that the Legislature has enacted a specific statute covering much the same ground as a more general law is a powerful indication that the Legislature intended the specific provision alone to apply. Indeed, in most instances, an overlap of provisions is determinative of the issue of legislative intent and "requires us to give effect to the special provision alone in the face of the dual applicability of the general provision . . . and the special provision. . . ." ( People v. Gilbert, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 481.)

(2b) In the present case, however, there exists what can only be characterized as overwhelming indications of a contrary legislative intent. In this limited situation, the usually decisive rule that a specific statute precludes prosecution under a general statute cannot apply.

The language of two relevant provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code, i.e., sections 11054 and 11265, is significant. Section 11054, which is a general provision applicable to all of the public assistance programs in part 3 of division 9, requires applicants for these programs merely to file an "affirmation" of eligibility prior to receiving aid. In the next sentence, the statute expressly mentions the AFDC program and states that "in the case of applicants for aid to families with dependent children," these "statements" of eligibility "shall contain a written declaration that the affirmation is made under penalty of perjury." Thus, of all the programs in part 3, only AFDC applications are required by section 11054 to be completed under penalty of perjury.

The third sentence of section 11054 contains the statement that "[a]ny person signing a statement containing such declaration . . . is subject to the penalty prescribed for perjury in the Penal Code" if he or she willfully and knowingly and with intent to deceive makes a false statement. (Italics added.) The explicit function of this third sentence is to authorize a perjury prosecution under section 118. Moreover, that legislative purpose is aimed specifically and exclusively at AFDC applications. The only referent for "a statement containing such declaration" in the third sentence is language in the second sentence which refers to a "statement . . . contain[ing] a written declaration" that the affirmation of eligibility is made under penalty of perjury. The quoted language from the second sentence, in turn, applies solely to AFDC applicants. The conclusion is unavoidable that section 118 has been incorporated into the AFDC program by virtue of section 11054, at least as to initial applications for benefits.

The situation is only slightly different with respect to annual redeterminations of aid and monthly eligibility reports. Section 11054 permits a county to require "new statements" at any time for purposes of continuing assistance. Section 11265, which is one of the AFDC provisions in chapter 2, obliges a family receiving AFDC to complete a "certificate of eligibility" at each annual redetermination of eligibility. It also permits the county to require such certificates "monthly or at such other intervals as may be deemed necessary. . . ." Each adult member of the family is obligated to provide "under penalty of perjury" the information necessary to complete such certificate.

Under other circumstances, it might be possible to infer that section 118 does not apply to misstatements on such certificates since neither section 11265 nor any other provision in chapter 2 contains language like that of section 11054, explicitly making such misstatements "subject to the penalty prescribed for perjury in the Penal Code." However, the history of section 11265 reveals this inference to be incorrect.

Prior to 1971, section 11265 did not contain the requirement that information relevant to a certificate of eligibility be provided under penalty of perjury. Instead, it provided that "[a]ny person signing such certificate who willfully states therein any material matter which he knows to be false is guilty of a misdemeanor." (Italics added.) Relying in large part upon this language, the Court of Appeal held that section 11265 was a special statute pertaining to redetermination certificates and thus precluded prosecutions for perjury for any misstatements. ( People v. Smith (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 134 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 258] .)

In 1971, the Legislature deleted the language relied upon in Smith. (Sen. Bill No. 796 (1971 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 1971, ch. 578, § 25, p. 1154, eff. Aug. 13, 1971.) In place of the misdemeanor provision, the Legislature inserted the present sentence, obligating a family to provide the necessary information "under penalty of perjury." Shortly after this substitution was made in Senate Bill No. 796, an analysis of the bill was prepared by the Legislative Analyst. The proposed amendment to section 11265 was described as follows: "Section 25 of this bill proposes elimination of the current provisions defining attempts to fraudently secure AFDC assistance as a misdemeanor. It further provides that persons attempting to secure such aid fraudently shall be deemed to be guilty of perjury." (Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 796 (as amended Aug. 10, 1971) by Leg. Analyst, at p. 17, original underscoring deleted, italics added.)

In light of this history, the conclusion appears unavoidable that the Legislature intended the perjury provisions of the Penal Code to be available as an alternative charge for misstatements made in connection with annual redeterminations and monthly eligibility reports.

Respondent tenders two arguments in support of her contention that section 11483 bars prosecution under section 118. Initially, she points out that the penalty provisions of section 11483 were enacted in 1970, well after the language had been added to section 11054 explicitly authorizing perjury prosecutions. To the extent these two statutes conflict, she argues, the later enactment (§ 11483) should prevail as an implied repeal of the older statute.

The difficulty with this contention is that it proves too much. If the 1970 amendments to section 11483 constituted an implied repeal of the language in section 11054, then it would seem to follow that the 1971 amendment to section 11265 impliedly repealed both sections 11482 and 11483. This court can discern no such legislative intent. The more logical interpretation is that the Legislature has permitted perjury prosecutions as an alternative to AFDC fraud.

Finally, respondent points out that section 11483 contains a requirement that "all actions necessary to secure restitution shall be brought against persons in violation of this section as provided in Sections 12250 and 12850." (Cf. fn. 2, ante, at p. 498.) In People v. McGee (1977) 19 Cal.3d 948, 955 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 657, 568 P.2d 382], this court held that this provision "must be accorded mandatory effect" and that the state could not bring a criminal action for AFDC fraud until it had sought restitution. These holdings were based squarely on our finding that this restitution requirement was intended by the Legislature to "provide protection for individuals accused of welfare fraud. . . ." ( Id., at p. 961, original italics deleted.) (4) Respondent complains that if a perjury prosecution is permissible as an alternative to section 11483, the state can circumvent this protection by the simple device of charging perjury rather than AFDC fraud, thereby frustrating legislative intent. It is noted that a divided Court of Appeal in People v. Batten (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 848 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 567] approved a perjury prosecution for misstatements in obtaining AFDC benefits without requiring the state to conform to the restitution requirement of McGee.

Respondent's argument has merit. Allowing a perjury prosecution to go forward where the state has made no attempt at restitution would fly squarely in the face of the Legislature's repeated insistence on a request for restitution. That intent was manifested for the first time in 1957 (see People v. McGee, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 959) and was reiterated in the 1970, 1977, and 1979 amendments to section 11483

However, the consequence of accepting this argument should not be to bar prosecutions for perjury. Rather, the various legislative intents can be easily harmonized. To carry out the Legislature's oft-expressed wishes with regard to restitution, no prosecution under section 118 for AFDC fraud may be commenced until the restitution requirements set forth in section 11483 are satisfied.

III.

Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Manuel, J., and Newman, J., concurred.