Summary
regarding interest under General Statutes § 52-192a
Summary of this case from Bower v. D'OnfroOpinion
(9632)
By statute ( 52-141) a party may set off against a judgment rendered against it in certain civil actions any debt it holds against the party to whom damages have been awarded. A complaint for such setoff must be filed within twenty-four hours after final judgment. The plaintiff P Co., a New York brokerage corporation, sought to recover on two promissory notes executed by the defendant W, a former employee. W filed a counterclaim alleging, inter alia, that after P Co. fired him, P Co. employees made false and defamatory statements about him to his clients. The trial court rendered judgment on the $440,000 jury verdict for P Co. on the complaint, and rendered judgment on a separate $440,000.18 verdict for W on his counterclaim. Following an appeal to this court, P Co. was awarded $260,000 in prejudgment interest. The trial court subsequently denied P Co.'s claim for a setoff of the awards on the ground that P Co. had failed to file its complaint seeking a setoff within twenty-four hours after the final judgment, and P Co. appealed to this court. Held that because the judgments rendered by the trial court in the underlying action here were not set aside as a result of the appeal in which P Co. was awarded interest, those judgments were final at the time that they were rendered and, thus, P Co.'s complaint for a setoff was not timely filed.
Argued October 2, 1991
Decision released December 31, 1991
Action to recover monies allegedly owed on a promissory note, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, where the defendant filed a counterclaim, and tried to the jury before Harrigan, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff on the complaint and verdict and judgment for the defendant on the counterclaim; thereafter, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for interest, and the plaintiff appealed to this court, which remanded the matter with direction to award interest; subsequently, the court, Thim, J., denied the plaintiff's motion for setoff, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Jan A. Marcus, with whom was Alan R. Spirer, for the appellant (plaintiff).
John Haven Chapman, with whom, on the brief, was Brian E. Moran, for the appellee (defendant).
The plaintiff, Paine Webber Jackson Curtis, Inc. (PaineWebber), appeals following the trial court's denial of its motion for setoff pursuant to General Statutes 52-141 (b)(4). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
This motion for setoff arose out of an action by the plaintiff against the defendant, Geoffrey Winters, for sums due on a promissory note. The defendant filed a counterclaim for tortious misconduct. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff on its complaint for $440,000 and for the defendant on his counterclaim for $440,000.18. On May 15, 1989, separate judgments were rendered. The plaintiff moved for prejudgment interest pursuant to General Statutes 52-192 (a) because the plaintiff's award exceeded its offer of judgment for $295,000. We reversed the trial court's denial of this motion for interest and directed an award of prejudgment interest to the plaintiff. Paine Webber Jackson Curtis, Inc. v. Winters, 22 Conn. App. 640, 579 A.2d 545, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 820, 581 A.2d 1055 (1990).
On August 21, 1990, the day this court issued its decision, the plaintiff filed this complaint and motion for setoff pursuant to General Statutes 52-141. The trial court denied this motion holding that the plaintiff had failed to file its complaint within twenty-four hours after final judgment as required by 52-141 (b)(4). The plaintiff argues that the court's granting of a setoff in the related case of Connecticut Bank Trust Co. v. Winters, 26 Conn. App. 317, 600 A.2d 1046 (1991) was inconsistent with the denial of its motion for set-off in this case. Connecticut Bank Trust Co. v. Winters, supra, is a foreclosure proceeding in which PaineWebber has a lien on the proceeds remaining from the sale of Winters' property. We note that a motion to consolidate this appeal with Connecticut Bank Trust Co. v. Winters, supra, has been denied. We will consider this appeal independent of that case. The only issue in this appeal is whether the term "final judgment" in 52-141 (b)(4) applies to the trial court's judgments on May 15, 1989, or to this court's decision on August 21, 1990. We hold that final judgment was rendered in this case on May 15, 1989.
General Statutes 52-141 provides in pertinent part: "(a) In a civil action for trespass to real or personal property or for a tort, unaccompanied by force, resulting in consequential injury, a defendant may set off against any judgment rendered against him any debt which he holds, jointly or severally, against the plaintiff, subject to the conditions contained in subsections (b) and (c) of this section. "(b) . . . (4) Any such set-off shall be claimed by filing a complaint in the court in which the judgment has been rendered within twenty-four hours after final judgment."
Appellate Court jurisdiction is restricted to appeals from judgments that are final. General Statutes 51-197a (a). Therefore, this court had jurisdiction over the original appeal by the plaintiff concerning the award of prejudgment interest. The term final judgment, however, lacks a "`plain and unambiguous'" definition. Capalbo v. Planning Zoning Board of Appeals, 208 Conn. 480, 486, 547 A.2d 528 (1988). Generally, a pending appeal's effect on an otherwise final judgment presents a very difficult problem in applying the concept of finality because of the lack of formalized rules. Id.; Preisner v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 203 Conn. 407, 413-14, 525 A.2d 83 (1987). Due to the absence of formalized rules, our Supreme Court has held "that the relationship between a pending appeal and a judgment depends upon the nature of the issue to be addressed." Preisner v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., supra, 414.
The present case involves the commencement of the statute of limitations. A pending appeal does not affect the finality of a trial court's judgment when the issue involves the triggering of the statute of limitations. Varley v. Varley, 181 Conn. 58, 60-61, 434 A.2d 312 (1980). Our Supreme Court has noted that "[a]n appeal does not vacate a judgment; it serves only to stay the enforcement of the rights acquired by the successful litigant." Saunders v. Saunders, 140 Conn. 140, 146, 98 A.2d 815 (1953). Therefore, the trial court's judgment is final "unless set aside by this court . . . ." Id.
This court's decision in Paine Webber Jackson Curtis, Inc. v. Winters, supra, 22 Conn. App. 648-56, to award interest pursuant to 52-192a did not operate to set aside the original judgments in the case. A party seeking an award of interest as allowed by 52-192a must file a posttrial motion because the award can be determined only after a judgment has been rendered. Id., 653; see Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 192 Conn. 301, 310, 472 A.2d 316 (1984). The determination of postjudgment motions are separate and distinct from the original judgments. "Rulings on postjudgment motions to modify an original judgment where the court has continuing jurisdiction are final judgments." Pascal v. Pascal, 2 Conn. App. 472, 476, 481 A.2d 68 (1984).
Here, the only mistake in the original judgments was the trial court's failure to award the plaintiff interest under 52-192a. This court's decision to award interest did not require us to examine or to disturb the underlying substantive issues that were decided by the trial court. Paine Webber Jackson Curtis, Inc. v. Winters, supra. Thus, the final judgment in this case was rendered on May 15, 1989. The statute of limitations for the 52-141 motion to set off was triggered that same day. As a result, the plaintiff's complaint and motion for setoff filed on August 21, 1990, was untimely.