Based on a Superior Court jury's answers to special questions that the defendant knowingly induced the plaintiffs to delay commencing their action to collect a deficiency on a promissory note after foreclosure, and that the plaintiffs' reliance on that inducement was reasonable, a Superior Court judge entered judgment for the plaintiffs. On appeal, the defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish estoppel to bar his affirmative defense of the statute of limitations. The Appeals Court reversed the judgment, concluding that once the plaintiffs decided to bring an action and hired an attorney to file suit the "circumstances inducing the delay [had] ceased." Pagliarini v. Iannaco, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 605 (2003). The attorney was hired, and directed by his client, to file suit, one month before the statute of limitations ran. But the attorney failed to file suit until four months later. Because there was no evidence proffered by the plaintiffs to suggest either that the defendant had induced the attorney to delay filing the suit, or that the time remaining was inadequate to institute the action, the Appeals Court concluded that judgment should have entered for the defendant because the plaintiff had not complied with the applicable statute of limitations. We granted the plaintiffs' application for further appellate review.

The plaintiffs have the burden of proving that the defendant is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a bar to their claim. Clickner v. Lowell, 422 Mass. 539, 544 (1996). It has long been the rule that to meet this burden, a plaintiff must show that the "statements of the defendant lulled the plaintiff into the false belief that it was not necessary . . . to commence action within the statutory period of limitations . . . that the plaintiff was induced by these statements to refrain from bringing suit, as otherwise [the plaintiff] would have done, and was thereby harmed, and that the defendant `knew or had reasonable cause to know that such consequence might follow.'" Ford v. Rogovin, 289 Mass. 549, 552 (1935), quoting Boston A. R.R. v.Reardon, 226 Mass. 286, 291 (1917). A plaintiff must also show that reliance on the defendant's statements was reasonable. Knight v.Lawrence, 331 Mass. 293, 295 (1954). Implicit in these requirements is that the defendant's inducements caused the plaintiffs to delay taking appropriate, timely legal action. Although the jury found that the defendant's statements induced some delay in the bringing of the lawsuit, they could not have found, based on the evidence, that those statements caused the plaintiffs to delay taking action until after the statute of limitations had expired.

We agree with the Appeals Court that "[e]quitable estoppel will not apply if a reasonable time remains within the limitations period for filing the action once the circumstances inducing the delay have ceased,"Pagliarini v. Iannaco, supra at 605, and that once the plaintiffs hired an attorney and directed that suit be filed, those circumstances had ceased. While the question whether the time remaining was reasonable (or not) may be one for the jury to decide where the facts are disputed or the matter rests largely on inference, the evidence presented in this case warrants but one conclusion. There was no evidence on which the jury could have found that the time remaining was not reasonable for the filing of a five paragraph straightforward complaint for the collection of a deficiency. Where the plaintiffs bore the burden of proof, the defendant's motion for a directed verdict should have been allowed. Judgment reversed.