Lee A. Mencacci, Anthony P. Brown, Galveston, for Respondent.

John Joyce III, Harolyn Denise Nance Pierce, Joseph E. Hoffer, Robert Allen Schulman, San Antonio, for Petitioner.

Elizabeth G. Bloch, Dale Wainwright, Austin, for Amicus Curiae Texas Charter Schools Association.

Kathryn E. Boatman, Leah Nommensen, Houston, Paige Dusthimer, Thomas Anderson Sage, Houston, for Amicus Curiae Charter School Solutions d/b/a Harmony Education Foundation and Harmony Public Schools.

Justice Busby delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Lehrmann, Justice Boyd, Justice Devine, Justice Blacklock, and Justice Bland joined.

This tax-exemption case concerns privately owned real property in Galveston County. Petitioner Odyssey 2020 Academy subleases the property and uses it to operate a public open-enrollment charter school. Odyssey contractually agreed to pay the property owners’ ad valorem taxes, and it requested that the Galveston Central Appraisal District exempt the property from taxation under section 11.11(a) of the Tax Code as "property owned by this state." Odyssey relies on section 12.128(a) of the Education Code, which provides that property a charter school purchases or leases with state funds "is considered to be public property for all purposes under state law."

The District denied Odyssey's exemption request and Odyssey sought review in district court, which granted summary judgment for the District. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that Odyssey has only a leasehold interest and section 12.128 does not in fact give Odyssey either legal or equitable title to the property.

We agree with the District, trial court, and court of appeals: Odyssey is not entitled to an exemption from the ad valorem tax. Property encumbered by a lease is taxed to the lessor who owns the underlying fee interest, and not even Odyssey contends that section 12.128 actually strips the private lessors of their fee ownership. We assume that section 12.128 "consider[s]" property to be publicly owned for tax purposes if a charter school has a leasehold interest in it. But our Constitution does not allow the Legislature to recharacterize a property interest that is not in fact publicly owned so that it qualifies for an exemption.

The Texas Constitution sets detailed limits on the Legislature's authority to create exemptions because they undermine the guarantee that "[t]axation shall be equal and uniform," imposing a greater burden on some taxpayers rather than sharing the burden among all taxpayers equally. We have long enforced these constitutional limits, and our precedent is clear that the Legislature may not treat the public as the owner of a fee estate it does not actually own. See Tex. Tpk. Co. v. Dallas County , 153 Tex. 474, 271 S.W.2d 400, 402 (1954) ("Public ownership, for tax-exemption purposes, must grow out of the facts ... [and] may not be created or conferred by mere legislative, or even contractual, declaration."). To hold that the Legislature can alter the facts by statute in order to trigger an exemption, we would have to overrule many of our decisions. Moreover, we would eliminate the constraining force of the carefully drawn constitutional limits on exemptions—limits that the Constitution ranks as important enough to provide expressly that laws exceeding them are null and void.

If the people of Texas want to exempt any property owner who leases to a charter school and take that additional tax burden on themselves, they can do so by amending the Constitution. And such an exemption may very well be good policy. But so far, the people have seen fit to permit an exemption for real property leased to a school only if that property "is owned by a church or by a strictly religious society." TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 2. It is not our place to override their policy judgment. See Tex. So. Univ. v. Villarreal , 620 S.W.3d 899, –––– (Tex. 2021). We therefore hold that the Constitution does not permit an exemption for Odyssey on these facts.

BACKGROUND

The State of Texas has authorized Odyssey to operate public open-enrollment charter schools and provide public education to children in Galveston County and surrounding areas. Some Odyssey schools are located on property that Odyssey owns, and the District has designated that property as exempt from ad valorem taxation. Part of Odyssey's main campus is located on property it does not own but uses under a long-term sublease from private owners. This dispute concerns whether the property subleased by Odyssey is exempt from taxation.

The owners of the property are Aneff, LLC and Alisan, LLC, Delaware Limited Liability Companies based in Boca Raton, Florida. Safeway Stores, Inc. leased the property from the LLCs beginning in 1976. Safeway subsequently assigned its tenancy under the lease to HEB Grocery Company, L.P.

HEB subleased the property to Odyssey in 2009. Under the sublease, Odyssey agreed to pay HEB monthly rent. Odyssey also agreed to pay ad valorem taxes assessed against the property. Odyssey has no right to purchase any of the leased premises.

In December 2016, Odyssey requested that the District exempt the property from ad valorem taxes as "property owned by this state" under section 11.11 of the Tax Code, pointing out that section 12.128(a) of the Education Code considers property purchased or leased by a charter school to be "public property for all purposes." Odyssey sought the exemption for the 2009 tax year and all subsequent years. The District denied Odyssey's exemption request, and Odyssey exhausted its administrative remedies by protesting the denial to the appraisal review board. The board denied the protest, and Odyssey sued in district court in Galveston County. In its petition, Odyssey sought review of the denial under Chapter 42 of the Tax Code and also requested a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief establishing its entitlement to an exemption, as well as attorneys’ fees. Both the District and Odyssey moved for summary judgment.

The trial court granted summary judgment for the District, ordering that Odyssey take nothing. Odyssey appealed and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the property is not publicly owned as required for a section 11.11 exemption. 585 S.W.3d 530, 534–35 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019). The court reasoned that section 12.128 of the Education Code does not provide a tax exemption, nor does it "purport to confer legal or equitable title in leased property to a charter school that leases the property from a private entity...." Id. at 536. It also held that Odyssey's claim for declaratory relief was properly dismissed as redundant. Id. We granted Odyssey's petition for review.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of review and applicable law

We review the trial court's summary judgment de novo. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott , 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). On cross-motions for summary judgment, each party bears the burden of establishing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. City of Garland v. Dall. Morning News , 22 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex. 2000). When the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, the reviewing court must determine all questions presented and render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered. Id.

This case also involves the interpretation of constitutional and statutory language, which we review de novo "to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent." Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers , 282 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Tex. 2009). We look for that intent first and foremost in the plain language of the constitutional or statutory provision. Lippincott v. Whisenhunt , 462 S.W.3d 507, 509 (Tex. 2015). We give effect to all words of a provision and avoid constructions that would render any part of it meaningless. Spradlin v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc. , 34 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. 2000).

These summary judgment motions require us to decide whether Odyssey is entitled to claim a tax exemption. A foundational principle of our Texas tax system is that "[t]axation shall be equal and uniform." TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (a). Applying this principle, the Constitution provides that real and tangible personal property "shall be taxed in proportion to its value"—so-called ad valorem taxation—"unless exempt as required or permitted by this Constitution." Id. § 1(b). The Constitution requires certain exemptions and specifies additional exemptions that it permits the Legislature to adopt by statute. See, e.g., id. § 1 (d). But the Constitution also provides that "all laws exempting [other] property from taxation ... shall be null and void." Id. § 2(a).

The Tax Code's chapter on taxable property begins by reiterating the constitutional command that "[a]ll real and tangible personal property that this state has jurisdiction to tax is taxable unless exempt by law." TEX. TAX CODE § 11.01(a). "Statutory exemptions from taxation are subject to strict construction because they undermine equality and uniformity by placing a greater burden on some taxpaying businesses and individuals rather than placing the burden on all taxpayers equally." N. Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. Willacy Cnty. Appraisal Dist. , 804 S.W.2d 894, 899 (Tex. 1991). Thus, we have held that "an exemption cannot be raised by implication, but must affirmatively appear." Tex. Student Housing Auth. v. Brazos Cnty. Appraisal Dist. , 460 S.W.3d 137, 141 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Bullock v. Nat'l Bancshares Corp. , 584 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tex. 1979) ). The taxpayer has the burden to "clearly show" that an exemption applies, and all doubts are resolved against the granting of an exemption. Id. But construing exemptions narrowly does not mean disregarding the words used by the Legislature. See AHF–Arbors at Huntsville I, LLC v. Walker Cnty. Appraisal Dist. , 410 S.W.3d 831, 837 (Tex. 2012).

II. Odyssey may not claim a tax exemption for private property it leases.

A. Ownership of leased property determines tax liability and the right to an exemption.

To decide whether Odyssey is entitled to a tax exemption, we must begin with a clear understanding of what property is being taxed and to whom. This Court has long recognized that property taxes are tied to the property rather than to a person or entity. See, e.g., State v. Wynne , 134 Tex. 455, 133 S.W.2d 951, 956 (Tex. 1939). "A person who owns property is generally liable for property taxes assessed on that property, and a person who does not own property generally has no property tax liability." Willacy Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Sebastian Cotton & Grain, Ltd. , 555 S.W.3d 29, 42 (Tex. 2018) ; see TEX. TAX CODE § 32.07(a) ("[P]roperty taxes are the personal obligation of the person who owns or acquires the property on January 1 of the year for which the tax is imposed."). Either legal or equitable title can be sufficient to demonstrate ownership. Sebastian Cotton & Grain , 555 S.W.3d at 46 ; AHF–Arbors at Huntsville I , 410 S.W.3d at 839.

Sections 25.06 and 25.07 of the Tax Code specifically address the tax liability of an owner of real property and the owner of a leasehold interest in that property. Generally, "[p]roperty encumbered by a leasehold or other possessory interest ... shall be listed in [the appraisal records in] the name of"—and therefore taxed to—"the owner of the property so encumbered." TEX. TAX CODE § 25.06(a). There is an exception to this general rule: if the property "is exempt from taxation to the owner of the estate," then generally the "leasehold or other possessory interest ... shall be listed in the name of the owner of the possessory interest" if it may last at least one year. Id. § 25.07(a). But the Code includes no special rule for the reverse situation in which the owner of a leasehold interest could claim an exemption because none is necessary: the lessee's interest is not taxed under the general rule of section 25.06. See Cnty. of Dall. Collector v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Dall. , 41 S.W.3d 739, 744 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.) ("Unless the leasehold involves exempt property, the leasehold is not independently taxed, but rather, it is subsumed within the value of the fee simple estate.").

In this case, the two LLCs are listed on the appraisal rolls as the owners of the real property at issue, and it is undisputed that they hold both legal and equitable title to the property. The District is not taxing Odyssey's leasehold interest; Odyssey owes taxes only because it contractually bound itself to pay the LLCs’ taxes as owners of the property. Odyssey can thus obtain an exemption by showing that either (1) the property is exempt from being taxed to the LLCs as owners of the fee estate, or (2) Odyssey's lease changes the property's ownership for tax purposes so that it becomes exempt.

Odyssey pursues the latter course by claiming an exemption under section 11.11 of the Tax Code and under Article XI section 9 and Article VIII section 2 of the Constitution. Section 11.11's general rule is that "property owned by this state ... is exempt from taxation if the property is used for public purposes." TEX. TAX CODE § 11.11(a). Noting that "[a]n open-enrollment charter school is part of the public school system of this state," Odyssey argues that section 12.128(a) of the Education Code deems any property it leases with state funds "to be public property for all purposes"—which necessarily includes ownership of the property for tax purposes. Because the property is considered owned by a public entity and is used exclusively for public school purposes, this argument runs, the property is exempt under section 11.11 and the Constitution.

We analyze Odyssey's argument in two parts. First, we consider whether section 12.128 characterizes the property interest being taxed—the fee estate—as public property for tax purposes. Second, if so, we address how that statutory characterization impacts Odyssey's entitlement to the tax exemptions it claims.

B. Section 12.128 considers leased property to be public but does not alter fee ownership.

During the earliest tax years at issue, section 12.128 of the Education Code provided in relevant part:

(a) Property purchased or leased with [state] funds received by a charter holder ... after September 1, 2001:

(1) is considered to be public property for all purposes under state law;

(2) is property of this state held in trust by the charter holder for the benefit of the students of the open-enrolment charter school; and

(3) may be used only for a purpose for which a school district may use school district property.

The section goes on to limit the charter school's ability to transfer, sell, or otherwise dispose of such property and to provide for the property's disposition in the event the school ceases to operate.

In 2019, the Legislature divided this section into two parts: section 12.128(a), which states the three rules quoted above for purchased property; and section 12.128(a-1), which restates the same rules for leased property. Although this change was not substantive, the Legislature also added section (b-1), which provides that "while an open-enrollment charter school is in operation, the charter holder holds title to any property described by subsection (a) or (b) [addressing purchases prior to September 1, 2001] and may exercise complete control over the property as permitted under the law." TEX. EDUC. CODE § 12.128(b-1).

Focusing on the language of subsection (a) (now subsection (a-1)) that considers leased property to be "public property for all purposes under state law," Odyssey argues that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the statute's failure to mention taxation or exemptions means that it does not operate as to those subjects. Section 12.128 does not say "all purposes except for exemption from taxation," or even "all purposes under this section," as Odyssey notes some other statutes do. In Odyssey's view, taxes, exemptions, and all other subjects state law could contemplate are necessarily encompassed by the words "all purposes under state law." Moreover, the section does not say that only the leasehold interest is public for tax purposes; it says that the "property leased" with state funds is considered public. Odyssey recognizes, however, that the statute does not "usurp the private owner's remaining [fee] interest."

The District responds that section 12.128 does not speak to tax exemptions for leased real property. Nor does it establish that the entire property is publicly owned for purposes of claiming an exemption under Tax Code section 11.11, as the property Odyssey acquired with public funds is limited to its leasehold interest. Section 12.128 does not say that if state funds are used to acquire any interest in property, then all interests in that property—all sticks in the bundle of property rights—are deemed to be publicly owned. The District points out that the statute does not mention the concept of ownership or say that the public owns more property than Odyssey paid for.

The District also contends that under Odyssey's proposed interpretation, any person leasing property to a charter school is effectively divested of their private ownership interest. The property immediately becomes "public property for all purposes" and is no longer privately owned. Thus, the landlord's ownership interest is automatically forfeited.

We assume for purposes of our analysis that Odyssey's interpretation of the statute is correct. We also conclude that this interpretation does not strip private owners of their fee ownership, as the District asserts. "A court may not judicially amend a statute by adding words that are not contained in the language of the statute. Instead, it must apply the statute as written." Lippincott , 462 S.W.3d at 508. As Odyssey argues, the statute applies "for all purposes." We cannot add a proviso "except for tax purposes." Nor can we look to the rule that an exemption must affirmatively appear, as Odyssey is not primarily arguing that section 12.128 itself provides a tax exemption. Rather, it argues that section 12.128 considers the property public so that it falls within different provisions that expressly exempt publicly owned property from taxation (which we discuss in Part II.C. below).

Section 12.128 ensures that restrictions on state funds will carry forward when they are used to acquire real and personal property. It does so by deeming the property leased to be public for all purposes, requiring charter schools to hold it in trust, and providing that it may be used and disposed of only for school purposes. But as Odyssey concedes, the statute does not alter the normal rules regarding acquisition and divestiture of title to real property held by others. Thus, although we assume that section 12.128 characterizes the underlying property as public when it is leased by a public charter school using state funds, the statute does not transfer actual ownership of that property.

Section 12.128(b-1) confirms this conclusion. As discussed above, this subsection provides that "the charter holder holds title to any property described by subsection (a) or (b) and may exercise complete control over the property." TEX. EDUC. CODE § 12.128(b-1). Subsections (a) and (b) refer to purchases of property; the Legislature did not include a lessee under subsection (a-1) in the list of charter holders that hold title to their property. "We presume the legislature chose statutory language deliberately and purposefully." Tex. Lottery Comm'n v. First State Bank of DeQueen , 325 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Tex. 2010). Thus, we conclude that the Legislature intended a charter school to be an actual owner—holding title in trust for the public—only when the school purchases the land.

In sum, we agree with Odyssey that state funds retain their public character when a charter school uses them to purchase or lease property. And we assume that section 12.128 characterizes the property Odyssey leased with state funds as public property for taxation purposes. But section 12.128 does not deprive the private lessors of their fee ownership of the property.

C. The Constitution does not authorize an exemption for leased property that is privately owned but deemed public by statute.

Having assumed that section 12.128 considers property to be public when it is leased by a charter school, we next address whether the Constitution allows Odyssey to claim an exemption based on that statutory characterization. As explained above, all real property must be taxed unless the Constitution either requires or permits an exemption. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (b). The exemptions Odyssey claims fall into two categories: exemptions for certain public property and certain school property. But as we discuss below, our cases uniformly hold that the first category requires actual public ownership of the property, and the second requires that the owners of the property and the operators of the school be the same people or entities. A statute that deems property public without altering actual ownership does not help Odyssey meet either constitutional requirement.

1. Exemptions for publicly owned property

Odyssey contends that section 12.128 ’s characterization of the leased property as public allows it to claim an exemption not only under Tax Code section 11.11, but also under Article XI section 9 and the public property clause of Article VIII section 2 of the Constitution. We disagree.

As a preliminary matter, we note that Article XI section 9 is a distinct constitutional ground for exemption that is "self-operative," requiring no legislation to implement it. A&M Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Bryan , 143 Tex. 348, 184 S.W.2d 914, 915 (1945). Odyssey did not exhaust its administrative remedies by asking the District for this exemption, nor did it raise Article XI section 9 in the trial court, assign the failure to grant that exemption as error in the court of appeals, or mention the exemption in its petition seeking this Court's review. Rather, it raised the exemption for the first time in its merits brief after it had been addressed in an amicus brief. The issue of Odyssey's entitlement to an Article XI section 9 exemption is therefore not properly presented for our review. Nevertheless, considering Article XI section 9 would not change the outcome of this case because that exemption—like Article VIII section 2 of the Constitution and Tax Code section 11.11 —requires actual public ownership.

a. A public entity must actually own the property.

Article XI section 9 is a constitutionally required exemption for "[t]he property of counties, cities, and towns, owned and held only for public purposes." Decades ago, we interpreted this section broadly to exempt "any property publicly owned and held only for public purposes." Lower Colo. River Auth. v. Chem. Bank & Trust Co. , 144 Tex. 326, 190 S.W.2d 48, 52 (1945). Thus, its scope is now similar to the public property clause of Article VIII section 2, which permits "the legislature ..., by general laws, [to] exempt from taxation public property used for public purposes." TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 2. One key difference between these provisions is that Article XI section 9 "exempts certain property by its own terms," while Article VIII section 2 "authorizes the Legislature to grant exemptions." Leander Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cedar Park Water Supply Corp. , 479 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. 1972).

In Leander ISD , we noted the anomaly presented by interpreting these different provisions to have the same scope, but we declined to revisit our holding in Chemical Bank. See id. at 913. In any event, the Legislature has exercised its authority under the public property clause of Article VIII section 2 to grant an exemption that is similar in scope to Article XI section 9. It did so in section 11.11 of the Tax Code, which as we have said generally exempts "property owned by this state or a political subdivision of this state ... if the property is used for public purposes." TEX. TAX CODE § 11.11(a) ; see A&M Consol. ISD , 184 S.W.2d at 915.

Both Article XI section 9 and section 11.11 expressly provide that property must be publicly "owned," and we have held that the public property clause of Article VIII section 2 similarly requires public ownership for property to qualify as exempt. See Leander ISD , 479 S.W.2d at 912. Odyssey argues that this requirement is met because section 12.128 of the Education Code "consider[s]" the private property it leased to be public property. Although we assume that Odyssey's reading of section 12.128 is correct, we have held that the Constitution does not allow the Legislature to give Odyssey a tax exemption by deeming the public to be the owner of a fee estate it does not actually own.

"Public ownership, for tax-exemption purposes, must grow out of the facts; it is a legal status, based on facts, that may not be created or conferred by mere legislative, or even contractual, declaration. If the state does not in fact own the taxable title to the property, neither the Legislature by statute, nor the [parties] by contract, may make the state the owner thereof by simply saying that it is the owner." Tex. Tnpk. Co. , 271 S.W.2d at 402.

This rule is not a quaint formalism; it is necessary to preserve our Constitution's structural limits on the Legislature's authority to create exemptions. If the Legislature could simply declare by statute that a taxpayer qualifies for an exemption regardless of whether it factually meets the constitutional criteria for such an exemption, the Constitution's goal of equal and uniform taxation would be undermined. See TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (a). And the Constitution's provisions carefully defining which property the Legislature may exempt and nullifying laws that exempt other property would be dead letters. E.g., id. § 2(a).

Here, Odyssey does not in fact own the fee estate being taxed, so it cannot qualify for the tax exemption on publicly owned property. Property leased is not property owned. Odyssey argues that section 12.128 does not declare a falsehood; it simply mandates that public funds used to purchase or lease property retain their public character. We agree that the Legislature may provide for the funds to retain their character. But here, public funds were used only to acquire a leasehold interest, and not even Odyssey contends that section 12.128 divests the private owners of their unpurchased fee. Texas Turnpike teaches that an exemption cannot be created indirectly by enacting a legal fiction that leasing privately owned property and putting it to a public use amounts to public ownership.

Indeed, Texas Turnpike presented stronger grounds for an exemption than we have in this case. There, private toll road corporations placed their property in escrow for delivery to the State upon certain conditions, and both a statute and a contract declared that "equitable, beneficial, and superior title to" the property "shall be vested at all times in the State of Texas and shall constitute public property used for public purposes." 271 S.W.2d at 401. We held that the property was not exempt as publicly owned property because the conditions for delivery might not occur, so the State did not in fact have equitable title. Id. at 402–03.

Unlike in Texas Turnpike , nothing in Odyssey's lease agreement or section 12.128 of the Education Code purports to vest title in Odyssey or provides a mechanism for it to acquire title. We assume that section considers the leased property public, just as the statute in Texas Turnpike declared that the escrowed property constituted public property. But as we have explained, "[p]ublic ownership, for tax-exemption purposes, ... may not be created or conferred by mere legislative, or even contractual, declaration." Tex. Tnpk. , 271 S.W.2d at 477.

b. Public use is not a separate ground for exemption.

In the alternative, Odyssey argues that Article XI section 9 and Article VIII section 2 do not require public ownership to qualify for a tax exemption—public use is sufficient. Again, the constitutional text and our precedent foreclose Odyssey's position.

i. We begin with Article XI section 9, which provides in full:

The property of counties, cities and towns, owned and held only for public purposes, such as public buildings and the sites therefor, fire engines and the furniture thereof, and all property used, or intended for extinguishing fires, public grounds and all other property devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public shall be exempt from forced sale and from taxation.

(Emphasis added). According to Odyssey, this section contains two separate exemptions in one sentence: (1) an exemption for property of counties, cities and towns—which Chemical Bank construed broadly to include all government entities—owned and held only for public purposes, with examples such as public buildings, fire engines, and public grounds; and (2) an exemption for property devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public, which need not be publicly owned. Odyssey contends that this second exemption applies here because its leased property is devoted exclusively to public use.

We disagree with Odyssey because its interpretation disregards the structure of the sentence as a whole and gives no meaning to the words "and all other property," which show that these two parts of the sentence are not separate. The subject of the sentence is "[t]he property of [government entities]," and the following words describe what subset of these entities’ property "shall be exempt." We see no grammatical indication that "all other property devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public" need not also be "property of [government entities]."

In particular, the words immediately following the subject explain that the government entities’ property must be "owned and held only for public purposes." The sentence then includes a list beginning with "such as," which gives non-exclusive examples of property of government entities owned and held only for public purposes. That list does not end with "public grounds," which is not preceded by the word "and," as the last item in a list would be. Rather, the words "and all other" signal that the following noun phrase is "additional" or "a further ... thing of the type already mentioned." Thus, "and all other" indicates that "property devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public" is the same type of property: part of the list of property of government entities that is owned and held only for public purposes, not a separate ground for exemption that requires no public ownership.

This reading does not render the phrase "all other property devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public" surplusage, as Odyssey contends. To the contrary, as we explained in Chemical Bank , the "all other property" phrase is what shows that the doctrine of ejusdem generis does not apply to the list—i.e., that its scope is not limited to things similar to public buildings, fire engines, and public grounds. 190 S.W.2d at 51.

Moreover, we observed that the "all other property" phrase makes clear the full scope of the earlier phrase "held only for public purposes." Id. (citing Corp. of San Felipe de Austin v. State , 111 Tex. 108, 229 S.W. 845, 847 (1921) ). Under section 9, property owned and held only for public purposes includes not only (a) property owned and used by the government itself such as buildings and fire equipment, but also (b) property owned by the government and devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the general public such as public grounds. Id. at 51–52 (explaining that exemption is not limited to government uses). Recognizing that these pieces of section 9 work together to define a single ground for exemption, Chemical Bank restated the requirements for exemption as whether the property is "publicly owned and held only for public purposes and devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public." Id. at 52 (emphasis added). Or as we put the matter in Galveston Wharf Co. v. City of Galveston , section 9 defines "the character of property and uses to which it must be put, when owned by municipal corporations , to make it, within the meaning of the [constitution], property ‘held only for public purposes, or devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public.’ " 63 Tex. 14, 23 (1884) (emphasis added).

Odyssey's position—that section 9 creates a separate exemption for property devoted exclusively to public use that is not owned by a government entity—is contrary to these statements from Chemical Bank and Galveston Wharf. Moreover, it is contrary to Texas Turnpike , which holds unequivocally that "the property in question [must be] ‘publicly owned’ so as to be exempt from taxes under Article XI, Section 9 of the constitution." 271 S.W.2d at 402. Thus, we concluded in Texas Turnpike that "the property involved in this case is not publicly owned and we need not inquire into the nature of its use," id. at 401, which would make no sense if exclusive public use were a separate ground for exemption.

Likewise, we have recognized in several other cases that both government ownership and exclusive public use are required to claim an exemption under Article XI section 9. E.g., Leander ISD , 479 S.W.2d at 911 (explaining that the framers of Article XI section 9 contemplated its application "only to property owned by ... political subdivisions provided it was devoted exclusively to a public use"); State v. City of San Antonio , 147 Tex. 1, 209 S.W.2d 756, 758 (1948) ; A&M Consol. ISD , 184 S.W.2d at 915 ("The property in question is owned by the City of Bryan ... and is therefore public property. Is it used for public purposes?"). That is no doubt why Odyssey can "point to no case that extends the exemption created in article XI, section 9 to property that is not publicly owned." Hays Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Sw. Tex. State Univ. , 973 S.W.2d 419, 422 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.).

Put simply, reading section 9 to create a stand-alone exemption for private property used exclusively for public purposes would lead to the opposite outcome in cases such as Texas Turnpike (which held that a private nonprofit turnpike corporation that opened its toll roads to the public and placed title in escrow for the State could not claim a section 9 exemption ) and Leander ISD (which held that a private nonprofit corporation that supplied water to rural residents could not claim the exemption ). We decline to overrule these cases and extend the exemption as Odyssey requests.

We also reject Odyssey's proposed extension because it would render the ownership requirements in Article XI section 9 and other parts of the Constitution surplusage. If the "all other property" phrase of section 9 created a stand-alone exemption, it would be so broad that even private landowners could exempt their property by "devot[ing] [it] exclusively to the use and benefit of the public" for the tax year at issue—for example, by giving a temporary conservation easement or free public access. Thus, there would never be a need to ask whether the property is "owned and held only for public purposes." TEX. CONST. art XI, § 9. The stand-alone exemption would also render pointless the Constitution's authorization of an exemption for property owned by a church or religious society and leased for use as a school. Id. art. VIII, § 2.

Given the many flaws in the broad exemption Odyssey proposes, our dissenting colleagues take a somewhat different approach: they would recognize three exemptions in section 9 rather than two and rewrite the third exemption to narrow its reach. In their view, section 9 provides that the following property shall be exempt: (1) property of government entities, owned and held only for public purposes (such as public buildings and fire engines); (2) public grounds; and (3) property devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public. Post at ––––. In addition, they would narrow Odyssey's proposal by amending the third exemption to require that the property be "used by a public entity exclusively for the public's benefit," post at –––– (emphasis omitted), though they agree with Odyssey that this exemption does not require public ownership. Most of our reasons for rejecting Odyssey's two-exemption interpretation apply equally to the dissent's three-exemption approach: it does not give meaning to the words "and all other property," it makes other parts of the Constitution surplusage, and its failure to require public ownership is contrary to all of our cases applying section 9.

Moreover, the dissent's insertion of a government-user requirement into the words "property devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public" is contrary to the Constitution's plain text. A government-user requirement cannot be implied from the word "public," which includes the people of a state as well as their government. Thus, the property need not be used by the government; it can also qualify for exemption if it is used by the general public, as we recognized in holding that a wharf "all persons and vessels have the right to use" was "devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public." Galveston Wharf , 63 Tex. at 23. Nevertheless, the dissent says we should consult section 9's larger context to define "public" as "pertain[ing] only to governmental entities." Post at ––––. But as the dissent concedes with respect to its proposed separate exemption for "public grounds," this larger context requires that property be owned by a government entity as well as held by it only for a public purpose. Post at ––––.

The dissent's creation of three stand-alone exemptions is also at odds with the structure and grammar of the section and ignores certain of its words. Section 9 does not begin by saying "the property that shall be exempt is" and then listing different categories of exemptions. Rather, the whole section provides that "The property of [government entities] ... shall be exempt," and what comes in the ellipsis is further definition of what property of government entities is exempt. Thus, as we have said, "all other property devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public" also must be "the property of [government entities]" to qualify for an exemption. The meaning of "and all other property," which refers to a type of property already mentioned, confirms this interpretation. In contrast, the dissent's interpretation gives no meaning to the words "all other"; its reading would be the same if they did not exist.

In sum, the dissent's need to alter section 9 ’s wording to limit its proposed new exemption confirms that the section contains no separate exemption for property not owned by a government entity that is devoted exclusively to public use. And our cases uniformly hold that Article XI section 9 requires both government ownership and exclusive public use. Thus, it does not extend to the property leased by Odyssey.

ii. Turning to Article VIII section 2, we have likewise rejected Odyssey's position that the public property clause permits the Legislature to exempt property that is not publicly owned. In Leander ISD , we addressed a statute expressly exempting the property of a privately owned water supply company, which the company argued was a constitutionally authorized exemption of "public property used for public purposes." 479 S.W.2d at 909–10. The trial court declared the statutory exemption invalid but the court of appeals disagreed, holding that the Legislature may exempt privately owned property if it is devoted to a purpose which gives it a public character. 469 S.W.2d at ––––. We reversed, explaining that it is essential under Article VIII section 2 "that the property be used for public purposes but that in itself is not enough. The property must, wholly apart from its use, be ‘public property.’ In our opinion this means public ownership...." 479 S.W.2d at 912. Thus, we held the Legislature had no power to exempt the property of a privately owned water supply company even though it was used for a public purpose. Id. at 910.

This decision not only confirms that the Constitution requires exempt property to be publicly owned, it also reveals the destructive potential of Odyssey's position that a statute can recharacterize property as public so that it qualifies for the exemption. If Odyssey were correct, the Legislature could have avoided the outcome in Leander ISD by framing its invalid exemption indirectly rather than directly. Rather than passing a statute exempting the water supply company's property, the Legislature could simply have declared that the property "is considered to be public property for all purposes," making it eligible for the existing constitutional and statutory exemptions for publicly owned property. We decline to gut the Constitution's careful limits on legislative exemptions by holding that the Legislature can employ a legal fiction to accomplish indirectly what it cannot do directly. See Dickison , 280 S.W.2d at 318 (applying Texas Turnpike to deny tax exemption for an insurance company that statute declared to be a charity because "[t]he Legislature could not by legislative fiat declare that to be true which is not in fact true, and thus enlarge the tax exemption provided for in Art. 8, Sec. 2").

For these reasons, we hold that our Constitution does not permit Odyssey to claim an exemption under Article XI section 9 or under the public property clause of Article VIII section 2 and Tax Code section 11.11 because Odyssey is not actually the fee owner of the property. Accepting Odyssey's position would require us to overrule Texas Turnpike, Leander ISD , and other cases, which we conclude are well grounded in our Constitution's text and structure.

2. Exemptions for certain school property

Odyssey also contends that it is entitled to an exemption under a different clause of Article VIII section 2 relating to school property. Article VIII section 2 has two clauses that permit exemptions for property used for school purposes; Odyssey relies on one that addresses school buildings and furniture. That clause authorizes the Legislature to exempt "all buildings used exclusively and owned by persons or associations of persons for school purposes and the necessary furniture of all schools." TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (a).

The Legislature enacted section 11.21 of the Tax Code to create this exemption, but Odyssey does not seek an exemption under that statute—perhaps because it is seeking to exempt real property rather than just buildings and furniture. Instead, Odyssey argues that section 12.128 of the Education Code is an additional tax exemption enacted under the authority of this constitutional clause. We note that section 12.128 does not mention an exemption, nor does it refer to school buildings and furniture. Yet even assuming that section 12.128 could be characterized as an exemption, "it may not broaden [that exemption] beyond the constitutional confines" of the clause. Dickison , 280 S.W.2d at 317. Because we conclude that the constitutional clause quoted above does not authorize the exemption Odyssey seeks, we need not decide whether section 12.128 creates such an exemption.

Odyssey argues that this constitutional clause permits an exemption for property used by a non-profit school regardless of whether that school is public, and it does not require that the owners and users be the same people. Although we agree with Odyssey's first argument, our cases addressing its second argument hold precisely the opposite.

In Red v. Morris , we agreed with the court of appeals that "in order to exempt the property from taxation by reason of its use for school purposes, it must also be owned for such purposes." 72 Tex. 554, 10 S.W. 681, 682 (1889). Put another way, the property "must be used exclusively by persons or associations of persons who own [it]." Smith v. Feather , 149 Tex. 402, 234 S.W.2d 418, 421 (1950) (holding lack of ownership by one of the people who used property as school destroyed exemption). Red pointed out that the operative language of the constitutional provision and the statute creating the exemption was the same in requiring both ownership and use. 10 S.W. at 682 ; see TEX. TAX CODE § 11.21(a). And it addressed how this rule applies in the lease context we have here, explaining that "the legislature meant, by the employment of the terms [requiring ownership], to prevent the owners of the property from taking advantage of the exemption, when they leased the property to others for profit, to be used by the latter for the maintenance of schools." 10 S.W. at 682 ; see also Smith , 234 S.W.2d at 421 ("Had [respondents] rented the building to others who used it exclusively for school purposes, it would not be exempt.").

In this case, the property is owned and used by different entities: Odyssey uses the property exclusively for school purposes, but the taxable fee is owned by two LLCs based in Florida. The LLCs lease the property to Odyssey for profit and are not involved in operating the school. Under these circumstances, our cases are clear that Odyssey cannot claim the constitutional exemption for school buildings and furniture.

Significantly, Article VIII section 2 was amended in 2003 to add a second school-related clause, and it permits an exemption for real property leased for use as a school—the very situation presented here. But Odyssey cannot claim this exemption because it applies only if the leased property "is owned by a church or by a strictly religious society." TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.

The Texas Constitution is frequently amended. See Villarreal , ––– S.W.3d at ––––. Indeed, Article VIII section 2 has been amended ten times since 1876—most recently in 2019. If the people of Texas wanted to adopt a broad tax exemption for property leased for educational purposes, they certainly could have done so. Instead, they chose to limit the availability of that exemption to a narrow class of owners. It is not our role as judges to broaden the exemption for them. See id.

* * *

We recognize the practical undesirability of charter schools using state funds provided for education to pay local taxes. But this is not a case where government is "engag[ing] in the senseless process of taxing itself." Chem. Bank , 190 S.W.2d at 51. Galveston County is taxing private LLCs because they own the underlying property in fee; it is not taxing Odyssey's leasehold interest. Odyssey is paying the LLCs’ taxes only because it voluntarily undertook to do so in its sublease agreement.

We also note that the Legislature has chosen to tax even publicly owned property that benefits education in a variety of situations. See, e.g. , TEX. TAX CODE § 11.11(b) ("Land owned by the Permanent University Fund is taxable for county purposes."), (c) ("Agricultural or grazing land owned by a county for the benefit of public schools ... is taxable for all purposes."). More specifically, the Legislature provided for payment of taxes with public funds in the very situation we have here: "[f]unds received by a charter holder" may be used "to pay property taxes imposed on an instructional facility." TEX. EDUC. CODE § 12.106(f). If the Legislature did not intend to permit such a result, section 12.106(f) would not exist. Finally, we are aware that other charter schools have structured their leases in different ways that some courts have held qualifies the property for an exemption. For example, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that when a charter school entered into a lease that included a unilateral purchase option, it acquired equitable title to the property and could claim an exemption under section 11.11 of the Tax Code. Dall. Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Int'l Am. Educ. Fed'n , 618 S.W.3d 375, 379 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, no pet.). In this case, however, Odyssey is the lessee (indeed the sublessee) rather than the owner, and its lease expressly provides that there is no purchase option. Thus, Odyssey does not hold equitable title to the leased property and is not entitled to an exemption. See Tex. Tnpk. Co. , 271 S.W.2d at 402 ("If the agreement[ ] ... would not create taxable ownership in a private grantee, it is difficult to see how [it] could create a tax-exempt ownership in the State of Texas.").

CONCLUSION

Odyssey contends it is entitled to an exemption from ad valorem taxes it contractually agreed to pay on privately owned property it leases for a public charter school. We conclude that the plain text and structure of the Texas Constitution do not authorize such an exemption. Holding otherwise would require us to overturn several of our decisions and accept a legal fiction regarding ownership of the property that would undermine the constitutional structure of our tax system. We therefore overrule Odyssey's issues and affirm the court of appeals’ judgment denying the requested exemption.

Justice Guzman filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Hecht and Justice Huddle joined.

Justice Guzman, joined by Chief Justice Hecht and Justice Huddle, dissenting.

The Texas Constitution mandates that "[t]axation shall be equal and uniform" but expressly provides that property "shall be exempt ... from taxation" when "devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public". At issue here is the availability of an ad valorem tax exemption for real property leased and used by a charter school as a public-school campus. Like traditional public schools, government-funded charter schools are public entities that provide a cost-free public education. And, as all agree, the charter school's campus is used exclusively for public purposes. The Court nonetheless holds that no tax exemption is available to Odyssey 2020 Academy, Inc. because the charter school pays ad valorem property taxes under the terms of a lease rather than as the property's owner. Public ownership, the Court holds, is a necessary predicate to tax exemption under Article XI, section 9 of the Texas Constitution (Article 11). I respectfully dissent because Article 11's text does not support the Court's conclusion.

Article 11 does indeed provide a tax exemption for publicly owned property, but it also exempts property that a governmental entity does not own but nevertheless "devote[s] exclusively to the use and benefit of the public". Such is the case here. Article 11 thus exempts the charter-school campus from ad valorem taxation.

I. Constitutional Tax Exemption

Article 11 is a "self-operative" tax exemption that applies to municipalities and arms of state government "serv[ing] a public purpose" and "absolutely exempts from taxation" covered property. The Court has previously explained that the "automatic" exemption in Article 11 prevents "an idle expenditure of public funds" that would result if government were made to "engage in the senseless process of taxing itself, the net result of which would be [only] to take its own money out of one pocket for the purpose of putting it into another."

The constitutional exemption in Article 11 encompasses charter schools like Odyssey because "open-enrollment charter schools act as an arm of the State Government." The Court does not contend otherwise. Where we part company is with respect to the nature of the property the Constitution exempts from taxation. Our disagreement centers on the proper grammatical construction of Article 11.

In relevant part, Article 11 provides:

The property of counties, cities and towns, owned and held only for public purposes, such as public buildings and the sites therefor, fire engines and the furniture thereof, and all property used, or intended for extinguishing fires, public grounds and all other property devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public shall be exempt ... from taxation....

The Court construes Article 11 as exempting only the property of public entities "owned and held only for public purposes". In the Court's view, the provision's remaining text, introduced by the phrase "such as", merely supplies a non-exclusive list of property that may be "owned" by public entities "and held only for public purposes". While facially reasonable, the Court's construction is inconsistent with the provision's grammatical structure, renders constitutional language superfluous, and fails to give effect to the precise language the people adopted.

When applying the Texas Constitution, "we construe its words as generally understood" and "rely heavily on the plain language of [its] literal text." If possible, we do not treat any of the Constitution's language as surplusage, and we "avoid constructions that would render any constitutional provision meaningless or nugatory." Applying these standards, Article 11 is more aptly construed as exempting from taxation three separate categories of property. That is,

1. "The property of counties, cities and towns, owned and held only for public purposes, such as

[i] public buildings and the sites therefor,

[ii] fire engines and the furniture thereof, and

[iii] all property used, or intended for extinguishing fires, ... shall be exempt ... from taxation";

2. "[P]ublic grounds ... shall be exempt ... from taxation";

3. "[A]nd all other property devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public shall be exempt ... from taxation".

Giving full effect to its syntactic structure, Article 11 exempts property that is either owned by public entities exclusively for public purposes or used by public entities exclusively for public purposes.

The Court is correct that Article 11 provides an exemption for publicly owned property used only for public purposes. The Court is also correct that Article 11 supplies a non-exclusive list of property that would qualify for that public-ownership exemption. But the Court is wrong about where the exemplar list ends. Rather than concluding with "all other property devoted exclusively to the [public's] use and benefit", as the Court holds, the list of examples initiated by the "such as" phrase grammatically ends with "and all property used, or intended for extinguishing fires". Syntactically, that phrase closes the "such as" list both by virtue of the "and" that precedes it and by the parenthetical comma that follows it. The list's terminal point is further confirmed by the absence of a parenthetical comma after "all other property devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public", which would be necessary if the "such as" clause were inclusive of that language, as the Court contends. The first phrase, and first exemption, in Article 11 applies to publicly owned property, as the Court says, but it is not the only exemption the provision establishes. The next phrase in Article 11 provides a separate exemption for "public grounds" —that is, publicly owned real property as compared to publicly owned chattels and improved property exempted by the first phrase. The word "public" means "of or relating to a government" and, like the first exemption, makes this exemption applicable only to grounds owned by public entities. In interpreting another constitutional provision, we said just that, observing that public ownership is required to make something "public property." Article 11's context further constrains the "public grounds" exemption to those properties held only for a public purpose. The requirement that tax-exempt grounds be "public" immediately follows the first exemption's application to property "owned and held only for public purposes", which is then described as referring to "public buildings and the sites therefor". In this manner, Article 11 defines what constitutes "public" property for purposes of the automatic exemption.

In contrast, the last exemption applies to "all other property devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public". Notably, this phrase is not textually limited to "public" property, nor does it refer to public ownership like the preceding two phrases. Rather, it applies to "other property" and focuses on the property's "exclusive[ ]" "use" by and for the "public". In this way, the context makes clear that "other" means "different" and "not the same" as the preceding two exemption categories. The difference relates to the public-ownership requirement. The third category is a clear textual shift from public property to "other property" used for public purposes. We have recognized that, under the Constitution, "public use" and "public property" are separate concepts. Ownership is required to make something "public property." "Public use" is not equivalent phrasing and mere "use for public purposes" is not sufficient to make something "public property." In this respect, Article 11's inclusion of a public ownership requirement for the first two exemptions as compared to the third exemption's omission of the word "public" as a property descriptor and simultaneous inclusion of "public" as a use descriptor precludes an interpretation that requires the property to be publicly owned. In effect, Article 11 deems property used by a public entity exclusively for the public's benefit to be public property for purposes of taxation.

The Court contends that Article 11 cannot be construed as containing three exemptions without adding language limiting its application to governmental use, which it says would be necessary to avoid the exemption's application to private entities covered by certain permissive exemptions in Article VIII, section 2 of the Constitution (Article 8). But words do not have to be added to effectuate that limitation because Article 11's own text and placement within the Constitution clarifies that only governmental entities are eligible for Article 11's exemptions. First, Article 11 is in a portion of the Constitution that pertains only to governmental entities. By title, that portion of the Constitution is applicable to "Municipal Corporations" and every section that falls within that article is applicable only to counties, cities, towns, and other municipal corporations. The specific section at issue here—Article 11, section 9—likewise pertains only to counties, cities, and towns, which we have construed as applying to all governmental entities. The Court's fear that a three-exemption construction of Article 11 could be applied absent governmental use is unfounded, and the Court's contention that words would have to be added to Article 11 to effectuate that limitation is incorrect.

Moreover, the Court's alternative construction of Article 11 as containing only a single exemption fails because it reads out the exclusive-use phrase and creates surplusage. Under the Court's reading, the phrase "property ... owned and held only for public purposes" has an identical meaning to the subsequent phrase "property devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public". "Exclusively" in the exclusive-use provision and "only" in the public-ownership provision both mean "sole". To hold property solely for public purposes means that it can only be used for public purposes. Under the Court's interpretation, the exclusive-use phrase is therefore redundant of the public-ownership phrase because "only for public purposes" already encompasses "exclusive[ ] to the use and benefit of the public". The only way to give effect to all of Article 11's language is to recognize that property exclusively "use[d]" by the public for the "benefit of the public" is exempt from taxation even if not "owned" by the public. Odyssey's leased property is used exclusively for public-education purposes and is therefore exempt under Article 11's plain language.

In arguing that Article 11 requires public ownership, the Court points to our opinion in Lower Colorado River Authority v. Chemical Bank & Trust Co. , in which we stated "the legislature is without power to tax any property publicly owned and held only for public purposes and devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public." Focusing on the opinion's single-sentence formulation and multiple uses of the conjunction "and," the Court argues that Chemical Bank effectively declared Article 11 as being composed of a single tax exemption that, in all circumstances, requires the government's legal or equitable ownership of property that would otherwise be subject to taxation.

However, nothing about this formulation—read either in isolation or in the opinion's broader context—indicates that Chemical Bank was articulating Article 11 as a single exemption. More plausibly, the Court was acknowledging that Article 11 provides multiple grounds for exemption. The first "and" links the two requirements establishing exemption based on public ownership while the second "and" introduces the exclusive-use exemption. If the Court were setting out a single exemption, the proper grammatical choice would be to use a comma instead of the first "and." Replacing the first "and" with a comma would have clarified that it was listing three requirements for a single exemption. As it did not, a more reasonable interpretation of Chemical Bank is recognition that Article 11 is not composed of only a single exemption. Chemical Bank also cannot be construed as supporting the Court's holding today because none of the parties in that case raised exclusive use as an independent basis for exemption, and the Court did not address it. Indeed, the facts in Chemical Bank did not warrant such an analysis, as the governmental entity in that case owned and controlled the property at issue. The case before us today provides a previously unaddressed factual scenario involving a public entity leasing private property and devoting it exclusively to public use. This set of facts triggers the exclusive-use exemption in a way that our past cases have not, and unlike the precedent the Court relies on, applicability of that exemption has been expressly raised in this case.

The other cases the Court points to in support of its single-exemption construction of Article 11 are not on point for similar reasons: the Court did not address the exclusive-use ground for exemption in any of those cases, and none of those cases involved a public entity using property it possessed, but did not own, only for public purposes. Our precedent correctly states the standard for the public-ownership exemptions but is silent as to the exclusive-use exemption. The Court mistakes this silence as affirmation of its non-existence. But in reality, there is no conflict between my construction of Article 11 and the outcomes reflected in our precedent.

With respect to Article 11's text, the Court contends that reading exclusive use as being an independent ground for exemption would make the public-ownership exemptions surplusage. Viewing exclusive-use as an independent exemption would, the Court says, reduce the controlling inquiry to whether the property is being exclusively used for public purposes, owned or not, because the public-ownership exemptions have their own exclusive-use component. For that reason, the Court asserts that construing Article 11 as having an independent exclusive-use exemption would render the public-ownership exemptions meaningless.

It is true that exclusive use is a component of both the public-ownership and exclusive-use exemptions, so in some cases the inquiries will overlap. But these exemptions address different situations and are not identical. That is, the public-ownership exemptions apply to scenarios where property is publicly owned but exclusively used by private persons for public purposes. This scenario is exemplified by Galveston Wharf Co. v. City of Galveston , where the Court held that a wharf partially owned by the City of Galveston, but not operated by the City, was nonetheless entitled to a partial tax exemption because it was used for public purposes.

But because the public-ownership exemptions do not apply absent such ownership, they do not encompass the obverse scenario: property privately owned but used by public entities exclusively for public purposes. That is the situation presented in this case. Under my view of Article 11, the public-ownership exemptions are not surplusage because they apply to scenarios that are not covered by the exclusive-use exemption. Stated differently, Article 11 recognizes that property used exclusively for the public may be owned but not possessed by a public entity and, conversely, that such property may be possessed but not so owned.

The public-ownership exemptions cover the most obvious circumstances in which property would be devoted "exclusively" to public purposes while the exclusive-use exemption functions as a "catch all" that encompasses less common circumstances in which privately owned property is nonetheless being used by the government exclusively for the public. Article 11's specification of exemptions for (1) property owned and held by the government only for public purposes, such as improved property and chattels, and for (2) public grounds highlights those circumstances in particular without negating an exemption for (3) "all other property" that is "devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public". Rather, through this contrast, Article 11 emphasizes that the phrase "all other property" means exactly what it says.

Additionally, the public-ownership language is not meaningless because the word "only" further clarifies that, when public ownership is involved, the property must also be exclusively used for public purposes. "Only" dispels the notion that a different standard applies when public ownership is involved than when it is not. Repetition of the exclusive-use requirement through "only" and "all other property devoted exclusively to the use and benefit of the public" in Article 11 clarifies that, regardless of ownership status, exclusive use by and for the public is necessary for an Article 11 exemption. Under the Court's single-exemption construction, this repetition serves no purpose.

Ultimately, the three-exemption construction of Article 11 is more reasonable than the Court's single-exemption construction. Interpreting Article 11 as providing three separate exemptions not only comports with and gives effect to the Constitution's plain language and grammatical structure, but also avoids taxing governmental entities that are using property exclusively to benefit the public. Whether a lessee is charged directly with paying the tax bill, as in this case, or whether tax costs are passed on indirectly through the cost of leasing, the economic reality of the Court's construction would result in "an idle expenditure of public funds" with the government "engag[ing] in the senseless process of taxing itself."

II. Preservation

The Court and the parties dispute whether Odyssey properly preserved its claim to an automatic exemption under Article 11. The Court and the Galveston Central Appraisal District argue that Odyssey failed to preserve the constitutional claim by raising it for the first time in its briefing to this Court. Odyssey concedes Article 11 was first briefed here, but it contends the argument is properly before the Court because Odyssey's statutory-and constitutional-exemption arguments under section 11.11 of the Tax Code and Article 8 of the Constitution rest on the same premise: that the charter-school campus is tax exempt because it is used exclusively for public purposes. I agree with Odyssey.

To preserve a complaint for appellate review, "a party must present to the trial court a timely request, motion, or objection, state the specific grounds therefor, and obtain a ruling." The stated grounds for the ruling must be made "with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint." The rationale behind the preservation rules is that "[p]reservation of error reflects important prudential considerations recognizing that the judicial process benefits greatly when trial courts have the opportunity to first consider and rule on error." In essence, "the trial court should have the chance to rule on issues that become the subject of the appeal." Even so, rules of error preservation "should not be applied so strictly as to unduly restrain appellate courts from reaching the merits of a case." More to the point, a party is always "free to construct new arguments in support of issues properly before the Court."

Section 11.11(a) of the Tax Code provides a tax exemption for property "owned by this state" and "used for public purposes." Article 8 of the Constitution authorizes the Legislature to pass laws "exempt[ing] from taxation public property used for public purposes". In the trial court, Odyssey raised claims under section 11.11 and Article 8 but not Article 11. Nevertheless, I conclude Odyssey's Article 11 argument is fairly subsumed in these preserved claims because all three have "public purpose" as an essential element. Because those issues were preserved in the courts below, Odyssey's argument under Article 11 is essentially a new argument in support of issues properly before the Court, not a new issue that was not preserved.

Accordingly, I would hold that Odyssey's Article 11 exemption claim was preserved. Addressing that claim, I cannot agree with the Court that Article 11 provides a tax exemption only for property owned by a public entity. As I read the Constitution, Odyssey qualifies for exemption under Article 11 because it exclusively uses its leased property to benefit the public. Because the Court holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.