MONCURE, P.

1. I files his bill claiming to be a judgment creditor of N, deceased, seeking to subject to the satisfaction of his judgments a tract of land conveyed by N, in trust, for the separate use of his wife, and two other tracts conveyed by N to his son. He charges that the deeds were without consideration, and were fraudulent. He states that N and this son were partners, and asks that if it is necessary to show the true consideration of the deeds to the son, that his account as late partner of N may be settled-- HELD: The bill is not multifarious.

2. Three of the judgments of I were judgments of the United States court, rendered in a cause in which citizens of Maryland were plantiffs and the Bank of the Valley of Virginia was defendant, brought to have the assets of the bank administered, and upon petition and notice, the judgments were rendered against N as a debtor of the bank--HELD: That N being a citizen of Virginia, the United States court had no jurisdiction in the case to render the judgments against N, and they were invalid as judgments.

3. The deeds to the son having been on valuable consideration, the land sold and conveyed to him is not liable for the debts of N; but the deed in favor of the wife having been without consideration, this land is liable to pay the debt due I.

In 1873, William B. Isaacs & Co. filed their bill in the circuit court of Frederick county, stating therein, substantially, that they were holders of a large amount of notes of the old Bank of the Valley in Virginia, and of the Farmers Bank of Virginia; that their claims as such note holders were audited, reported and confirmed against the said banks in the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Virginia, in the chancery causes therein pending, in which the debts of the said banks have been audited and their assets disbursed, and complainants having waited in vain, with the hope of being permitted to participate in the distribution of the cash assets of the said bank, were compelled to accept certain claims which the receiver of the court held as the custodian of the assets of the bank against certain persons in that section of the state. Among the claims thus assigned to complainants, are three judgments which were rendered in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Virginia on the 12th day of December, 1868, in the chancery cause therein depending, in which the Merchants National Bank of Baltimore and al. were plaintiff's, and the Bank of the Valley in Virginia and als. were defendants; the said judgments being in the name of said plaintiffs (for the use of H. G. Fant, the receiver of the court), against J. S. Carson, treasurer, A. Nulton and J. R. Bowen, official copies of which judgments, marked A, B and C, were filed with said bill, one of them being for $1,450, with interest from the 20th day of April, 1862, and costs, $32.05; another for $900, with interest from the 4th day of April, 1862, and costs, $30.25; and the other for $300, with interest from the 21st day of March, 1862, and costs, $30.20. In addition to these judgments, there was also assigned to complainants, on account of their claims which had been audited against the Farmers Bank, the negotiable note of Abraham Nulton, endorsed by J. S. Carson and Samuel R. Atwell, for the sum of $600, which note had been protested for non-payment on the 3d day of July, 1862. Suit was brought upon said note in the county court of Frederick county in the name of complainants, as assignees of said receiver, on the 19th day of July, 1870, against Abraham Nulton, the maker of the note, and judgment was recovered in said suit at the following December term of said court for the full amount of said note, interest and costs, of which judgment an official copy, marked D, was filed with the bill. Official copies of the decrees of the circuit court of the United States under which the three judgments of said court, and negotiable note aforesaid were assigned to complainants, were marked E and F, and also filed with the bill. And an official copy of the assignments of the said three judgments of the United States circuit court was marked G, and also filed with the bill.

It is charged in the said bill, that the said Abraham Nulton was possessed, at the time said judgments of the United States circuit court were rendered, of very valuable real estate situated in the town of Winchester, and particularly described in the bill; and that the said three judgments of the United States circuit court became liens upon said real estate as of the first day of November term, 1868, of said court; and the said judgment of the county court of Frederick county became a lien upon the same as of the first day of the December term, 1870, of the said court.

It is further charged in said bill that after the said three judgments of the United States circuit court were rendered, said Abraham Nulton made conveyances of said real estate, which were and are ineffectual to withdraw the same from its responsibility for the said judgments, and also for the said judgment of the county court, both because of the then existing lien of the said judgment of the United States circuit court, and because said conveyances were not based upon adequate consideration, and were therefore void so far as any of the debts of said Nulton then existing were concerned. The first of said conveyances was made on the 24th day of June, 1869, and was recorded in the corporation court of Winchester on the 13th day of December of the same year, of which an official copy, marked H, is filed with the bill. This deed purports to be a conveyance of the brick dwelling, store-room and lot before described in the bill, and the conveyance of it is made to Joseph A. Nulton, who is a son of said Abraham, and was in trust for the sole and separate use of Sarah Nulton, who was then the wife of said Abraham, and is expessed to have been in consideration of the said Sarah having united theretofore with said Abraham in conveyances of large quantities of real estate lying in said county; the said deed alleging that her uniting in said conveyances had been in consideration of an express promise and agreement of her husband that he would convey to her the real estate described in the deed so soon as he should receive from the proper parties a good deed for it.

Complainants allege that they have had all the deeds examined which are on record in the clerk's office of the county court of said county and of the corporation court of Winchester, which have been made by the said Nulton, and in which his wife, Sarah, had united, from the date of said deed, June 24th, 1869, to the 1st day of January, 1820, and they have found no such promise, express or implied, referred to in any of said deeds, and they deny that there ever was any such promise. They allege that the lot conveyed by said Nulton for the separate use of his wife as aforesaid, was first acquired by him on the 1st day of December, 1854, as will be seen by exhibits K and L, filed with the bill. And as the consideration for this settlement is in the settlement impliedly recited to have been for conveyances made between the acquiring of this property by the said Nulton and the date of the sttlement, the promise of the said Nulton being therein recited to have been to settle this identical property upon the said Sarah, so soon as he should receive from the proper parties a deed for it, which was not accomplished until the 24th day of June, 1860; yet complainants allege that the total fee simple value of all the property in respect to which the said Sarah relinquished her title of dower during this interval, did not equal one-third of the value of the property which the said Nulton thus attempted to settle upon her. And if an error has been committed by the parties in the recital in the deed of settlement of the time during which these alleged promises were made, still complainants aver that the value of the property so conveyed to his wife was equal to one-half the fee simple value of all the property which ever had been conveyed by said Nulton and wife to any one, embracing all the deeds which are on record in the said two offices at any time previous to the said settlement. In addition to the facts thus set forth, complainants further show that said Sarah was the senior in years of the said Abraham, that she was in very delicate health at the time said settlement was made upon her, viz: the 24th of June, 1869, and that she died on the 7th of December following, leaving her husband surviving her. The deed of settlement was then wholly without consideration, and was illegal and void as respects the debts of said Abraham Nulton which existed at the time of the settlement, and especially the several judgments of the United States circuit court aforesaid, and the claim by negotiable note for $600, upon which judgment has been rendered in the county court of said county as aforesaid, the said note having been a debt of the said Nulton long pre-existing the date of said settlement, having been protested for non-payment the 3d of April, 1862.

Complainants further say that under the pretended powers derived to her from the said settlement, the said Sarah Nulton made her will, which is dated in December, 1869, and was admitted to probate in the corporation court of Winchester at the February term, 1870, of which an official copy, marked M, is filed with the bill; by which will she devised the whole of the property to her said husband and to their unmarried daughter, Georgiana Nulton, jointly, during the life of the said Abraham, with remainder in fee upon the death of said Abraham to the said Georgiana and the two other daughters of said testatrix, viz: Harriet Haines, the wife of George E. or George H. Haines, and Catherine Herbert, then the wife of Joseph Herbert. Abraham Nulton survived his wife, Sarah, two years, and died on the 7th of December, 1871; he died intestate, and administration on his estate was granted to Holmes Conrad by an order of the county court of said county in 1872. The personal estate left by said Abraham was very small, and wholly inadequate to pay even the judgment for $600 recovered in the county court as aforesaid, thus rendering a resort to the real estate unavoidable upon the part of complainants.

They further show that in addition to the property thus conveyed by said Abraham Nulton to his wife, he also conveyed to his son, Joseph A. Nulton, two other valuable pieces of property in said town described in the bill, constituting, with the property settled on his wife, as aforesaid, all the real estate which he owned at the time said judgments were rendered. Official copies of the deeds whereby the said two pieces of property were conveyed are marked N and O, and filed with the bill.

Complainants charge that the said Joseph A. Nulton was without means to any amount at the time said conveyances were made to him; that he was a young man who had only reached his majority either during or shortly before the commencement of the war; that at the close of the war he commenced business as a partner with his father in the tinning and stove selling business, but there was comparatively little profit attending the business in Winchester during this period, or indeed since; that all the stock in their store, including the tools, remained in possession of said Joseph A. Nulton when his father withdrew from the business, and also, as complainants suppose, the unsettled accounts. They claim that all these should be accounted for by the said Joseph A. Nulton, and that he should exhibit a full settlement of the said partnership accounts, and a discovery of the settlement which is referred to in the said deed, by which the consideration cited in said deed, viz: the sum of $4,804.49, was paid by him. They charge that upon such an investigation being made, it will be found that no adequate consideration has been given by him, either for the property conveyed to him by the deed of November 10th, 1869, or by that of February 23d, 1870, and that the operation of said deeds is to withdraw from complainants' claims property of said Abraham Nulton, which is legally responsible for their payment.

They therefore pray that Joseph A. Nulton, in his own right, and as trustee for Georgiana Nulton, Harriet Haines, the wife of George E. or George H. Haines, Catharine Herbert, the wife of Joseph Herbert, and Holmes Conrad, administrator of Abraham Nulton, deceased, may be made defendants to the bill and required to answer the same; that the personal estate of said Abraham may be applied to the discharge of complainants' judgments, and that the lien of said judgments upon the real estate may be enforced for the satisfaction of the same so far as the personal estate may be insufficient for that purpose; that the said deeds of Abraham Nulton may be set aside, so far as necessary to satisfy complainants' claims, and that the real estate embraced in them may be subjected to the payment of the same; and to this end that all necessary accounts of administration, of liens and of debts, may be taken; that the defendant, Joseph A. Nulton, may make a complete discovery of the considerations upon which the two deeds to him were based, and if essential to the proper understanding of the same, that his account as late partner with the decedent may be settled, and that complainants may have such other relief as may be consistent with equity and be required by the nature of the case.

In April, 1873, Joseph A. Nulton filed his answer to the said bill, in which he demurs to it for want of equity on its face, and because the same is multifarious in confounding subjects that are distinct and in no wise related to each other. And not waiving the benefit of said demurrer, but insisting thereon, he proceeds to answer the same by saying in substance as follows: He denies that any right and lawful judgments have been rendered in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Virginia, against his father, Abraham Nulton, as complainants in their bill pretend. He admits the allegation of the bill, that the note upon which the judgment of which a copy marked D and filed with the bill was rendered, was executed by said Abraham Nulton, Joseph S. Carson and Samuel R. Atwell as representing the Methodist Episcopal church of Winchester, and had been discounted at bank and the proceeds applied as stated in the bill; he avers that the understanding in this and all like transactions between these parties, was that their liability on such paper was joint and not successive; that in pursuance of this understanding, one of the parties, Mr. Atwell, obtained, long prior to the assignment made by the bank, a sufficient sum of the notes of the bank to meet and satisfy this claim; that those notes were obtained by Mr. Atwell as one of the official body of said church, and are yet retained by him as an endorser to pay off this note, and respondent pleads said notes as a set off to said judgment.

Respondent admits that Abraham Nulton conveyed to him the property mentioned in the bill in trust for the separate use of Sarah, wife of the said Abraham, and mother of respondent, as therein mentioned. He denies that this conveyance was voluntary and without consideration, but avers that it was in pursuance of an agreement made between his father and mother long prior to the date of said conveyance, the consideration of said agreement being, as recited in the deed, viz: the relinquishment by his mother of her dower interest in several pieces of property sold by his father. He does not admit the allegation of the bill as to the value of the property thus settled upon his mother as compared with the value of that in which she relinquished her dower, but demands proof thereof.

He admits that Abraham Nulton did sell and convey to him two pieces of property as mentioned in the bill, but denies that said conveyance was without consideration, and that he was without means as stated in the bill. In response to the discovery asked for, he says: " That for shop, store-house and lot on Loudoun street, conveyed to him by his father, he paid the sum of $4,804.47, an amount ascertained to be due respondent from the said Abraham Nulton upon a full settlement made for and between them by Joseph S. Carson, the life-long friend and counsellor of the said Abraham Nulton, and in whose integrity the complainants express the most abounding and justly merited confidence." Said settlement is exhibited as part of the answer. He further states that he has, since the date of said settlement, discovered that there had been omitted from the account presented by him, through his own inadvertence, a large debt of his father's which he had at that time paid off, amounting to the sum of $1,500, which debt is described in the answer. He challenges the fullest investigation of these transactions, and closes his answer with other remarks which need not be here mentioned.

About the same time answers were filed by Georgiana Nulton and Catherine Herbert, wife of Joseph Herbert, and by George H. Haines and Harriet A. R., his wife, in which they deny that the conveyances impeached by the bill were fraudulent or without consideration, and affirm their validity; but it is unnecessary to state, in detail, the contents of said answers.

The three judgments of the United States court were rendered upon petitions filed by the plaintiffs in a suit in equity in that court, they being citizens of Maryland, against the Bank of the Valley of Virginia, and H. M. Brent, trustee, to have the assets of the bank administered by the court, and upon notice to Nulton and the other parties to the notes, all of them living in Virginia, and the notes having been discounted by the bank. And without stating here any other portions of the record, except the substance of the decree appealed from, it is sufficient to say that on the 30th day of June, 1876, the cause came on to be heard upon the bill and the exhibits filed therewith; the answers of Joseph A. Nulton, in his own right and as trustee; of George H. Haines and Harriet A. R., his wife; of Georgiana Nulton, and of Catherine, the wife of Joseph Herbert; the general replication to said answers; the depositions taken in the cause, and those which it had been agreed by the parties should be read in the cause as set forth in the agreement of facts filed in the papers; the act of the Virginia convention; the decrees and other record evidence from the circuit court of the United States; the said agreement of facts; the admissions in open court made by the defendant, Holmes Conrad, administrator of Abraham Nulton, deceased, that the personal estate of said Abraham is inconsiderable and will pay but a small per cent., if any, of the complainants' claim, and the other papers filed in the cause, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, the court overruled the several demurrers to the bill, and being of opinion that the judgments of the circuit court of the United States, referred to in the bill, are not valid liens upon the real estate of said Abraham Nulton, and that there was no fraud in the conveyances from said Abraham to Joseph A. Nulton, in his own right, which are filed as exhibits N and O with the bill, decreed that the property conveyed in said deeds is not liable to the payment of the complainants' claims. But the court being of opinion that the conveyance from Abraham Nulton to Joseph A. Nulton, as trustee for Sarah Nulton, which is filed as exhibit H with the bill, was voluntary and without consideration, decreed that the said conveyance be set aside, so far as the claims of the complainants are concerned, and that the said property be subjected to the payment of the same; and as preliminary thereto, the court directed that one of its commissioners should ascertain and report to the court the amount due to the complainants from the estate of Abraham Nulton, deceased, and should settle the account of the said Holmes Conrad, administrator of said Abraham Nulton, deceased, and report what portion of the said claims the personal estate of said Nulton will pay??

From the said decree the said Georgiana Nulton, George H. Haines and Harriet Haines, Joseph Herbert and Catherine Herbert, and Joseph A. Nulton applied to a judge of this court for an appeal; which was accordingly allowed.

Holmes Conrad and Tucker & Tucker, for the appellants.

William L. Clark, for the appellees.

OPINION

MONCURE, P.

After stating the case he proceeded:

There is but a single assignment of error in the petition for an appeal in this case, which is in these words:

" The single error complained of is in overruling the demurrer to the bill of the complainants, and thereby permitting the complainants to proceed in one bill against several persons in regard to matters entirely distinct and independent, and as to which the defendants had no common or related interest."

And the petitioners proceed as follows in their said petition:

" The bill charges (page 5) that Abraham Nulton, by deed of 24th June, 1869, conveyed to Joseph A. Nulton, one of the petitioners, certain real estate in trust for Sarah Nulton. And that this deed was wholly without consideration, and was illegal and void; that on the 10th of November, 1869, and on the 23d February, 1870, the said Abraham Nulton conveyed to Joseph A. Nulton certain other pieces of real property ‘ for which no adequate consideration hath been given him; ’ and the said Joseph A. Nulton is required to make discovery of the settlement referred to in the deeds to him, and to exhibit a full settlement of his partnership accounts with his father, the said Abraham Nulton.

And the prayer of the bill is, that the deed to Sarah Nulton and the two deeds to Joseph A. Nulton may be set aside, and that he be required to settle his accounts as partner of his father.

Petitioners are advised that this bill is decidedly multifarious--Joseph A. Nulton protesting that he has nothing to do with the property conveyed to Sarah Nulton, and by her devised to his co-petitioners, and the other petitioners protesting that they have no interest or concern in the two deeds to Joseph A. Nulton, or in the settlement of his partnership account with his father. 1 Daniel, Ch'y Pr. p. 334; Story's Eq. Pl. § 271; Dunn v. Dunn & als., 26 Gratt. 291; Sawyer v. Noble, 55 Me. 227."

The court is of opinion that the circuit court did not err in overruling the demurrer to the bill, and that the same is not multifarious. This, we think, plainly appears from the authorities referred to in the petition and the notes of argument. Story's Eq. Pl. §§ 271, 285-6; Segar, & c., v. Parish, & c., 20 Gratt. 672; Jones' ex'ors v. Clarke & als., 25 Id. 662, 676; Dunn v. Dunn & als., 26 Id. 291; Brenkerhoff v. Brown, 6 Johns. Ch. R. 139; Fellows v. Fellows, 4 Cow. R. 682. It is true, as was said by Lord Cottenham in Campbell v. Mackey, 1 My. & Cr. 603, in the passage quoted from his opinion in that case by the counsel for the appellants: " To lay down any rule applicable universally, or to say what constitutes multifariousness as an abstract proposition is, upon the authorities, utterly impossible. The cases upon the subject are extremely various, and the court in deciding them, seems to have considered what was convenient in particular circumstances, rather than to have attempted to lay down any absolute rule." Yet, in most cases there is little or no difficulty in deciding the question whether or not multifariousness exists in the particular case, and such, in our opinion, is this case.

The complainants, William B. Isaacs & Co., claimed to be creditors of Abraham Nulton, under assignments to them of several of his notes by the Bank of the Valley in Virginia and the Farmers Bank of Virginia; and they brought their suit to enforce the payment of their claim out of the estate of their debtor. He had little or no personal estate, and all his real estate he had conveyed to and for the use of his wife, Sarah Nulton, and his son, Joseph A. Nulton, which conveyances were charged by the said creditors to be voluntary and fraudulent and void as to his creditors, and especially the complainants. They, therefore, sought by their said suit to remove these obstructions out of their way, without which they could not possibly obtain satisfaction of their claims, and for that purpose they had, necessarily, to make not only the administrator of Abraham Nulton, but also the claimants under the said alleged fraudulent conveyances, defendants to the bill; and as Joseph A. Nulton claimed to have become the purchaser of the property conveyed to him by his father, the said Abraham Nulton, by means of a balance alleged to have been due to him on a settlement of a partnership account between them, the complainants prayed in their bill that the defendant, Joseph A. Nulton, might " make a complete discovery of the consideration upon which the two deeds to him were based, and if essential to the proper understanding of the same, that his account as late partner of the decedent may be settled. " We think that all the persons made defendants to the suit were proper and necessary parties, and that the conditional prayer for a settlement of the partnership account was proper and unobjectionable, if not necessary. We have said so much on this subject, not because we had any difficulty about it, but because the learned counsel for the appellants made it the chief, if not the only ground of complaint, at least in the petition for an appeal. We will now proceed to consider whether there be any error in any other portion of the decree, which was complained of as being erroneous, though in different respects, in the arguments of the counsel, both of the appellants and appellees.

The court is further of opinion, that the circuit court did not err in decreeing that the property conveyed by Abraham Nulton to Joseph A. Nulton, in his own right by the two deeds, of which copies marked N and O, are filed as exhibits with the bill, is not liable for the payment of the complainants' claims.

If the orders of the circuit court of the United States in the record mentioned for the payment of three out of the four claims of the complainants had been valid judgments, and liens as such on the real estate of the debtor, Abraham Nulton, notwithstanding they were never registered, then the said property would have been liable for the payment, at least of the said three claims, whether the said two deeds were voluntary and fradulent or not.

But the court is of opinion, that the said orders of the circuit court of the United States were not valid judgments against the said Abraham Nulton. The said court would have had no jurisdiction to render such judgments, even if actions of debt had been brought in the said court by the Bank of the Valley in Virginia against the said Abraham Nulton for the recovery of the said claims, as both parties, plaintiffs and defendants, resided in the state. We do not mean to say that judgments rendered in such actions would have been regarded as void in any collateral proceeding. But we are of opinion that where, as in this case, the creditors, instead of proceeding by the common law action of debt to recover their claims, obtain an order for their payment on a mere summary rule to show cause--such order, though no defence be made to the rule, has not the force and effect of a judgment, and is not a lien on real estate, whether registered or not. The order is void on its face as a judgment. The defendant is entitled to the benefit of a common law action in which he can regularly make his defence, and have the benefit of a trial by jury; and he is entitled to be sued in the courts of his own state, and is not suable in the federal courts, even in an action brought against him alone. Much less can he be proceeded against by a mere summary rule and order in a suit brought in one of the federal courts against his creditor by another person or corporation. An order might, no doubt, have been made in that suit for the collection of debts due the defendant and liable to the claim of the plaintiff. But such collection, if it could not be made without legal proceedings, would have to be made by action at common law in a court of competent jurisdiction, just as if such debts had not been assigned or were still due to the original creditor. The debtor would lose none of his rights of defence by the assignment.

The true doctrine of the law on this subject is, in our opinion, correctly laid down in the opinion of the supreme court of the United States, delivered by Mr. Justice Field in Windsor v. McVeigh, 3 Otto R. 274. " The doctrine invoked by counsel," said the court in that case, page 282, " that where a court has once acquired jurisdiction, it has a right to decide every question which arises in the cause, and its judgment, however erroneous, cannot be collaterally assailed, is undoubtedly correct as a general proposition; but like all general propositions, is subject to many qualifications in its application. All courts, even the highest, are more or less limited in their jurisdiction; they are limited to particular classes of actions, such as civil or criminal, or to particular modes of administering relief, such as legal or equitable," & c. " Though the court may possess jurisdiction of a cause, of the subject matter and of the parties, it is still limited in its mode of procedure, and in the extent and character of its judgments. It must act judicially in all things, and cannot then transcend the power conferred by the law. If, for instance, the action be for a money demand, the court, notwithstanding its complete jurisdiction over the subject and parties, has no power to pass judgment of imprisonment in the penitentiary upon the defendant. If the action be for a libel or personal tort, the court cannot order in that case a specific performance of a contract. If the action be for the possession of real property, the court is powerless to admit in the case the probate of a will. Instances of this kind show that the general doctrine stated by counsel is subject to many qualifications. The judgments mentioned, given in the cases supposed, would not be merely erroneous, they would be absolutely void, because the court in rendering them would transcend the limits of its authority in those cases." " So a departure from established modes of procedure will often render the judgment void; thus the sentence of a person charged with felony, upon conviction by the court, without the intervention of a jury, would be invalid for any purpose. The decree of a court of equity upon oral allegations, without written pleadings, would be an idle act of no force beyond that of an advisory proceeding of the chancellor; and the reason is, that the courts are not authorized to exert their power in that way."

According to the principles thus laid down, the orders in question have not the force and effect of judgments. There is nothing in those principles at all in conflict with the opinion of this court, delivered by Judge Christian, in the case of Lancaster v. Wilson, 27 Gratt. 624. The distinction between the two is sufficiently obvious without any comment upon them here.

If the orders aforesaid were judgments, a very interesting question would arise, whether registration of those orders would have been necessary to make them liens on the real estate of the debtor; but as they are not judgments, it is unnecessary to consider that question.

It follows, therefore, from what has been said, that the property conveyed to the said Joseph A. Nulton, as aforesaid, is not liable for the payment of the complainants' claims. His answer in response to an allegation of the bill positively denied that the deeds were executed with fraudulent intent, and set out the valuable consideration on which he alleged that they were founded, and there is no proof on the other side. The court, therefore, rightly considered that there was no fraud in the said deeds, and decreed accordingly.

The court is further of opinion that the circuit court did not err in the opinion that from the evidence the conveyance from Abraham Nulton to Joseph A. Nulton, as trustee for Sarah Nulton, which is filed as exhibit II with the complainants' bill, was voluntary and without consideration, and in, therefore, decreeing that the said conveyance be set aside so far as the claims of the complainants are concerned, and that the property thereby conveyed be subjected to the payment of said claims. Blow v. Maynard, 2 Leigh 29.

The court is further of opinion that there is no error in the said decree, and that the same ought therefore to be affirmed, which is ordered accordingly.

DECREE AFFIRMED.