MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SARA LIOI, District Judge

On May 11, 2010, pro se Petitioner Julius K. Nganga (Petitioner or Nganga) filed the above-captioned petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Nganga, who describes himself as an 11 year resident of Cuyahoga County, seeks an Order from this Court restraining the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Nganga received a telephone call from an unnamed ICE agent on the same date he filed his Motion to Stay. The agent allegedly "suggested" the following to Nganga:

1. Petitioner's `Appeal had Been Denied'.

2. It would take 18 Months to Deport Petitioner

3. Petitioner Should contact Previous Counsel of Representation.

4. Petitioner should call back for an Inspection And Processing Procedure.

On Monday, May 10th, 2010, Petitioner Recorded a Voice Message Originated by Same caller and asking for call Back to Effect The Previous Demand via a Future Visit To ICE Offices.

(Doc. No. 1, Petition at 2.) Petitioner believes the call from the ICE agent, as well as his 2002 detention in a Newark, New Jersey jail, prove he will soon be taken into custody by ICE. He asks this Court to grant his petition for a writ to "restrain ICE (The Agency) From Arresting, Detaining, Harassing Or And Other Actions Restraining, Restricting Or Excluding Petitioner From Liberty as Protected by The Due Process Clause." (Id. at 2.)

INITIAL REVIEW

This matter is before the court for screening. 28 U.S.C. § 2243; Harper v. Thoms, No. 02-5520 2002, WL 31388736, at *1 (6^th Cir. Oct. 22, 2002). At this stage, allegations in the petition are taken as true and liberally construed in Petitioner's favor. Urbina v. Thoms, 270 F.3d 292, 295 (6^th Cir. 2001). Moreover, because Nganga is appearing pro se, his petition is held to less stringent standards than those drafted by attorneys. Burton v. Jones, 321 F.3d 569, 573 (6^th Cir. 2003); Hahn v. Star Bank, 190 F.3d 708, 715 (6^th Cir. 1999). Considering all of these factors, however, it is apparent Nganga is not entitled to an award of the writ. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 ("[J]udge . . . shall forthwith award the writ . . ., unless it appears . . . person detained is not entitled thereto.")

HABEAS PETITIONS

United States district courts have jurisdiction to hear and determine petitions for writs of habeas corpus seeking review of a final decision regarding alien deportation, but the scope of that jurisdiction is limited to review of "purely legal statutory and constitutional claims." Calcano-Martinez v. I.N.S., 232 F.3d 328, 342 (2d Cir. 2000), aff'd, 533 U.S. 348, 351-52 (2001). District courts do not have jurisdiction to review discretionary determinations by an IJ or the BIA. Sol v. I.N.S., 274 F.3d 648, 651 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 941 (2002).

As a threshold matter, a "writ of habeas corpus functions to grant relief from unlawful custody or imprisonment. Absent custody by the authority against whom relief is sought, jurisdiction usually will not lie to grant the requested writ." Campillo v. Sullivan, 853 F.2d 593, 595 (8^th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1082 (1989). The custody requirement limits this "extraordinary remedy" to cases of special urgency involving "severe restraints on individual liberty." See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973). Some courts have held that a lawful permanent resident of the United States who is subject to a final order of deportation, but not yet deported, satisfies the "in custody" requirement of § 2241(c)(1). See Nakaranurack v. United States, 68 F.3d 290, 293 (9^th Cir. 1995) (holding that the "in custody" requirement of the since-repealed INA habeas provision previously found at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10) is satisfied in "situations in which an alien is not suffering any actual physical detention; i.e., so long as he is subject to a final order of deportation"); Galaviz-Medina v. Wooten, 27 F.3d 487, 493 (10^th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1086 (1995); see, e.g,. Mustata v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 179 F.3d 1017, 1022 n. 4 (6^th Cir. 1999) (plaintiffs not literally in custody, were constructively "in custody" given specialized meaning those words have in the context of an immigration-related habeas petition). Without question, Nganga is not "literally" in custody. While he is subject to a final order of deportation, the question now turns to the scope of this Court's jurisdiction over his habeas petition.

Habeas Relief Limited

Parts of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) were revised and repealed by the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 ("IIRIRA") on April 1, 1997. Specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a, was repealed and replaced by the following:

(g) Exclusive jurisdiction.

Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this Act.

Section 241(a) governs the detention of aliens subject to final orders of removal. It mandates that the Attorney General remove an alien within a 90-day "removal period," 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A); however, an alien found removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2), like Petitioner, "may be detained beyond the removal period." 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). In either case, Nganga has not yet been taken into custody, and does not argue any constitutional violation regarding his pending deportation. Thus, his request for preemptive action falls squarely beyond the boundaries of this Court's jurisdiction. Such a request for injunctive relief is further foreclosed by statute, which states:

Without regard to the nature of the action or claim and without regard to the identity of the party or parties bringing the action, no court may —

(A) enter declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief in any action pertaining to an order to exclude an alien in accordance with section 1225(b)(1) of this title except as specifically authorized in a subsequent paragraph of this subsection.

Nganga's requested relief falls within the discretion of the Attorney General. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e); American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 482-86. Accordingly, even when his removal period does begin to run, and Respondent takes him into custody pending removal, Petitioner may only attack the reasonableness of the length of that detention as a statutory or Constitutional challenge. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001) (habeas corpus proceedings are available as forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention of alien).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this action is DISMISSED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.