OPINION AND ORDER

KENNETH KARAS, District Judge

Before the Court is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which was filed on June 14, 2004, and received by the Court's Pro Se Office on August 30, 2004. Upon an initial review of the Petition, Chief Judge Michael B. Mukasey concluded that it was filed three and a half years after the challenged state court conviction became final on or about January 3, 2001. By an order dated December 3, 2004, Chief Judge Mukasey explained both the limitation period established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") and the exhaustion of remedies requirement, and ordered Petitioner to show cause why the one year statute of limitation should not bar Petitioner's action as untimely. (Order, Dec. 3, 2004) Petitioner was instructed to amend his Petition in response to the Court's order within sixty days, during which time his habeas proceedings were stayed, and after which time failure to comply with the order would lead to dismissal of the Petition. On January 24, 2005, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition along with numerous supporting exhibits and a motion to again stay the proceedings. The action was reassigned to the undersigned for all purposes on March 29, 2005. Because the Court finds that the Amended Petition fails to establish that the Petition was timely filed and otherwise provides no basis for equitable tolling in this case, the Amended Petition is dismissed as untimely.

I. Background

After a trial by a judge in New York Supreme Court, Sullivan County on April 24, 1997, Petitioner was convicted of murder in the second degree, two counts of robbery in the first degree, and grand larceny in the third and fourth degrees. On June 29, 2000, his conviction was affirmed. People v. Nash, 273 A.D.2d 696, 696, 710 N.Y.S.2d 157, 158 (3d Dep't 2000). The Appellate Division also affirmed the Supreme Court's order, entered October 8, 1998, denying Petitioner's motion to vacate the judgment of conviction, pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10. Petitioner alleges that he filed an Application for Leave to Appeal his conviction to the New York Court of Appeals and that this was denied on October 4, 2000. (Am. Pet. at 1, ¶ 10) He did not petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. (Am. Pet. at 1, ¶ 10)

Along with his original federal habeas petition, it appears that Petitioner initiated other post-conviction remedies in state court around the same time. On or about March 29, 2004, Petitioner filed a Writ of Error Coram Nobis in the New York Court of Appeals, which was denied on June 18, 2004. (Am. Pet. at 2, ¶ 11) He also filed a second application for leave to appeal his conviction, which was denied on August 18, 2004, a motion for reargument denied on December 20, 2004, and a petition for writ of habeas corpus denied on August 11, 2004. (Am. Pet. at 2, ¶ 11)

II. Discussion

The AEDPA provides, in relevant part, that:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of —

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

"AEDPA's 1-year limitations period `quite plainly serves the well-recognized interest in the finality of state court judgments.'" Rhines v. Weber, 125 S. Ct. 1528, 1534 (2005) (quoting Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)). It also "promotes judicial efficiency and conservation of judicial resources, [and] safeguards the accuracy of state court judgments by requiring resolution of constitutional questions while the record is fresh." Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 2000). As such, the limitations period "implicates values beyond the concerns of the parties." Id. For these and other reasons, the Second Circuit has squarely held that a "district court has the authority to raise a petitioner's apparent failure to comply with the AEDPA statute of limitation on its own motion," as long as the petitioner receives notice and an opportunity to be heard before his petition is dismissed on this ground. Id. at 121. In this case, it is beyond dispute that Chief Judge Mukasey's order has afforded Petitioner notice and an opportunity to be heard on the question of the timeliness of his Petition.

Petitioner's conviction became final on or about January 3, 2001, at the latest, when his time to petition to the United States Supreme Court expired. See Wims v. United States, 225 F.3d 186, 188 (2d Cir. 2000). Thus, his habeas petition became time-barred under AEDPA as of January 2002 — unless the limitation period was tolled by post-conviction proceedings or equitable considerations.

A habeas petitioner will be entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA limitation period only if he meets his heavy burden of showing (i) "that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing his petition on time," and (ii) that he acted with "reasonable diligence throughout the period he seeks to toll." Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 2000) ( per curiam). Because federal courts must respect Congress' clearly stated desire to streamline the federal habeas process, courts should authorize such de facto extensions of the limitations period "only in the `rare and exceptional circumstance.'" Id. (quoting Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 391-92 (5th Cir. 1999)); see also Martinez v. Kuhlmann, No. 99 Civ. 1094, 1999 WL 1565177, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1999).

Petitioner offers the following reasons for the three and a half year delay in filing his Petition: (1) the combined effect of his psychiatric condition, the ineffective assistance of his counsel, his "incompetence," and his low reading and math level meant that it "would have been impossible (and quite naturally out of his control), for petitioner to have submitted a timely filed petition" (Am. Pet. at 5, ¶ 13); (2) he never had a complete copy of his trial transcripts; (3) his legal papers were "slowly confiscated" starting in 2000 and then taken more openly since March 2003 (Am. Pet. at 5, ¶ 13); (4) he has been in segregated housing or in lock down for much of the last eight years; (5) he was never informed by counsel of AEDPA or of his right to federal habeas review. The Court addresses each of these claims in turn.

Regarding his competence, Petitioner states that he has been homeless or in juvenile detention centers since he was 12 years old and submits two pages from his medical records reflecting treatment for clinical disorders. (Am. Pet., Ex. 8) These summary references to his mental illness and alleged incompetence are not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling. Petitioner must show that "his mental health or medical problems rendered him unable to pursue his legal rights during the relevant time period," Cannon v. Kuhlmann, No. 99 Civ. 10101, 2000 WL 1277331, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2000), and courts in this District have rejected claims of mental and physical illnesses more debilitating than the conditions Petitioner alleges here. See, e.g., Mendez v. Artuz, No. 99 Civ. 2472, 2000 WL 991336, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2000) (finding insufficient petitioner's statements that he takes eleven different pills a day for diabetes and high blood pressure, and that he is "constantly going in and out of the hospital"); Cannon, 2000 WL 1277331, at *2 (dismissing petition sua sponte as untimely and finding that allegations of low intelligence, learning disability, loss of memory, and use of psychiatric medication did not meet petitioner's burden of showing he was unable to pursue his habeas rights throughout the limitation period); Rhodes v. Senkowski, 82 F. Supp. 2d 160, 169-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding insufficient allegations of extreme headaches, depression, hypertension, weight loss, fungal infection, and a chest disorder brought on by AIDS that required three hospitalizations in one year period). In this regard, it is worth noting that whatever ailments Petitioner allegedly may have, he twice was able to submit a reasonably coherent and comprehensive Petition in this case.

It is also well-established that lack of education and even illiteracy by themselves do not justify equitable tolling. See Mendez, 2000 WL 991336, at *2 ("Mendez's statement that he is not proficient in the English language is insufficient to warrant equitable tolling. Such a limitation, under which numerous pro se inmate petitioners suffer, does not amount to `extraordinary circumstances' and accordingly, courts have repeatedly rejected such an argument."); Fennell v. Artuz, 14 F. Supp. 2d 374, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that lack of education and unfamiliarity with legal research do not warrant equitable tolling); Francis v. Miller, 198 F. Supp. 2d 232, 235 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that limited education, ignorance of law and legal procedure, lack of funds, limited access to legal assistance, and limited use of the prison library are not so "exceptional" as to merit equitable tolling). Petitioner claims that his reading and math levels at the start of his incarceration were so low that it would have been impossible for him to timely file his petition, and that his efforts to educate himself while incarcerated were themselves acts of due diligence. But the law of this Circuit is that lack of education cannot excuse the untimeliness of a pro se prisoner's habeas petition and, even if it could, Petitioner had almost four years before the beginning of the limitation period, within which reasonable diligence could have prepared him to file a timely petition.

Petitioner's claims concerning his trial transcript and the partial confiscation of his legal documentation also are unavailing. It is true that confiscation of legal papers may justify equitable tolling if it can be said to prevent the petitioner from filing his petition within the limitation period, and if he was otherwise diligent in attempting to procure the materials necessary to seek habeas relief. See Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[C]onfiscation of a prisoner's legal papers by a corrections officer shortly before the filing deadline may justify equitable tolling and permit the filing of a petition after the statute of limitations ordinarily would have run."); Paul v. Conway, No. 04 Civ. 9493, 2005 WL 914384, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2005) ("The word `prevent' requires the petitioner to demonstrate a causal relationship between the extraordinary circumstances on which the claim for equitable tolling rests and the lateness of his filing, a demonstration that cannot be made if the petitioner, acting with reasonable diligence, could have filed on time notwithstanding the extraordinary circumstances.") (emphasis in original).

Here, however, Petitioner makes no specific allegations explaining how an incomplete trial transcript prevented him from filing his habeas petition in a timely manner, let alone what efforts he made to secure the transcript, or when and how he secured enough of the transcript to file the instant Petition. This alone fatally undermines Petitioner's claim for equitable tolling. See Felix v. Artuz, No. 98 Civ. 6703, 2000 WL 278077, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2000) ("Petitioner has not established how his failure to receive those transcripts has impeded or prevented him in the first place from filing his habeas petition in a timely manner."); Paul, 2005 WL 914384, at *6 ("Paul does not explain how the loss of his papers prevented him from sending our Court a timely habeas petition on the simple form. . . . He doesn't say whether he ever obtained the other "half" [of his documents], or whether it was significant to the writing of his habeas petition. In short, Paul has not made a showing that he acted diligently to prepare a timely petition."); Mateos v. West, 357 F. Supp. 2d 572, 577 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Here, the petitioner does not state when the alleged confiscation occurred. Moreover, the petitioner fails to meet his burden to demonstrate that he acted with reasonable diligence to file his habeas petition following the confiscation of his legal papers. Indeed, as the petitioner seeks to equitably toll 1318 days of the limitations period, the petitioner's burden to demonstrate he acted with reasonable diligence throughout this entire period is particularly high."). Instead, Petitioner merely asserts that there was a "slow" confiscation of less than all of his legal papers, and that the more egregious confiscation did not begin until March 2003, more than a year after his filing deadline. (Am. Pet. at 5, ¶ 13) Yet, it is evident that Petitioner was ultimately able to file his Petition based on whatever portion of his trial transcript was available to him. On this point, it is highly relevant that at least some of Petitioner's claims for relief mimic those made either in his direct appeal or in the appeal of the denial of his § 440.10 motion. See Felix, 2000 WL 278077, at *3 (finding "no rational basis" for claim that lost transcripts were the cause of delay when the petition relied on arguments made on direct appeal). Thus, the allegedly incomplete trial transcript does not qualify as an "extraordinary circumstance" that excuses compliance with the AEDPA limitation period.

Petitioner's claim with respect to his restrictive confinement is only relevant to the extent it prevented him from filing his Petition on time by, for example, limiting his access to legal materials. See Hizbullahankhamon v. Walker, 105 F. Supp. 2d 339, 344-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that solitary confinement does not qualify as extraordinary circumstance justifying equitable tolling), aff'd, 255 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[W]ere we to determine, in an appropriate case, that the discretionary deprivation of a prisoner's access to his own legal materials and law library materials prevented a prisoner from petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, we would be obliged to consider granting a request for equitable tolling in order to avoid the constitutional difficulty posed by such a denial of access to the federal courts.").

Once again, Petitioner falls far short of meeting his burden of demonstrating that his is an extraordinary circumstance that merits equitable tolling. Aside from the fact that Petitioner fails to explain how his supposedly constant restrictive confinement prevented him from filing his Petition, the record of Petitioner's Internal Movement History from the Department of Correctional Services indicates that from January 2001 through January 2002, Petitioner was neither in segregated housing nor subject to keep lock, although he may have been subject to some lesser form of restrictive confinement. (Am. Pet., Ex. 9) Furthermore, as for his restrictive confinement both before and after the limitation period, Petitioner makes no specific allegations concerning his access to legal research materials during these periods of time. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that his prison conditions prevented him from filing his habeas petition on time. See Asencio v. Senkowski, No. 00 Civ. 6418, 2000 WL 1760908, at *2 n. 4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2000) (holding solitary confinement does not qualify as extraordinary circumstance); Warren v. Kelly, 207 F. Supp. 2d 6, 10 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Transfers between prison facilities, solitary confinement, lockdowns, restricted access to the law library and an inability to secure court documents do not qualify as extraordinary circumstances.").

Finally, the failure of counsel to inform a client of his federal habeas rights and obligations does not fall within the scope of attorney failures that toll the limitation. Such a failure is not "sufficiently egregious . . . [to] constitute the sort of `extraordinary circumstances' that would justify the application of equitable tolling." Baldayaque v. United States, 338 F.3d 145, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2003). ( See also Order, Dec. 3, 2004 at 3-4) Nor does ignorance of AEDPA warrant equitable tolling, as such ignorance among pro se inmate petitioners is a typical rather than extraordinary circumstance. Cannon, 2000 WL 1277331, at *2.

Because Petitioner filed his habeas Petition well over one year after his state conviction became final, and because he does not meet any of AEDPA's exceptions to the limitation period or qualify for equitable tolling, his Petition is time-barred and must be dismissed.

III. Conclusion

It is further ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter a judgment in favor of Respondent and to close this case.

SO ORDERED.