Opinion by JUDGE BERMAN.

The Jefferson County Department of Social Services (Jefferson County Department) and its director, Nelson Nadeau, appellants, appeal the dismissal of their complaint seeking review of action by the Merit System Council for the County Departments of Social Services of the State of Colorado (Merit System Council). We affirm.

On March 28, 1974, Harry Havemeyer, a caseworker with the Jefferson County Department, was dismissed from his employment. He appealed his dismissal to the Merit System Council. The Merit System Council appointed a hearing officer who, after conducting a hearing, recommended that the Merit System Council uphold the dismissal. Thereafter, the Merit System Council adopted the hearing officer's findings of fact in their entirety, but ordered a 30-day suspension instead of a dismissal.

The Jefferson County Department and its director then initiated this action, pursuant to § 24-4-106, C.R.S. 1973, seeking review of the decision of the Merit System Council. On November 27, 1974, the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim, and this appeal followed.

The question presented for review is whether the Jefferson County Department and its director can appeal from a decision of the Merit System Council. The appellants assert that they are "aggrieved" parties within the meaning of § 24-4-106, C.R.S. 1973, and therefore are entitled to seek judicial review. The appellees urge affirmance of the dismissal of the complaint in this case upon the authority of Board of County Commissioners of Otero v. State Board of Social Services, 186 Colo. 435, 528 P.2d 244.

In Otero, supra, the Board of County Commissioners filed a complaint under § 24-4-106, C.R.S. 1973, against the State Board of Social Services challenging the action of the State Board in increasing salaries of county public assistance and welfare department employees. In affirming the district court's dismissal of the complaint, the court stated:

"[T]he right to judicial review of the final administrative actions of the State Board of Social Services, under the law of this state, is limited to those parties to the proceeding before the administrative agency whose rights, privileges, or duties, as distinct from those of the State, are adversely affected by the decision. The county as an arm of the State Board of Social Services has no rights or privileges so far as its statutory duties are concerned and hence does not come within the meaning of 'party.' Excluded from the provisions of 1969 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 3-16-5, [now § 24-4-106, C.R.S. 1973], the county, and as such, the Board of County Commissioners are without standing to challenge the action of the State Board . . . . "

In support of their claimed right to seek judicial review, plaintiffs point to § 26-1-120(5), C.R.S. 1973, which provides that in regard to hearings conducted relative to an employee's status:

"[T]he merit system council shall make the decision concerning the applicant's or the employee's status, which shall be reviewable in accordance with section 24-4-106, C.R.S. 1973."

And, § 24-4-106(4), C.R.S. 1973, provides that:

"Any party adversely affected or aggrieved by any agency action may commence an action for judicial review in the district court . . . . "

Construing these statutes in the light of the ruling in Otero, supra, the right of the Jefferson County Department and its director to obtain judicial review of the action of the Merit System Council depends on whether they are parties to the proceeding before the administrative agency whose rights, privileges, and duties, as distinct from those of the state, are adversely affected by that action.

By statute, the State Board of Social Services is the state agency for the administration and supervision of programs relating to public assistance and welfare. Section 26-1-102 et seq., C.R.S. 1973. The county departments of social services are designated by statute as agent for the State Department of Social Services for the administration of public assistance and welfare-related activities in the respective counties. Section 26-1-118, C.R.S. 1973. The county director is charged with the executive and administrative duties and responsibilities of the county department, subject to the rules and regulations of the State Department of Social Services. Section 26-1-117, C.R.S. 1973.

The Merit System, including the Merit System Council, is established by the State Department of Social Services pursuant to statute for the purpose of "the selection, retention, and promotion of employees of the county department." Section 26-1-120(1), C.R.S. 1973. In addition, the rules and regulations adopted by the State Department of Social Services for the Merit System must, by statute, provide for the "discipline, dismissal, separation, reinstatement, and transfers" of employees. Section 26-1-120(5)(f), C.R.S. 1973.

It is clear from these statutory provisions that the county departments of social services, and the Merit System Council, are both functional divisions of the State Department of Social Services for the convenient administration of the state program and are not independent entities separate and distinct from the state. See Board of County Commissioners v. Love, 172 Colo. 121, 470 P.2d 861.

It is appellants' position that since the statutes cited above clearly provide for judicial review of Merit System Council action, and the legislature, on the fact of the statute, has not specifically denied the right to seek such review to the county department, that where a county department is adversely affected by a decision of the Merit System Council, it must be granted judicial review. Love, supra, answered this argument, stating: "Since the legislature has not seen fit to grant such power and authority, we necessarily conclude that the [county] commissions were without standing to bring the instant action."

[1] The Jefferson County Department, in the instance case, occupies the same position as the Board of County Commissioners in Otero, supra, vis-a-vis the State Board of Social Services, and, in such role, it has not standing to seek judicial review of the action by the Merit System Council.

Judgment affirmed.

JUDGE ENOCH concur.

JUDGE COYTE dissents.