Opinion by JUDGE RULAND.

Plaintiff, Mr. Steak, Inc., initiated this action to obtain a permanent injunction against the sale of alcoholic beverages by defendants upon the premises of a restaurant operated pursuant to a franchise agreement. Mr. Steak appeals from a judgment dismissing its complaint. We reverse.

The facts pertinent to this review are not disputed. Mr. Steak was organized in 1962 for the purposes of owning and issuing franchise agreements, to operate sit-down restaurants. By the terms of its franchise agreements, an operator is licensed to erect and operate a restaurant to serve a designated territory, and to use the Mr. Steak trade name, its restaurant design, management techniques, accounting procedures, and advertising materials. Mr. Steak is obligated to assist in opening the restaurant, to train employees, and to provide other services and products for operation of the restaurant. In addition to an initial fee, the operator is obligated to pay Mr. Steak a percentage of gross weekly sales.

As of September 1974, Mr. Steak owned 41 restaurants located in various parts of the United States, and an additional 213 were operated pursuant to franchise agreements. Six of the restaurants owned by Mr. Steak were located in Colorado as well as 15 operated under franchise agreements. Of the Colorado restaurants, 12 were located in the metropolitan Denver area.

From 1962 through approximately 1968, all franchise agreements issued by Mr. Steak contained a prohibition against the sale of alcoholic beverages on the restaurant premises. In 1968 this provision was inadvertently omitted when the franchise form was reprinted, and various franchise agreements were issued which did not contain such prohibition. As a result, 27 of the franchise restaurants serve alcoholic beverages, including one restaurant in Pueblo. However, the omission was discovered thereafter and reinserted in the franchise agreement form.

Beginning in 1969 and continuing into 1973, Mr. Steak sustained a marked decrease in business and experimented with various programs in an effort to increase gross sales through its restaurants and those operated pursuant to its franchises. One of the experiments involved authorizing the sale of alcoholic beverages on the premises of certain restaurants. In this connection, Mr. Steak issued four written waivers. Another ten franchise operators, including one restaurant in Colorado Springs, proceeded with the sale of alcoholic beverages without obtaining a written waiver. However, there are no restaurants in the metropolitan Denver area which serve alcoholic beverages.

Defendants Edward H. Neilson and Lucy J. Neilson were the owners of all of the stock in defendant Lensco, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation. In 1970, Lensco acquired the stock of Belleview Steak, Inc., which operated a restaurant located in the City of Greenwood Village. The franchise agreement issued by Mr. Steak governing this restaurant contained a prohibition against the sale of alcoholic beverages. The Neilsons were acquainted with this provision when they assumed operation of the restaurant and they were aware that other restaurants located in the same trade area dispensed alcoholic beverages.

In the fall of 1974, defendants filed an application with the city council of Greenwood Village for issuance of a three-way beer, wine, and liquor license for the restaurant. In this connection, defendants advised Mr. Steak of their intent to sell alcoholic beverages at the restaurant, but Mr. Steak refused to grant permission therefor. Following a public hearing in December of 1974, the council approved issuance of the license. Mr. Steak then filed the present action.

Defendants based their decision to dispense alcoholic beverages on the fact that the Colorado Springs franchise was serving alcoholic beverages and the fact that various customers had indicated a desire to have alcoholic beverages served with their meals. Defendants projected an increase in gross and net revenues. Mr. Steak declined to approve sale of alcoholic beverages because its board of directors had concluded for various reasons that the franchise restaurants generally would be more successful if alcoholic beverages were not dispensed on the premises. The parties agree that defendants would gain some customers and lose others if alcoholic beverages were served at defendants' restaurant.

Following a trial to the court, it ruled that Mr. Steak was estopped to enforce the prohibition since Mr. Steak had "waived this provision of its franchise agreement with certain other Mr. Steak franchises throughout the United States, including a franchise in Colorado Springs."

[1,2] Waiver is generally defined at the relinquishment of a known right. In re Estate of McEndaffer, 36 Colo. App. 393, 543 P.2d 535 (1975) cert. granted 192 Colo. 431, 560 P.2d 87, (1975) While defendants stipulated prior to trial that Mr. Steak had "always resisted and prohibited the sale of alcoholic beverages" at their restaurant, they contend that a waiver nevertheless results by reason of Mr. Steak's grant of permission to four other franchise operators for the sale of alcohol, by its failure to enforce the prohibition by legal action against ten other franchise operators, and by its inadvertent failure to include the prohibitions as a term of other franchise agreements. While defendants in effect concede that the franchise agreement constitutes a formal contract which establishes the legal relationship between the parties, see 62 Am. Jur. 2d Private Franchise Contracts § 5, they argue that the franchise relationship should be governed by fiduciary principles so that Mr. Steak is obligated to accord all franchises the same options in the operation of their respective restaurants. We do not find this argument persuasive under the circumstances of this case.

First, as to the claim of waiver, it is not disputed that Mr. Steak's refusal of defendants' request to serve alcoholic beverages was based solely on its conclusion that franchise restaurants will succeed to a greater degree by not serving alcoholic beverages. This conclusion was based upon various business considerations such as the volume and type of customers who can be served in a given time period when alcoholic beverages are not served on the premises, the type of personnel who can be employed to serve those customers as distinguished from the requirements for restaurants which serve alcohol, and the necessary alterations in design and construction of restaurants which serve alcohol. Also, defendants do not dispute that Mr. Steak's initial failure to enforce the prohibition against other franchise operators resulted, inter alia, from lack of the necessary funds to conduct litigation in various jurisdictions. Under such circumstances, Mr. Steak's actions with regard to other franchises cannot sustain a finding that it waived its rights under the specific terms of its agreement with these defendants.

Second, although defendants seek to impose a fiduciary obligation upon Mr. Steak to accord each franchise operator the same options in conducting the business of a restaurant, defendants do not suggest that the fiduciary concept is applicable so as to standardize all provisions of the franchise agreement. For example, defendants operate under a franchise which limits Mr. Steak to revenues of two and one-half percent of gross weekly sales, yet franchise agreements executed after that acquired by defendants obligated the franchise operators in some cases to remit from four to seven percent of gross weekly sales upon a "sliding scale," and still others to remit a flat three percent. Hence, if defendants were entitled to disregard the prohibition against sale of alcohol in their franchise agreement, it follows that to accord all franchise operators equal treatment, Mr. Steak would be entitled to insist upon an increase in revenues from defendants similar to that paid by other franchisees. Thus, the fiduciary concept advocated by defendants would render long established principles of contract law meaningless in the franchise context, and we find no judicial or legislative authority supporting such a result.

Defendants next contend that the trial court's judgment was properly based upon the doctrine of estoppel. Again, we disagree.

[3] In order to establish an estoppel against Mr. Steak, it must appear, inter alia, that defendants detrimentally changed their position in reliance upon the conduct of Mr. Steak. Susman v. Exchange National Bank, 117 Colo. 12, 183 P.2d 571 (1947). However, defendants concede that they were aware of the prohibition against the sale of alcoholic beverages at the time they assumed management of the restaurant, and that Mr. Steak has at no time consented to or even acquiesced in their attempt to initiate the sale of alcoholic beverages on the restaurant premises. Hence, there is no basis in the record before us to conclude that defendants changed their position in reliance upon the conduct of Mr. Steak. Rather, they seek only to change their position in the future by dispensing alcoholic beverages. The doctrine of estoppel does not apply.

The judgment dismissing Mr. Steak's complaint is reversed and the cause remanded for entry of judgment not inconsistent with the views herein.

JUDGE COYTE and JUDGE PIERCE concur.