ROBINSON, C. J.

Michael W. Brown, West Hartford, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

Mitchell S. Brody, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Matthew C. Gedansky, state's attorney, and Angela R. Macchiarulo, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D'Auria, Kahn and Ecker, Js.

ROBINSON, C. J. The principal issue in this certified appeal is whether a criminal defense attorney who is aware that his or her client has a legal misunderstanding material to the decision of whether to accept a plea bargain has a duty to provide advice to address that misunderstanding. The petitioner, Joseph Moore, appeals, upon our grant of his petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court dismissing his appeal from the judgment of the habeas court. The habeas court denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in which he claimed that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations prior to his criminal trial at which he was convicted of, among other crimes, robbery in the first degree. Moore v. Commissioner of Correction , 186 Conn. App. 254, 255–58, 270, 199 A.3d 594 (2018). On appeal, the petitioner claims that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney did not adequately advise him of his maximum sentencing exposure if convicted at trial of the lesser included offense of robbery in the third degree. Because the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving that trial counsel did not advise him about his maximum exposure for a conviction of the lesser included offense of robbery in the third degree, we conclude that the petitioner cannot prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history, much of which is aptly recited in the Appellate Court's opinion in this case. The petitioner was arrested in 2009 after entering a New Alliance Bank and demanding cash from the bank employees. Id. at 256–57, 199 A.3d 594. He was charged with robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (4) and commission of a class B felony with a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53-202k. The state also filed a part B information charging the petitioner with (1) committing the offenses while on release in violation of General Statutes § 53a-40b, and (2) being a persistent felony offender in violation of General Statutes § 53a-40 (f). Id. at 256, 199 A.3d 594. At his criminal trial, the petitioner did not dispute having robbed the bank; his only contention was that he did not write a note to the bank teller stating " ‘[g]ive cash. I have gun.’ " Id. The petitioner's theory at trial was that he did not write the note and, therefore, should be convicted of only the lesser included offense of robbery in the third degree. See id. at 258 and n.2, 199 A.3d 594. The petitioner was, however, convicted of all the crimes charged after a jury trial and sentenced to a total effective term of thirty-four years of incarceration. Id. at 256, 199 A.3d 594. The Appellate Court subsequently affirmed the petitioner's conviction on direct appeal. State v. Moore , 141 Conn. App. 814, 825, 64 A.3d 787, cert. denied, 309 Conn. 908, 68 A.3d 663 (2013).

In 2016, the petitioner filed an amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his trial counsel, Douglas A. Ovian, rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to advise the petitioner adequately during pretrial plea negotiations. Moore v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 186 Conn. App. at 257–58, 199 A.3d 594. "At the habeas trial on September 15, 2016, the habeas court heard testimony from Matthew C. Gedansky, the state's attorney in the petitioner's criminal case, [Ovian], and the petitioner. ... There was testimony that three plea offers were made to the petitioner: an offer for ten years to serve with five years of special parole; an offer for ten years to serve with two years of special parole; and an offer made at a judicial pretrial conference with Sullivan , J. , offering the petitioner fifteen years to serve if he pleaded guilty to one count of robbery in the first degree. Ovian testified that his notes indicated that he advised the petitioner to accept the offers and that he would never have told the petitioner to take this case to trial. In addition, Gedansky testified that he recalled Ovian telling him that Ovian had advised the petitioner to take the offer of ten years to serve with two years [of] special parole. The petitioner testified that he rejected these offers because he had faith the state might present him with a more favorable offer, and that he believed he deserved only five years of imprisonment. There also was differing testimony between Ovian and the petitioner with respect to what Ovian advised as to the potential maximum sentence the petitioner faced if he was found guilty of all the charges, and whether he advised the petitioner of the potential maximum sentence he faced if he prevailed on a robbery in the third degree theory at trial.

"In a memorandum of decision filed [on] January 10, 2017, the habeas court denied the amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, finding that the petitioner had failed to prove deficient performance or prejudice. In particular, the habeas court found that ‘Ovian had many discussions with the petitioner throughout the course of his representation,’ and that Ovian ‘went over the state's evidence with [the petitioner] and he advised the petitioner to take each of the deals as they were offered given the circumstances.’ Additionally, the habeas court found that Ovian ‘informed the petitioner that he was facing a maximum exposure of forty-eight and one-half years if convicted of robbery in the first degree due to the sentence enhancements the petitioner faced.’ The habeas court concluded that Ovian relayed the offers to the petitioner, properly explained the state's evidence to him, and adequately warned him of the exposure he could face should he choose to go to trial. On January 17, 2017, the petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal, which was later denied by the habeas court." (Footnotes in original; footnote omitted.) Id. at 258–60, 199 A.3d 594.

The petitioner appealed from the denial of his petition for certification to appeal to the Appellate Court, claiming that the habeas court improperly rejected his claim that Ovian's "performance was deficient for failing to advise him of the maximum sentence he faced if he was successful in proving at trial that he was guilty only of committing the lesser included offense of robbery in the third degree." Id. at 261, 199 A.3d 594. The Appellate Court declined to conclude that Ovian's performance was deficient as a result of his alleged "failure to inform the petitioner of the potential total sentence exposure he faced if he succeeded on the unlikely theory of [defense that the state could only] prov[e] robbery in the third degree ...." Id. at 268, 199 A.3d 594. Instead, the Appellate Court held that the information and advice that Ovian did provide were adequate to allow the petitioner to make an informed decision regarding the state's plea offers and that any failure to further explain the consequences of proceeding to trial fell outside the objective standard of reasonableness of counsel's performance. Id. at 268–69, 199 A.3d 594. In so concluding, the Appellate Court opined that criminal defense attorneys should not be required "to advise their clients on the total sentence exposure they face for each and every possible defense scenario ...." Id. at 265, 199 A.3d 594. Finally, in holding that Ovian's advice was appropriate, the Appellate Court observed that any effort made by Ovian to correct the petitioner's mistaken belief that he would receive a sentence of less than ten years if he had been convicted of the lesser included offense of robbery in the third degree would have only encouraged his mistaken belief. Id. at 269 n.10, 199 A.3d 594. Accordingly, the Appellate Court rendered judgment dismissing the appeal. Id. at 270, 199 A.3d 594. This certified appeal followed. See footnote 1 of this opinion.

On appeal, the petitioner claims that, although Ovian rendered competent advice in clearly conveying all pretrial offers to the petitioner and advising him to accept those offers, his assistance was nevertheless ineffective because he failed to advise the petitioner on his maximum sentencing exposure for robbery in the third degree. The petitioner argues that Ovian's performance was ineffective because he failed to address the petitioner's expressed misunderstanding of the law regarding his sentencing exposure for robbery in the third degree at trial, which meant that the petitioner lacked the appropriate context for deciding whether to accept a plea or to go to trial. The petitioner argues, and the habeas court found, that the petitioner's choice to proceed to trial was a result of his mistaken belief that he would be exposed only to a sentence of less than ten years if convicted of robbery in the third degree. As a result, the petitioner argues, his choice to proceed to trial was "irrational and essentially suicidal given the circumstances."

In response, the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, argues that Ovian's advice to accept the plea offers was constitutionally sufficient because he made clear to the petitioner the low probability of acquittal for robbery in the first degree. The respondent asserts that the petitioner's decision to proceed to trial was a last chance " ‘Hail Mary’ " to avoid a sentence for robbery in the first degree. Furthermore, the respondent contends that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving that Ovian did not advise him that a sentence for a conviction of robbery in the third degree would still exceed the plea offers presented to the petitioner.

Having considered the parties’ arguments, we agree with the petitioner that trial counsel has a duty to correct a defendant's expressed, material misunderstanding of the law that influences his decision whether to accept a plea. Nevertheless, we conclude that the Appellate Court properly upheld the habeas court's denial of the petition for certification to appeal in light of the habeas court's articulation, which this court sua sponte ordered after hearing oral argument, clarifying that the petitioner had failed to prove that Ovian did not advise him in this regard.

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review. "The habeas court is afforded broad discretion in making its factual findings, and those findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. ... The application of [the pertinent legal standard to] the habeas court's factual findings ... however, presents a mixed question of law and fact, which is subject to plenary review." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ebron v. Commissioner of Correction , 307 Conn. 342, 351, 53 A.3d 983 (2012), cert. denied sub nom. Arnone v. Ebron , 569 U.S. 913, 133 S. Ct. 1726, 185 L. Ed. 2d 802 (2013).

"Faced with the habeas court's denial of certification to appeal, a petitioner's first burden is to demonstrate that the habeas court's ruling constituted an abuse of discretion. ... A petitioner may establish an abuse of discretion by demonstrating that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason ... [the] court could resolve the issues [in a different manner] ... or ... the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. ... The required determination may be made on the basis of the record before the habeas court and the applicable legal principles. ... If the petitioner succeeds in surmounting that hurdle, the petitioner must then demonstrate that the judgment of the habeas court should be reversed on its merits. ... In determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner's request for certification, we necessarily must consider the merits of the petitioner's underlying claims to determine whether the habeas court reasonably determined that the petitioner's appeal was frivolous." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Meletrich v. Commissioner of Correction , 332 Conn. 615, 626, 212 A.3d 678 (2019).

Given the centrality of plea bargaining to the efficient administration of the criminal justice system, "defense counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process, responsibilities that must be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the [s]ixth [a]mendment [to the United States constitution] requires in the criminal process at critical stages. Because ours ‘is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials’ ... it is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process." (Citation omitted.) Missouri v. Frye , 566 U.S. 134, 143–44, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 182 L. Ed. 2d 379 (2012), quoting Lafler v. Cooper , 566 U.S. 156, 170, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 182 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2012). "In today's criminal justice system, therefore, the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a defendant." Missouri v. Frye , supra, at 144, 132 S.Ct. 1399. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations under the well established standard of Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), which governs such claims, the defendant must establish that (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) there was a reasonable probability that—but for the deficient performance—the petitioner would have accepted the plea offer, and that the trial court would have assented to the plea offer. See Ebron v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 307 Conn. at 357, 53 A.3d 983. For purposes of this appeal, we focus on the first prong of Strickland , specifically, whether counsel's failure to correct a client's expressed, material misunderstanding of his sentencing exposure for a lesser included charge constitutes deficient performance. As we noted previously, the petitioner's exposure with respect to the lesser included offense of robbery in the third degree is a significant consideration in this case because, as the habeas court found, he "believed that he should be convicted of robbery in the third degree because he only gave the bank teller a note and did not hurt anyone. The petitioner rejected both plea offers for ten and fifteen years to serve for robbery in the first degree because he [believed that he] ... committed [only] a robbery in the third degree and he believed that five years was a more reasonable sentence for his offense." The United States Supreme Court has declined to limit findings of deficient performance solely to affirmative misadvice by counsel because there is no meaningful distinction between acts of commission and acts of omission when assessing ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Padilla v. Kentucky , 559 U.S. 356, 370, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010). There is no per se rule requiring specific conduct of defense attorneys during plea negotiations. Purdy v. United States , 208 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2000). Instead, we must determine whether, "in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Strickland v. Washington , supra, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; accord Padilla v. Kentucky , supra, at 370, 130 S.Ct. 1473. The parameters of appropriate advice required during plea negotiations are determined by a fact specific inquiry in which we consider whether an attorney's performance fell below "an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland v. Washington , supra, at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; accord Padilla v. Kentucky , supra, at 366, 130 S.Ct. 1473 ; Davis v. Commissioner of Correction , 319 Conn. 548, 555, 126 A.3d 538 (2015), cert. denied sub nom. Semple v. Davis , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1676, 194 L. Ed. 2d 801 (2016).

The objective standard of reasonableness for an attorney's performance is defined by prevailing professional norms and standards, such as those contained in the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice and Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky , supra, 559 U.S. at 366–67, 130 S.Ct. 1473 ; Strickland v. Washington , supra, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; G. Chin & R. Holmes, "Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas," 87 Cornell L. Rev. 697, 713 (2002). When advising a defendant during plea negotiations, counsel should "advise the defendant of the alternatives available and address considerations deemed important by defense counsel or the defendant in reaching a decision." (Emphasis added.) A.B.A., Standards for Criminal Justice: Pleas of Guilty (3d Ed. 1999) standard 14-3.2 (b), p. 116 (A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice). "[D]efense counsel is charged with the primary responsibility [of] ensur[ing] that the defendant fully understands the plea that is being offered, including all terms of the sentence that could be imposed and other ramifications of that plea." Id., standard 14-3.2, commentary, p. 120. Given the fact specific nature of plea negotiations and client communications, the necessary information depends on the individual circumstances of each defendant and his or her case. Id.; see also 1 Restatement (Third), The Law Governing Lawyers § 20 (3), p. 169 (2000) ("[a] lawyer ... must explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation"). "Counsel rendering advice in this critical area may take into account, among other factors, the defendant's chances of prevailing at trial, the likely disparity in sentencing after a full trial as compared to a guilty plea ... whether the defendant has maintained his innocence, and the defendant's comprehension of the various factors that will inform his plea decision ." (Emphasis added.) Purdy v. United States , supra, 208 F.3d at 45. Instead of failing to meet a prescribed, mechanical standard, counsel's performance has been held constitutionally deficient when counsel failed to provide his client with "sufficient information about the client's sentencing exposure to allow the client ‘to make a reasonably informed decision [regarding] whether to accept a plea offer.’ " United States v. Penoncello , 358 F. Supp. 3d 815, 822 (D. Minn. 2019), quoting United States v. Day , 969 F.2d 39, 43 (3d Cir. 1992). An understanding of the difference between sentencing exposures resulting from standing trial and accepting a plea offer "will often be crucial to the decision [regarding] whether to plead guilty." United States v. Day , supra, at 43 ; see id. at 44 (holding that performance would be deficient if counsel failed to advise defendant about sentence exposure). "A defendant cannot make an intelligent choice about whether to accept a plea offer unless he fully understands the risks of proceeding to trial." United States v. Herrera , 412 F.3d 577, 580 (5th Cir. 2005) ; see also Smith v. United States , 348 F.3d 545, 553 (6th Cir. 2003) ("[a] criminal defendant has a right to expect at least that his attorney will ... explain the sentencing exposure the defendant will face as a consequence of exercising each of the options available"). On this point, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that a defense attorney's failure to accurately advise his client about the range of sentences he faced if found guilty constituted ineffective assistance of counsel inasmuch as "his judgment was clouded by misunderstanding up through the time of his trial because his counsel did not do his job." United States v. Bennett , 588 Fed. Appx. 159, 161 (3d Cir. 2014) ; see also United States v. Penoncello , supra, at 822–23 (concluding that defense counsel's failure to inform defendant that rejecting initial plea offer would result in fifty year increase in sentencing exposure amounted to deficient performance).

The respondent argues, and the Appellate Court agreed, that requiring counsel to advise their criminal defense clients as to each and every possible sentencing scenario would broaden the duty of trial counsel beyond the scope of the objective standard of reasonableness. Moore v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 186 Conn. App. at 265, 199 A.3d 594. We do not, however, understand the petitioner to seek to impose such a broad duty on defense attorneys in contending that Ovian failed to provide him with constitutionally adequate advice. Instead, the petitioner argues that, "[w]hen a criminal defendant's strong, subjective, and unrealistic beliefs about his case ... stem from an articulated legal or factual misunderstanding , the role of constitutionally competent counsel is to give accurate and complete advice about the law or relevant facts." (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) We agree with this more limited understanding of the defense attorney's obligation. Indeed, this obligation is consistent with those already imposed on counsel when advising on deportation or other collateral consequences that are likely determinative of a criminal defendant's decision whether to accept a plea offer, beyond just maximum exposure after conviction. See Lee v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1967, 198 L. Ed. 2d 476 (2017) (recognizing that defense counsel's error in advising on deportation consequences prejudiced defendant because deportation was " ‘the determinative issue’ " in his decision whether to accept plea); Padilla v. Kentucky , supra, 559 U.S. at 368–69, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (holding performance to be deficient when counsel failed to advise client about deportation consequences of plea agreement). Given the gravity of a defendant's decision whether to accept a plea offer or proceed to trial, we conclude that trial counsel has an obligation to address a material misunderstanding of law, expressed by the client, that appears to influence the client's decision whether to accept a plea offer or to proceed to trial. This obligation is wholly consistent with counsel's obligation to ensure defendants have the specific information necessary for them to make an informed decision. See Purdy v. United States , supra, 208 F.3d at 44–45 (clarifying that counsel's obligation to advise on probable costs and benefits of decision requires fact specific inquiry into circumstances surrounding plea negotiation).

In response to this court's articulation order; see footnote 5 of this opinion; the habeas court clarified that the petitioner failed to "meet his burden to establish facts that would support his claim that ... Ovian did not advise him as to his maximum exposure with enhancements on a conviction for robbery in the third degree." Specifically, during the habeas proceedings, neither the petitioner nor Ovian could recall whether Ovian specifically advised him as to his exposure under a sentence for robbery in the third degree. Ovian testified that, "although not completely certain, [he] was reasonably certain that he would have explained to the petitioner that the enhanced penalties would apply to any conviction, including robbery in the third degree . He therefore believed that he would have told the petitioner that, even if he was convicted of robbery in the third degree, he would face more than ten years." (Emphasis added.) In its articulation, the habeas court expressly credited Ovian's testimony and found that he likely did advise the petitioner as to his exposure for a sentence of robbery in the third degree. Therefore, because the habeas court found, as a factual matter, that the petitioner did not meet his burden of proving that Ovian breached his duty to advise him regarding his sentencing exposure for robbery in the third degree, we conclude that the petitioner has failed to establish that Ovian rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the Appellate Court properly dismissed the petitioner's appeal from the denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.