MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TOM S. LEE, District Judge.

Sherri Flowers filed in this cause a motion to dismiss, asserting that the individual capacity claims alleged in plaintiffs' amended complaint should be dismissed, since plaintiffs have admitted they asserted an individual capacity claim against her in error. In addition, all defendants (including Flowers in her official capacity) have moved to dismiss, ostensibly pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on the basis that the injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, and on the basis of Younger abstention. Plaintiff Charles Lucroy has responded in opposition to the motion; plaintiffs James Christopher Milone and Jimmie Lee Robinson have not responded to the motion. For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that Younger abstention is appropriate.

On May 6, 2009 and December 10, 2009, respectively, plaintiffs James Christopher Milone and Jimmy Lee Robinson, Jr. were cited for driving under the influence in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated § 63-11-30(1)(a). Both appeared in Hinds County Justice Court and through their attorneys, pled not guilty. Similarly, on February 11, 2009, plaintiff Charles Shawn Lucrow was charged in Rankin County, Mississippi with driving under the influence. He initially appeared and pled not guilty in Rankin County Justice Court. On March 16, 2010, while the charges remained pending against them in the state justice courts, plaintiffs filed the present action in this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants, as a matter of official policy, custom and practice, systematically deny justice court defendants access to favorable evidence relating to both guilt and punishment, in violation of their due process rights. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.ct. 1194, 1196-96, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963) (holding that suppression "of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process when evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution"). More particularly,

plaintiffs alleged that defendants failed and refused to respond to lawful discovery requests for exculpatory or otherwise favorable evidence, and thereby violated plaintiffs' due process rights. Plaintiffs have demanded a declaratory judgment, holding that defendants' official policy, practice and custom of suppressing evidence favorable to the accused violates justice court defendants' due process rights, and an injunction against defendants' suppression and failure to disclose evidence favorable to the accused in proceedings within their respective justice courts.

Defendants' motion to dismiss this action is based in part on the doctrine established in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971), which requires that the federal courts abstain from hearing claims for injunctive or declaratory relief "[when] assumption of jurisdiction . . . would interfere with pending state proceedings, whether of a criminal, civil, or even administrative character.'" Louisiana Debating and Literary Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 1483, 1489 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church, Inc. v. Morales, 986 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1993)), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1145, 115 S.ct. 2583, 132 L. Ed. 2d 832 (1995)). TheYounger abstention doctrine is based on notions of comity and federalism, and prohibits federal judicial interference with pending state judicial proceedings where important state interests are involved and the plaintiff has or will have an opportunity to present his federal claims in the state proceedings. Id. See also Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 99 S.ct. 2371, 60 L. Ed. 2d 994 (1979). To determine whether Younger abstention is appropriate, the Supreme Court has devised a three-part inquiry which asks (1) whether the judicial or judicial-in-nature state proceedings are ongoing; (2) whether the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) whether there is an adequate opportunity in the state proceeding to raise constitutional challenges. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S.ct. 2515, 73 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1982). If each of these inquiries is answered in the affirmative, then the district court must dismiss the federal action and allow the state process to continue. See Geotes v. Mississippi Bd. of Veterinary Medicine, 986 F. Supp. 1028, 1031 (S.D. Miss. 1997)). A federal court may refuse to abstain and grant the requested equitable relief only if

(1) the state court proceeding was brought in bad faith or with the purpose of harassing the federal plaintiff, (2) the state statute is "flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it," or (3) application of the doctrine was waived.

In the court's opinion, Younger abstention clearly applies to the plaintiffs' claims herein. As for Milone and Robinson, against whom prosecutions presumably are still proceeding in justice court, their claims obviously involve an "ongoing state judicial proceeding," in which there is an important state interest, i.e., the state's enforcement of its criminal laws. Moreover, the state proceedings, which include the appeal process, appear adequate to redress the alleged constitutional deprivation they have alleged. Regarding this final requirement, the court notes that under state law, a defendant convicted in justice court has an absolute right to appeal to county court or circuit court, where he is entitled to a trial de novo and where court rules indisputably provide defendants a meaningful and effective procedural mechanism for the disclosure of exculpatory evidence. See Kline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 71 L. Ed. 1146, 47 S.ct. 681 (1927) (criminal defendant can raise federal questions in the state court with the right to appeal to the highest court of the state and to the Supreme Court of the United States);Ballard v. Wilson, 856 F.2d 1568, 1571 (5^th Cir. 1988) (holding that Younger abstention was appropriate "while the case works its way through the state appellate process"); DeSpain v. Johnston, 731 F.2d 1171, 1177 (5^th Cir. 1984) ("The state interest that is triggered by the institution of the state proceeding continues through the completion of the state appeals process.").

As to the claims of plaintiff Lucroy, it appears from the parties' submissions that on June 14, 2010, shortly after this case was filed, Lucroy entered a plea of "no contest" to the criminal charges that were pending against him in justice court, and on the same day, he filed an appeal for trial de novo in the County Court of Rankin County. Hence, in contrast to his co-plaintiffs, there is no longer a case pending against him in justice court. Lucroy thus argues that since the challenge in this case is solely to the constitutionality of defendants' policy and practice of withholding exculpatory evidence from defendants in justice court, then in view of his plea in justice court and appeal to county court, this case no longer involves an "ongoing state judicial proceeding," and Younger abstention is therefore inapplicable to his claims herein. However, as defendants correctly point out, a pending state proceeding remains pending until such time as the state court appeals are exhausted. See DeSpain, 731 F.2d at 1178.

Based on the foregoing, it is ordered that defendants' motion to dismiss is granted.

A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.