Summary
holding defendant failed to prove harm when trial court suggested community supervision was available when it was not, because defendant already pleaded guilty before issue was raised by trial court
Summary of this case from Villanueva v. StateOpinion
No. 06-03-00179-CR.
Submitted: January 20, 2004.
Decided: February 27, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH.
On Appeal from the 188th Judicial District Court Gregg County, Texas Trial Court No. 30298-A.
Before MORRISS, C.J., ROSS and CARTER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Terry Louis Miller pled guilty to aggravated assault. The trial court made a deadly weapon finding and sentenced him to forty years' imprisonment. Miller was also convicted, during the course of the proceeding, of the offense of possession of a firearm by a felon, which is also before this Court on appeal ( Miller v. State, No. 06-03-00180-CR) and is decided by separate opinion. On appeal, Miller argues that, before Miller pled guilty, the trial court (1) did not properly admonish him about the effect of a deadly weapon allegation and (2) erroneously informed him he could apply for community supervision. We affirm. Deadly Weapon Admonishment Miller first argues the trial court did not follow the requirements of TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004), because it failed to admonish Miller that, if he was found guilty of an offense, with a deadly weapon finding, he would be required to serve half of any sentence before becoming eligible for parole. Article 26.13 contains no requirement for a trial court to so admonish a defendant, and counsel has directed this Court to no such requirement. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13 (Vernon Supp. 2004). To the contrary, although defendants are often concerned about parole eligibility, it remains only a collateral consequence of the entry of the plea. See Ex parte Young, 644 S.W.2d 3, 4-5 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983), overruled on other grounds, Ex parte Evans, 690 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985). In the absence of any authority requiring a court to give such an admonishment, we will not engraft that requirement onto the Code. We overrule this contention of error. Community Supervision Application Miller next contends that the trial court erred by suggesting to him he may wish to file an application for a probated sentence when it was clear he would not be entitled to community supervision, and that he was thereby misled to his detriment. Miller had clearly decided to plead guilty — and had actually done so — before the court raised the issue regarding community supervision. The following exchanges took place before the trial court raised the issue of community supervision:
THE COURT: Mr. Miller, I understand that you wish to plead guilty in 30,298-A to aggravated assault, repetition of a felony. Is that what you want to do?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: In 30,600-A, I understand you wish to plead guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Is that what you want to do?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
. . . .
THE COURT: Who made the decision to plead guilty in this case?
[Defendant]: I did, sir.
THE COURT: And are you guilty of each of these offenses?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
. . . .
THE COURT: . . . . So you're guilty of aggravated assault, repetition of a felony. You're also guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon; is that correct?
[Defendant]: Right. Yes, sir.
. . . .
THE COURT: What are you doing in court here today?
[Defendant]: I'm pleading guilty to offenses, crimes that I've committed.Only later — after (1) the above exchanges took place, (2) the trial court admonished Miller, orally and in writing, regarding the range of punishment and the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty, and (3) the court, by thoroughly questioning Miller, established he was voluntarily pleading guilty — did the court bring up community supervision.
THE COURT: Are you going to make a request for probation? I'm not saying that you should. Are you going to make a request for probation?
. . . .
I mean, as I understand the law, somebody files an application for probation, they're theoretically eligible for probation, they're theoretically eligible from the Court no matter what their history is.
. . . .
Now, Mr. Miller, just before [sic] you filed a request for probation doesn't mean that I'm going to give you probation.
[Defendant]: I understand that, your Honor.
THE COURT: It will be totally up to me; do you understand that?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.
. . . .
THE COURT: Do you still wish to plead guilty. . . ?
[Defendant]: Yes, sir.Miller argues the trial court should have admonished him that he was not eligible for community supervision because of the deadly weapon finding under TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 3g (Vernon Supp. 2004). Miller argues that, as in Tabora v. State, 14 S.W.3d 332 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.), we should find the trial court gave him inaccurate information about the availability of community supervision, thus effectively leaving him unaware of the real consequences of his plea, to his detriment. This ignores the context of the proceeding which reveals Miller had decided to plead guilty to both charges — and had actually done so — before the trial court raised the issue. It was also quite clear that the trial court admonished Miller of the court's discretion to assess any sentence within the range of punishment, which for this case was five to ninety-nine years or life imprisonment, plus a possible $10,000.00 fine, and that, even if Miller applied for community supervision, the court was not required to order it. Regardless of whether there was error in the trial court's suggestion of, and willingness to receive, an application for community supervision, Miller has shown no harm from it. It was Miller's burden to establish he was harmed by relying on any such incorrect admonishment. Harrison v. State, 688 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex.Crim. App. 1985); Tabora, 14 S.W.3d at 335. There was no such reliance or harm. Under these circumstances, we overrule this contention of error. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Miller, in response to the trial court's inquiry, did file an application for community supervision, but did not change his course, finally reaffirming his guilty plea nonetheless. The court accepted his plea and adjudged him guilty.
Although Miller may have been technically eligible for deferred adjudication community supervision under the terms of TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 2004), had the trial court found it was in the best interest of society, the record is devoid of any indication anyone was thinking of deferred adjudication for Miller or that deferring adjudication in this case was a realistic possibility. Cf. Harrison v. State, 688 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985). Clearly, Miller would not have been eligible for community supervision after the trial court's adjudication of his guilt, because at the heart of his guilty plea for aggravated assault was an admission that he had used a firearm, a deadly weapon. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 3g(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004). For that reason, the community supervision issue was potentially misleading and should not have been interjected into the proceedings.