COMBS

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE ROBERT V. COSTANZO, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 11-CI-00165

OPINION

REVERSING AND REMANDING

BEFORE: ACREE, CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS AND STUMBO, JUDGES. COMBS, JUDGE: Steven Medairos appeals from a judgment of the Bell Circuit Court that affirmed the denial by the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission (KUIC) of Medairos's claim for unemployment insurance benefits. After our review, we reverse and remand.

Medairos, a diabetic, began work with Stan Koch & Sons Trucking, Inc., a Minnesota corporation, as a commercial truck driver on September 16, 2010. On November 26, 2010, Medairos sustained a work-related injury to his knee, for which he received worker compensation benefits. During his recovery from the work-related knee injury, Medairos learned from his doctor that his diabetes could no longer be controlled through medication and diet but would have to be regulated with daily injections of insulin.

On January 6, 2011, Medairos provided his employer with the necessary medical documentation for his return to work following his recovery from the knee injury. He also advised the trucking company that he had been diagnosed as insulin-dependent. Medairos was immediately notified that federal regulations prohibit employers who are engaged in interstate commerce from employing insulin-dependent diabetics as commercial truck drivers. No other work was available with the company.

Following separation from his employment with the trucking company, Medairos applied for unemployment insurance benefits. He was denied benefits by his local KUIC office in a Notice of Determination dated January 26, 2011. The determination was based upon KUIC's conclusion that Medairos "quit without good cause attributable to the employment." Medairos filed a timely administrative appeal of the determination. Following a review of the undisputed evidence, the Referee affirmed the determination that Medairos was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits. The Referee concluded that Medairos "voluntarily left the employer without good cause attributable to the employment." Medairos appealed the Referee's decision to the KUIC, which unanimously affirmed the decision in an order dated April 6, 2011.

On April, 25, 2011, Medairos filed a complaint in the Bell Circuit Court pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute(s) (KRS) 341.450(1), seeking judicial review of the KUIC decision. In an order entered January 10, 2012, the circuit court affirmed the decision of the KUIC. This appeal followed.

Our review of an administrative agency's adjudicatory decision is strictly circumscribed. See American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission, 379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky.1964). If the findings of fact of an administrative agency are supported by substantial evidence, they are binding upon the court. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Landmark Community Newspapers of Kentucky, Inc., 91 S.W.3d 575 (Ky.2002). Substantial evidence is defined as evidence that has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409 (Ky.1998). A reviewing court may not substitute its opinion as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight given the evidence, or the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Burch v. Taylor Drug Store, Inc., 965 S.W2d 830 (Ky.App.1998).

However, we are not bound by the agency's determination on questions of law.. Hutchison v. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission, 329 S.W.3d 353 (Ky.App.2010). Our review entails the proper the application of the law to the facts under a de novo standard. Additionally, we must construe the unemployment insurance act liberally in favor of claimants. See Department of Education v. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission, 798 S.W.2d 464 (Ky.App.1990).

The case before us involves the proper application of the provisions of KRS 341.370. That statute provides that a worker shall be disqualified from receiving benefits where "[h]e has been discharged for misconduct or dishonesty" or where "[h]e has left his . . . work . . . voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employment." KRS 341.370(1)(b), (c). Most assuredly, Medairos was not discharged for misconduct or dishonesty; he contends that he did not voluntarily leave his employment. And we agree with that contention.

In Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Young, 389 S.W.2d 451 (Ky. 1965), our Supreme Court considered the case of an employee who was required by company policy to leave his employment at the age of 65. The issue was whether he could be said to have left work "voluntarily" upon reaching the age of mandatory retirement. The court held that under circumstances where Young received no benefit from the company's mandatory retirement policy as an arguable incentive to retire, it could not be said that he had ended his employment voluntarily. The court declared that the termination of Young's employment was an event over which he "had little free choice." Id. at 452. It defined the term voluntary as used in the statute as meaning "proceeding from one's own choice or full consent." Id. at 453. Since Young was forced from his employment because of forces beyond his control, the court held that he had not voluntarily left his employment and that he was, therefore, entitled to receive unemployment insurance benefits.

In Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Henry Fischer Packing Co., 259 S.W.2d 436 (Ky. 1953), our highest court considered a dispute involving a factual scenario strikingly similar to the one before us. In Henry Fischer, the employee, a butcher, suffered an epileptic seizure while at work. Since his duties required his use of sharp knives in proximity to his fellow employees, the company concluded that his dismissal was in everyone's best interests. His claim for unemployment insurance benefits was initially approved, but that determination was reversed upon judicial review in the circuit court. However, upon appellate review, the court held that the claimant "did not voluntarily leave his job but was discharged from it for reasons beyond his control ." Id. at 440. (Emphasis added.) Consequently, his benefits were reinstated.

The Commission's reliance on our later decision in Murphy v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 694 S.W.2d 709 (Ky.App. 1985), is wholly misplaced. In Murphy, a recently hired insurance agent was terminated by his employer after he failed a state-administered proficiency examination. A passing score on the examination was required before the agent could be eligible for the permanent license necessary for his continued employment. When Murphy sought to collect unemployment insurance benefits following his termination, the commission concluded that the employee had "severed his employment with the employer by voluntarily leaving without good cause when he failed to meet the condition of continued employment." Id. at 710. On appeal, we concluded that Murphy's failure to achieve "certain standards of academic competence" was indicative of his "unskillfulness or incompetence in that line of work. . . ." Id. On that basis, we concluded that the employer was not liable for payment of Murphy's unemployment insurance benefits.

In this case, Medairos's employment ended solely as a consequence of the application of federal regulations prohibiting employers engaged in interstate commerce from employing insulin-dependent diabetics as commercial truck drivers. See 49 C.F.R. § 391.41. There was absolutely no evidence (much less substantial evidence) presented from which to conclude that Medairos was unskillful or incompetent at his work.

We cannot agree that the KUIC had any basis to conclude that Medairos was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits. Medairos's employment did not end because he was unskillful at this work with the trucking company; nor did it end "voluntarily" since his separation from the employment was an event over which he had absolutely no free choice. Since Medairos left his employment because of forces beyond his control and not of his own volition or creation, we must conclude - as a matter of law - that he did not voluntarily leave his employment and that he was clearly entitled to receive unemployment insurance benefits.

We hold that the circuit court erred in affirming the clearly erroneous decision of the KUIC. Therefore, the judgment is reversed and remanded for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.

ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Don Meade
Ben Basil
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE COMMISSION:
James C. Maxon
Frankfort, Kentucky