MYERS, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶ 1. George McKee appeals from a judgment of the Oktibbeha County Circuit Court affirming the order of the Mayor and Board of Aldermen (Board) of the City of Starkville (City), Mississippi, to deny his rezoning petition. Because we find that no proper bill of exceptions was filed in the circuit court, we reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision in Reed v. Adams, 236 Miss. 333, 111 So. 2d 222 (1959).

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. In 2008, McKee applied to the Starkville Planning and Zoning Commission (Commission) to rezone a piece of property (approximately .75 acres), which is located immediately adjacent to the rear of 514 South Washington Street in Starkville, from R-2 (single-family, duplex) to R-5 (multi-family, high-density). After proper notice, the Commission heard McKee's request at its regularly scheduled public meeting on April 8, 2008. No opposition was voiced by anyone from the public, and the Commission voted unanimously to recommend approval of McKee's request to the Board based on changing conditions in the neighborhood consistent with R-5 zoning.

¶ 3. Part of the same property was the subject of a rezoning petition filed by McKee in 2004. In that petition, McKee requested that the property at issue and the property located at 514 South Washington Street, also zoned R-2, be rezoned to R-5. The Board denied the request, and McKee filed suit, which he later dropped.

¶ 4. The Board took up McKee's latest request at its regularly scheduled public meeting held on April 15, 2008, which McKee did not attend. At the meeting, Ben Griffith, the City Planner for Starkville, presented his staff report to the Board, which contained background information on this property and its surrounding area, a rezoning analysis, and staff recommendations.

¶ 5. According to the report, the adjacent properties to the north and west of the subject property were rezoned to R-5 in 1981, and the adjacent property to the south was rezoned to R-5 in 1996; each of these properties have since been developed as the Brownsville Station apartment complex, which McKee owns. McKee proposed to rezone the subject property in order to expand the apartment complex. The report noted that McKee had unsuccessfully petitioned for a similar rezoning in 2004 which included the property of 514 South Washington Street. In the report, Griffith stated that this particular area is considered a historic district, although the City does not have a historic-preservation ordinance. In speaking to the changed conditions to the surrounding area, Griffith reiterated that the adjacent properties were rezoned to R-5 in 1981 and in 1996, respectively. Griffith also stated that the area has been gradually transitioning from single-family residential uses to more dense residential uses and from owner-occupied dwellings to rental properties. Griffith reported that the construction of the new apartment units McKee planned to build would have a positive economic effect in the area, providing construction jobs for tradesmen in the community and business for local construction-material suppliers. The taxable value of the subject property would increase, which in turn would add to the City's tax base. He stated there is a public need for the rezoning because there is a constant and increasing need for residential rental units for students who attend Mississippi State University, which is located in Starkville. The report noted that student enrollment at the university had set a new record in 2008. According to Griffith, McKee had stated that the Brownsville Station apartment complex is usually one hundred percent occupied; and if additional units were available, they would be occupied as well.

¶ 6. During the Board's meeting, Griffith was asked by the Board whether conditions have changed in that area since 2004, when McKee filed his first petition. Griffith said the only change in the area since that time is that more apartments had been built at Brownsville Station. The board members then discussed amongst themselves the fact that when the subject property came up in 2004, it included the property with "the big white house" fronting South Washington Street (referring to 514 South Washington Street). One of the aldermen stated that part of the Board's reluctance to approve McKee's request back in 2004 was because the property containing "the big white house" was a separate distinct area than the subject property located behind it, and McKee had requested that both properties be rezoned together. Another aldermen, who stated that he was not on the Board in 2004, said that, based on his knowledge of the area, he did not think McKee's current request was unreasonable. Yet, another alderman said that McKee had failed to prove a change in condition in the neighborhood in relation to Washington Street, and he noted that all the properties across the street remain zoned R-2. He voiced concern that if McKee's request were granted, the City's action would actually encourage a change in the neighborhood. The Mayor noted for the record that the Commission unanimously voted in favor of the rezoning request and that there was no opposition from any citizens. He then moved the matter for a vote. Five board members voted to deny McKee's zoning request, and two board members voted to grant. Failing to receive a majority of the affirmative vote from the board members present and voting, the Mayor declared that the motion had failed.

¶ 7. On April 25, 2008, McKee, an inactive member of The Mississippi Bar, filed a pro se "Appeal and Complaint" in the Oktibbeha County Circuit Court against the City, in which he claimed he was denied constitutional due process. He asked that the Board's decision be overruled, and he sought compensatory and punitive damages. Along with the "Appeal and Complaint," McKee filed a bill of exceptions. Contrary to Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-51-75 (Rev. 2002), the bill was not signed by the president of the Board (in this case, the Mayor). The bill contained general allegations that: the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious; the Board was limited to either approving the rezoning application or rescheduling the matter for a hearing on the merits; McKee was not duly notified of the Board's meeting; and the board members had conspired amongst themselves to deprive McKee of his civil rights. Attached to the bill were two exhibits: Griffith's staff report and a letter from Griffith addressed to McKee, dated April 18, 2008, which stated that the Board had voted five to two to deny McKee's rezoning request based on the Board's belief that there had been no change in the characteristics of the neighborhood.

¶ 8. On the same day, McKee served the Mayor's office with a copy of the "Appeal and Complaint" and the bill of exceptions. The City responded by filing an answer and affirmative defenses to McKee's complaint and by filing its own bill of exceptions. The bill was signed by the Mayor on May 23, 2008, and it contained the facts the City considered essential to a decision on the issues being presented to the circuit court incident to the Board's decision to deny McKee's rezoning request. The City's bill set forth, among other things, that McKee had unsuccessfully sought to rezone this property in 2004; he had applied to the Commission for the same rezoning in 2008, and the Commission approved his request; he "then perfected his Appeal to the [Board] and after a public hearing regarding [rezoning] of the request . . ., the Board voted 7 to 0 to overturn the recommendation of the [Commission][,] . . . finding that there had not been a change in the area to warrant the [rezoning]." The City attached the following exhibits to its bill: photographs of the subject property and the neighborhood, the case-locator map, minutes from the Board's denial of McKee's rezoning request, an explanation of the structures permitted under R-2 zoning and R-5 zoning, and a copy of McKee's bill of exceptions.

¶ 9. McKee thereafter filed a motion for partial summary judgment and a brief in support of the motion. McKee attached additional exhibits to his brief-exhibits that had not been made a part of his bill of exceptions. The City filed a motion to strike and/or dismiss McKee's motion, charging that because McKee's bill of exceptions had not been signed by the Mayor, it was invalid. The City claimed that its bill of exceptions was the only proper bill in the matter, and only it could be considered by the circuit court in reviewing the Board's decision. In turn, McKee filed a response to the City's motion, in which he alleged that the Mayor had refused to sign and forward McKee's bill of exceptions in accordance with law; instead, the Mayor prepared his own bill of exceptions for the City misrepresenting what had occurred in the matter.

¶ 10. The circuit court requested final briefs from the parties, and then subsequently the court issued an order affirming the Board's decision. The circuit court held that the Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence, was not arbitrary and capricious, and did not violate McKee's due-process rights. On the due-process issue, the circuit court did not expressly address McKee's claim that he was not given notice of the Board's meeting. Rather, the circuit court found that based on its reading of Mississippi Code Annotated section 17-1-17 (Supp. 2009), McKee was not entitled to a public hearing.

¶ 11. McKee appeals, averring that the circuit court erred by holding that the Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary and capricious, and the court erred by holding that McKee's due-process rights were not violated.

DISCUSSION

¶ 12. A municipal governing board's decision not to rezone is a legislative function and is presumed to be valid. Barnes v. Board of Supervisors of DeSoto County, 553 So. 2d 508, 510 (Miss. 1989); see also Burdine v. City of Greenville, 755 So. 2d 1154, 1156 (¶ 3) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) ("Both zoning and rezoning are legislative rather than judicial matters."). "The courts presume that the zoning ordinances are well planned and designed to be permanent." Martinson v. City of Jackson, 215 So. 2d 414, 417 (Miss. 1968). Reclassification of property from one zone to another requires proof that: (1) there was a mistake in the original zoning, or (2)(a) the character of the neighborhood has changed to such an extent as to justify reclassification, and (b) there was a public need for rezoning. Mayor and Comm'rs of City of Jackson v. Wheatley Place, Inc., 468 So. 2d 81, 83 (Miss. 1985). "[A]n applicant seeking rezoning must prove by clear and convincing evidence either (1) or (2) above." Id. at 84.

¶ 13. On appeal, the order of the municipal governing board may not be disturbed "unless it is clearly shown to be arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, or is illegal, or without a substantial evidentiary basis." Faircloth v. Lyles, 592 So. 2d 941, 943 (Miss. 1991). An appellate court has no authority to set aside the board's rezoning decision if the controversy is "fairly debatable." Saunders v. City of Jackson, 511 So. 2d 902, 906 (Miss. 1987).

¶ 14. The method of appeal from a judgment or decision of a governing board is set forth in section 11-51-75, which mandates that the circuit court shall decide such a case "as presented by the bill of exceptions as an appellate court. . . ." The circuit court, sitting as an appellate court, considers the case as presented by the bill of exceptions. Stewart v. City of Pascagoula, 206 So. 2d 325, 326 (Miss. 1968). The bill of exceptions is the only record before the circuit court, and the court is not permitted to go outside the record as made in the bill of exceptions. Id. "If the bill of exceptions is not complete and is fatally defective in that pertinent and important facts and documents are omitted therefrom, then the court does not have a record upon which it can intelligently act." Id. at 328.

¶ 15. In Bowling v. Madison County Board of Supervisors, 724 So. 2d 431, 436 (¶ 24) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998), this Court set out the essential components of section 11-51-75, stating:

1) a person must be aggrieved by a decision of the local governing authority;

2) within ten days from the session of the board there must be an appeal;

3) a bill of exceptions that embodies the facts, judgment and decision must be prepared by the aggrieved party, presented, and "shall be signed" by the president of the governing body;

4) the clerk of the city or county transmits the bill of exceptions to the circuit court;

5) the circuit court reviews the decision as an appellate court.

¶ 16. In Wilkinson County Board of Supervisors v. Quality Farms, Inc., 767 So. 2d 1007, 1012 (¶ 14) (Miss. 2000), the supreme court reiterated the procedure for submitting a proper bill of exceptions. Quoting from Reed, 236 Miss. at 340-41, 111 So. 2d at 224-25, the Wilkinson court stated as follows:

The general rule with respect to bills of exceptions when presented to the proper official for signature appears to be that the such officer or official cannot arbitrarily refuse to sign and return the bill of exceptions merely because he deems the same to be incorrect, but that it is his duty to point out wherein he deems the same to be incorrect, and to note his corrections thereon, and to sign the same as correct.

. . . .

If he deemed incorrect the bill of exceptions presented to him, he was under an implied duty to point out wherein he deemed the same incorrect so that the aggrieved parties might have an opportunity to amend the same, and then to sign the same as corrected.

Wilkinson, 767 So. 2d at 1012 (¶ 14).

¶ 17. This Court made the following observation in Bowling with regard to bills of exceptions: "At its simplest, a bill of exceptions is the citizen's statement of the facts that the president of a local Board accepts or partly disputes after review and any mutually acceptable revision." Bowling, 724 So. 2d at 433 (¶ 7). When an accurate bill of exceptions is presented, the president of the board has a duty to sign it; otherwise, a writ of mandamus can be issued requiring that he or she sign it. Id. at 438 (¶ 35). "If the president [of the board] believes that some defect exists, the aggrieved party is entitled to have the specific defect explained so that a correction may be made." Id.

¶ 18. Here, neither party satisfactorily complied with these requirements. McKee erred at the outset of the matter by labeling his initial pleading both as an appeal and a complaint. The only avenue McKee had available to him for seeking relief from the wrong he claimed was done to him by the Board's order denying his rezoning request was by way of an appeal to the circuit court. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-51-75. Relief through an original action, initiated by filing a complaint in the circuit court, was not an option for McKee in this type of case. With respect to McKee's bill of exceptions, the bill not only lacked the Mayor's signature, it also failed to include essential documents, such as the minutes from the Board's April meeting and any statutory or local authority in support of his claim that he was entitled to a public hearing in front of the Board.

¶ 19. As for the City, it filed its own bill of exceptions and did not inform McKee of the deficiencies in his bill of exceptions. The City's bill of exceptions inaccurately stated that the Board unanimously voted to deny McKee's rezoning request, and it wrongly asserted that McKee had filed a notice of appeal to the Board following the Commission's unanimous decision to recommend that his rezoning request be granted.

¶ 20. The Stewart case illustrates the rule outlined in Reed. There, the mayor pointed out the important omissions made in the bill of exceptions when he received the bill from the petitioners for his certification. Stewart, 206 So. 2d at 327. The petitioners failed to amend the bill, and the circuit court subsequently dismissed the appeal because it found their bill fatally defective. Id. at 328. The supreme court affirmed the circuit court. Id.

¶ 21. Here, the City sought to have McKee's bill dismissed on the basis that it was fatally defective and to have its own bill used instead. In its motion, the City referenced section 17-1-17 for its contention that McKee was not entitled to notice. This was the first time in the case that section was mentioned. And we note here, the City initially had claimed in its answer and affirmative defenses that McKee had been provided notice of the Board's April 15 meeting.

¶ 22. The circuit court interpreted section 17-1-17 to mean that McKee was not entitled to a public hearing. Based on that interpretation, the circuit court implicitly found that McKee was not entitled to notice of the Board's meeting. This may very well be an accurate interpretation of the statute. But the record presented to the circuit court was not a proper record by which to review the circuit court's application of the statute. Section 17-1-17 is an enabling statute, and it contains enumerated conditions. See, e.g., City of Jackson v. McMurry, 288 So. 2d 23, 24-26 (Miss. 1974) (discussing Mississippi Code section 3594 (Supp. 1971), predecessor to section 17-1-17). Whether or not the City was in compliance with this section, we think, requires consideration of facts that were not made part of the record.

¶ 23. Because the bill of exceptions presented to the circuit court was fatally defective, we reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand this case to the circuit court with instructions to allow the parties to file a properly amended bill of exceptions following the procedure outlined in Reed.

¶ 24. THE JUDGMENT OF THE OKTIBBEHA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS REVERSED, AND THIS CASE IS REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLEE. KING, C.J., LEE, P.J., IRVING, ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON AND MAXWELL, JJ., CONCUR. GRIFFIS, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. BARNES, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.