OPINION AND ORDER

John G. KOELTL, United States District Judge.

The plaintiffs are members of the New York City Police Department ("NYCPD") Pension Fund ("the Fund") who retired from the NYCPD because of disability or under a vested pension retirement provision. They do not receive certain benefits known as "variable supplements," from two police Variable Supplement Funds ("VSFs"). Under New York State law, VSF benefits are only distributed to "service retirees" of the NYCPD, that is, individuals who retired from the NYCPD after 20 years of service for reasons other than disability.

The plaintiffs have sued two groups of defendants referred to in the amended complaint as "Municipal" and "Police Union" defendants. They allege that the defendants have violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and under the Internal Revenue Code. They assert their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs also allege state law claims arising under Article V, Section 7 of the New York State Constitution, which protects pension or retirement benefits in a state or local system from being diminished or impaired.

The plaintiffs assert five causes of action. More specifically, the first three causes of action argue that the Municipal Defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause and Article V, Section 7 of the New York State Constitution by reducing their contribution to the Fund and in effect transferring part of the Fund to the City of New York. The plaintiffs ask for injunctive relief enjoining these reductions and ordering a refund of the funds allegedly transferred. The fourth cause of action alleges that the reduction in the Municipal Defendants' contribution violates the exclusive benefit rule of the Internal Revenue Code and places the Fund in danger of losing certain tax benefits. The fifth cause of action asks this Court to remedy what the plaintiffs characterize as a manifest injustice by issuing a declaration that the plaintiffs are entitled to VSF benefits.

The defendants now move for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. They also move for sanctions against the plaintiffs and their counsel under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. The plaintiffs represented by the same counsel have brought four prior lawsuits seeking to establish their right to VSF benefits. They have been unsuccessful in each of these lawsuits. For the reasons explained below, the plaintiffs also cannot recover in this, their fifth lawsuit.

I. A.

The defendants argue that this Court should grant summary judgment because the plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata and by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which generally deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction to review a state court judgment.

The standard for granting summary judgment is well established. Summary judgment may not be granted unless "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. Partnership, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party.See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)); see also Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1223. Summary judgment is improper if there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994). "In considering the motion, the court's responsibility is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are factual issues to be tried." Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1986)

On a motion for summary judgment, once the moving party meets its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts to show there is a factual question that must be resolved at trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The non-moving party must produce evidence in the record and "may not rely simply on conclusory statements or on contentions that the affidavits supporting the motion are not credible."Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir. 1993);accord Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1998) (collecting cases); Wyler v. Unites States, 725 F.2d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 1983)

B.

The basic facts of this case have been recounted many times and are not in dispute except where noted. In 1968, the PBA and New York City negotiated a collective bargaining agreement ("the CBA") that authorized the Fund to invest in assets other than fixed income securities. (Amended Complaint ¶ 10; Castellano v. Board of Trustees of the Police Officers' Variable Supplements Fund, 937 F.2d 752, 754 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Castellano I").) If the annual gain from those investments was greater than the hypothetical return on fixed income obligations, the excess gain was to be transferred from the Fund to a VSF administered by a separate board of trustees. (Amended Complaint ¶ 12; Castellano I, 937 F.2d at 754.) The CBA did not exclude any subsequently retired members of the NYCPD from entitlement to benefits from the VSF. (Amended Complaint ¶ 11; Castellano I, 937 F.2d at 757.) However, the New York State Legislature, which passed enabling legislation that gave effect to the CBA, specified that the VSF benefits would only be distributed to "for service" retirees, that is, individuals who retired from the NYCPD after 20 years of service for reasons other than disability. (N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 13-268(5), 13-271(a)(1), 13-278(5), 13-281(a)(1); Castellano I, 937 F.2d at 755.)

Chapter 247 of the Laws of 1988, which was also passed after collective bargaining, changed the VSF benefit from a variable, discretionary benefit to a fixed benefit. (Amended Complaint ¶ 20; Municipal Defendants' Local Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 3; Plaintiffs' Counter 56.1 Statement ¶ 3.) The legislation also provided for a $75 million transfer of Fund money to New York City. (Amended Complaint ¶ 20; Affidavit of Susan Sanders sworn to June 7, 2000 ("Sanders Aff.") ¶ 34.) The plaintiffs allege that at various times since 1988, the Municipal Defendants have reduced their employer contribution to the Fund by taking a credit against income retained in the Fund. (Amended Complaint ¶ 25.) The plaintiffs allege that the Municipal Defendants have in effect transferred assets of the Fund to the City of New York. (Amended Complaint ¶ 26.)

C.

In the last decade, the plaintiffs represented by the same counsel have filed four lawsuits in both federal and state court challenging various aspects of the statutory scheme governing the VSF. In their first federal lawsuit, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the VSF scheme under both the United States Constitution and the New York State Constitution. See Castellano I. They argued that the statutory scheme, which authorized payments to "for service" retirees and denied VSF benefits to all other retirees violated the United States Constitution's Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause, and Contracts Clause, as well as Article V, Section 7 of the New York State Constitution. See Castellano I, 932 F.2d at 755.

The district court denied all the plaintiffs' federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their state law claims. See id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the federal Equal Protection claim, reasoning that the New York State legislature's judgment to limit VSF benefits to "for service" retirees was rationally related to legitimate governmental objectives. See Castellano I, 932 F.2d at 755-57. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the district court's denial of the plaintiffs' Contract Clause claim, which argued that the statute's exclusion of the plaintiffs from VSF benefits impaired contractual obligations established by the CBA. The Court of Appeals reasoned that there was no conflict between the CBA and statute because "the collective bargaining agreement created a fund; it did not establish the beneficiaries of that fund. The beneficiaries were determined by the legislature in its implementing statute." Id. at 757. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the plaintiffs' Due Process claim because the plaintiffs had no property right in receiving VSF benefits. See id. at 757-58. Finally, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' pendent state law claim. See id. at 758.

In Bergamine v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of the City of New York. Inc., 608 N.Y.S.2d 431 (App.Div. 1994), motion for leave to appeal denied, 639 N.E.2d 417 (N.Y. 1994), the plaintiffs brought an Article 78 petition in New York state court arguing that the PBA had violated its duty of fair representation to them by not taking steps to ensure they would receive VSF benefits. The New York State Supreme Court dismissed the petition. In its opinion affirming the dismissal, the Appellate Division noted that the constitutionality of the VSF scheme had been upheld in Castellano I. See Bergamine, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 432. The Appellate Division also reasoned that it was not the collective bargaining agreement but the "legislation which implemented the collective bargaining agreement that set restrictions on the payment of such benefits." Id. Given the constitutionality of the VSF scheme and the absence of "any facts to show either arbitrariness, discrimination or bad faith conduct on the part of respondents in discharging their duties," the plaintiffs had not shown that the PBA violated its duty of fair representation. See id.

In their second federal action, the plaintiffs alleged that the statutory scheme discriminated against them on the basis of disability by denying them VSF benefits. See Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 525 U.S. 820 (1998) ("Castellano II"). InCastellano II, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated the plaintiffs' appeal with a number of other actions and held that the denial of VSF benefits did not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq., or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. See Castellano II, 142 F.3d at 70-72. In the course of its decision, the Court of Appeals reiterated that it had denied an Equal Protection Clause challenge to the denial of benefits for non-"for service" retirees in Castellano I, and it rejected the plaintiffs' First Amendment and Due Process claims as "frivolous."See id. at 74.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals rejected an argument that all retirees are entitled to VSF benefits because the benefits are deferred compensation. The Court noted that some appellants had supported their argument by citing Gagliardo v. Dinkins, 674 N.E.2d 298 (N.Y. 1996), a case which involved VSFs for New York City Transit Police and New York City Housing Police. In Gagliardo, the New York Court of Appeals wrote that "[t]he [VSFs] were created through collective bargaining as additional future compensation for services actually rendered. . . ."Gagliardo, 674 N.E.2d at 303. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals replied to this argument by noting that in a later passage in Gagliardo, the New York Court of Appeals characterized the VSFs as an inducement to remain in active service rather than deferred compensation. See Castellano II, 142 F.3d at 71. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals also noted that "[t]he fact that the level of VSF benefits does not vary by years served is a further indication that the VSF is not bargained-for compensation for services rendered." Id.

Finally, the plaintiffs brought a fourth action in New York state court in Castellano v. City of New York, No. 9200/92, slip op. (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Nov. 12, 1996), affirmed 674 N.Y.S.2d 364 (App.Div.), motion for leave to appeal denied, 707 N.E.2d 444 (N.Y. 1998), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1131 (1999) ("Castellano III") In that case, the plaintiffs again sought a declaration that they were entitled to VSF benefits. They also argued that Chapter 247 of the Laws of 1988, which authorized a transfer of $75 million from the Fund to New York City, was unconstitutional under Article V, Section 7 of the New York State Constitution and violated General Construction Law § 93. See Castellano III, No. 9200/92, slip. op. at 1-2. The New York State Supreme Court granted summary judgment dismissing the claims. It reasoned that the plaintiffs could not relitigate their claim that they were entitled to VSF benefits and that the plaintiffs had no standing to challenge Chapter 247 because they were not entitled to VSF benefits. See id. at 4-5. It also held that Chapter 247 did not violate Article V, Section 7 or Article VIII, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution. See id. at 5-6. Finally, the Court found that the $75 million transfer authorized by Chapter 247 did not violate General Construction Law § 93. In its opinion affirming the judgment of dismissal, the Appellate Division explained that the claims arose out of the same transaction that gave rise to the plaintiffs' prior lawsuits and "[w]hile plaintiffs could have raised additional claims in one or more of the foregoing actions, they opted not to do so, and they are barred by res judicata from doing so now." Castellano III, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 365. The Court also noted that, in any event, there was no merit to any of the plaintiffs' claims. See id.

II. A.

The defendants first argue that this action is barred by res judicata because the plaintiffs have raised all of their current claims or could have raised them in their four prior federal and state lawsuits. Res judicata bars "subsequent litigation of any ground of recovery that was available in the prior action, whether or not it was actually litigated or determined." Balderman v. United States Veterans Admin., 870 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1989); accord Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 789 (2d Cir. 1994); Greenberg v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 968 F.2d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1992). It acts to protect "litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and [to promote] judicial economy by preventing needless litigation." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, Inc., 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1977). Res judicata ensures the conclusiveness of judgments and thus "secure[s] the peace and repose of society by the settlement of matters capable of judicial determination." Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 129 (1983) (internal quotation omitted)

A federal court must give the same preclusive effect to a state court decision as a state court would give it. See Brooks v. Giuliani, 84 F.3d 1454, 1463 (2d Cir. 1996); Schulz v. Williams, 44 F.3d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984)); Hennessy v. Cement and Concrete Worker's Union Local 18A, 963 F. Supp. 334, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Thus, the binding effect on this Court of the judgments in the plaintiffs' prior New York actions is governed by New York res judicata doctrine. Under New York law, the transactional approach to res judicata prevents parties "from raising in a subsequent proceeding any claim they could have raised in the prior one, where all of the claims arise from the same underlying transaction." Schulz, 44 F.3d at 53 (citing Reilly v. Reid, 379 N.E.2d 172 (N.Y. 1978)); accord Ferris v. Cuevas, 118 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1997) (collecting New York cases); Brooks, 84 F.3d at 1463 (citing O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 429 N.E.2d 1158, 1159 (N.Y. 1981); Hennessy, 963 F. Supp. at 338; Smith v. Russell Sage College, 429 N.E.2d 746, 749 (N.Y. 1981); Castellano III, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 365. Under New York law, "[t]he policy against relitigation of adjudicated disputes is strong enough generally to bar a second action even where further investigation of the law or facts indicates that the controversy has been erroneously decided, whether due to oversight by the parties or error by the courts."Reilly, 379 N.E.2d at 175.

B.

The defendants correctly argue that all of the plaintiffs' claims are precluded under the doctrine of res judicata by the New York state court judgment in Castellano III. In its dispositive opinion, the Appellate Division began by recounting the "long series of challenges to the validity of the Police Officers' Variable Supplements Fund and the Police Superior Officers' Variable Supplements Fund, all of which matters were previously resolved unfavorably to plaintiffs. . . ." See Castellano III, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 365. It then held that the plaintiffs' claims were all barred by res judicata as well as on the merits. See id. ("While plaintiffs could have raised additional claims in one or more of the following actions, they opted not to do so, and they are barred by res judicata from doing so now.").

In Castellano III, as well as in this case, the plaintiffs argued that the practice by New York City of crediting Fund assets against its employer contribution to the Fund is unconstitutional under Article V, Section 7 of the New York State Constitution. Specifically, in their reply brief to the Appellate Division in Castellano III, the plaintiffs argued:

This taking of credit by the city against its contributions to the PPF [Police Pension Fund] by reducing that contribution to the extent that excess earnings of the PPF beyond that needed to fund the defined benefit successor to the variable supplement benefit is doing by indirection that which is specifically illegal under Art. V. Sec. 7 of the New York State Constitution. Such a state of affairs was and is an obvious raid on PPF assets, and all of the plaintiffs are members of the PPF.

(Sanders Aff. ¶ 45, quoting Plaintiffs-Appellants' Reply Brief attached to Sanders Sanctions Aff. sworn to April 20, 2000 ("Sanders Sanctions Aff."), at 3); see also (Sanders Aff. ¶ 45, citing Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief attached to Sanders Sanctions Aff., at 16.) The Appellate Division considered and rejected this argument along with the plaintiffs' other arguments on the merits. See Castellano III, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 365 ("We have considered plaintiffs' other arguments and find them to be without merit."). The argument the Appellate Division dismissed in Castellano III is identical to the Article V, Section 7 argument that the plaintiffs allege in their first three causes of action.

The plaintiffs have added claims based on the federal Equal Protection Clause in their first cause of action, a claim based on the alleged noncompliance with the Internal Revenue Code exclusive benefits rule in their fourth cause of action, and a claim of "manifest injustice" in their fifth cause of action. However, all of these claims must also be dismissed under the doctrine of res judicata because they have an identical factual predicate as the state law claims rejected inCastellano III. See. e.g., Brooks, 84 F.3d at 1463 (citing Schulz v. Williams, 44 F.3d 48, 55 (2d Cir. 1994)) (dismissing federal claims because underlying facts were substantially the same as allegations previously dismissed in state court); see also Reilly, 379 N.E.2d at 176.

It is significant that the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiffs' claims not just on the merits, but because they were barred by res judicata. This is not a typical case of res judicata where the plaintiffs advance claims that were raised or should have been raised in one prior proceeding. Instead, the plaintiffs attempt to raise claims that have already been barred by res judicata in Castellano III because they had already been raised and rejected or could have been raised in multiple other proceedings. This is, in short, a case of res judicata all over again. All of the plaintiffs' claims are barred just as they were inCastellano III.

III.

The plaintiffs' fifth cause of action asks this Court to determine that the deprivation of VSF benefits for the plaintiffs and the prior administrative and judicial determinations authorizing those actions constitute "manifest injustice" that this Court should exercise its equitable jurisdiction to remedy. As developed in their papers on the current motions, the plaintiffs ask this Court to overrule the previous four federal and state decisions against them by holding that they are entitled to VSF benefits. The plaintiffs invoke what they claim is a general equitable power under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) to remedy a manifest injustice. The argument is completely merit less

A.

As the defendants correctly point out, this Court cannot review state court decisions such as Bergamine or Castellano III, both of which upheld the current statutory scheme that denies the plaintiffs VSF benefits. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court does not have jurisdiction over a case that seeks to review a state court decision. Such federal review may only be obtained in the Supreme Court. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); Moccio v. New York State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 1996); Bal v. New York City Loft Board, No. 00 Civ. 1112, 2000 WL 890199, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2000).

Even if this Court could reconsider state court decisions, the plaintiffs' challenge to Castellano III is without merit. The plaintiffs contend that Castellano III failed to take into account comments by the New York Court of Appeals in Gagliardo that VSF benefits were "additional future compensation for services actually rendered," and that under certain statutory arrangements, grave constitutional concerns would be created. Gagliardo, 674 N.E.2d at 373, 375. The plaintiffs contend that these comments supported their claim to VSF benefits. However, the plaintiffs concede that they were able to amend their briefs in Castellano II and Castellano III to make an argument based on the Gagliardo decision. (Plaintiffs' Memo. at 6.) The Appellate Division thus considered the plaintiffs' current argument and found it to be meritless. See Castellano III, 674 N.Y.S.2d at 365. Moreover, inCastellano II, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals also explicitly rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they were entitled to VSF benefits as "deferred compensation," and concluded that the holding in Gagliardo did not support the plaintiffs' argument. See Castellano II, 142 F.3d at 71. Furthermore, the "grave constitutional concerns" cited in Gagliardo referred to a hypothetical statutory scheme that would simultaneously establish a VSF fund with pension funds and then transfer a portion of them to the City. See Gagliardo, 674 N.E.2d at 305. That hypothetical is not analogous to the VSF statutory scheme where there was a twenty year gap between the establishment of the VSFs and the transfer of funds in 1988, and the Gagliardo court explicitly found that it was not faced with a situation that raised such concerns.

Thus, the plaintiffs' fifth cause of action must be dismissed insofar as it asks this Court to overrule state court decisions in their prior actions.

B.

The defendants are also correct that the plaintiffs' Rule 60(b)(6) argument has no merit insofar as the plaintiffs ask this Court to reconsider prior federal court decisions. The plaintiffs essentially argue that despite the previous decisions in Castellano I and Castellano II upholding the validity of the VSF scheme, this Court should overrule those decisions and declare that the plaintiffs are entitled to VSF benefits. The plaintiffs' argument is baseless and presumptuous.

There is an initial procedural problem with the plaintiffs' argument because they have never brought a Rule 60(b)(6) motion in theCastellano cases in an effort to reopen the judgments in those cases. Rather they instituted a new lawsuit and have not even referred to Rule 60(b)(6) in their complaint or brought any semblance of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion.

In any event, the plaintiffs have not established the existence of "extraordinary circumstances" that would be necessary to grant relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b)(6). See Transaero. Inc. v. La Fuerza Area Boliviana, 24 F.3d 457, 461 (2d Cir. 1994); DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 1272 (2d Cir. 1994); Mendell v. Gollust, 909 F.2d 724, 731 (2d Cir. 1990) This is not a case like Agostino v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), on which the plaintiffs primarily rely. Agostino dealt with a Rule 60(b)(5) motion to reopen a judgment to relieve the plaintiffs in that case from the effect of a prospective injunction because of a significant change in the law as announced by the Supreme Court. It does not stand for the remarkable proposition that district courts have broad equitable powers to overturn Court of Appeals decisions. The Supreme Court in Agostino was careful to note that the holding was "intimately tied to the context in which it arose." Agostino, 521 U.S. at 238. It further emphasized that the "decision will have no effect outside the context of ordinary civil litigation where the propriety of continuing prospective relief is at issue." Id. at 239. In Agostino there was a significant change in Supreme Court doctrine while an injunction was in effect. See id. at 237. In this case, there is no injunction and there is no change in the law. Indeed, the Court of Appeals specifically considered the plaintiffs' arguments concerning Gagliardo when it issued its decision in Castellano II. The Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs' arguments and the plaintiffs are simply attempting to relitigate the argument the Court of Appeals found to have no merit. That is not a proper basis for a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Thus, the plaintiffs' fifth cause of action must be dismissed insofar as it asks this Court to reconsider the decisions in the prior federal lawsuits brought by these plaintiffs.

IV.

The defendants move pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 for sanctions against the plaintiffs and their counsel on the grounds that the plaintiffs' action is frivolous. For an argument to warrant Rule 11 sanctions, "it must be clear under existing precedents that there is no chance of success." Shafii v. British Airways, PLC, 83 F.3d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Mareno v. Rowe, 910 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. 1990)). To determine if Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate, the Court must apply an objective standard of reasonableness to determine if the subject of the motion has conducted a "reasonable inquiry" into the basis of the argument. See MacDraw, Inc. v. The Cit Group Equip. Fin., 73 F.3d 1253, 1257 (2d Cir. 1996). The imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is discretionary and should be done with caution, see Knipe v. Skinner, 19 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 1994), "and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the signing attorney." K.M.B. Warehouse Distrib., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).

The Court exercises its discretion to decline to award sanctions. The significant number of actions commenced with respect to the VSF funds reflects the importance of the litigation to the plaintiffs and the arguments in this case indicate the creative but thoroughly unsuccessful effort to find any way to avoid the prior decisions denying relief to the plaintiffs. However, the Court cautions the plaintiffs and their counsel that the numerous lawsuits filed concerning the VSFs are on the brink of making any further cause of action frivolous, particularly in light of two successive findings that the claims are barred by res judicata. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., No. 95 Civ. 9380, 1996 WL 204468, at *7 (S.D.N Y April 26, 1996).

CONCLUSION

SO ORDERED.