SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Rose McCormick, pro se, appeals the district court's grant of the Defendant's motion to dismiss, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), her complaint alleging retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2001). Here, McCormick's complaint consisted of two categories of retaliation claims. The first concerned her allegation that employees of the Defendant and others engaged in a broad conspiracy to create and disseminate non-consensual pornographic videos of her using hidden cameras and other technology, and that the videotapes produced from these recordings were sold to thousands of individuals, and resulted in harassment and ridicule. The second category of allegations concerned disciplinary actions taken by McCormick's supervisors, who she alleged acted in retaliation for a complaint she filed in April 2002 about inadequate job training and other misconduct.

After a thorough and exhaustive review of McCormick's complaint, we conclude that the district court correctly dismissed her conspiracy allegations under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). With respect to McCormick's alleged disciplinary retaliation, we find that the district court also properly dismissed this claim. To set forth a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer was aware of that activity; (3) the employee suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse action. Kessler v. Westchester County Dep't of Social Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 205 (2d Cir. 2006). Assuming, arguendo, that McCormick satisfied the first three criteria, the only evidence in the record that could support the fourth criteria was the temporal proximity between her April 2002 complaint and the discipline she received.

Here, because McCormick filed her complaint in April 2002, and the first disciplinary action occurred in September 2003, this year and a half delay — without any additional evidence or special circumstances that would suggest causation — was insufficient to suggest a causal relationship between the two events so as to demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation. Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed this claim, as it failed as a matter of law.

We have considered all of McCormick's remaining claims and determine them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby

AFFIRMED.