MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN KOELTL, District Judge

The plaintiff, Michael McClenton, brought this pro se action against twelve current and former Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") employees alleging violations of his constitutional and statutory rights while an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution in Otisville, New York ("FCI Otisville"). In a prior opinion, this Court dismissed all of the plaintiff's claims except for his First Amendment retaliation claims against Frederick Menifee ("Menifee"), the Warden of FCI Otisville, and Richard Marchese ("Marchese"), a correctional officer at FCI Otisville, and his equal protection claims against the same two defendants. See McClenton v. Menifee, No. 05 Civ. 2844, 2006 WL 2474872 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The defendants now move for summary judgment dismissing the remainder of the plaintiff's claims. The defendants' motion is unopposed.

I.

Summary judgment is appropriate if it appears that the non-moving party cannot prove an element that is essential to the non-moving party's case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805-06 (1999); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Powell v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 364 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2004). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)); see also Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1223. Summary judgment is improper if there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See Chambers v. T.R.M. Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994). If the moving party meets its initial burden of showing a lack of a material issue of fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with "specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). The nonmoving party must produce evidence in the record and "may not rely simply on conclusory statements or on contentions that the affidavits supporting the motion are not credible." Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1998); Singh v. New York City Off-Track Betting Corp., No. 03 Civ. 5238, 2005 WL 1354038, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2005).

Where, as here, a pro se litigant is involved, although the same standards for dismissal apply, a court should give the pro se litigant special latitude in responding to a summary judgment motion. See McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 279 (2d Cir. 1999) (courts "read the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally and interpret them `to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest'") (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)). In particular, the pro se party must be given express notice of the consequences of failing to respond appropriately to a motion for summary judgment. See McPherson, 174 F.3d at 281;Vital v. Interfaith Med. Ctr., 168 F.3d 615, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1999).

The defendants provided express notice of the consequences of a failure to respond to the plaintiff at his mother's address, where the plaintiff had indicated he preferred to receive mail relating to the case. On October 29, 2008, the Court issued an Order extending the plaintiff's time to respond until November 24, 2008, and informed the plaintiff that a failure to respond could result in the dismissal of his case. This Order was also mailed to his mother's address. The plaintiff did not file any response, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment is therefore unopposed.

However, "[e]ven when a motion for summary judgment is unopposed, the district court is not relieved of its duty to decide whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Vermont Teddy Bear Co., Inc. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 242 (2d Cir. 2004). The district court may not grant an unopposed motion for summary judgment "without first examining the moving party's submission to determine if it has met its burden of demonstrating that no material issue of fact remains for trial." Amaker v. Foley, 274 F.3d 677, 681 (2d Cir. 2001). "[I]n determining whether the moving party has met this burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue for trial, the district court may not rely solely on the statement of undisputed facts contained in the moving party's Rule 56.1 statement. It must be satisfied that the citation to evidence in the record supports the assertion." Vermont Teddy Bear, 373 F.3d at 244.

II.

The factual allegations in this case are detailed in the prior opinion, McClenton, 2006 WL 2474872, *3-6. Familiarity with that opinion is assumed, and details are recounted here only as necessary to decide the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.

The plaintiff is a former inmate who was incarcerated at FCI Otisville between October 2000 and December 2005. (Defs.' Statement of Material Facts Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 ("Defs.' 56.1 Statement") ¶ 1; Dep. of Michael McClenton, dated Apr. 25, 2008 ("McClenton Dep."), attached as Ex. B to the Decl. of Kristin Vassallo, dated July 23, 2008 ("Vassallo Decl.) 9-10.) In the fall of 2004, the plaintiff was a member of the inmate "work pool" assigned to sweep the "compound," an outdoor courtyard at the facility. (Defs.' 56.1 Statement ¶ 2; McClenton Dep. 36-37; Decl. of Richard Marchese, dated July 21, 2008 ("Marchese Decl.") ¶ 5.) Under FCI Otisville policy, work pool inmates were not allowed to report to the compound until their housing units had been called for dinner, unless authorized by a staff member. (Defs.' 56.1 Statement ¶ 6; Marchese Decl. ¶ 3.) However, inmates often violated this policy by coming to the compound after the afternoon "activity move," during which inmates traveled to and from the recreation area, but before their housing units had been called for dinner. (Defs.' 56.1 Statement ¶ 7; Marchese Decl. ¶ 4.) In response to this problem, FCI Otisville Captain Douglas White issued a memorandum instructing correctional officers to keep inmates out of the compound after the afternoon activity move. (Defs.' 56.1 Statement ¶ 7-8; Marchese Decl. ¶ 4; Decl. of Douglas White, dated July 23, 2008 ¶ 2.)

Defendant Marchese was one of the compound officers who supervised the work pool inmates, including the plaintiff, during the fall of 2004. (Defs.' 56.1 Statement ¶ 5; Marchese Decl. ¶ 3-5.) In October and November 2004, after Captain White had issued the memorandum, the plaintiff came to the compound on several occasions before his unit was called for dinner. (Defs.' 56.1 Statement ¶ 10; McClenton Dep. 85; Marchese Decl. ¶ 5.) On those occasions, Marchese directed the plaintiff to return to his housing unit. (Defs.' 56.1 Statement ¶ 11; Marchese Decl. ¶ 5.) During two or three of those occasions, John Correy ("Correy"), a white work pool inmate, was allowed to remain on the compound while the plaintiff was ordered to return to his unit. (Defs.' 56.1 Statement ¶ 12; Marchese Decl. ¶ 6.) Correy had been authorized to stay by another compound officer who needed an inmate to clear the compound sidewalks of debris. (Defs.' 56.1 Statement ¶ 13; Marchese Decl. ¶ 6.)

On October 14, 2004, the plaintiff filed an informal grievance, a BP-8 form, alleging that Marchese and the other compound officers were treating white inmates in the work pool more favorably than black inmates. According to the plaintiff, after he filed the BP-8, he saw Marchese show a group of white inmates a piece of paper. (McClenton Dep. 89-91, 98-99.) The plaintiff also alleges that a white inmate told him that Marchese had shown the white inmates the plaintiff's BP-8 form and had told them that the plaintiff was "causing problems," although the plaintiff could not identify the name of the white inmate who gave him this information. (McClenton Dep. 90-91, 98.) Marchese states under penalty of perjury that he did not show the plaintiff's BP-8 to white inmates for any reason, and certainly not because of the plaintiff's race or in retaliation against the plaintiff for filing grievances. (Marchese Decl. ¶ 14.) Defendant Menifee was not present when Marchese allegedly showed the plaintiff's BP-8 to the white inmates, and the plaintiff does not recall seeing Menifee on the occasions when Marchese directed him to return to his housing unit. (McClenton Dep. 104-05, 138.)

Under BOP policy, correctional officers may pat search inmates on a routine or random basis in order to control contraband. (Marchese Decl. Exs. A, C.) FCI Otisville policy also calls for correctional officers to conduct random pat searches during "ten minute moves," during which inmates move in and out of their housing units. (Marchese Decl. Ex. A.) On November 11, 2004, Marchese selected the plaintiff for a random pat search, which he conducted from behind the plaintiff, pursuant to safety protocols. (Defs.' 56.1 Statement ¶ 22-23; Marchese Decl. ¶ 13 Ex. B.) The pat search lasted no more than "a minute or two," and the plaintiff was then allowed to enter his housing unit. (Defs.' 56.1 Statement ¶ 24; McClenton Dep. 113; Marchese Decl. ¶ 13.)

III.

The defendants move for summary judgment on the remaining claims in this case, namely the retaliation and racial discrimination claims against Marchese and Menifee.

A.

The defendants argue that the plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claims should be dismissed because the plaintiff has failed to offer legally sufficient evidence to establish a triable claim of retaliation based on the pat down search and the alleged disclosure of the BP-8 to white inmates. The Court agrees.

"[T]o sustain a First Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner must demonstrate the following: (1) that the speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against the plaintiff, and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected speech and the adverse action." Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 380 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and citation omitted). "Only retaliatory conduct that would deter a similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her constitutional rights constitutes an adverse action." Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 353 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

The plaintiff cannot establish a First Amendment retaliation claim against either Marchese or Menifee because a single, routine pat down search conducted as part of a policy to control contraband does not rise to the level of an "adverse action." Courts in this district have held that a search of an inmate's cell, even if retaliatory, is insufficient to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim. See Salahuddin v. Mead, No. 95 Civ. 8581, 2002 WL 1968329, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2002) (listing cases). Like cell searches, a routine pat search of an inmate may be conducted at any time, and would therefore not deter an inmate of ordinary firmness from continuing to file grievances against prison officials. Marchese's pat search of the plaintiff therefore cannot support his retaliation claim.

The defendants also contend that Marchese's alleged disclosure of the plaintiff's BP-8 does not constitute an adverse action sufficient to support a retaliation claim. Whether Marchese's alleged act of disclosure, if true, would have constituted a retaliatory act need not be addressed here, however, because the plaintiff has not adduced evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Marchese showed the BP-8 to white inmates. His only evidence based on his own personal knowledge is that he saw Marchese show them a white piece of paper. He does claim that a white inmate, who he cannot identify, told him that the paper was his BP-8, but this statement is inadmissible hearsay and may not be considered on a motion for summary judgment. See Jones v. Goord, 435 F. Supp. 2d 221, 251 n. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Therefore, the alleged disclosure of the BP-8 cannot support the plaintiff's retaliation claims either. Because there is no evidence showing that Marchese took any adverse action against the plaintiff, the First Amendment retaliation claim against both Marchese and Menifee must be dismissed.

B.

The plaintiff also alleges that Marchese racially discriminated against him in violation of his right to equal protection under the laws by pat searching him without cause, directing him back to his cell on various occasions, and showing his BP-8 grievance to white inmates. The defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted in their favor on these claims because the plaintiff has not adduced sufficient evidence to support these claims.

To establish an equal protection claim based on racial discrimination, a prisoner must demonstrate that (1) he was treated differently than similarly situated prisoners (2) because of his race. See Giano v. Senkowski, 54 F.3d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir. 1995); Pugh v. Goord, 571 F. Supp. 2d 477, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Bussey v. Phillips, 419 F. Supp. 2d 569, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

There is no admissible evidence that Marchese showed the plaintiff's grievance to other inmates. With respect to the other alleged actions, the plaintiff has not come forth with any evidence showing that similarly situated white inmates were not subject to pat searches or to being sent away from the compound. The defendants, on the other hand, have submitted evidence that all inmates were subject to random pat searches and to being kept out of the compound until their housing units had been called for dinner. The plaintiff does allege that Correy was allowed to remain on the compound, but as the defendants point out, Correy was not similarly situated because he had been authorized by another compound officer to stay on the compound to perform cleaning duties. For this reason alone, the plaintiff's equal protection claim must fail.

The plaintiff also has not adduced any evidence that would support a finding that Marchese took any of the alleged actions toward the plaintiff because of a racially discriminatory reason. He has not offered any evidence beyond mere speculation that Marchese pat searched him and sent him away from the compound because of his race. Marchese, however, has stated under oath that he enforced the directive to keep the compound clear without regard to race, and that he did not ever treat the plaintiff differently because of his race. Based on this evidence, there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried on the plaintiff's equal protection claims, and summary judgment in favor of the defendants on these claims must be granted.

CONCLUSION

The Court has considered all of the arguments of the parties. To the extent not specifically addressed above, the remaining arguments are either moot or without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment dismissing the complaint and closing this case.

SO ORDERED.