MEMORANDUM ORDER

DEBORAH BATTS, District Judge

Plaintiff John McCabe (hereinafter "McCabe") acting pro se, brings this action for damages pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), the Human Rights Law of the State of New York (N.Y. Executive Law § 296 et seq.), the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107, and for breach of contract. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Quiet Man, Inc. and John Semerad (collectively "Defendants") discriminated against him by fostering a hostile work environment and by terminating his employment because he rebuffed his supervisor's sexual advance, and that they breached his employment contract by terminating his employment before the end of the contract.

Defendants now move for Summary Judgment seeking dismissal of all of Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, or, in the alternative, a limitation on Plaintiff's damages. Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment on his breach of contract claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART, and Plaintiff's motion for partial Summary Judgment is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant Quiet Man, Inc. ("Quiet Man") is a New York corporation engaged in advertising production, and Defendant John Semerad ("Semerad") is the president of Quiet Man. (Amended Complaint (hereinafter "Am. Compl.") ¶ 8(b); Attachment.) On July 17, 1997, Plaintiff was hired to serve as Quiet Man's systems manager. (Defs.' Affirm., Ex. A at 1.) Under the terms of the parties' contract, Plaintiff was to be employed for a period of twenty-four months, starting on July 21, 1997, and at the end of the period, each party was to have the option of renewing the contract. (Id. at 3.) The contract's termination provision states that "[i]f Employee terminates his employment prior to two years (24 months) the Employee agrees to reimburse costs incurred by the employer for training, and all related expenses. . . ." (Id.) Plaintiff admits that he did not attend a training scheduled for May of 1998, but states that he gave advance notice to Executive Producer Amy Taylor [Satterthwaite] that he would be unable to attend, and furthermore, was never informed of a specific schedule regarding training to which he was supposed to adhere. (Pl.'s Decl., Ex. B (Satterthwaite Dep.) at 177.) The contract does not specify any conditions under which Defendants could terminate Plaintiff's employment earlier, and also does not state any penalties the Defendants could incur for terminating Plaintiff's employment. (Id.)

The parties do not dispute that unconventional office behavior prevailed at Quiet Man during Plaintiff's tenure, including "rough-housing" and "wrestling." (Defendants' 56.1 Statement ¶ 6 (hereinafter "Defs.' 56.1"); Plaintiff's 56.1 Statement ¶ 6 (hereinafter "Pl.'s 56.1").) It also is undisputed that Quiet Man employees often used vulgar language in the office. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 8; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 8.)

The parties differ in their assessments of how this conduct affected the office atmosphere and Quiet Man employees. For example, the parties dispute whether "employees" or Semerad initiated and participated in the physical activities. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 6; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 6.) According to Defendant, employees wrestled and rough-housed to relieve tension and used explicit language jokingly without intending "the statements to be taken as demands for sexual favors." (Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 6, 8.) By contrast, Plaintiff alleges that Semerad persistently initiated inappropriate physical contact with employees and that his pattern of allegedly inappropriate conduct was directed exclusively at male employees. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 6; Pl.'s Decl., Ex. G (Kellner Dep.) at 13, Ex. C (Goodman Dep.) at 43); Defs.' Affirm., Ex. S (Satterthwaite Dep.) at 47).) Plaintiff also alleges that Quiet Man employees' use of sexually explicit language was widely perceived as offensive. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 8.)

Prior to January 1998, Semerad's allegedly improper conduct toward Plaintiff included Semerad showing Plaintiff a collection of pornographic images on Semerad's computer, and Semerad retelling a sexually explicit joke about sex with underage women to Plaintiff. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff further alleges that at some point during his employment, Semerad altered a photograph taken of Plaintiff's coworker when he was a child to make it appear as if the child was sexually aroused, and also circulated a magazine article on oral sex. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 13; Ex. C (Goodman Dep.) at 45.) Plaintiff admits these incidents were not directed specifically toward him. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 13.)

Semerad's allegedly inappropriate conduct toward Plaintiff intensified on a workday in mid — to late-January, 1998, when Semerad allegedly approached Plaintiff in the office kitchen, "cupped his hand over his mouth," and said into Plaintiff's ear: "What I really need is a blow job. What I really want is a blow job." (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 2; Defs.' Affirm., Ex. Q (McCabe Dep.) at 45.) Plaintiff alleges that Semerad neither laughed nor gave any indication that the remark was intended to be a joke; instead, according to Plaintiff, Semerad "simply hovered just inches from [Plaintiff's] face with an intense look on his own face awaiting a response, which led [Plaintiff] to recognize the comment as being the solicitation of oral sex." (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 2.) Following the alleged solicitation, Plaintiff "laughed haltingly" and left the kitchen. (Id.) Defendant Semerad claims to have no recollection of the alleged incident. (Defs.' Affirm., Ex. T (Semerad Dep.) at 53.) Plaintiff does not believe that anyone overheard Semerad's remark. (Defs.' Affirm., Ex. Q (McCabe Dep.) at 45.) However, another employee alleges that Semerad talked at work about masturbation and said once that he "needed a blow job." (Pl.s' Ex. I (Shirk Dep.) at 39.)

Plaintiff did not issue a formal complaint about the alleged harassment because he was unaware of any company policies regarding the submission of harassment complaints, and because he believed that Semerad, as the president of the company, would not be held accountable for his behavior. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 3.) Instead, Plaintiff decided to "protest in silence" by avoiding Semerad, withdrawing from his coworkers, wearing "neck-to-ankle coveralls," and posting next to his desk a page from his contract listing his responsibilities and the dates of his employment term. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Semerad responded to Plaintiff's silence in February 1998 by asking Plaintiff for a list of the passwords for all the computers at Quiet Man, which Plaintiff understood to be a "threatening gesture," because 12 of the 13 passwords were identical and were Semerad's daughter's name, "as everyone knew." (Id. at ¶ 4.)

On or about March 15, 1998, Plaintiff telephoned his co-worker, Glenn McQuaid, at home and the two agreed to meet for drinks at a bar. (Id. at ¶ 5; Defs.' Affirm., Ex. B (McQuaid Affid.) at 2.) The parties dispute what took place at the bar. According to Plaintiff, when McQuaid mentioned that Plaintiff had withdrawn from his coworkers, Plaintiff informed McQuaid of the "blow job" incident and explained that Semerad's conduct had caused Plaintiff to limit his contact with coworkers. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff made a series of critical comments about Semerad, to which McQuaid responded by "bec[oming] visibly upset and [telling Plaintiff] that [McQuaid] was working really hard at Quiet Man and really wanted to do well there." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that McQuaid subsequently informed Amy Satterthwaite, an executive at Quiet Man, of Plaintiff's remarks about Semerad. (Id. at ¶ 6.)

According to McQuaid, who recalls the evening entirely differently, Plaintiff confessed to have been flirting with McQuaid since August, 1997, and that when McQuaid asked why Plaintiff had been rude to him since January, Plaintiff explained that it was because he mistakenly had thought that McQuaid was heterosexual, which had made Plaintiff angry. (Defs.' Affirm., Ex. B (McQuaid Affid.) at 3.) McQuaid alleges that at the bar, Plaintiff "kept moving his leg near mine," asked questions about McQuaid's personal life, and suggested that the two "become personally intimate." (Id. at 3-4.) When McQuaid rebuffed Plaintiff's advances and informed him that he already had a boyfriend, Plaintiff "kept putting his leg against [McQuaid's], ignoring [McQuaid's] explicit rejection of his advance." (Id. at 4.) McQuaid allegedly left the bar shortly thereafter and informed Satterthwaite of Plaintiff's conduct. (Id.)

On or about March 20, 1998, Plaintiff was summoned to a meeting with Semerad, Satterthwaite, and Clayton Hemmert, who was a director at Quiet Man. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 7; Def.'s 56.1 ¶ 2.) Again, the parties give conflicting accounts of what occurred at the meeting. According to Semerad, Plaintiff asked immediately, "Is this about me and Glenn [McQuaid]?" (Defs.' Affirm., Ex. T (Semerad Dep.) at 20.) Semerad claims to have informed Plaintiff that "that type of behavior" was unacceptable and illegal and could rwwwesult in Plaintiff's termination. (Id. at 20-21.) Semerad alleges that Plaintiff's proffered excuse for his conduct was mutual attraction between Plaintiff and McQuaid. (Id. at 21.) Semerad claims to have told Plaintiff "to stop this behavior and it will be forgotten, we will move on, [and] no one will mention it again." (Id.) According to Satterthwaite, the managers told Plaintiff at the meeting that he was not permitted to call coworkers at home "for inappropriate reasons or irrelevant reasons," but that he could call "for work-related reasons." (Defs.' Affirm., Ex. S (Satterthwaite Dep.) at 49.)

According to Plaintiff's account of the meeting, Semerad initially informed him that his contract could be terminated on account of his behavior. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 7.) When Plaintiff asked what behavior Semerad was referring to, Semerad cited "calling people at home," which prompted Plaintiff to ask whether the matter concerned McQuaid, given that Plaintiff had called McQuaid on the Sunday preceding the meeting. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Semerad confirmed that the issue concerned McQuaid, but did not mention sexual harassment and would not be more specific than to proscribe "calling people at home." (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff claims to have followed up on this meeting by requesting on numerous occasions that the company investigate any charges of impropriety, but Defendants denied his requests. (Id. ¶ 11.) On April 17, 1998, Plaintiff states that he informed Semerad that he thought sexual harassment constituted a "serious workplace issue" at Quiet Man, but that Semerad — not Plaintiff — was at the root of the problem. (Id. ¶ 14.)

On or about April 22, 1998, Plaintiff spoke with Jason Goodman, a coworker, who complained of Semerad's inappropriate "roughhousing." (Defs.' Affirm., Ex. N (Goodman Dep.) at 17-19.) According to Goodman, Semerad "would come up behind me and start grabbing my nipple and my butt." (Pl.'s Decl., Ex. C (Goodman Dep.) at 91.) When Goodman told Semerad to stop grabbing him one time, Semerad allegedly asked Goodman whether he was molested as a child, and he continued to engage in such activity. (Id. at 92-93.) Goodman also complained of a time when Semerad choked him with his forearm (Id. at 94-95.) According to Goodman, he stated that he was considering filing a lawsuit against Semerad and asked Plaintiff if he would be willing to testify, to which Plaintiff responded affirmatively. (Id. at 19-20.) Plaintiff claims that Semerad told Goodman that he knew Plaintiff intended to support a sexual harassment claim by Goodman against Semerad, and Plaintiff's "expectations dropped from getting an investigation [into McQuaid's harassment claim] to simply trying to salvage [his] reputation." (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff also states that sometime in 1998, he "was no longer given tasks to perform or jobs to do other than break-fix." (Defs.' Affirm., Ex. Q (McCabe Dep.) at 91.)

Between March 23, 1998 and June 5, 1998, Defendants purportedly received numerous complaints about Plaintiff's conduct and performance. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 3-4.) According to Defendant Semerad, David Sullivan, a Quiet Man employee, complained that it "was a common activity for [Plaintiff] to talk explicitly about sex and things like that in the workplace." (Defs'. Ex. T (Semerad Dep.) at 22.) According to Satterthwaite, Plaintiff also had called Sullivan at home on several occasions "not discussing work[-]related things." (Defs'. Ex. S (Satterthwaite Dep.) at 55.) Sullivan states, however, that he never complained about Plaintiff's behavior: "I don't ever recall officially complaining about [McCabe's] behavior other than [his] job performance" and he also states in reference to Plaintiff calling him at home, "I don't recall [McCabe] calling me ever." (Pl.'s Decl., Ex. D (Sullivan Dep.) at 30-32, 42-43] Colin Stackpole, another employee, reportedly complained that Plaintiff called him on a Sunday night to discuss "Monday-related work things." (Id.) Additionally, five employees complained that Plaintiff was "incompetent." (Id. at 144-45.) Plaintiff's employment was terminated on June 5, 1998. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 5; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 5. The letter from Amy Taylor [Satterthwaite], executive producer, dated June 10, 1998 states in total, "This letter is to confirm that John McCabe's employment was terminated on June 5, 1998." (Pl.'s Decl., Ex. L.)

Plaintiff filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights ("NYSDHR") on July 2, 1998, alleging quid pro quo sexual harassment and claiming that Quiet Man constituted a hostile work environment. (Pl.'s Decl. ¶ 17.) In an order dated and mailed December 20, 2000, the NYSDHR found no probable cause to support Plaintiff's claim. (Def. Aff. Ex. F.) On March 13, 2001, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) issued Plaintiff a "right to sue" letter. (Id.) On June 5, 2001, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court; on September 24, 2001, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint alleging Title VII violations and breach of contract; and on February 22, 2002, he filed a Second Amended Complaint, the only difference being the addition of a New York City Human Rights Law claim. Defendants have moved for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Title VII sexual harassment claims, or, in the alternative, seek a limitation on Plaintiff's damages. Plaintiff has moved for partial summary judgment on his breach of contract claim. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART, and Plaintiff's motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby DENIED.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment may be granted only when there is no genuine issue of material fact remaining for trial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248 (1986); Corselli v. Couglin, 842 F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir. 1988).

Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), "[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that, "[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

As a general rule, "the court is to draw all factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought, viewing the factual assertions . . . in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion". Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1061 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Consarc Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 996 F.2d 568, 572 (2d Cir. 1993). All ambiguities and all inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be resolved in favor of the party contesting the motion, and all uncertainty as to the existence of a genuine issue for trial must be resolved against the moving party. LaFond v. General Physics Servs. Corp., 50 F.3d 165, 171 (2d Cir. 1995). As is often stated, "[v]iewing the evidence produced in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, if a rational trier could not find for the nonmovant, then there is no genuine issue of material fact and entry of summary judgment is appropriate." Binder v. LILCO, 933 F.2d 187, 191 (2d Cir. 1991).

Furthermore, plaintiffs proceeding pro se — particularly in cases involving civil rights allegations — "deserve special latitude on summary judgment motions" and their "submissions . . . must be generously and liberally construed." Ancekewicz v. Long Island Univ., No. 02 Civ. 4490, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11662, 2005 WL 1411917, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2005) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Weixel v. Board of Educ. of N.Y., 287 F.3d 138, 145-46 (2d Cir. 2002).

B. Title VII Sexual Harassment

Title VII prohibits employers from "discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1). A plaintiff may make a sexual harassment claim under Title VII under two theories: (1) hostile work environment and (2) quid pro quo.Kariban v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1994).

1. Hostile Work Environment

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants fostered a hostile environment at Quiet Man based on his sex. (Second Am. Compl. at 3.) Defendants argue that the incidents Plaintiff complains of are "not sufficiently egregious to create a hostile work environment" because they are not severe enough and no one was forced to engage in the activity, and furthermore, Plaintiff cannot show that the behavior complained of was because of sex, nor can he show that his work was hampered by the "onetime comment about oral sex, vulgar language, and occasional rough-housing." (Defs.' Mem. of Law at 10-14.)

The Supreme Court has held that Title VII is violated "[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295, 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). To succeed on his hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff must show (1) that his workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his work environment; and (2) that a specific basis exists for imputing the conduct that created the hostile environment to the employer. Richardson v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 436 (2d Cir. 1999). "A work environment will be considered hostile if a reasonable person would have found it to be so and if the plaintiff subjectively so perceived it." Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass'n, 192 F.3d 310, 318 (2d Cir. 1999). Whether a reasonable person would find a given work environment to be hostile depends on the "totality of the circumstances," considerations of which include: "(1) the frequency of the conduct, (2) the severity of the conduct, (3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance, and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee's work performance."Id. at 319 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). Furthermore, "it is `axiomatic' that in order to establish a sex-based hostile work environment under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct occurred because of her sex." Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)).

Here, Plaintiff cites numerous factors that he argues demonstrate the hostile work environment to which he was subjected at Quiet Man. They include Semerad wrestling with male employees in the hallways; vulgar language; Semerad asking another male employee whether he was abused as a child when the employee rebuffed his attempt to grab him; distribution of a magazine article about oral sex that was circulated among employees; Semerad repeating a vulgar joke to Plaintiff; Semerad showing Plaintiff pornography on his computer screen; and Semerad telling Plaintiff that he needed or wanted a "blow job." (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 6, 8; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 6, 8; Pl.'s Decl., Ex. C (Goodman Dep.) at 92; Pl.'s Decl. ¶¶ 2, 10, 13.) As a result, Plaintiff claims he purposefully avoided Semerad, withdrew from his coworkers, and wore coveralls to work. Plaintiff also states that the "offensive and abusive behavior by Semerad . . . interfered both with his job performance and peace of mind." (Pl.'s Mem. Law in Opp. at 5.)

"Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998). Defendants describe the atmosphere at Quiet Man as one of simple rough-housing, in which no one was forced to participate. However, according to Plaintiff, Semerad was the main instigator of these activities, and as the president of the company, could subtly force a reasonable person to feel compelled to participate in or condone such behavior. Significant factual questions exist surrounding the alleged activities of those involved in this matter, but viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, Plaintiff's work environment appears to have been permeated with more than offensive remarks and sexual innuendo, to the extent that he subjectively felt threatened, and a reasonable person would find working there to be abusive. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that his working conditions were altered by the hostile environment, particularly by the "blow job" incident with his supervisor. Plaintiff also has shown that the conduct alleged, with the exception of the magazine article and the altered photograph of the child, were directed solely at men. Accordingly, Plaintiff has sufficiently established he was subjected to sexual harassment and his claim survives. Defendants' Summary Judgment motion on this claim is DENIED.

2. Quid Pro Quo

Reviewing Plaintiff's pro se submissions liberally, Plaintiff appears to argue that his refusal to grant Semerad's request for a sexual favor in January of 1998 resulted in his eventual termination in June of 1998. Quid pro quo harassment occurs when "submission to or rejection of [unwelcome sexual] conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual." Karibian, 14 F.3d at 777 (quotations and citations omitted); see also Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 346 (2d Cir. 1998). "Simply put, the question is whether plaintiff's supervisor `linked tangible job benefits to the acceptance or rejection of sexual advances.'" Hamilton v. Bally of Switz., No. 03 Civ. 5685, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9319, *14-15 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2005) (quotingKaribian, 14 F.3d at 778).

Even viewing the submissions in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is no support to his assertion that his rebuttal of, or, more accurately, his act of ignoring Semerad's alleged sexual advance, was the basis for his termination five months later. Plaintiff has not shown any connection or link between Semerad's single alleged sexual request and Plaintiff's ultimate termination. As Plaintiff has not established a case of quid pro quo sexual harassment under Title VII, Defendants' motion for Summary Judgment on this claim is GRANTED.

C. Breach of Contract

Plaintiff argues that the Court should grant Summary Judgment on his breach of contract claim, which is based on his employer, Quiet Man, terminating his employment prior to the expiration of the contract term. (Plaintiff Memo of Law in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1 (hereinafter "Pl. Mem. Law").) Defendants argue that they were entitled to terminate Plaintiff's employment contract because of Plaintiff's own misconduct. (Defendants Memo of Law in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1 (hereinafter "Defs.' Opp. Mem.").)

In New York, the act by an employer of discharging an employee who has a term contract before the term expires, "constitutes a breach of the contract by the employer." Leiser v. Gerard Daniel Co., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10372, 29-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Borne Chem. Co., Inc. v. Dictrow, 85 A.D.2d 646, 445 N.Y.S.2d 406, 412 (2d Dep't 1981)). However, an employment contract for a definite term may be terminated by the employer prior to the employment end-date with just cause. Alpern v. Hurwitz, 644 F.2d 943, 945 (2d Cir. 1981) (citingCrane v. Perfect Film Chemical Corp., 38 App. Div.2d 288, 291, 329 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1972); 53 Am.Jur.2d Master Servant, §§ 27, 34, 45, 49 (1970)); see also Levine v. Zerfuss Offset Plate Service Co., 492 F. Supp. 946, 948 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that where employment is for a definite term, the employer may not fire the employee "without a cause sufficient in law") (citations omitted).

In the present case, the employment contract was for two years, and the only provisions relating to early termination pertained to a situation where the employee terminated his employment early. As there were no stated conditions regarding how Plaintiff's employment could be terminated, Plaintiff's employment could only be terminated for good cause.

Defendants argue that they terminated Plaintiff because Quiet Man's management received a complaint that Plaintiff had harassed a fellow employee and after being told to stop, Plaintiff failed to modify his behavior. (Defs.' Opp. Mem. Law at 3.) They also argue that they terminated Plaintiff because he refused to attend a training which he was obligated to attend under the terms of the contract. (Id.) Because of these instances of disobedience, Defendants argue they were "fully justified" in terminating Plaintiff, and, in fact, "obligated to take action against" him. (Defs.' Opp. Mem. Law at 3-4.) Plaintiff argues in response that Defendants invented the reasons for his termination after he was fired. (Pl.'s Reply Mem. at 3-4.) Plaintiff admits that he did not attend a training scheduled for May of 1998, but states that he gave advance notice that he would be unable to attend, and he was never informed of a specific schedule to which he was supposed to adhere. (Pl.'s Reply Mem. at 5.) As to the sexual harassment claims, Plaintiff argues Defendants never investigated the alleged complaint against him, "much less found it to have any merit." (Pl.'s Reply Mem. at 5.)

Great weight is afforded the nonmoving party in a summary judgment motion, and thus, Defendants' proffered reason for firing Plaintiff is viewed in a favorable light. Certainly, an employer is well within its right to fire an employee for disobedience. See, e.g., Reilly v. Polychrome Corp., 872 F. Supp. 1265, 1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that it is "unquestioned that the general rule is that an employee's willful refusal to obey the reasonable instruction of his employer is grounds for discharge") (quotations and citations omitted). Furthermore, a finding that an employee has engaged in sexual harassment is a perfectly legitimate reason to fire the person.See, e.g., DeCintio v. Lawrence Hosp., 797 F. Supp. 323, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that a finding of sexual harassment may "be treated as an adequate basis for adverse personnel action unless a collective bargaining or other agreement dictates the contrary"). However, the question of whether Plaintiff engaged in the activity Defendants allegedly instructed him to stop is hotly disputed. As discussed above, material issues of fact remain in the case. The question of whether Defendants' instructions to Plaintiff to stop harassing his fellow employees resulted in a valid "for cause" reason to fire him before the definite term of the contract ended is unresolved, as is whether Plaintiff in fact "refused" to attend training. Resolution of these material facts is appropriately left to a jury. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for Partial Summary Judgment on his breach of contract claim is DENIED.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim is hereby DENIED; Defendants' motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff'squid pro quo claim is GRANTED; and Plaintiff's motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the contract claim is hereby DENIED. Because the Court finds it premature, it does not address Defendants' argument regarding damages at this time. The Court sets the following pretrial submission dates: Joint Pre-Trial Statement ("JPTS"), Requests to Charge and Proposed Voir Dire are to be filed no later than 60 days from the date of this Memorandum and Order; Memoranda of Law addressing those issues in the JPTS are also to be filed no later than 60 days from the date of this Memorandum and Order; Responses to the Memoranda of Law are to be filed no later than 90 days from the date of this Memorandum and Order.

SO ORDERED.