MELTON, Presiding Justice.

Oliver Maner, Patrick T. O'Connor, James P. Gerard, David Bobo Mullens III, for appellant.

Karsman, McKenzie & Hart, Christopher D. Britt, for appellees.

MELTON, Presiding Justice.

This case concerns the proper statutory interpretation of the Recreational Property Act, OCGA § 51-3-20 et seq. (RPA), which shields from potential liability landowners who "either directly or indirectly invite[ ] or permit[ ] without charge any person to use the[ir] property for recreational purposes." OCGA § 51-3-23. We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a landowner would not be shielded from potential liability by the RPA where that landowner charged a fee to some people who used the landowner's property for recreational purposes, but did not charge any fee to the injured party who used the property for such purposes. The Mayor and Alderman of the City of Garden City v. Harris , 339 Ga.App. 452, 793 S.E.2d 628 (2016). As explained more fully below, because the plain language of the RPA shields a landowner from potential liability under the circumstances presented here, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding otherwise, and we must reverse.

By way of background, on November 10, 2012, Willie and Kristy Harris, along with their six-year-old daughter, Riley, attended a youth football game at the Garden City Stadium, a facility owned and maintained by the City of Garden City. Willie and Kristy each paid the required $2 admission fee for spectators over the age of six. However, because Riley was only six years old, the Harrises were not required to pay an entrance fee for her, and Riley was admitted to the event free of charge. At one point during the game, while Riley was walking across the bleachers to return to her seat after visiting the concession stand, she slipped and fell between the bench seats and suffered serious injuries after falling to the ground nearly thirty feet below.

The Harrises sued the City to recover for Riley's injuries, and the City moved for summary judgment, relying on the immunity provided by the RPA. Specifically, OCGA § 51-3-23 states:

Except as specifically recognized by or provided in Code Section 51-3-25, an owner of land who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to use the property for recreational purposes does not thereby: (1) Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose; (2) Confer upon such person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed; or (3) Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by an act of omission of such persons.

And, with respect to the exceptions specifically recognized in OCGA § 51-3-25, that Code section states in relevant part:

Nothing in this article limits in any way any liability which otherwise exists ... [f]or injury suffered in any case when the owner of land charges the person or persons who enter or go on the land for the recreational use thereof. ...

OCGA § 51-3-25 (2).

The City argued that, because Riley was not one of the persons who was charged a fee to use the City's property for recreational purposes, the City could not be held liable for Riley's injuries as a matter of law. However, the trial court denied the City's motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling on appeal.

In order to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court's ruling, we must analyze the relevant provisions of the RPA mentioned above. In interpreting these statutory provisions, we must presume

that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. To that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory

text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would ... [and] if the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning is at an end.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172–173 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013).

With these principles in mind, a natural reading of the plain language of OCGA § 51-3-23 indicates that a landowner remains free from potential liability to any individual person who is injured on the landowner's property who has been allowed to use the property for recreational purposes free of charge. Indeed, a landowner

who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to use the property for recreational purposes does not thereby ... [c]onfer upon such person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed; or ... [a]ssume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by an act of omission of such persons.

(Emphasis supplied.) The statute specifically and unambiguously references "any person" who is not charged a fee to use a landowner's property for recreational purposes as being such a "person" to whom the landowner does not owe a duty of care. Because the statutory text of OCGA § 51-3-23 is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning of shielding landowners from potential liability to individual persons whom they have invited to use their property for recreational purposes free of charge, "and our search for statutory meaning is at an end." Deal, supra, 294 Ga. at 173 (1) (a), 751 S.E.2d 337.

Our interpretation of the plain meaning of OCGA § 51-3-23 is not diminished when the statute is considered in the context of the exceptions to the statute set forth in OCGA § 51-3-25. Again, pursuant to OCGA § 51-3-25 (2) : "Nothing in this article limits in any way any liability which otherwise exists ... [f]or injury suffered in any case when the owner of land charges the person or persons who enter or go on the land for the recreational use thereof [.]" (Emphasis supplied.) Read in conjunction with the other provisions of the statute, it is plain that, in any case where the injured party is a person who has been charged a fee to use the landowner's property for recreational purposes, the landowner would not be immune from potential liability to such paying persons, because the landowner only receives the protections of OCGA § 51-3-23 with respect to those persons who have not been charged a fee to use the property for recreational purposes. This is the case because any individual person who has been or persons who have been charged a fee to use the landowner's property for recreational purposes obviously could not qualify as "any person [who has been invited] to use the property for recreational purposes" "without charge" and to whom the landowner could not be liable based on the plain language of OCGA § 51-3-23.

This is also consistent with the stated legislative purpose of the RPA, which "is to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting the owners' liability toward persons entering thereon for recreational purposes." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 51-3-20. A landowner's liability is limited to those injured persons who have paid to use the landowner's property for recreational purposes, and there is nothing in the natural reading of the plain text of OCGA §§ 51-3-23 and OCGA § 51-3-25 to suggest that the legislature intended instead to leave in place the potential liability of landowners to persons who have not paid to use an owner's property for recreational purposes just because the landowner would be potentially liable to others who have paid to use the property for such purposes. Nothing in the RPA requires that all participants in recreational activities on a landowner's property must enter free of charge for the landowner to enjoy immunity as to any of them. Indeed, providing free admission on a select basis (for example, by inviting special groups such as the Boy Scouts or Girl Scouts, honor roll students, veterans, etc., to events where others have paid to enter) is a common practice that fits within the stated legislative purpose of the RPA "to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes" while at the same time limiting the landowner's potential legal liability to only the "person or persons" who the landowner

"charges ... [to] enter or go on the land for the recreational use thereof." OCGA §§ 51-3-20 and 51-3-25.

Because the injured party in this case was not charged a fee to use the City's property for recreational purposes, the City was shielded from liability for that party's injuries as a matter of law by the RPA. Accordingly, the City was entitled to summary judgment in this case, and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that it was not.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Benham and Hunstein, JJ., who dissent.

HUNSTEIN, Justice, dissenting.

For decades the Georgia courts have held that a landowner is shielded from liability pursuant to OCGA § 51-3-23 only where its property is open to the public for a recreational purpose without charge . Here, there is no question that the City's football stadium was open to the public for a recreational purpose and that the City charged an admission fee to enter the premises. Applying OCGA § 51-3-25 (2) and Georgia's well-established case law, I would conclude that the City is not exempted from liability under the RPA. The contrary decision reached by the majority circumvents the limitations placed on the RPA's liability waiver by the General Assembly and effectively overturns well-settled case law without explanation. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

"As in all appeals involving the construction of statutes, our review is conducted under a de novo standard." Hankla v. Postell, 293 Ga. 692, 693, 749 S.E.2d 726 (2013). "A statute draws its meaning, of course, from its text." (Citation omitted.) Chan v. Ellis, 296 Ga. 838, 839, 770 S.E.2d 851 (2015). "The common and customary usages of the words are important, but so is their context." (Citation omitted.) Tibbles v. Teachers Ret. Sys. of Ga., 297 Ga. 557, 558 (1), 775 S.E.2d 527 (2015). "For context, we may look to other provisions of the same statute, the structure and history of the whole statute, and the other law—constitutional, statutory, and common law alike—that forms the legal background of the statutory provision in question." (Citation and punctuation omitted). Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589, 591 (1), 774 S.E.2d 688 (2015). With these principles in mind, I turn to the relevant portions of the RPA.

The RPA was first drafted and published by the Council of State Governments in 1965, explaining that the act "is designed to encourage availability of private lands by limiting the liability of owners to situations in which they are compensated for the use of their property and those in which injury results from malicious or willful acts of the owner." (Emphasis supplied.) Council of State Governments,

Suggested State Legislation 150 (24th ed. 1965). A few months later, the General Assembly adopted the proposed legislation, virtually unchanged, underlining the importance of encouraging landowners to open their lands to the general public free of charge. See OCGA § 51-3-20 ("The purpose of this article is to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting the owners' liability toward persons entering thereon for recreational purposes."). When looking at the relevant provisions of the RPA, we must keep in mind that it is a statute in derogation of common law, and thus, must be strictly and narrowly construed. Couch v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 291 Ga. 359, 374, 729 S.E.2d 378 (2012) ("[A] statute in derogation of the common law [should] be construed strictly by the courts." (citation omitted) (Benham, J., dissenting)).

The General Assembly codified the RPA's liability waiver in OCGA § 51-3-23, which provides:

Except as specifically recognized by or provided in Code Section 51-3-25, an owner of land who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to use the property for recreational purposes does not thereby:

(1) Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose;

(2) Confer upon such person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed; or

(3) Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by an act of omission of such persons.

Id. This liability waiver is subject to a companion statute, OCGA § 51-3-25, which provides:

Nothing in this article limits in any way any liability which otherwise exists:

...

(2) For injury suffered in any case when the owner of land charges the person or persons who enter or go on the

land for the recreational use thereof, except that, in the case of land leased to the state or a subdivision thereof, any consideration received by the owner for the lease shall not be deemed a charge within the meaning of this Code section.

Id.

The majority concludes, after ostensibly applying the "plain language" of the above-quoted provisions without citation to meaningful authority, that the liability waiver of OCGA § 51-3-23 applies (and, consequently, that OCGA § 51-3-25 does not) because Riley did not pay the admission fee. At first glance, such a reading appears correct. However, simply parsing the language of OCGA § 51-3-23 does not end the analysis. The plain language of that Code section—indeed the first sentence—states that the RPA's general liability protection is expressly controlled by the provisions of OCGA § 51-3-25. See OCGA § 51-3-23 ("Except as specifically recognized by or provided in Code Section 51-3-25...."). Accordingly, we must read the two statutes together, see Mooney v. Webster, 300 Ga. 283, 290, 794 S.E.2d 31 (2016), giving effect to all parts of the statute, see Bibb County v. Hancock, 211 Ga. 429, 440, 86 S.E.2d 511 (1955), so as to avoid "a construction that makes some language mere surplusage," Slakman v. Continental Gas Co., 277 Ga. 189, 191, 587 S.E.2d 24 (2003).

Turning to the relevant portion of OCGA § 51-3-25, the liability protections of the RPA do not apply "[f]or injury suffered in any case when the owner of land charges the person or persons who enter or go on the land for the recreational use thereof." Id. at (2). Georgia courts have consistently held that this provision is applicable where (1) the property was open to the public, (2) the property was used for a recreational purpose, and (3) the landowner charged a fee in exchange for permission for the public to enter the premises. See Anderson v. Atlanta Comm. for the Olympic Games, Inc., 273 Ga. 113, 114 (1) (a), 537 S.E.2d 345 (2000) ("The RPA limits, with certain exceptions, the liability of an owner of land who has made property available without charge to the public for recreational purposes."); Cedeno v. Lockwood, Inc., 250 Ga. 799, 301 S.E.2d 265 (1983) (interpreting OCGA § 51-3-25 ), disapproved on other grounds, Atlanta Comm. for the Olympic Games, Inc. v. Hawthorne, 278 Ga. 116, 118, n.3, 598 S.E.2d 471 (2004). See also Stone Mountain Mem'l Ass'n v. Amestoy, 337 Ga. App. 467, 788 S.E.2d 110 (2016) ; Gayle v. Frank Callen Boys & Girls Club, Inc., 322 Ga. App. 412, 745 S.E.2d 695 (2013) ; Martin v. Dempsey Funeral Servs. of Georgia, Inc., 319 Ga. App. 343, 345, 735 S.E.2d 59 (2012) ; Carroll v. City of Carrollton, 280 Ga. App. 172, 633 S.E.2d 591 (2006) ; Spivey v. City of Baxley, 210 Ga. App. 772, 774, 437 S.E.2d 623 (1993) ; Edmondson v. Brooks County Bd. of Ed., 205 Ga. App. 662, 664, 423 S.E.2d 413 (1992).

The parties agree that the first two factors are met; this leaves open the question of whether the landowner charged a fee in exchange for permission for the public to enter the premises. The majority concludes that this provision is only satisfied where the injured party is "the person or persons" who have been charged to enter. This, however, is but one way to interpret this portion of OCGA § 51-3-25 (2). At issue is whether the phrase "charges the person or persons who enter or go on the land" refers specifically to the injured person who has been charged or, instead, refers to a landowner who generally charges for entry onto the land. Our precedent clearly answers this question.

Almost thirty-five years ago, this Court held in Cedeno that, "[a]s a prerequisite to immunity under the RPA, the owner cannot charge a fee for admission to the property ." 250 Ga. at 801 (2), 301 S.E.2d 265 (citing OCGA § 51-3-25 ) (emphasis supplied). See also City of Tybee Island v. Godinho, 270 Ga. 567, 511 S.E.2d 517 (1999) ("The RPA, with certain exceptions, shields property owners from tort liability for property that they permit the public to use without charge for ‘recreational purposes' " (emphasis supplied.)), disapproved on other grounds, Hawthorne, 278 Ga. 116, 598 S.E.2d 471. Later, the Court of Appeals reiterated this principle in Carroll, holding that " ‘[t]he important criterion is the purpose for which the public is permitted on the property,’ i.e., whether ‘the property is open to the public for recreational purposes free of charge .’ " (Emphasis supplied; citations and punctuation omitted). 280 Ga. App. at 175, 633 S.E.2d 591.

Consistent with these long-standing decisions, as well as a natural reading of the statute, I conclude that it is the fee associated with the use of the property that controls our analysis, not whether a specific individual was charged. Such a resolution of the ambiguity between OCGA §§ 51-3-23 and 51-3-25 (2) is consistent with the requirement that we narrowly construe the liability waiver, which abrogates the common law right of an invitee to sue a landowner. Furthermore, this construction maintains the liability shield envisioned by the General Assembly in OCGA § 51-3-23, encouraging landowners to allow the public to use their lands free of charge, while also protecting the waiver exemption codified in OCGA § 51-3-25 (2). See Malphurs v. State, 336 Ga. App. 867, 869, 785 S.E.2d 414 (2016) ("When the courts are called upon to determine if there is a conflict between statutes they are required to undertake to construe them together and seek to give full effect to both laws as representing all of the legislative intention.") (citation and punctuation omitted).

Finally, my interpretation is bolstered by the General Assembly's inclusion of the phrase "in any case" in OCGA 51-3-25 (2). This all-encompassing phrase illustrates the General Assembly's intent to grant greater liability rights to the public when a landowner assesses a fee to enter onto its land. In other words, where a landowner levies a charge in exchange for permission to enter its land for a recreational purpose, then the landowner is liable for an injury suffered on its property in any case , no matter whether that person paid the admission fee or not. This construction further avoids the patently absurd result of permitting landowners to cherry-pick groups of potential plaintiffs, resulting in similarly injured individuals having unequal rights of recovery. See Roberts v. Deal, 290 Ga. 705, 709, 723 S.E.2d 901 (2012) (explaining that "this Court may construe statutes to avoid absurd results") (citing Allen v. Wright, 282 Ga. 9, 12 (1), 644 S.E.2d 814 (2007) ).

In this case, the record clearly supports the trial court's finding that the public was charged a fee to enter the premises. See OCGA § 51-3-21 (1) (defines a "charge" as "the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land"). Compare Stone Mountain Mem'l Ass'n v. Herrington, 225 Ga. 746 (1), 171 S.E.2d 521 (1969) (where public was paid a fee to park their cars but not to enter the premises, parking fee did not qualify as charge pursuant to RPA); Brannon v. Stone Mountain Mem'l Ass'n, 165 Ga. App. 120, 299 S.E.2d 176 (1983) (same); S. Gwinnett Athletic Ass'n, Inc. v. Nash, 220 Ga. App. 116 (1), 469 S.E.2d 276 (1996) (baseball registration fee did not qualify as a charge under RPA).

Pursuant to OCGA § 51-3-25 (2), and applying Georgia's well-established case law, I would conclude that by generally charging a fee for admission, the City is excluded from the RPA's liability protection, no matter that the individual injured was relieved from paying the admission fee because of her age. If the City wished to be protected by the RPA's liability waiver, it could have allowed all Rebel Bowl spectators to enter the stadium free of charge as the City does for its regular season games. See Spivey, 210 Ga. App. at 775, 437 S.E.2d 623 (1993) (concluding that "the RPA applies to spectators at athletic events, when no admission charge is imposed"). Consequently, I would affirm the Court of Appeals' determination that the City was exempted from the RPA's protection pursuant to OCGA § 51-3-25 (2).

I am authorized to state that Justice Benham joins me in this dissent.