Summary
In Dahn, the challenged determination was the denial of the petitioner's initial application for section 207-a (2) benefits and not, as here, the termination of such benefits previously awarded and paid for three years.
Summary of this case from Heck vs. KeaneOpinion
CA 03-00787.
November 21, 2003.
Appeal from a judgment (denominated order and judgment) of Supreme Court, Erie County (Notaro, J.), entered June 13, 2002, which dismissed the Cplr article 78 petition.
Schwan Sammarco, Buffalo (W. James Schwan of Counsel), for Petitioner-Appellant.
Michael B. Risman, Corporation Counsel, Buffalo (Christopher M. Putrino of Counsel) for Respondents-Respondents.
Before: Present: Pigott, Jr., P.J., Green, Scudder, Kehoe, and Hayes, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 seeking a judgment directing respondent City of Buffalo (City) to pay him supplemental wages and benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) or, alternatively, to conduct a hearing on his eligibility for such benefits. In their answer, respondents asserted the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. Supreme Court properly dismissed the petition as timebarred. The New York State Police and Fire Retirement System granted petitioner a performance of duty disability retirement and, by letter dated June 12, 2001, the City informed petitioner that he was not eligible for supplemental wages and benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-a (2). On September 4, 2001, petitioner served a demand for such wages and benefits upon the City or, alternatively, for a hearing to determine his eligibility for those wages and benefits. Petitioner thereafter commenced this proceeding on December 24, 2001. Contrary to petitioner's contention, this proceeding is in the nature of mandamus to review, not mandamus to compel the performance of a statutory duty ( see Matter of Dearman v. City of White Plains, 237 A.D.2d 603), and the statute of limitations thus began to run on June 12, 2001, the date on which the City's determination became final and binding on petitioner ( see CPLR 217; Matter of De Milio v. Borghard, 55 N.Y.2d 216, 220; Matter of Gruosso v. County of Nassau, 264 A.D.2d 396). The City's determination was "formal, explicit, and unequivocal" and was thus final on that date ( Nickerson v. City of Jamestown, 178 A.D.2d 1003, 1003). Petitioner's subsequent demand for supplemental wages and benefits or for a hearing was at most a request for reconsideration of the City's determination and did not toll or revive the statute of limitations ( see Matter of Lubin v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 N.Y.2d 974, 976, rearg denied 61 N.Y.2d 905, 62 N.Y.2d 803, cert denied 469 U.S. 823).