Summary
In Martinez, the defendant, who filed the motion for reconsideration, had been on notice for more than four months about the genuine issues of material fact that the Court had found remained in the case, but filed a motion for reconsideration only a month before the case was set to go forward for trial.
Summary of this case from Deeds v. Whirlpool Corp.Opinion
Civil Action No: SA-04-CA-0120-XR.
July 18, 2005
ORDER
On this date the Court considered Defendant's motion for leave to file Defendant's motion for reconsideration (docket no. 60) and Defendant's motion for leave to file Defendant's second motion for summary judgment (docket no. 59). Defendant seeks leave to move for reconsideration of the Order granting in part and denying in part Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Defendant requests that the Court reconsider the Order as to the issues the Court denied summary judgment upon — retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards Act and hostile work environment harassment under Title VII. The Court's original Order was dated February 28, 2005. This Order was amended April 11, 2005 to certify it for interlocutory appeal. No changes were made regarding the substantive issues that Defendant now asks to have reconsidered. Defendant has therefore been on notice for four and one-half months as to the Court's ruling on these issues. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically provide for the filing of motions for reconsideration. See Sierra Club v. Tri-State Generation and Transmission Assoc., Inc., 173 F.R.D. 275, 287 (D. Col. 1997); see also St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Fair Grounds Corp., 123 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir. 1997). The Court retains the power, however, to revise any interlocutory order at any time prior to the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). A motion seeking the reconsideration of a judgment or order is generally considered a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) if it seeks to change the order or judgment issued. Standard Quimica De Venezuela v. Cent. Hispano Int'l, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 202, 204 (D. Puerto Rico 1999). Rule 59(e)'s legal standards are therefore applied to motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders. See Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Karg Bros., 841 F. Supp. 51, 55 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (motion for reconsideration of an order granting in part and denying in part a motion for summary judgment). In addition, though the general rule is that motions for reconsideration will not be considered when filed more than ten days after the judgment at issue is entered, this deadline does not apply to the reconsideration of interlocutory orders. Standard Quimica De Venezuela, 189 F.R.D. at 205. Motions to reconsider interlocutory orders are left to the Court's discretion so long as not filed unreasonably late. Id. (citing McDowell Oil Service, Inc. v. Interstate Fire and Casualty Co., 817 F. Supp. 538, 543 (M.D. Pa. 1993)).
Plaintiff's request for permission to appeal the interlocutory order was denied by the Fifth Circuit on May 19, 2005.
Defendant has not explained what prevented it from filing for reconsideration when it originally received the February 28, 2005 Order, or when it received the May 19, 2005 Order denying permission to appeal from the Fifth Circuit, or anytime in between. Defendant has been on notice for more than four months as to the genuine issues of material fact that the Court found remained in this case. There is but one month until this case is set to go forward for trial. Defendant's delaying tactics to avoid trial should not be encouraged. As Defendant's motion for reconsideration was filed "unreasonably late," the Court DENIES Defendant's motion for leave to file Defendant's motion for reconsideration (docket no. 60).
Even were the Court to grant Defendant's motion for leave to file Defendant's motion for reconsideration, the Court would not be inclined to grant the motion for reconsideration itself. "The Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment [or order]." CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2810.1 at 127-28 (2d ed. 1995) (footnotes omitted). Defendant's motion for reconsideration is simply an argument that the Court was incorrect in its previous Order. Defendant consistently confuses the standard applicable at the summary judgment stage. Plaintiff is not forced to conclusively establish his allegation — this would require the Court granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. He must only come forward with evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact. Despite Defendant's protestations, there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there existed a hostile work environment such that a term, condition or privilege of Plaintiff's employment was affected. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66, 67 (1986)) ("When the workplace is permeated with `discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,' that is `sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment,' Title VII is violated."). There also exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff was promised a salary increase to $9.00 per hour by Defendant's vice-president, and whether such increase was taken away because of Plaintiff's protected activity under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Defendant is free to present evidence at trial to counter Plaintiff's allegations.
As to Defendant's motion for leave to file Defendant's second motion for summary judgment, the Court initially notes that the dispositive motion deadline in this case was set for January 13, 2005. Therefore, allowing Defendant's second motion for summary judgment would permit Defendant to file a dispositive motion beyond that deadline. In addition, Defendant has not put forward any new argument or evidence establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the two remaining claims in this case. Plaintiff's pay stubs from July 27, 2001 to June 27, 2003 do nothing to conclusively establish that Plaintiff's salary was not to be increased to $9.00 per hour. Defendant is free to introduce this evidence at trial, as well as to argue that Plaintiff has not come forward with evidence beyond his testimony as to such a promise. Defendant is also free to argue at trial, consistent with its arguments on summary judgment, that Plaintiff voluntarily resigned over a denial of a request for a raise. Contrary to Defendant's assertions, the Court has not held that Plaintiff was terminated by Defendant; there simply exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Plaintiff was fired or resigned. Again, this is an issue to be decided by the trier of fact. Defendant's motion for leave to file Defendant's second motion for summary judgment is therefore DENIED (docket no. 59).