Basch & Keegan, LLP, Kingston, N.Y. (Derek J. Spada of counsel), for appellant.

Burke, Conway & Dillon, White Plains, N.Y. (Michelle J. Piantadosi of counsel), for respondent.

ALAN D. SCHEINKMAN, P.J., SHERI S. ROMAN, SANDRA L. SGROI, JOSEPH J. MALTESE, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Christine A. Sproat, J.), dated May 24, 2017. The order granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

On the morning of May 28, 2016, the plaintiff's vehicle struck the defendant's vehicle on State Route 82 at or near its intersection with Cole Road in the town of La Grange. Prior to the incident, both vehicles were traveling in the southbound lane of State Route 82. The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant alleging that he sustained personal injuries as a result of the accident. The defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, contending that the plaintiff's negligence in striking the rear of the defendant's stopped vehicle was the sole proximate cause of the accident. The Supreme Court granted the motion, and the plaintiff appeals.

A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision (see Tutrani v. County of Suffolk, 10 N.Y.3d 906, 908, 861 N.Y.S.2d 610, 891 N.E.2d 726 ; De Castillo v. Sormeley, 140 A.D.3d 918, 32 N.Y.S.3d 654 ). There can be more than one proximate cause of an accident (see Cox v. Nunez, 23 A.D.3d 427, 805 N.Y.S.2d 604 ), and a defendant moving for summary judgment in a negligence action has the burden of establishing, prima facie, that he or she was not at fault in the happening of the subject accident (see Suris v Citiwide Auto Leasing, Inc., 145 A.D.3d 817, 43 N.Y.S.3d 434 ; Boulos v. Lerner–Harrington, 124 A.D.3d 709, 2 N.Y.S.3d 526 ). "[N]ot every rear-end collision is the exclusive fault of the rearmost driver. The frontmost driver also has the duty not to stop suddenly or slow down without proper signaling so as to avoid a collision" ( Tutrani v. County of Suffolk, 64 A.D.3d 53, 59–60, 878 N.Y.S.2d 412 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

Here, in support of her motion for summary judgment, the defendant submitted an affidavit in which she averred that she brought her vehicle to a gradual stop to make a left turn onto Cole Road from the southbound lane of State Route 82. She activated her left turning signal and had been stopped for at least 35 seconds, waiting for traffic to clear, when her vehicle was struck in the rear by the plaintiff's vehicle. The defendant's affidavit was sufficient to establish the defendant's prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, as it demonstrated that she was not comparatively negligent in the happening of the accident and that the plaintiff was solely at fault (see De Castillo v. Sormeley, 140 A.D.3d at 919, 32 N.Y.S.3d 654 ; Ortiz v. Hub Truck Rental Corp., 82 A.D.3d 725, 727, 918 N.Y.S.2d 156 ).

In opposition, the plaintiff averred that the defendant made a sudden stop and failed to give proper signals, as required by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163. The plaintiff's affidavit was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant negligently caused or contributed to the accident (see Gleason v. Villegas, 81 A.D.3d 889, 890, 917 N.Y.S.2d 890 ; Costa v. Eramo, 76 A.D.3d 942, 907 N.Y.S.2d 510 ; Klopchin v. Masri, 45 A.D.3d 737, 738, 846 N.Y.S.2d 311 ).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

SCHEINKMAN, P.J., ROMAN, SGROI and MALTESE, JJ., concur.