Summary
holding deputy had probable cause for arrest where defendant had strong odor of alcohol on his breath, his eyes were glassy and bloodshot, speech was slurred, he could not maintain his balance, an open alcoholic beverage was found in the car, and he refused to perform field sobriety tests
Summary of this case from State v. VasquezOpinion
No. 13-10-00061-CR
Delivered and filed July 21, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
On appeal from the 156th District Court of Bee County, Texas.
Before Chief Justice VALDEZ and Justices RODRIGUEZ and GARZA. Memorandum Opinion by Justice GARZA.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant, Jeffery Wayne Markert, of the felony offense of driving while intoxicated, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04 (West 2003), § 49.09(b)(2) (West Supp. 2010), enhanced by a prior felony conviction to a second-degree felony, see id. § 12.42(a)(3) (West Supp. 2010). The trial court sentenced him to twelve years' imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice — Institutional Division. See id. § 12.33 (West Supp. 2010). By one issue, appellant challenges the court's denial of his motion to suppress all evidence seized as a result of his arrest. Specifically, appellant contends there was insufficient probable cause to support (1) the initial stop of his vehicle and (2) his subsequent arrest. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The only witness at the suppression hearing was the arresting officer, Brandon Burdick, a deputy with the Bee County Sheriff's Department. Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, see Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), Deputy Burdick's testimony established the following facts: On March 14, 2009, at around 12:40 a.m., Deputy Burdick was patrolling northbound on St. Mary's Street in Beeville, Texas. As he approached the intersection at Charco Road, he observed a vehicle pointed southbound on St. Mary's Street stopped in the middle of the intersection. Although Deputy Burdick could not see the traffic signal for the southbound traffic, he assumed the light was green because the light was green for the northbound traffic on St. Mary's Street. Deputy Burdick continued through the intersection, made a U-turn, activated his lights, pulled behind the vehicle, and used his speaker to instruct the driver — later identified as appellant — to pull over to the right of the roadway. As Deputy Burdick approached the open driver's side window, he detected a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage. Deputy Burdick smelled alcohol on appellant's breath and observed that his eyes were glassy and bloodshot. As appellant complied with the deputy's request that he exit the vehicle, Deputy Burdick noticed that appellant's balance was unsteady and he was "staggering." Deputy Burdick requested that appellant perform field sobriety tests, but appellant refused to cooperate. Based on the odor of alcohol, appellant's glassy eyes and slurred speech, and the fact that he was stopped in the middle of an intersection on a green light, Deputy Burdick concluded that appellant was intoxicated and arrested him for driving while intoxicated. A search of appellant's vehicle revealed a mixed drink that smelled of alcohol. State's Exhibit One, a video recording of the traffic stop and appellant's arrest, was admitted in evidence and played at the suppression hearing. On cross-examination, Deputy Burdick admitted that initially, he assumed the southbound traffic signal was green because it was green for northbound traffic. However, after he turned around and pulled behind appellant's vehicle, he confirmed that the light was green. Deputy Burdick stated that appellant had committed a traffic violation by stopping or parking his vehicle in an intersection. The trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress. Appellant was tried and convicted, and this appeal followed.II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
Whether the trial court properly denied a defendant's motion to suppress is reviewed under a bifurcated standard of review. Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447; St. George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts and review de novo the trial court's application of law to facts not turning on credibility and demeanor. Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447; Scardino v. State, 294 S.W.3d 401, 405 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2009, no pet.). When, as in this case, the trial court makes no explicit findings of historical fact, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447. We must uphold the trial court's ruling if it is supported by the record and correct under any theory of law applicable to the case, even if the trial court gave the wrong reason for its ruling. Id. at 447-48.The Fourth Amendment is not a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only against unreasonable searches and seizures. For Fourth Amendment purposes, a traffic stop is a seizure and must be reasonable to be lawful. A traffic stop is reasonable if the police officer was justified in making the stop and his actions during the stop were confined in length and scope to that necessary to fulfill the purpose of the stop. In other words, an officer may initiate a traffic stop if he has a reasonable basis for suspecting that a person has committed a traffic violation.Vasquez v. State, 324 S.W.3d 912, 919 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd) (citations omitted). Once an officer concludes the investigation of the conduct that initiated the traffic stop, he may continue to detain a person if he has reasonable suspicion to believe another offense has been or is being committed. Id. "Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity." Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). The determination of reasonable suspicion is made by considering the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 492-93; Vasquez, 324 S.W.3d at 919.