Russell Lloyd Justice

On Appeal from County Civil Court at Law No. 4 Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1095974

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Stephen Manley is appealing the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of appellee Bank of America, N.A. (BANA). In three issues, Manley argues that (1) the county court erred by rendering summary judgment in BANA's favor by default because he appeared in the case and responded to the motion, (2) the justice court and county court lacked jurisdiction, and (3) the justice court and county court abused their discretion by not submitting the case to a jury.

We affirm the county court's judgment and dismiss Manley's claims against the justice court.

Background

In 2010, Hilda L. Durden executed a promissory note payable to BANA and a Deed of Trust in favor of BANA that placed a lien on the property located at 402 Heatherbrook Drive, Houston, Texas 77085 (the Property). The Deed of Trust Hilda Durden executed contains a tenant-at-sufferance provision stating:

If the Property is sold pursuant to this Paragraph 21, Borrower or any person holding possession of the Property through Borrower shall immediately surrender possession of the Property to the purchaser at that sale. If possession is not surrendered, Borrower or such person shall be tenants at sufferance and may be removed by writ or possession.

On June 23, 2017, BANA filed a forcible detainer action in a Harris County justice court against Manley and all other occupants of the Property. BANA alleged that it purchased the Property at the trustee's sale, Manley is a tenant at sufferance under the Deed of Trust, and Manley failed to vacate BANA's property after proper notice.

On July 5, 2017, Manley filed an answer, counterclaims, and affirmative defenses, along with a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Manley claimed ownership of the Property pursuant to a General Warranty Deed dated February 24, 2016, which Manley obtained from Michael Durden as Grantor.

The justice court held a jury trial on July 5, 2017. After the close of arguments, the court granted a directed verdict in BANA's favor. Manley appealed the justice court's verdict to Harris County's County Court at Law No. 4 and requested a jury trial.

BANA filed a motion for summary judgment on December 19, 2017, in which it argued that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its forcible detainer action because the evidence established that its right to immediate possession of the Property is superior to any right Manley may have in the Property, and that Manley is a tenant at sufferance pursuant to the terms of the Deed of Trust. Manley filed a response, to which BANA replied. BANA's motion for summary judgment was submitted to the court on January 19, 2018. The court granted the motion on January 25, 2018.

Manley filed a motion for new trial which was overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed.

Jurisdiction over BANA's Forcible Detainer Action

We address Manley's jurisdictional arguments first. In his second issue, Manley argues that the justice and county courts did not have subject matter jurisdiction over BANA's forcible detainer claim because there is a genuine dispute as to title that is so intertwined with the issue of possession that it deprived the lower courts of jurisdiction. Specifically, Manley argues that the 2016 warranty deed raises a question of fact regarding whether he or BANA has title to the Property, and there is no landlord-tenant relationship that would allow the lower courts to resolve the issue of possession without first resolving the title dispute. Manley further contends that the lower courts did not have jurisdiction because BANA did not have standing to file the forcible detainer action against him.

A. Standard of Review

Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review de novo. Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. State, 381 S.W.3d 468, 476 (Tex. 2012); Trimble v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 516 S.W.3d 24, 28 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) ("If the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the appellate court can make no order other than reversing the judgment of the court below and dismissing the cause.") (quoting City of Garland v. Louton, 691 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex. 1985)).

B. Forcible Detainers

Jurisdiction over a forcible detainer action is expressly given to the justice court of the precinct where the property is located and, on appeal, to the county court for a trial de novo. TEX. PROP. CODE § 24.004(a); TEX. GOV'T CODE § 27.031(a)(2); TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.10(c). Neither the justice court nor the county court has jurisdiction to determine or adjudicate title to land. See generally Black v. Washington Mut. Bank, 318 S.W.3d 414, 417 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. dism'd w.o.j.).

Thus, to prevail in a forcible detainer action, the plaintiff is not required to prove title, but is only required to present sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession. See Trimble, 516 S.W.3d at 29; see also Espinoza v. Lopez, 468 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). If, however, an issue of title is so intertwined with the issue of possession that a court must resolve the title dispute before determining which party has a superior right to immediate possession, then the justice court and the county court lack jurisdiction to resolve the matter. Espinoza, 468 S.W.3d at 695; Yarbrough v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 455 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).

Because a forcible detainer action's purpose is not to establish title, a plaintiff bringing a forcible detainer action "is not required to prove title, but is only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession." Trimble, 516 S.W.3d at 29 (quoting Black, 318 S.W.3d at 417). When there is a landlord-tenant relationship between the purchaser at foreclosure and the current possessor of the property, such a relationship "provides a basis for the trial court to determine the right to immediate possession, even if the possessor questions the validity of a foreclosure sale and the quality of the buyer's title." Trimble, 516 S.W.3d at 29 (quoting Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ezell, 410 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.)). Although such a relationship is not a prerequisite to jurisdiction, the lack of a landlord-tenant relationship indicates that the case may present a title issue. See Espinoza, 468 S.W.3d at 695-96; Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 712 n.4 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.).

Here, Manley claims ownership of the Property under a Warranty Deed he acquired from Michael Durden in 2016 which purportedly conveyed to Manley "all and singular the rights and appurtenances thereto in any way belonging" to the Property. The record reflects that the legal and equitable estates to the Property had been severed six years earlier when Hilda Durden executed the Deed of Trust to BANA in 2010; Hilda Durden retained the legal title and BANA acquired the equitable title. See Flag-Redfern Oil Co. v. Humble Exploration Co., 744 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Tex. 1987); Ford v. US Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 01-07-00183-CV, 2008 WL 4670514, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 23, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). Thus, as a result of the severance in 2010, the only right belonging to the Property that could have been conveyed to Manley in 2016 is the legal title that was initially retained by, and held through, Hilda Durden.

The Deed of Trust creates a landlord-tenant relationship between BANA and Hilda Durden and anyone holding possession of the Property through Hilda Durden in the event of foreclosure. As an intervening purchaser of legal title to the Property that was previously held by Hilda Durden, Manley acquired possession of the Property through Hilda, and is bound by the Deed of Trust's tenant-at-sufferance clause. See Pinnacle Premier Props., Inc. v. Breton, 447 S.W.3d 558, 564 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (stating deed of trust's tenant-at-sufferance clause binds subsequent occupants whose interests are junior to deed of trust); see also Ford, 2008 WL 4670514, at *3 (holding intervening purchaser of property was subject to tenant-at-sufferance clause in deed of trust).

Because Manley purchased Hilda Durden's legal right to the Property after the Deed of Trust was executed, the Deed of Trust's tenant-at-sufferance clause created a landlord-tenant relationship that makes Manley a tenant at sufferance when the Property was foreclosed upon. This landlord-tenant relationship provided the justice and county courts with a basis to determine which party was entitled to immediate possession of the Property, without resolving the title dispute. See Trimble, 516 S.W.3d at 29.

Because the evidence shows that a landlord-tenant relationship exists between Manley and BANA that would have provided the lower courts with an independent basis for resolving the issue of possession, the justice court, and county court on appeal, have jurisdiction over BANA's forcible detainer claim. See generally id.

C. Standing

Standing, a necessary component of subject matter jurisdiction, requires a concrete injury to the plaintiff and a real controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the court. Heckman v. Williamson Co., 369 S.W.3d 137, 154 (Tex. 2012). Generally, to have standing (1) the plaintiff must be personally injured; (2) the plaintiff's injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct; and (3) the plaintiff's injury must be likely to be redressed by the requested relief. See id. A standing inquiry requires a careful examination of the allegations in the petition to determine whether the "particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted." Id. at 156 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3325 (1984)). "A plaintiff does not lack standing simply because he cannot prevail on the merits of his claim." DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tex. 2008).

BANA has standing to bring this forcible detainer action if it was personally injured, its injury is fairly traceable to Manley's conduct, and BANA's injury is likely to be redressed by a forcible detainer action against Manley. See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154. Here, BANA alleged that it purchased the Property at the trustee's sale and that it has a superior right to immediate possession of the Property because Manley is a tenant at sufferance under the Deed of Trust. BANA further alleged that it was injured when Manley failed to vacate BANA's property after proper notice. Thus, BANA has alleged facts which, if true, would entitle it to relief in this case. See generally Espinoza, 468 S.W.3d at 695 (stating plaintiff must present sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate superior right to immediate possession in forcible detainer action); DaimlerChrysler Corp., 252 S.W.3d at 305 (stating standing does not depend on whether party will ultimately prevail on merits of its claim).

Manley's argument that BANA does not have standing to bring this forcible detainer action because he is not a party to the Deed of Trust and no landlord-tenant relationship otherwise exists between him and BANA is unavailing. As previously discussed, Manley is an intervening purchaser who is subject to the Deed of Trust's tenant-at-sufferance clause, and therefore, a landlord-tenant relationship between Manley and BANA exists. Furthermore, a formal contract between a purchaser at a foreclosure sale and an occupant of the subject property is not required for the occupant to be subject to a forcible detainer action. See Ford, 2008 WL 4670514, at *3 (holding occupant, who was not party to deed of trust, acquired borrower's interest in property after borrower had executed deed of trust encumbering property, and therefore, occupant was intervening purchaser and subject to tenant in sufferance clause in deed of trust); see also Fandey v. Lee, 880 S.W.2d 164, 169 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, writ denied) ("In the absence of a legally enforceable agreement, such as a lease or rental agreement or a contract to sell, an occupier of premises is at best a tenant at sufferance and at worst a trespasser.").

We overrule Manley's second issue.

Summary Judgment

In his first issue, Manley argues that the county court erred by granting summary judgment by "default" because BANA did not move for summary judgment on that ground, and the county court "[f]alsely alleg[ed] that [he] did not come to court in order to grant a default judgment to circumvent [his] constitutional rights."

Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); City of Richardson v. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co., 539 S.W.3d 252, 259 (Tex. 2018).

The county court's judgment states, "[BANA] appeared through counsel; [Manley], although duly and properly served, failed to appear or answer/ appeared pro se. After hearing counsel for [BANA] pray for judgment, the Court is of the opinion and so finds that [BANA] is entitled to the following judgment." (emphasis in original). The judgment does not allege that Manley failed to appear or answer, as Manley contends. Rather, the county court's use of "/" to separate the two clauses in the judgment indicates that the county court determined that Manley either (1) failed to appear or answer or (2) he appeared pro se. See New Wave Techs., Inc. v. Legacy Bank of Tex., 281 S.W.3d 99, 102 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, pet. denied) (holding common usage meaning of "/" is "or").

It is undisputed that Manley appeared pro se and filed an answer in this suit, along with a motion to dismiss, and a response to BANA's motion for summary judgment. The parties also agree that BANA did not move for a default judgment against Manley on any basis. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err by granting the summary judgment in BANA's favor by "default."

To the extent that Manley's brief can be liberally construed to argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to title, BANA was only required to prove that it has a right of possession to the Property that is superior to Manley's; BANA "is not required to prove title, but is only required to show sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate possession." Trimble, 516 S.W.3d at 29 (quoting Black, 318 S.W.3d at 417). Thus, even if a question of material fact exists with regard to title, this would not preclude BANA from establishing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its forcible detainer claim.

We overrule Manley's first issue.

Denial of Right to Jury

In his third issue, Manley argues that the justice court and county court abused their discretion by not submitting the case to a jury. According to Manley, the justice court denied him his right to a jury trial when it granted a directed verdict in BANA's favor. Manley further contends that the county court denied him his right to a jury trial when it granted summary judgment in BANA's favor.

The right to a jury trial in civil cases is not absolute. See, e.g., Green v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 422 S.W.2d 723, 725 (Tex. 1968); Martin v. Commercial Metals Co., 138 S.W.3d 619, 626 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.). Regarding the county court, "[i]t is well-settled that summary judgment does not deny the losing party its constitutional right to a jury trial, because the ruling means that no issues of fact exist for a jury to consider and decide." Haase v. GIM Res., Inc., No. 01-11-00343-CV, 2012 WL 5311332, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 25, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310, 40 S. Ct. 543, 546 (1920)). Therefore, the county court did not deny Manley his right to a jury trial by granting summary judgment in BANA's favor. We overrule Manley's fourth issue with respect to the county court.

We do not have jurisdiction over Manley's claim that the justice court denied him his right to a jury trial by granting a directed verdict in favor of BANA or his claim that the justice court improperly adjudicated title by searching property tax records online before it rendered the directed verdict. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.012 (granting courts of appeals with jurisdiction over appeals from "a final judgment of the district or county court"). Accordingly, we dismiss these claims for want of jurisdiction.

We overrule Manley's third issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the county court's judgment and we dismiss Manley's claims against the justice court for want of jurisdiction.

Russell Lloyd

Justice Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Lloyd.