granting a writ of certiorari regarding the Ninth Circuit's decision that the residual clause at 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague

granting certiorari review to decide whether Section 16(b), as incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act's provisions governing an alien's removal from the United States, is unconstitutionally vague

granting certiorari review to decide whether Section 16(b), as incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act's provisions governing an alien's removal from the United States, is unconstitutionally vague

granting certiorari review to decide whether Section 16(b), as incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act's provisions governing an alien's removal from the United States, is unconstitutionally vague

granting writ of certiorari on same question regarding identical language in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)

In Lynch, the Supreme Court will decide whether the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), using language similar to that struck down by Johnson in the ACCA, is unconstitutionally vague.

In Dimaya the plaintiff, a citizen of the Philippines, filed a petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determination that his California convictions for first-degree residential burglary were categorically "crimes of violence" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), and, therefore, he was removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony.

In Dimaya, the Ninth Circuit examined a provision for the removal of non-citizens who have been convicted of an "aggravated felony."

In Dimaya, the Ninth Circuit, relying on the analysis in Johnson, held that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), as incorporated in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) is unconstitutionally vague.