SMITH, J.

The insurer appeals a decision awarding compensation benefits for the tuberculosis, caught from on-the-job exposure to an infected co-worker. We agree with the insurer that, under the factual circumstances of this case, the hazard of contracting the infectious disease of tuberculosis was not "inherent" in the employee's job within the meaning of G.L.c. 152, § 1(7A). We reverse the decision and deny the claim.

The facts are straightforward and undisputed. Virginia Lussier operated one of many machines in a large room, in which thirteen employees worked. She worked in close proximity to two co-employees. (Dec. 3, 5.) One of those co-workers contracted tuberculosis during the winter of 1995-1996. Lussier contracted the disease from that infected individual, undergoing a biopsy that revealed a tubercular lesion in her lung. The tuberculosis incapacitated Lussier for a period of approximately two months. (Dec. 4-5.)

The judge concluded, based on these facts and an impartial medical opinion causally relating her tuberculosis to the workplace exposure, that Lussier was entitled to workers' compensation benefits. (Dec. 9-10.) In so concluding, the judge determined that the operative definition of G.L.c. 152, § 1(7A) had been satisfied. (Dec. 7.) That provision states, "`Personal injury' includes infectious or contagious diseases if the nature of the employment is such that the hazard of contracting such diseases by an employee is inherent in the employment." St. 1941, c. 437. The scope of this provision is the sole issue before us.

The insurer argues that the judge erred as a matter of law in concluding that the case was compensable. We agree. There is nothing in the case law to support the proposition that the random catching of an infectious disease from a fellow employee is a "hazard . . . inherent in the employment." If it were, every bout of the flu contracted at work, resulting in more than a five days' absence from work would be a personal injury under the Act. On the contrary, two pivotal cases construing the statutory language unequivocally support the insurer's argument.

In Perron's Case, 325 Mass. 6 (1949), the court addressed the then recently added infectious disease provision:

Previous to the passage of this statute it had been held in Smith's Case, 307 Mass. 516 (1940), that tuberculosis contracted by the inhalation of germs was a disease and not a personal injury within the meaning of the compensation act. Later in Mercier's Case, 315 Mass. 238, 240, 241[1943], where the tuberculosis was contracted before the passage of the 1941 statute, it was said: `The nature of the employment of a nurse attending tubercular patients is such that the hazard of contracting the disease might well be found to be inherent in the employment.' The term `hazard' was defined in Hough v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board, 309 Mass. 534, 539, to be `a danger or risk lurking in a situation which by chance or fortuity develops into an active agency of harm.' When, because of the nature of the employment, a possibility exists that an employee may contract an infectious or contagious disease, it becomes a question of fact whether the likelihood of infection or contagion is so essentially characteristic of the employment as to warrant a finding that the danger is inherent therein. In our opinion the danger of acquiring tuberculosis germs in a hospital while there employed, as was the employee in this case, in nursing positive cases of tuberculosis could be found to be a hazard inherent in the employment.

Perron's Case, supra at 8-9 (emphasis added). We fail to see anything in the present employment that conceivably would make tuberculosis "essentially characteristic" of the employee's machine operator job.

Later, in Raimo v. DeIulis Brothers Construction Co., 5 Mass. Workers' Comp. Rep. 201 (1991), the reviewing board appliedPerron's Case, by way of Zerofski's Case, 385 Mass. 590 (1982), to a claim involving the undisputed work-related aggravation of an underlying pneumonia due to exposure to inclement weather.

The essential issue in this case is whether the hazard of contracting pneumonia, or more precisely of aggravating a pre-existing pneumonic condition, is so essentially characteristic of the employee's work as to warrant a finding that the danger is inherent in his employment. Perron's Case, 325 Mass. 6, 9 (1949). "To be compensable, the harm must arise . . . from an identifiable condition that is not common and necessary to all or a great many occupations." Zerofski's Case, 385 Mass. 590, 595 (1982).

The vagaries of New England weather are legendary and all too familiar to the vast numbers of workers who toil out of doors. By virtue of where we live, exposure to the elements — cold, rain, snow, sleet, wind, heat, sun and humidity — is an everyday fact of life and labor. [footnote omitted.] We hold as a matter of law that such exposure is an identifiable condition common and necessary to a great many occupations. Construction work such as the employee performed is but one of those occupations.

Raimo, supra at 204-205.

We consider that the danger of exposure to germs from co-employees while working in close contact is a condition common and necessary to a great many occupations. Although it is undisputed that Lussier contracted tuberculosis in the work environment, that fact is not enough.

In some cases work may be a contributing cause of injury, but only to the extent that a great many activities pursued in its place would have contributed. When this is so, causation in fact is an inadequate test.

Zerofski's Case, supra, at 594. Without the hazard of contracting tuberculosis being "essentially characteristic of the employment[,]" Perron's Case supra, such an exposure as in the present case cannot support an award of workers' compensation benefits.

We reverse the orders of compensation and deny the claim.

So ordered.

________________________ Suzanne E. K. Smith Administrative Law Judge

________________________ William A. McCarthy Administrative Law Judge

________________________ Sara Holmes Wilson Administrative Law Judge

FILED: October 27, 1998