In this medical malpractice action, defendant's present claim that evidence of plaintiff's psychiatric history was relevant to the issue of causation is not preserved for our review ( People v. Williams, 6 N.Y.2d 18, 23, cert denied 361 U.S. 920; People v. Mejia, 221 A.D.2d 182, 183, lv denied 87 N.Y.2d 975). In any event, admission of the evidence of plaintiffs psychiatric history upon the theory lately advanced by defendants would have been properly denied since plaintiff withdrew her claims of emotional and psychological damage ( see, Strong v. Brookhaven Mem. Hosp. Med. Ctr., 240 A.D.2d 726; cf., Carr v. 583-587 Broadway Assocs., 238 A.D.2d 184), and insofar as the evidence was proferred on the issue of plaintiff's credibility, it was properly ruled inadmissible as collateral ( see, Coopersmith v. Gold, 89 N.Y.2d 957, 959). Contrary to defendant's argument, plaintiff's testimony regarding her loss of enjoyment of life was limited to the physical effects of defendant's malpractice. In the few instances where plaintiff testified about being "upset", the court struck her responses. Since plaintiff's psychiatric history was not probative of her claimed injury, it was properly excluded ( see, Cronin v. Gramercy Five Assocs., 233 A.D.2d 263).

The jury's verdict on causation was not against the weight of the evidence ( see, Mazariegos v. New York City Tr. Auth., 230 A.D.2d 608). Defendant's "own-self-serving view of the evidence * * * gives this Court no reason to disturb the trial court's denial of [a] motion to set aside the verdict" ( Maharam v. Maharam, 235 A.D.2d 226), and defendant's medical witnesses' contrary opinion is not a ground for setting aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence ( Ayoung v. Epstein, 177 A.D.2d 460).

The verdict, as reduced by the trial court, does not deviate materially from what is reasonable compensation under the circumstances ( see, CPLR 5501 [c]).

Concur — Ellerin, P. J., Rosenberger, Andrias and Friedman, JJ.