Order unanimously reversed on the law without costs and motion granted. Memorandum: Supreme Court erred in denying defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's amended cause of action for fraud. Although stated in terms of fraud, the gravamen of plaintiff's fourth cause of action is that defendants did not intend to perform their obligations under the February 12, 1987 letter of intent by permitting plaintiff to purchase 50% of the shares of defendant professional services corporation. Because the only fraud alleged arises out of the same facts that serve as the basis for his cause of action for breach of contract, plaintiff's amended complaint fails to state a legally sufficient cause of action for fraud (see, Garwood v. Sheen Shine, 175 A.D.2d 569, 570, lv denied 78 N.Y.2d 864; see also, Sparka Travel v. Hamza, 182 A.D.2d 1067). Although fraud may exist in the inducement of a contract, where, as here, it is based solely on the failure to perform a promised future act, plaintiff's remedy lies in an action on the contract (see, Garwood v. Sheen Shine, supra, at 570; Wegman v. Dairylea Coop., 50 A.D.2d 108, 113, lv dismissed 38 N.Y.2d 918).

Further, there was no basis for Supreme Court to conclude that plaintiff's amended complaint alleged facts sufficient to support a theory of liability in tort. Neither the nature of the parties' relationship nor the terms of their agreement suggest that defendants owed plaintiff a further duty of affirmative care upon which such a cause of action could be based (see, Sommer v Federal Signal Corp., 79 N.Y.2d 540; Charles v. Onondaga Community Coll., 69 A.D.2d 144, appeal dismissed 48 N.Y.2d 650). Because the remaining causes of action sound only in breach of contract, punitive damages are not available and plaintiff's claim for them must also be dismissed (see, Wegman v. Dairylea Coop., supra, at 113; see also, Charles v. Onondaga Community Coll., supra, at 149). In addition, in the absence of a statutory or contractual basis for payment of attorney's fees they are generally not recoverable (see, Umfrey v. NeMoyer, 184 A.D.2d 1047; cf., Huling v. Copp, 175 A.D.2d 572, 573). Thus, defendants' motion is in all respects granted.