HUDGINS, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court.

In 1926, Martha Miller Masury subdivided a tract of land lying north of the town of Virginia Beach in Princess Anne county, bounded on the east by the Atlantic Ocean, on the south by 51st street, on the west by Holly avenue and Holly boulevard and on the north by 5, 8th street. The plat of the subdivision, called "Ubermeer," was acknowledged and duly recorded. It shows that the subdivision contains blocks numbered from 1 to 16 inclusive, four hundred and seventy-five lots, with certain areas laid out as streets, alleys and ways. A rough sketch, not drawn to scale, of the pertinent parts of the plat is filed herewith as a part of this opinion.

All of the lots in Blocks 6 and 7 were conveyed to the Roymar Corporation. On January 24, 1936, it conveyed to Elizabeth Stuart James all of Block 7, lying west of the twenty-foot Way, which includes Lots 8 to 21, inclusive, with a fifteen foot alley in the rear as shown on the sketch.

In the spring of 1936, Roymar Corporation sold all lots in Block 6 to the Surf Beach Club, and in the conveyance, bearing date on August 1, 1937, described the property by the lot and block numbers as shown on the plat of Ubermeer. (See footnote for exact language.)

H. L. Lindsay and Pretlow Darden, president and secretary of the Surf Beach Club, acting for the corporation, In the spring of 1936, before acquiring the deed, began an extensive improvement of the property lying within Block 6. One or more of the buildings erected extended across

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the twenty foot way, and bath houses or cabanas were built across the east end of 57th street. By deed dated December 31, 1942, the Surf Beach Club conveyed to Katherine D. Lindsay and Pretlow Darden, all the lots in Block 6, and a part of Lot 4, and all of Lots 5, 6 and 7 in Block 7, describing the lots as they appeared on the plat of Ubermeer. Lot 7 in Block 7 adjoins the north line of 57th street and all the lots conveyed in Block 7 front on the ocean and extend west to the twenty foot way.

Mrs. James conveyed to other parties several of her lots in Block 7, but at the institution of the suit owned, among others, Lots 15, 16 and 17, on which she had erected two or more dwellings. Her total investment in the lots and improvements in this block is more than $50,000.00. Lot 15, in Block 7, is bounded on the east by the twenty-foot way, on the south by 57th street, and on the north by the fifteen foot alley.

A controversy arose between Mrs. James and Mr. Lindsay over the obstruction of the east end of 57th street. It was alleged that the street was forty feet wide and that thirty-five feet of it was obstructed. Mrs. James claimed that Mr. Lindsay failed to remove the obstructions as he had agreed to do, and so in January, 1946, she instituted suit against the owners praying that they be compelled to remove buildings and other obstructions across 57th street. The respondents named in that suit agreed to remove all their building from 57th street, and upon motion of Mrs. James, the suit was dismissed, but without prejudice to her. The decree of dismissal stated that she might institute further proceedings for relief if she was so advised. Parts of the obstructions in 57th street were removed but some of them were not, and this suit was instituted at Second May Rules, 1946, to compel the removal of the structures partially blocking 57th street, and those wholly blocking the twenty-foot way. The trial court entered a mandatory decree requiring respondents to remove the obstructions both in 57th street and in the twenty-foot way. From that decree they obtained this appeal.

Appellants concede that 57th street is a public thoroughfare and that they have no right to obstruct it. They concentrate their attack upon that part of the decree requiring them to remove permanent buildings obstructing the twenty-foot way.

Atlantic avenue, as shown on the sketch, is 100 feet wide, hard-surfaced and smooth-paved, and is the main thoroughfare for north-and-south-bound traffic through the town of Virginia Beach to Cape Henry. 58th street is thirty feet wide, hard-surfaced and paved from Atlantic avenue to the twenty-foot way. 57th street, a block south of 58th street, is 40 feet wide, hard-surfaced and paved from Atlantic avenue to the twenty-foot way. 56th street is south of 57th street and is parallel with it, but it is not paved and not open to motor vehicle traffic. The twenty-foot way is hard-surfaced and paved between 58th and 57th streets. It is unimproved from 57th street across 56th street to the middle of Block 5.

It does not appear that either the county or the highway officials have accepted the offer of dedication of the streets and alleys on the plat of Ubermeer. Under these circumstances, the provisions of Code, section 5219, are applicable, the pertinent part of which provides that the fact of recordation "shall operate to create a public easement or right of passage over such portion of the premises platted as is on such plat set apart for streets or other public use * * *." However, the rights of the public are not involved in this litigation, but only the private right of an owner who has acquired a lot in a subdivision, the plat of which shows certain areas laid out as streets and alleys.

The decisions in other jurisdictions are in conflict as to the extent of the easement in the streets and alleys created by grant with reference to a map or plat. It is held in some jurisdictions that a grantee acquires an easement as to all of the streets shown on the plat, and in other jurisdictions the easement is limited to the adjoining streets and such other streets as are necessary to give the grantee access to a public highway. 28 C.J.S., Easements, sec. 39, p. 703. A third view, and the one adopted in this jurisdiction, limits the extent of easements of this nature to such streets and alleys shown on the plat as are reasonably beneficial to the grantee, and a deprivation of which would reduce the value of his lot. In any event, such grantee is entitled to an easement in streets and alleys adjoining his lot. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 29 Gratt. (70 Va.) 780, 783; Cook v. Totten, 49 W. Va. 177, 38 S.E. 491, 87 Am. St. Rep. 792; 17 Am. Jur., Easements, sec. 47, p. 958; West's Virginia W. Va. Dig., Easements, Key No. 17(4), p. 726; Sipe v. Alley, 117 Va. 819, 86 S.E. 122; Payne v. Godwin, 147 Va. 1019, 133 S.E. 481; Williams v. Hendrick, 184 Va. 1076, 37 S.E.2d 8; Walters v. Smith, 186 Va. 159, 41 S.E.2d 617; Magee v. Omansky, 187 Va. 422, 46 S.E.2d 443.

Appellee contends that the decision in Sipe v. Alley, supra, is decisive of the issue. Appellants contend that this decision has been modified by subsequent decisions and that the rule in Virginia is that the easement in question extends only to the streets and alleys laid out on the plat which are reasonably necessary for the use of the owners of the particular lot. Neither of these contentions is quite correct.

In the Sipe Case the owner recorded a plat subdividing his tract of land adjacent to the town of Graham, Tazewell county, into lots, streets and alleys. Sipe and others bought 13 lots in section 33, bounded by Greever avenue, Wesley street, Calvin street and Tazewell avenue. Alley acquired a corner lot in this block, bounded by Calvin street, and another lot across the street in another block. He proceeded to obstruct Calvin street between his lots. Sipe and others, who owned lots fronting on Calvin street and within section 33, obtained a mandatory injunction requiring Alley to remove the obstructions. This court, in 117 Va. 819, at page 822, quoted with approval the general rule as follows: "When lands are laid off into lots, streets and alleys and a map or plat thereof is made and recorded, all lots sold and conveyed by reference thereto, without reservation, carry with them, as appurtenant thereto, the right to the use of the easement in such streets and alleys necessary to the enjoyment and value of said lots."

While the court in its discussions indicated that it did not think it material for complainants to prove whether or not their use of Calvin street was necessary, it will be noted that there the court was dealing with owners of lots in the same section, and the value of the Sipe property as a corner lot would have been materially affected if the obstructions had been allowed to remain.

A similar question was before the court in Payne v. Godwin, supra, where this court said the case of Sipe v. Alley was a bill for "a mandatory injunction to compel the opening of a street that had never been accepted and upon which all the lots abutted, and it was shown that the street was necessary to the enjoyment and value of said lots, therefore an owner in the same block could not close the street, thus depriving another of his vested right therein. An examination of the Sipe v. Alley Case will show that it is not authority to warrant an injunction in the instant case as the alley over the lots of Godwin was not necessary to the enjoyment by the plaintiff of his lots, as it had never been used in connection therewith, and he had private rights in the streets bounding his lots on two sides and the fee in this alley between his lots."

The facts in Fugate v. Carter, 151 Va. 108, 144 S.E. 483, were that both Fugate, the complainant, and Carter, the defendant, bought lots described by reference to a recorded plat. These lots were bounded by the same alley but in different blocks. A few months prior to the institution of the suit defendant built a garage in a street designated on the plat as Fifth street, immediately in front of complainant's lot. Defendant admitted that he had no right to build the garage in Fifth street, but that the complainant's predecessor in title had erected a barn across an alley which was a continuing obstruction of the alley itself and that the parties stood in pari delicto. The court rejected this contention and held that the garage built in Fifth street was both a public and private nuisance; that complainant, by reason of that fact, suffered special or peculiar damage as distinguished from that inflicted upon the general public; that the alley had been abandoned; and that no one would suffer loss by allowing the barn to remain across it. Mr. Justice Holt, speaking for the court, quoted the extract from the opinion in Sipe v. Alley, heretofore quoted, to the effect that the owner of a lot, as shown by a recorded plat, acquires the right to the use of such streets and alleys as are "necessary to the enjoyment and value of said lots. * * * This is settled law in Virginia."

Mr. Justice Holt, in stating the reasons for the rule, said: "There are many cases which hold that a lot owner who purchases under a recorded plat takes as appurtenant to his lot the right to the use of all of the streets and alleys there shown. Quoad the original owner, the recordation of the plat is a dedication of these highways which neither he nor those who claim under him can question. In the proper application of this rule the principles upon which it rests must be constantly remembered. They are based upon no covenants, but grow out of the doctrine of estoppel, and so are written by equity into each contract of sale.

"A lot owner has no vested interests in the sense in which that term is frequently used, for in certain circumstances they may be vacated at the instance of private parties (Code, sections 5220, 5221), and yet private property cannot be taken for private use either with or without compensation.

"Said section 5221 provides that the plat may be vacated in its entirety by the proprietor before sales, and it may likewise be vacated at the instance of all of the lot owners.

"It may be partially vacated, 'if such vacating does not abridge or destroy any of the rights or privileges of other proprietors in said plat,' by other lot owners who so desire. It thus appears that unanimous consent is not necessary, and no compensation is provided for nothing of value is taken. * * *

"* * * All that it is necessary to show is that nobody will be hurt. When these conditions obtain, the equitable doctrine of estoppel will not be extended to protect a right that does not exist in a cause already lost.

"This would seem to be the true rule. Lot owners are presumed to be interested in all streets and alleys shown on the recorded plat in which their lots are located, but this is a presumption of fact and may be rebutted both under general law and particularly under our statute. Whenever it is made to appear that a protestant has no interest, equity will stay its hand."

The facts in Walters v. Smith, 186 Va. 159, 41 S.E.2d 617, were that complainant purchased a lot described by reference to a recorded plat of a subdivision, which lot was bounded by a twenty-foot alley. Smith acquired a lot from the same grantor and started to erect a building across the alley. Complainant in her suit for a mandatory injunction established these facts, and in addition, proved that her grantor not only told her about the alley, but went upon the ground and staked it off and said that the value of her lot was considerably enhanced by the fact that it was bounded by a public way.

In Magee v. Omansky, 187 Va. 422, 46 S.E.2d 443, the evidence disclosed that the complainant and the respondents did not derive their title from a common grantor and hence complainant did not bring himself within the general rule applicable to easements of this nature.

The principles established by the Virginia decisions may be summarized as follows: (1) When land is subdivided into lots, streets and alleys, and lots are sold and conveyed by reference to the plat, without reservation, the conveyances carry with them the right to the use of such streets and alleys as may be necessary to the enjoyment and value of said lots: (2) purchasers acquiring such lots are presumed to be interested in all streets and alleys shown on the plat on which their lots are located; (3) but this is a presumption of fact and may be rebutted by showing that the easement in the way in question is not necessary to the enjoyment and value of said lots.

With these principles in mind we turn to the facts and find that title to the lots in question was traced to a common grantor and that the lots were described in the conveyances to the respective parties by reference, without reservation, to a recorded plat of the same subdivision. While the lots of the litigants were located in different blocks the southern boundary of the lots of appellee is the north side of 57th street and the northern boundary of the lots of appellants is the south side of the same street — that is, the lots of the litigants are separated by a forty-foot paved street. It thus appears that appellee has brought her case squarely within the influence of the controlling principles.

The only remaining question to be determined is whether her right to use the twenty-foot way is necessary to the enjoyment and value of her lots.

The twenty-foot way is shown on the plate to extend from 58th street south to 51st street, a distance of approximately 2140 feet, and that it is open and paved for the entire length except about 450 feet between 57th street southwardly across 56th street to half way of Block 5. The unimproved part of the twenty-foot way is shown by the shaded area on the sketch. Appellee and other witnesses testified that the right to use the twenty-foot way for its entire distance was not only an added convenience, but that such right would materially enhance the value of her property.

Appellants contend that the language of the deed from the Roymar Corporation to appellee limits her right to the use of that part of the twenty-foot way that extends from 58th street to 57th street.

An examination of the sketch shows that in each of the seven blocks fronting on the beach there is a fifteen-foot alley extending eastwardly from Atlantic avenue to the twenty-foot way. These fifteen-foot alleys are to the rear of all lots fronting on the cross streets, i.e., streets running east and west. The deed, after describing the property conveyed by lots and block numbers, as shown on the plat of Ubermeer, sets forth additional rights in the following language: "together with all of the right, title and interest of the said party of the first part * * * * * in and to that certain alley or lane 15 feet in width which runs in an easterly direction from the said Atlantic avenue along the rear boundary lines of the above described lots to an alley or lane twenty feet in width running in a Southerly direction from 58th street to 57th street along the eastern boundary line of said lots numbered 8 and 15, as shown on said plat."

That part of the quotation italicized describes the eastern terminus of the fifteen foot alley. It contains no word of reservation, limitation or restriction.

The physical set up in Block 7 is exactly the same as it is in the other six blocks lying east of Atlantic avenue, as shown on the plat. There is a similar fifteen-foot alley between Atlantic avenue on the west and the twenty-foot way on the east in each of the seven blocks. The language used clearly shows that it was the intention of the grantor to convey to the grantee all of the grantor's right and interest in the fifteen-foot alley, and in describing that alley the language italicized shows the eastern terminus of this alley and nothing more. It would be unreasonable to construe language describing the terminus of a street as a limitation upon a valid easement.

Appellants contend that appellee acquiesced in the obstruction of the twenty-foot way for a period of ten years, and that now she is estopped from asserting her rights therein.

The evidence shows that in 1936, when appellee bought her lots in the seventh block of Ubermeer, neither that block nor the sixth block was improved; that the officers of the Surf Beach Club, the consorts of the present owners, began construction of the building in the sixth block in 1936 before the deed was delivered to the club, and in the course of this construction a part, if not all, of the twenty-foot way was obstructed. Appellee testified that from 1936 to 1939 she saw the property very seldom, as she was not living at Virginia Beach or Norfolk. She returned to Norfolk in 1939 and stayed at the beach during the summer months. She had seen the plat of Ubermeer showing the twenty-foot way but inasmuch as it was not laid off on the ground, she did not know exactly where it was. She thought appellants' building was across the way, but was not certain until she caused a survey to be made of 57th street and the way after she had instituted her first suit.

In 1941, she discussed the matter with Mr. Lindsay who promised to remove the obstructions on the eastern end of 57th street. He failed to keep his promise, and in January, 1946, she instituted the suit heretofore mentioned, but before the suit was dismissed, she complained of the obstruction of the twenty-foot way, though she did not allege in her bill that it was obstructed. After she ascertained definitely the extent of the obstruction of the twenty-foot way she was informed that she would either have to amend her bill in the former suit or institute a new suit. When all of the obstructions at the end of 57th street were not removed, she instituted this suit praying that the appellants be compelled to remove the obstructions both in 57th street and the twenty-foot way.

When appellee ascertained the location of the twenty-foot way on the ground it had then been obstructed. She neither by act nor representation led appellants or their predecessors in title to believe that she had waived her right to the use of the twenty-foot way. Both appellants and appellee were charged with knowledge of the areas set apart on the plat of Ubermeer for streets and alleys.

It is essential to the application of the principles of equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais, that the party claiming to have been influenced by the conduct or declarations of another to his injury, was not only ignorant of the true state of facts, but had no convenient and available means of acquiring such information, and where the facts are known to both parties, and both had the same means of ascertaining the truth, there can be no estoppel. Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Walker, 100 Va. 69, 92, 93, 40 S.E. 633, 914; 19 Am. Jur., Estoppel, sec. 133, p. 788.

Appellants' final contention is that the mandatory injunction should not be awarded because the removal of the obstructions would burden appellants with a tremendous cost with little resulting benefit to appellee.

The evidence discloses that the appellants and their predecessors in title not only had constructive notice of the fact that the plat of Ubermeer revealed that 57th street and the twenty-foot way were laid out and designated as public ways, but their own engineer, Mr. Tarrall, indicated these on the survey which he made of a part of this subdivision. Notwithstanding this fact appellants proceeded to erect buildings both in 57th street and entirely across the twenty-foot way under the mistaken belief, so far as the twenty-foot way was concerned, that they had a right to so use this property. To permit them permanently to obstruct the twenty-foot way between 57th and 58th streets would alter the whole plan of Ubermeer adopted for the benefit of purchasers of all the lots in the subdivision. Traffic on Atlantic avenue, especially during the summer months, is very heavy, and to compel the owners of the lots bounded by this twenty-foot way to use Atlantic avenue instead of the twenty-foot way between 51st and 58th street would subject them to risk and inconvenience not contemplated under the plan of Ubermeer. Such an obstruction would cause special and peculiar damage to appellee as the owner of lot 15 in Block 7 adjacent to the way.

Appellants accepted a deed which described their property by reference to a recorded plat. This plat set forth not only the lots which were conveyed to them in fee, but the areas laid out for the joint use of them and others acquiring lots by reference to the plat. The cost of removing the buildings may be as much as $50,000, as stated by some of the witnesses, and the corresponding benefit to appellee may not be anything like this amount in dollars and cents, but appellants knew, or should have known, of the easement that appellee had over this way when they began to erect their buildings across it.

A similar question was before the court in Spilling v. Hutcheson, 111 Va. 179, 68 S.E. 250, where Judge Whittle, speaking for the court, said: "The correct rule in such case is clearly stated by Lord Cairns in Doherty v. Allman, 3 H.L. App. Cas. 720, as follows: 'If the parties, for valuable consideration, with their eyes open, contract that a particular thing shall not be done, all that a court of equity has to do is to say by way of injunction that which the parties have already said by way of covenant, that the thing shall not be done, and in such case the injunction does nothing more than give the sanction of the process of the court to that which already is the contract between the parties. It is not, then, a question of convenience or inconvenience, or of the amount of damage or injury — it is the specific performance, by the court, of that negative bargain which the parties have made, with their eyes open, between themselves.' "

Relief by way of a mandatory injunction will not be denied merely because the loss caused will be disproportionate to the benefits accruing to the opposing party where it appears that the obstruction or the violation of a right was made with full knowledge and understanding of the consequences which result. Mr. Lindsay, one of appellants, stated that he knew definitely that he was building across the twenty-foot way. It was so plain no one could have missed it. He added "I did not think I was building across a public street, but when I bought the block I thought I could build anywhere on it." The conveyance to him was not the entire area of Block 6, but lots numbered 1 to 19, inclusive, in this block. The recorded plat was notice to appellants that they in common with all other owners of lots in the subdivision, had a right to use the streets and alleys laid off thereon. Appellants' right to the twenty-foot way was subject to an easement appurtenant to the lots bounded by the way.

The decree of the trial court is

Affirmed.