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applying In re Globe and In re Pecan Groves 's limitation on those who can enforce the automatic stay
Summary of this case from Bank of New York Mellon v. Enchantment At Sunset Bay Condominium Assoc.Opinion
No. 15-60019 BAP No. 14-1266
11-21-2017
In re: DEMAS WAI YAN, Esquire, Debtor. CRYSTAL LEI, Appellant, v. DEMAS WAI YAN, Esquire; CHEUK TIN YAN, Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MEMORANDUM Appeal from the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Jury, Taylor, and Pappas, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Crystal Lei appeals pro se from the judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ("BAP") affirming the bankruptcy court's order denying Lei's motion to sanction chapter 7 debtor Demas Wai Yan. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo BAP decisions, and apply the same standard of review that the BAP applied to the bankruptcy court's ruling. Boyajian v. New Falls Corp. (In re Boyajian), 564 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.
The bankruptcy court did not err by denying Lei's request for attorney's fees incurred while defending against Yan's state court actions asserting pre-petition claims because Lei lacks standing to challenge violations of the automatic stay. See Tilley v. Vucurevich (In re Pecan Groves of Ariz.), 951 F.2d 242, 245 (9th Cir. 1991) (the debtor and trustee are the only legal beneficiaries of the automatic stay); cf. Magnoni v. Globe Inv. & Loan Co. (In re Globe Inv. & Loan Co.), 867 F.2d 556, 560 (9th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that parties with interests adverse to the bankruptcy estate do not have standing to enforce the automatic stay).
The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise its inherent authority to sanction Yan based on his misconduct before another court. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 55 (1991) (setting forth standard of review).
The BAP properly concluded that bankruptcy courts lack authority to award sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 because bankruptcy courts are not "court[s] of the United States" as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 451. See Perroton v. Gray (In re Perroton), 958 F.2d 889, 895-96 (9th Cir. 1992).
Lei's request seeking relief from this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, set forth in her opening brief, is denied.
Lei's motion for judicial notice (Docket Entry No. 15) is also denied.
AFFIRMED.