MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN GLEESON, United States District Judge.

Michael and Hindy Laster have prevailed in their action against Martin Cole for two violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. In a Memorandum and Order dated March 20, 2000, I awarded each plaintiff $100 in damages. See Laster v. Cole, No. 99-CV-2837 (JG), 2000 WL 306848 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2000). I also directed plaintiffs' counsel to file a fee application and supporting affidavit, which is before me now. For the following reasons, the fee application is granted in part and denied in part.

DISCUSSION

A consumer who prevails in a FDCPA action may recover "the costs of the action, together with reasonable attorney's fees as determined by the court." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). These expenses should be awarded regardless of whether the consumer received actual or statutory damages, and the amount should "be fixed in the discretion of the court." Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Savino III").

To calculate reasonable attorney's fees, courts engage in the "lodestar" method, whereby the number of hours reasonably expended is multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. See Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc., 71 F. Supp.2d 173, 175 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing, inter alia, Hensely v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). Pursuant to this method, a court may exclude any hours that were not reasonably expended. See id. However, "`[w]henever the district court augments or reduces the lodestar figure it must state its reasons for doing so as specifically as possible.'" Savino III, 164 F.3d at 88 (quoting Orchano v. Advanced Recovery, Inc., 107 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1999)).

In support of his application for attorney's fees, plaintiffs' counsel, Adam J. Fishbein, affirms that "he has extensive experience in FDCPA litigation both in filing individual actions and class actions"; he bills at the rate of $200 per hour; and he performed 30.45 hours of legal services (including 9 hours drafting a motion for summary judgment and 3 hours preparing a reply), for a total of $6090 in attorney's fees. (Pls.' Aff. ¶¶ 3, 4, 9-10.) He also states that he expended $300 in costs for filing the action, service of process, photocopying, and travel to court. (See id. ¶ 13.) Fishbein also asks the Court to sanction the defendant $5000 (10% of the defendant's counterclaim demand) for allegedly filing a frivolous counterclaim or, in the alternative, to apply a 1.8 multiplier to his hourly rate, which would add $4872 to his $6090 fee, "due to the conduct of defendant and the success of plaintiffs." (Id. ¶ 12.) Finally, Fishbein requests an additional $1000 for any future legal work. (See id.)

In opposition to this submission, the defendant insists that Fishbein's request is excessive because the "majority, if not nearly all," of his work product is either "boiler-plate" or adapted from submissions in prior actions. (Def.'s Aff. ¶ 3B.) At oral argument on May 18, 2000, I questioned Fishbein about this contention. Although he first argued that the nine hours allegedly spent preparing the summary judgment motion was a reasonable amount of time, and even low, he then admitted that he worked on the motion for only six hours, and that he added three additional hours to reflect the amount of time he would have spent if he had drafted the motion from scratch. (See Tr. of May 18, 2000, at 4-6.) In essence, Fishbein sought the benefit of a modest multiplier based on his alleged accumulated expertise in this type of case. But rather than file an honest affirmation of services and ask for the multiplier, he inflated his billable hours and filed a perjurious affirmation.

I find that Fishbein falsified his affirmation of services to the Court. He attested that he rendered 30.45 hours of legal services when, in fact, he performed at most 27.45 hours. Fishbein's total number of hours must be reduced accordingly.

I find Fishbein's hourly rate of $200 to be reasonable. See Savino III, 164 F.3d at 87 (affirming district court's conclusion that $200 per hour was reasonable fee in Eastern District). The amount of attorney's fees, therefore, is $5490. I also find reasonable Fishbein's request for $300 in costs, resulting in a total of $5790. I decline to award any legal fees for future expenses.

Fishbein's application for $5000 in sanctions or for a 1.8 multiplier based on the counterclaim is frivolous. In light of his admission that he filed a false affirmation of services, I am considering imposing sanctions on him. He is hereby ordered to show cause no later than July 7, 2000, why he should not be ordered to pay $600 — the amount by which he inflated his fee in this case — to the Clerk of the Court as a sanction for filing the false affirmation.

Finally, Fishbein's retainer agreement provides that his "fee will be 50% of any recovery." Thus, under this agreement, if Fishbein's clients prevail, Fishbein not only is entitled to recover his reasonable fees and costs, he also takes half of his clients' damages. I find this form of double recovery unnecessary. Accordingly, the award of attorney's fees and costs is reduced by $100 (50% of the Lasters' $200 recovery in statutory damages), for a total of $5690.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the fee application is granted in part and denied in part. The defendant shall pay the plaintiffs' counsel $5690 in attorney's fees and costs.

So Ordered.