MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON APPLICATION FOR FEES

WARREN K. URBOM, Senior District Judge

This case is now before me on an application for fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (hereinafter EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. On October 9, 1997, the plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits. The claim was denied throughout the administrative process. The plaintiff then filed a complaint on January 4, 2001, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's decision. See filing 1. In an opinion (dated October 23, 2001, I reversed the Commissioner's decision and remanded the case for further consideration. See filing 9. In doing so, I concluded that (1) the administrative law judge (hereinafter ALJ) failed to evaluate the plaintiffs subjective complaints of pain in accordance with the Eighth Circuit's decision in Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984); and (2) the ALJ failed to develop the record fully and fairly with respect to the plaintiffs residual functional capacity. See id. The Commissioner was therefore directed to reconsider the plaintiffs credibility and redetermine whether the plaintiff was able to perform his past relevant work. Plaintiffs counsel then filed an application for fees, with supporting evidence, on November 21, 2001, seeking a total of $3,451.25. See filing 11. The Commissioner has not responded to this application. After considering the record before me, I find that plaintiffs counsel is entitled to $3,350.00 in fees.

Analysis

The EAJA authorizes an award of "fees and other expenses" to a prevailing party in a case against the United States "unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust." 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(1)(A). Here, the plaintiff sought judicial review of the Commissioner's decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g), and his case was remanded pursuant to sentence four of that provision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) ("The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing."). The United States Supreme Court has explained that a claimant who obtains a "sentence-four remand order" meets the description of a "prevailing party" for purposes of the EAJA. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); see also Sorich v. Shalala, 838 F. Supp. 1354, 1358 (D. Neb. 1993) ("`[A] party who wins a sentence-four remand order is a prevailing party' because the practical impact of such an order is to reverse the Secretary's decision to deny benefits." (citing Schaefer, 509 U.S. at 302)). After reviewing the record, I do not find any "special circumstances" that would render an EAJA award unjust. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Thus, I must now determine whether the position of the Commissioner was "substantially justified." See id.

The Commissioner bears the burden of showing that his position was ""`justified in substance or in the main" — that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.'" Herman v. Schwent, 177 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)); see Trundle v. Bowen, 830 F.2d 807, 809 (8th Cir. 1987) ("The government bears the burden of proving that its position at both the administrative and litigation stages was substantially justified. . . ."); Brouwers v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 273, 275 (8th Cir. 1987) ("The Secretary bears the burden of proving that his position was substantially justified." (citation omitted)). The Commissioner's position must therefore "have a `reasonable basis both in law and fact.'" Herman, 177 F.3d at 1065 (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565); see Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 1984). Although the burden of demonstrating substantial justification is on the Commissioner, "a formal . . . response [from the Commissioner] to a petition for fees, while desirable, `is not a pre-condition of an order denying an award of fees under the Act.'" Trundle, 830 F.2d at 809 (quoting Campbell v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1986)); Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 129 (8th Cir. 1986) ("The Secretary's failure to oppose the petition for fees does not preclude a denial of a fee award under the EAJA" (citing Campbell, 800 F.2d at 1249)).

In the absence of a response from the Commissioner, I have independently reviewed the matter and have concluded that an EAJA award is appropriate. As noted above, I reversed the Commissioner's decision and remanded the case because (1) the ALJ failed to engage in a proper Polaski analysis when evaluating the plaintiffs subjective complaints of pain, and (2) the ALJ failed to develop the record fully and fairly. I agree with those courts that have rejected the Commissioner's "substantial justification" argument when reversal was based on such grounds. See Sullivan v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 332, 333 (W.D. Mo. 1990) ("Several courts in this district have held that an award of attorney's fees under EAJA is appropriate if `the ALJ failed to give full consideration to all the evidence presented relating to plaintiffs subjective complaints of pain.' . . . This court joins the other courts in this district in finding that the Secretary's decision is not substantially justified when an ALJ repeatedly ignores applicable Eighth Circuit precedent by failing to consider properly a claimant's subjective complaints of pain" (citations omitted)); Teramoto v. Bowen, 771 F. Supp. 292, 294 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (concluding that the Commissioner's position prior to moving for remand was not substantially justified where, inter alia, the Commissioner had failed "to develop fully the record" and "failed fully to analyze plaintiffs subjective complaints"); see also Fraction v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 574, 575 (8th Cir. 1988) (awarding EAJA fees following the plaintiffs successful appeal of a district court order affirming the denial of benefits where "the basis for reversal and remand was the government's failure, contrary to clearly established circuit precedent, to evaluate all the evidence concerning the claimant's subjective complaints of non-exertional impairments and to fully develop the record"); Trundle, 830 F.2d 810-11 (concluding that the government's position was not "substantially justified," based, in part, on the ALJ's failure to follow Polaski directives); Gamber v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 242, 245-46 (8th Cir. 1987) (concluding that the district court abused its discretion in finding that the Secretary's position was substantially justified where, inter alia, the ALJ failed to develop the record, ignored the plaintiffs complaints of pain, and ignored the plaintiffs job history); Sorich, 838 F. Supp. at 1360-61 (concluding that an EAJA award was proper where the case was remanded a second time "because the ALJ cited Polaski but did not discuss the inconsistences in the record in relationship to the factors outlined in Polaski" (citation omitted)). Accordingly, I find that the Commissioner has not met his burden of establishing that his position was "substantially justified." See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

Having concluded that an EAJA award is proper., I must now determine whether the amount sought by the plaintiff is reasonable. First, with respect to attorney's fees, plaintiffs counsel requests compensation at the rate of $125 per hour, the statutory rate authorized by the EAJA, for 25.60 hours of work. See filing 11; 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (limiting attorney's fees to $125 per hour unless the court "determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor . . . justifies a higher fee"); see also Stockton v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 49, 50 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting the prior "statutory rate for attorney's fees for a prevailing social security claimant"); McDannel v. Apfel, 78 F. Supp.2d 944, 949 (S.D. Iowa 1999) ("The Court notes that the EAJA statute contains an hourly rate that is to be used, absent some exceptions that are not applicable here."); Lowe v. Apfel, 65 F. Supp.2d 989, 990 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (noting that the plaintiffs attorney claimed an award "at the statutory hourly rate of $125"). In support of the application, plaintiffs counsel has attached an itemized accounting of his time and asserts that the amount of time expended was necessary based on, inter alia, the number of issues to be addressed and the fact that he did not begin representing the plaintiff until after the administrative hearing. See filing 11; Affidavit of Stephen Speicher ¶ 5 (filing 11). I agree with plaintiff's counsel and find that the expenditure of such hours was fair and reasonable. Accordingly, plaintiff will be awarded $3,200 in attorney's fees.

Plaintiff's counsel also requests compensation at the rate of $15 per hour for 16.75 hours of work by his paralegal. While paralegal fees are properly included in an EAJA award, "purely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of who performs them." Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n. 10 (1989); see Weaver v. Clarke, 933 F. Supp. 831, 837 (D. Neb. 1996), aff'd, 120 F.3d 852 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1098 (1998) ("I have previously concluded it is the practice in Lincoln, Nebraska[,] to bill clients for the work of paralegals and law clerks." (citing Lutheran Med. Ctr. v. Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters Eng'rs Health Welfare Plan, 814 F. Supp. 799, 805 n. 5 (D. Neb. 1993), aff'd, 25 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 1994); Tabech v. Gunter, 869 F. Supp. 1446, 1455 (D. Neb. 1994)); Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 285, 287-88 (concluding that the work of paralegals may be billed separately where it is the practice in the relevant market to do so); see also Surge v. Massanari, 155 F. Supp.2d 1301. 1305 (M.D. Ala. 2001) ("`[T]his court disapproves of the billing at a professional hourly rate for services reasonably performed by support staff, whose salaries are included in the lawyer's office overhead.'" (quotation omitted)); Gough v. Apfel, 133 F. Supp.2d 878, 881 (W.D. Va. 2001) ("Purely clerical activities, regardless of who performs them, are considered overhead and are not compensable as EAJA attorney fees." (quoting Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 288 n. 10; In re General Motors Corp., 110 F.3d 1003, 1024 (4th Cir. 1997)). After reviewing the itemized accounting of the paralegal's time, it appears that the following entries relate to clerical/secretarial tasks and should therefore be deleted:

01/02/01 Process final version of complaint, collect and copy exhibits, prepare summons and cover sheet for attorney review; prepare envelopes for certified mailing 2.00

01/03/01 Make copies of complaint, deliver copies and in forma pauperis paperwork to Clerk's office for Magistrate's Review .50

01/04/01 Pick up copies of complaint from court clerk's office; serve U.S. Attorney; mail certified mail at post office .75

01/29/01 Prepare return of service and mail to the Clerk's office .25

05/23/01 Process final version of reply brief, copy and prepare for mailing 2.50

See filing 11. In addition, the entry for 04/09/01 includes 1.25 hours for "formatting [brief]; print, copy and mail at post office." See id. I shall deduct .75 hours for the latter three tasks, which should also be classified as "clerical/secretarial" duties. It seems to me, however, that the remaining ten hours of documented paralegal time, along with the requested rate of $15.00 per hour, are justified. Accordingly, plaintiffs counsel will be awarded $150.00 for paralegal services.

IT IS ORDERED that the Application for Relief Under the Equal Access to Justice Act Pursuant to Sentence Four Remand, filing 11, is granted in part.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiffs attorney is awarded fees in the amount of $3,350.00.