OPINION AND ORDER

MERCURE, J.P.

In December 1993, Waste Stream Management Inc. (hereinafter WSM) operated a waste management facility on property in the Village of Potsdam, St. Lawrence County, that it leased from defendant Chester G. Bisnett. Plaintiff David La Clair (hereinafter plaintiff) was employed by WSM as a truck driver. WSM's office building fronted on a macadam parking area, and a truck scale (used to weigh trucks hauling waste to the facility) was situated near the building. Because an underground access pit housing some of the truck scale machinery was prone to flooding, WSM decided to install a sump pump in the pit; in that connection, WSM engaged defendant Shelly Electric Inc. to install electrical service to the area. In order to permit access to the pit, a steel plate that served as a cover was removed. At a time when Shelly's employee was occupied elsewhere and the pit opening was covered by a sheet of rigid insulation, plaintiff walked from his truck across the parking area toward the office building. In the process, he stepped on the sheet of insulation, which broke, and he fell into the pit, sustaining the injuries forming the basis for this action.

Plaintiffs brought separate actions against Shelly (action No. 1) and Bisnett (action No. 2) alleging their common-law negligence and violation of Labor Law §§ 200 Lab., 240 Lab. (1) and § 241 Lab. (6) and (8). The actions were joined for trial. Following joinder of issue and discovery, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on their Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1) causes of action and for leave to amend their bills of particulars so as to allege the violation of additional Industrial Code provisions in support of their causes of action under Labor Law § 241 Lab.. Shelly cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law § 240 Lab. (1) and § 241 Lab. (6) and Bisnett cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing all causes of action against him. Supreme Court denied plaintiffs' motion and granted both defendants' cross motions. Plaintiffs appeal.

We affirm. Initially, we conclude that Supreme Court did not err in dismissing the causes of action alleging defendants' violation of Labor Law § 241 Lab. (6). As the Court of Appeals held inMordkofsky v. V.C.V. Dev. Corp. ( 76 N.Y.2d 573) and reiterated inGibson v. Worthington Div. of McGraw-Edison Co. ( 78 N.Y.2d 1108) andJock v. Fien ( 80 N.Y.2d 965), because plaintiff was not engaged in any "construction, excavation or demolition work" (Labor Law § 241 Lab. [6]), he was not engaged in any activity protected under Labor Law § 241 Lab. (6), which subjects contractors and owners to "absolute strict liability" (Jock v. Fien, supra, at 968; see, Mordkofsky v. V.C.V. Dev. Corp., supra, at 577).

The causes of action pursuant to Labor Law § 241 Lab. (8) are only slightly more problematic. In the absence of any reported case interpreting that statutory provision, we question whether it was intended to create a cause of action. In fact, relevant legislative history tends to indicate that the sole purpose for the addition of subdivision (8) to Labor Law § 241 Lab. in 1974 (see, L 1974, ch 754) was to protect the public by the enactment of safety regulations (see, Sponsor's Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1974, ch 754; Mem of Dept of Labor, Bill Jacket, L 1974, ch 754). Further, plaintiffs have not established a violation of any regulation promulgated pursuant to Labor Law § 241 Lab. (8). Notably, 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 and 12 NYCRR 23-1.15, the Industrial Code provisions presently relied upon by plaintiffs, predate the enactment of Labor Law § 241 Lab. (8). Finally, the Court of Appeals has explicitly held that nonworkers are not "entitled to the protection afforded by the `flat and unvarying duty' imposed by the Labor Law" (Mordkofsky v. V.C.V. Dev. Corp., supra, at 577).

Crew III, Peters, Spain and Mugglin, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.