JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

Held
(Note: This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.)
In an action by the trustee of decedent's trust seeking to determine the beneficiaries of the trust, respondent was properly held in contempt for refusing to submit a DNA sample pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 215 for testing to determine whether he was decedent's grandson and a beneficiary of her trust, but based on the finding that respondent acted in good faith in appealing the trial court's decision, the order finding respondent in contempt was vacated. Decision Under Review Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County, No. 11-MR-594; the Hon. Lisa R. Fabiano, Judge, presiding. Judgment Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded. Counsel on Appeal Richard B. Kirk and Michael J. Schirger, both of Schirger Law Offices, LLC, of Rockford, for appellant. Laura D. Mruk, of WilliamsMcCarthy LLP, of Rockford, for appellee Mary K. Kaull. Nicholas O. Meyer, of Meyer & Horning, P.C., of Rockford, for appellees Elida Ochoa and Ryan Donald Schrader. Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Clifford W. Berlow, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee Illinois Attorney General. Panel JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Hutchinson and Spence concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 This action was brought by Mary K. Kaull (Mary), as the trustee of the Barbara B. Kaull Trust, to identify beneficiaries of the trust. Respondent Mark James Kaull (Mark James) was held in contempt of court for his refusal to submit a DNA sample, which the trial court ordered pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 215 (eff. Mar. 28, 2011) in order to determine whether respondent Ryan Donald Schrader (Ryan) and Mark James have the same biological father, Mark Kaull. On appeal, Mark James argues that he acted in good faith in refusing to submit a DNA sample on the grounds that: (1) Rule 215 is facially unconstitutional because it no longer requires a showing of "good cause"; (2) section 9(a) of the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (Parentage Act) (750 ILCS 45/9(a) (West 2010)) applies to this case to the exclusion of Rule 215; (3) inherited characteristics are not "physical conditions" within the meaning of Rule 215; and (4) the motion and the trial court's order for DNA testing did not comply with Rule 215. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The record reflects that Barbara B. Kaull passed away on March 16, 2011. Prior to her death, Barbara established the Barbara B. Kaull Trust, which stipulated that after her death the trust assets were to be divided "into separate shares equal in value, one for each then living child of mine and one for the descendents, collectively, of each deceased child of mine." Barbara had three children: Mary, Sarah, and Mark Kaull. Mary became trustee of the trust on April 13, 2011. Mark Kaull predeceased Barbara. There is no dispute that Mark James is Mark Kaull's son. At issue in this case is whether Mark James is Mark Kaull's only son. ¶ 4 This case began on September 29, 2011, when Mary, in her capacity as trustee, filed a "Petition for Instructions" seeking a judicial determination as to the proper beneficiaries and administration of the trust. In the petition Mary stated that there was a bona fide doubt as to whether Mark James is Mark Kaull's only child. Mary alleged that a bona fide doubt existed because on March 4, 2010, the Texas Attorney General filed a "Petition to Establish the Parent-Child Relationship" between Mark Kaull and Ryan. The Attorney General alleged that Mark Kaull was Ryan's father. A hearing on the petition was scheduled for August 6, 2010. However, Mark Kaull died on April 3, 2010. On the date the petition was to be heard the Attorney General dismissed the petition without prejudice. ¶ 5 Elida Ochoa, Ryan's mother, responded to the petition on behalf of her son. In the response, Elida alleged that Ryan was Mark Kaull's son and Mark James' brother and therefore an heir of Barbara and a beneficiary of the Barbara B. Kaull Trust. She admitted that she had been married to Ralph Hans Schrader and that Ralph was listed as Ryan's father on his birth certificate. However, she stated that she and Ralph had been living separate and apart since June 2008 and were divorced on May 20, 2009. Ryan was born on August 19, 2009, in Texas. ¶ 6 Elida attached several exhibits to the response, including her affidavit in which she alleged that Mark Kaull was Ryan's biological father. Elida also stated that a DNA home paternity test sent to the Identigene DNA Testing Center in Salt Lake City, Utah (Identigene), excluded Ralph and confirmed Mark Kaull as Ryan's biological father. A copy of the report was attached to the response. ¶ 7 Also attached to the response was a handwritten notarized document entitled "Deposition by Ralph Schrader," which he signed. In the document, Ralph stated that he was married to Elida when Ryan was conceived but had not been living with her since June 2008. Ralph stated that he lived in Illinois and Elida lived in Texas. Ralph also stated that "on or about November 12, 2009" he participated in a DNA test with Ryan and Elida, that Mark Kaull was also present, and that Mark also conducted a similar test. Ralph stated that the results of his DNA test indicated that he could not be Ryan's natural father. Ralph further stated that Mark Kaull told him that he had a sexual relationship with Elida and that the DNA test indicated that he was Ryan's natural father. Ralph said that Mark Kaull told him that he was paying biweekly child support for Ryan and intended to "fulfill all usual fatherly duties." ¶ 8 The DNA report from Identigene stated that 99.9% of Caucasian men were excluded from paternity and that Mark Kaull could not be excluded as Ryan's father. The report also stated that the "transport and testing" were not performed in compliance with established chain-of-custody guidelines. ¶ 9 Elida also attached a handwritten note to the response to the petition. The note was purportedly signed by Mark Kaull and stated:

"I, Mark M. Kaull, am giving Elida Schrader $500 per month for the support of our son Ryan D. Schrader. Sincerely, Mark Kaull."

1. The motion does not suggest the identity of the examiner, nor does it set forth the examiner's specialty or discipline;
2. The motion does not state that counsel have attempted to resolve this dispute prior to court intervention as Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(k) (eff. Jan. 1, 2013) mandates;
3. Even if otherwise sufficient, the evidence in this matter is not persuasive and credible enough to support it;
4. Rule 215 does not apply to paternity issues, because a familial relationship is not a "physical condition"; and
5. Rule 215 is unconstitutional on its face because it no longer requires that movants show even good cause.

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 We are called upon to determine whether Mark James was justified in refusing to obey the trial court's order requiring him to provide a DNA sample pursuant to Rule 215. Discovery orders are not final orders and are not ordinarily appealable. However, the correctness of a discovery order may be tested through contempt proceedings. Norskog v. Pfiel, 197 Ill. 2d 60, 69 (2001). We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(5) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). Review of the trial court's contempt finding requires our review of the order on which it was based. Discovery orders are ordinarily reviewed for a manifest abuse of discretion. Maxwell v. Hobart Corp., 216 Ill. App. 3d 108, 110 (1991). This appeal involves a constitutional challenge to Rule 215 as well as issues of construction of the Parentage Act. These are matters of law, which we review de novo. Clark v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 2014 IL App (1st) 141937, ¶ 15 (constitutionality is a pure question of law, which we review de novo); Nelson v. Kendall County, 2014 IL 116303, ¶ 22 (issues of statutory construction are reviewed de novo). ¶ 23 We are also called upon to decide whether, assuming we reject Mark James' constitutional claim and determine that Rule 215 applies in this case, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a DNA test. ¶ 24 Before addressing the merits of this appeal, we note that Mark James failed to strictly comply with Rule 19 in the trial court. That rule requires that in any cause challenging the constitutionality of a statute, ordinance, administrative regulation, or other law affecting the public interest, where the State or political subdivision, agency, or officer affected is not already a party, the litigant raising the constitutional issue shall serve an appropriate notice on the Attorney General. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 19(a) (eff. Sept. 1, 2006). The purpose of the notice is to afford the Attorney General the opportunity, but not the obligation, to intervene for the purpose of defending the constitutionality of the law that is being challenged. ¶ 25 Mark James' purported notice pursuant to Rule 19 in the trial court was mailed to the Attorney General on January 23, 2013, for a hearing that was scheduled for January 25, 2013. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 12(c) (eff. Jan. 4, 2013) provides that "[s]ervice by mail is complete four days after mailing." Local rule 10.03 of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit provides that "service of notice of hearing must be perfected by 4:00 P.M. of the second court day preceding the hearing of the motion." 17th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 10.03 (Oct. 1991). Strict compliance with Rule 19 is generally required. Village of Lake Villa v. Stokovich, 211 Ill. 2d 106, 116 (2004). In this case, it is clear that Mark James did not strictly comply with the rule, which may result in forfeiture. Id. at 119. However, failure to comply with Rule 19 does not deprive this court of jurisdiction to consider the constitutional issue. Id. In this case, although Mark James failed to comply with Rule 19's notice requirements for the January 25, 2013, hearing, he did serve an appropriate notice on the Attorney General for purposes of this appeal. Therefore, in the exercise of our discretion we will consider the merits of this appeal.

¶ 26 A. Federal and State Constitutional Violations

¶ 27 Mark James argues that Rule 215 is unconstitutional under both the federal and Illinois constitutions. The constitutionality of Rule 215 is an issue of first impression. In fact, our research has not uncovered a single case from any jurisdiction holding that a state supreme court discovery rule violates the fourth amendment. Here, Mark James claims that Rule 215 allows the court to order searches, seizures, and (with respect to the Illinois Constitution) invasions of privacy without a showing of any cause whatsoever. He argues that it would be improper for this court to read into the rule a "good cause" or "persuasive and credible evidence" standard, because its drafters clearly intended that no such showing is required. ¶ 28 Supreme court rules are adopted to facilitate the work of the courts and they have the force of law. Harris v. Annunzio, 411 Ill. 124, 127 (1952). There is a presumption that the rules will be obeyed and enforced as written. People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173, 189 (2009). Toward this end, we interpret supreme court rules in the same manner as statutes. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 2(a) (eff. May 30, 2008); People v. Blair, 2011 IL App (2d) 070862, ¶ 33. In analyzing Rule 215, our task is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the drafters. People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 606 (2010). The best indication of intent is the language of the rule, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. (citing People v. Marker, 233 Ill. 2d 158, 165 (2009)). When a rule's language is clear and unambiguous, it will be applied as written without resort to aids of construction. Id. (citing People v. Campbell, 224 Ill. 2d 80, 84 (2006)). Our interpretation is de novo. Id. (citing People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 41-42 (2007)). ¶ 29 As with statutes, there is a strong presumption that a court rule is constitutional, and the party challenging its constitutionality bears the burden of clearly establishing that the rule violates the constitution. See People v. Kitch, 239 Ill. 2d 452, 466 (2011). We must construe the challenged rule in a manner that upholds its constitutionality, if reasonably possible. See People v. Hollins, 2012 IL 112754, ¶ 13. A facial challenge is the most difficult to make. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 305 (2008). In a facial challenge, the party must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the rule would be valid. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010). Illinois Supreme Court Rules 201 through 224, the rules of discovery, are designed to be "flexible and adaptable to the infinite variety of cases and circumstances appearing in the trial courts." Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351, 355 (1966). The objective under the discovery rules is to obtain the " 'expeditious and final determination of controversies in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties.' " Sarver v. Barrett Ace Hardware, Inc., 63 Ill. 2d 454, 460 (1976) (quoting Monier, 35 Ill. 2d at 357). ¶ 30 Mark James advances the theory that the 1996 amendment to Rule 215, which eliminated the "good cause" requirement for seeking a physical or mental examination of a party, is unconstitutional because it intrudes without restriction on a fundamental right-the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the fourth amendment to the federal constitution and the right to privacy under article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. The Attorney General argues that Mark James cannot mount such a challenge, because the protections of the fourth amendment as well as the right to privacy under the Illinois Constitution apply only to state action. People v. Phillips, 215 Ill. 2d 554, 566 (2005); People v. Clements, 80 Ill. App. 3d 821, 824 (1980). The Attorney General relies on Union Oil Co. of California v. Hertel, 89 Ill. App. 3d 383 (1980), which held that the protections of the fourth amendment and the Illinois Constitution against unreasonable searches and seizures did not apply to a civil discovery order in an action between private parties. Id. at 386. The Attorney General also cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions in which courts have declined to apply the protection of the fourth amendment to civil discovery. For example, one federal court has observed that "[i]t strains common sense and constitutional analysis to conclude that the fourth amendment was meant to protect against unreasonable discovery demands made by a private litigant in the course of civil litigation." United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 83 F.R.D. 97, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The Attorney General argues that applying the fourth amendment to civil discovery in private litigation "would undermine the core principles of modern civil discovery." ¶ 31 In response, Mark James argues that none of the cases that Elida, Ryan, and the Attorney General rely on concern a power reserved to the court to order invasions into a fundamental right. He contends that his focus is not on "depositions, interrogatories and requests-to-produce," which do not require court orders for their effect. Instead, he argues that "giving courts the power to command people to submit to physical and mental examinations without a good reason is state action at its worst." ¶ 32 A state's mere acquiescence to a private action does not convert it to a state action. In re Marriage of Braundmeier, 201 Ill. App. 3d 14, 17 (1990). However, in his facial challenge, Mark James is not contesting the trial court's order itself. In fact, during the hearing on the Rule 215 motion he conceded that, under Rule 215 as presently written, the trial court had the authority and the discretion to order the DNA test. Instead, his argument is that the Illinois Supreme Court, by removing the "good cause" requirement, rendered the rule unconstitutional on its face. ¶ 33 There is no question that our supreme court is a state actor. The question before us is whether the court's action in amending Rule 215 was sufficiently significant so that Mark James can invoke the protection afforded by the fourth amendment. See USA I Lehndorff Vermoegensverwaltung GmbH & Cie v. Cousins Club, Inc., 64 Ill. 2d 11, 18 (1976). In Illinois, "once a lawsuit has been filed, and all parties have appeared, the pretrial search for matters relevant to the pending litigation is controlled by discovery rules promulgated" by our supreme court. Bruske v. Arnold, 44 Ill. 2d 132, 135 (1969). Under the Illinois Constitution, the Illinois Supreme Court "retains primary constitutional authority over court procedure." Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 528 (1998). ¶ 34 In Kunkel, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of section 2-1003(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1003(a) (West 1994)) as amended by the Civil Justice Reform Amendment of 1995 (Pub. Act 89-7 (eff. Mar. 9, 1995)). Section 2-1003(a) provided that any party who alleged a claim for bodily injury or disease shall be deemed to waive any privilege of confidentiality with his or her health care provider. Kunkel, 179 Ill. 2d at 523. The section also provided that, upon request of the other party, the party claiming injury shall sign and deliver consent forms authorizing health care providers to disclose records and to engage in ex parte conferences with the requesting party's attorneys. Id. at 523-24. In Kunkel, the defendants argued that the provisions of section 2-1003(a) "[did] not run afoul of the prohibition of unreasonable invasions of privacy because, according to defendants, that prohibition 'does not apply to actions between private parties.' " Id. at 539. The supreme court rejected this argument, stating: "However, section 2-1003(a) provides for state action as the means to compel the disclosure of constitutionally protected medical information: where a party fails to tender a consent the trial court may either dismiss the lawsuit or enter an order authorizing disclosure of the requested medical information." Id. The supreme court did not cite any precedent for this holding. However, it is clear from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), that "[w]hile private misuse of a state statute does not describe conduct that can be attributed to the State, the procedural scheme created by the statute obviously is the product of state action." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 941. While the Lugar decision involved a "color of state law" issue in a civil rights case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court stated, "[i]f the challenged conduct of respondents constitutes state action as delimited by our prior decisions, then that conduct was also action under color of state law and will support a suit under § 1983." Id. at 935. The Lugar Court stressed the important role the "state action" requirement plays in preserving "an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power." Id. at 936. Additionally, the "state action" requirement "avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed." Id. The Court explained that its past cases had "insisted that the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right be fairly attributable to the State." Id. at 937. The Court outlined a two-part approach to the issue of fair attribution:

"First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible. *** Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he is a state official, because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State." Id.

"[W]e said that the discovery rules 'were adopted as procedural tools to effectuate the prompt and just disposition of litigation, by educating the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses. As noted by legal scholars, those rules will suffice for present needs if lawyers and judges will use them with an understanding of that purpose.' " Id. at 403 (quoting People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 236 (1957)).

"The Rules do not differentiate between information that is private or intimate and that to which no privacy interests attach. Under the Rules, the only express limitations are that the information sought is not privileged, and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action. Thus, the Rules often allow extensive intrusion into the affairs of both litigants and third parties." (Emphases added.) Id. at 30.

"The constitutionality of legislation providing for physical examination of parties was sustained in Lyon v. Manhattan Railway Co., 142 N.Y. 298, 37 N.E. 113 (1894), and McGovern v. Hope, 63 N.J.L. 76, 42 Atl. 830 (1899). In Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891), it was held that the court could not order the physical examination of a party in the absence of statutory authority. But in Camden and Suburban Ry. Co. v. Stetson, 177 U.S. 172 (1900) where there was no statutory authority for such examination, derived from a state statute made operative by the conformity act, the practice was sustained. Such authority is now found in the present rule made operative by the Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, U.S.C., Title 28, §§ 723b

[now § 2072] (Rules in actions at law; Supreme Court authorized to make) and 723c [now § 2072] (Union of equity and action at law rules; power of Supreme Court)." Fed. R. Civ. P. 35, Advisory Committee Notes, 1937.

"In every action to recover damages for personal injuries, the court or judge, in granting an order for the examination of the plaintiff before trial, may, if the defendant apply therefor, direct that the plaintiff submit to a physical examination by one or more physicians or surgeons to be designated by the court or judge, and such examination shall be had and made under such restrictions and directions as to the court or judge shall seem proper." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lyon, 142 N.Y. at 303.

"The argument, though perhaps novel, and subject to the objection that it seeks to push a principle to extremes, is not without interest on account of the ideas advanced and the manner of their presentation. In the view we take of the questions involved in the appeal, it will not be necessary to follow the discussion. The statute enacts a rule of procedure, the purpose of which is the discovery of the truth in respect of certain allegations which the plaintiff has presented for judicial investigation in the courts of justice. It prescribes a method of aiding the court and jury in the correct determination of an issue of fact raised by the pleadings, and, as it seems to me, does not violate any of the express or implied restraints upon legislative power to be found in the fundamental law. But, in regard to the meaning and construction of the statute, I think the court below was entirely correct. The general purpose of the enactment was to change a rule of the common law which had recently been asserted by the highest court and by this court. (The Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250; McQuigan v. D., L.&W. R.R. Co., 129 N.Y. 50.)" Id.

"On or before the trial of any action brought to recover damages for injury to the person, the court before whom such action is pending may, from time to time, on application of any party therein, order and direct an examination of the person injured as to the injury complained of by a competent physician or physicians, surgeon or surgeons, in order to qualify the person or persons making such examination to testify in the said cause as to the nature, extent and probable duration of the injury complained of; and the court may in such order direct and determine the time and place of such examination: provided, this act shall not be construed to prevent any other person or physician from being called and examined as a witness as heretofore." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McGovern v. Hope, 42 A. 830, 831 (N.J. 1899).

"The suggestion that the rule offends the important right to freedom from invasion of the person ignores the fact that as we hold, no invasion of freedom from personal restraint attaches to refusal so to comply with its provisions. If we were to adopt the suggested criterion of the importance of the alleged right we should invite endless litigation and confusion worse confounded. The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,-the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them. That the rules in question are such is admitted." Id. at 14.

" 'Physical and Mental Examination of Persons. (a) Order for Examination. In an action in which the mental or physical condition of a party is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order him to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician. The order may be made only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the party to be examined and to all other parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made.' " Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 106 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 35).

"We can see no basis under the Sibbach holding for such a distinction. Discovery 'is not a one-way proposition.' Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507. Issues cannot be resolved by a doctrine of favoring one class of litigants over another." Id.

"Two possible explanations of this treatment of the problem occur to us. Strong feelings as to the 'inviolability of the person' (see the majority opinion in Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891),) may have been tacitly responsible. But when one seeks to recover damages on the basis of his physical injuries he puts his physical condition in issue. It becomes a fact to be proved, as much as the physical conduct that gave rise to his injury, or the documents on which a right to recover is asserted in a contract action. The basic principle that animates our law of evidence is that what is relevant is admissible. Exceptions to that principle must justify themselves. If there is to be exception here, it must be because a privilege exists. And a privilege in the law of evidence, to be soundly based, must rest on considerations that make it more desirable to risk concealment of the truth than to disrupt the values that the privilege supports. No such considerations are involved in the ordinary physical examination in a personal injury case." Id. at 292-93.

¶ 74 B. Illinois Parentage Act

¶ 75 Mark James argues that the Parentage Act applies to this case because section 9(a) of the Parentage Act provides that "[i]n any civil action not brought under this Act, the provisions of this Act shall apply if parentage is at issue." 750 ILCS 45/9(a) (West 2010). Mary argues that this court does not have jurisdiction to consider Mark James' claim that the Parentage Act controls, because the appeal in this case is pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(5) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010), an appeal from an order holding Mark James in contempt. Additionally, Mark James raised the applicability of the Parentage Act in his motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was denied. "A ruling denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not an appealable order." Fabian v. Norman, 138 Ill. App. 3d 507, 509 (1985). In his reply brief, Mark James claims that his assertion that the Parentage Act applies in this case relates to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. He argues that "[a]n action taken by a court that is without subject matter jurisdiction is void and may be attacked at any time." ¶ 76 We agree with Mary. " '[S]ubject matter jurisdiction' refers to the power of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceeding in question belongs." Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 334 (2002). Here, the trial court clearly had subject matter jurisdiction.

"It is a well-settled right of a trustee that '[w]herever there is any bona fide doubt as to the true meaning and intent of the provisions of the instrument creating the trust or as to the particular course which he ought to pursue, the trustee is always entitled to maintain a suit in equity at the expense of the trust estate and obtain a judicial construction of the instrument and directions as to his own conduct.' " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bangert v. Northern Trust Co., 362 Ill. App. 3d 402, 408-09 (2005) (quoting Warner v. Mettler, 260 Ill. 416, 420 (1913)).

¶ 77 C. Physical Condition

¶ 78 Mark James argues that his "inherited characteristics," i.e., his alleged biological relationship to Ryan, is not a physical condition within the meaning of Rule 215. He acknowledges, however, that a long line of Illinois precedent dictates the opposite result. Aldworth, 112 Ill. 2d at 511; Jarke, 2011 IL App (4th) 110150, ¶ 8; Zavaleta v. Zavaleta, 43 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1021 (1976). ¶ 79 We have no authority to overrule our supreme court. People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 396 (1990). In Aldworth, the court unequivocally stated that Rule 215 "authorizes the tests as a matter of discovery." Aldworth, 112 Ill. 2d at 510-11 (blood tests to determine paternity). Even if the supreme court had not ruled on this issue, we would not agree with Mark James' argument. He claims that, because rules in 42 states and federal Rule 35 have been amended to specifically include tests for inherited characteristics, and because Illinois Rule 215 has not been so amended, "the authority to order tests to determine inherited characteristics is outside the scope of the rule." This argument has no merit whatsoever. Our discovery rules "were designed to be flexible and adaptable to the infinite variety of cases and circumstances appearing in the trial court." Atwood v. Warner Electric Brake & Clutch Co., 239 Ill. App. 3d 81, 88 (1992). Rule 215 operates at the intersection of justice and science. The rules committee and the supreme court were wise not to amend the rule. Had they done so we would no doubt see more arguments like Mark James' based on the rule of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the mention of one thing implies exclusion of another). Parties in civil litigation "may obtain by discovery full disclosure regarding any matter relevant to the subject matter involved." Ill. S. Ct. R. 201(b)(1) (eff. July 1, 2002). In this case, as in many cases, the parties have taken advantage of the rules to discover information that would be otherwise highly personal and confidential. Mark James, for example, took full advantage in his Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213 (eff. Jan. 1, 2007) interrogatories of Elida to learn the intimate details of her relationship with Mark Kaull. Mark James relies upon some of these answers in his brief before this court. It would be manifestly unfair to Ryan to allow Mark James to use liberal discovery as a sword on the one hand and on the other hand shield private, yet relevant, information of his own. The purpose of full discovery is not only to level the playing field but also to seek the truth so that cases are decided based on the facts revealed, not on what information is concealed. People v. Tally, 2014 IL App (5th) 120349, ¶ 27 (the purpose of discovery rules is to prevent unfair surprise or advantage and to aid in the search for the truth).

¶ 80 D. Compliance With Rule 215

¶ 81 In the alternative, Mark James argues that, assuming Rule 215 is constitutionally sound, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering DNA testing, because Elida and Ryan's motion "neither strictly nor substantially" complied with Rule 215's requirements. He also argues, relying on Jarke, that there was no "clear and persuasive evidence" to support the trial court's order. Finally, he argues that Elida and Ryan's motion did not include a statement of compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(k) (eff. July 1, 2002) (statement that reasonable attempts to resolve differences have been made). Each of these claims is without merit. ¶ 82 Although a "good cause" requirement has been eliminated from Rule 215, physical and mental examinations, like all of our discovery devices, require that trial courts carefully exercise their discretion. Trial courts must balance the relevance of and need for the requested disclosure against any excessive burden or hardship. A trial court's ruling on the grant or denial of a Rule 215 request is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. J.S.A. v. M.H., 384 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1006 (2008). ¶ 83 The record demonstrates that, well before the hearing on Elida and Ryan's motion, Mark James made it clear to opposing counsel and to the trial court that he would object to an order requiring him to submit to DNA testing, based upon his constitutional argument. Mark James informed the trial court, "I do want to let you know, Your Honor, that Mr. Meyer and I have been talking. He has been great to work with. The professional courtesy and all that, that's the way lawyers should behave." Regarding compliance with the specific requirements of Rule 215, the trial court directed counsel to include the name of the testing agency and other information in the proposed order. Counsel for Ryan submitted an order that complied with Rule 215's requirements, which was entered over Mark James' objection. In any event, failure to follow the specific requirements of Rule 215 may be corrected on remand with a specific order. Harris v. Mercy Hospital, 231 Ill. App. 3d 105, 109 (1992). ¶ 84 Mark James argues that the evidence presented for the Rule 215 order was insufficient as a matter of law because Elida "judicially admitted" facts that gave rise to the presumption that Ralph is Ryan's father. He argues that there is no chain of custody for the 2009 home DNA tests and that the hearsay affidavits are unreliable under Jarke. We reject these arguments. The Parentage Act provides that the marital presumptions of paternity are rebuttable. People ex rel. the Department of Public Aid v. Smith, 212 Ill. 2d 389, 404 (2004). The affidavits of Elida and Ralph rebut the presumption that Ralph is Ryan's father. Tersavich v. First National Bank & Trust, 143 Ill. 2d 74, 80-81 (1991); People ex rel. Davis v. Clark, 99 Ill. App. 3d 979, 980-81 (1981). The presumption's having been rebutted leaves the issue of whether Mark is Ryan's father. ¶ 85 As we have stated, the trial court has broad discretion under Rule 215 in determining whether a sufficient showing of relevance has been made. Mark James' argument that the evidentiary standards for chain of custody must be met before a trial court can consider a DNA lab report would defeat the purpose of the rule. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in considering the report as part of Elida and Ryan's showing of relevance. ¶ 86 Mark James relies on Jarke for the proposition that the hearsay affidavits in this case are unreliable. Jarke is inapposite. In Jarke, the movant presented two hearsay affidavits, one from the movant herself, and the other from a 17-year-old who lived with the movant. The appellate court determined that these affidavits constituted an insufficient showing under Rule 215 to order DNA testing, especially in light of the presumption of paternity that "has deep roots in the common law." Jarke, 2011 IL App (4th) 110150, ¶ 25. This was especially true in light of the evidence presented by the respondent to the motion, which included the deposition of the children's mother, which corroborated the presumption of paternity. Id. ¶ 32. ¶ 87 Unlike the affidavits in Jarke, the evidence submitted by Elida and Ryan was very reliable. We note that, although a movant's relevancy showing need not be based upon evidence that would be admissible at trial, the statements attributed to Mark Kaull, as well as his note to the Texas Department of Human Services wherein he claimed to be Ryan's father, fell under Illinois Rule of Evidence 804(b)(4) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). That rule provides, in relevant part:

"(b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:

* * *

(4) Statement of Personal or Family History.
(A) A statement concerning the declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history, even though declarant had no means of acquiring personal knowledge of the matter stated[.]" (Emphasis added.) Ill. R. Evid. 804(b)(4)(A) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).

"In proper circumstances Rule 201(k) might be satisfied by a showing of active, but unsuccessful, efforts to contact, and proof of telephone calls unreturned or letters unanswered might, in some instances, suffice. There is, however, nothing of that type in this case." Id. at 566.

¶ 91 E. Contempt Finding

¶ 92 Based on the above rationale we uphold the trial court's Rule 215 order requiring Mark James to submit a DNA sample. However, in light of the trial court's finding that Mark James' refusal to comply with the Rule 215 order was made in good faith to challenge the constitutionality of the rule, we vacate the contempt order. Dufour, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 162-63.

¶ 93 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 94 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Rule 215 is constitutional under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution as well as under the Illinois Constitution's privacy clause. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. We also hold that the requirements of Rule 215 apply to a request for DNA testing in a trust case to determine beneficiaries and that inherited characteristics are considered a "physical condition" under that rule. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a DNA test in this case. The record demonstrates compliance with both Rules 201(k) and 215. Finally, based upon the trial court's finding of "good faith," we vacate the contempt ruling. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment is affirmed in part and vacated in part, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ¶ 95 The judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is affirmed in part and vacated in part, and this cause is remanded. ¶ 96 Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded.