OPINION AND ORDER

LORETTA PRESKA, District Judge

Plaintiff Frederick Jones ("Plaintiff") brought this action seeking injunctive relief, damages, and costs against the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"), the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development ("HPD"), and Allen A.M.E. Neighborhood Preservation and Development Corporation ("AME"). Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to, but has been denied, a variety of services to minimize the hardship of his relocation during the renovation of his apartment. HUD has moved to dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. HPD has also moved to dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and Rule 17(b) for lack of capacity to be sued. For the reasons set forth below, the motions to dismiss are granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a tenant in a building located at 107-05 Sutphin Blvd., Queens, New York (the "Building"). (Am. Compl. ¶ 1). Plaintiff is employed as the superintendent of the Building. (Compl. ¶ 1). It is not contested that the Building is in the process of being transferred from the City of New York (the "City") to AME, a private developer, for rehabilitation and operation as affordable housing. (HPD Mem. at 1).

The City and AME are relocating tenants during the renovation, covering their moving expenses, and arranging for the provision of similar temporary housing at the same rent. (Id.). Plaintiff has been offered a similar apartment. (Transcript of Order to Show Cause Argument, dated April 20, 2006 ("Tr."), at 14/23-15/2 ("The Court: [Y]ou will be provided at no additional cost. Do you agree with that, sir? Mr. Jones: Yes. They [are] willing to provide the housing, but they are not providing me the services to protect me. That's my point.")). However, Plaintiff complains that he has not been provided with legal assistance or employment counseling. (Id. at 13/1-2). Plaintiff contends that the denial of these services constitutes violations of 42 U.S.C § 1983, the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704, 706, the Uniform Relocation Act ("URA"), 49 U.S.C. § 5601, and the Housing and Community Development Act ("HCDA"), 42 U.S.C. § 5301. (See Compl. at 1; Am. Compl. at 1).

DISCUSSION

1. Legal Standard for Dismissal

"A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it." Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). For purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts the factual allegations made in the Complaint as true and draws all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Karedes v. Ackerly Group, Inc., 423 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2005). It is well-settled that "[a] case should not be dismissed unless the court is satisfied that the complaint cannot state any set of facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Miller v. Wolpoff Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly Hills, 259 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2001)). The Court, however, need not give "`credence to plaintiff's conclusory allegations'" or legal conclusions offered as pleadings. Cantor Fitzgerald v. Lutnick, 313 F.3d 704, 709 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2001)); Van Carpals v. S.S. Am. Harvester, 297 F.2d 9, 11 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1961) (Friendly, J.) ("[I]n federal pleading there is no need to plead legal conclusions; these are for the court to apply."). Pro se complaints are construed liberally by the Court, but are not entirely immune from the rules of pleading. See Shehab v. Chas. H. Sells, Inc., 2006 WL 938715 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2006), see also Stinson v. Sherriff's Department, 499 F.Supp. 259, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (noting that the liberal standard accorded to pro se pleadings "is not without limits, and all normal rules of pleadings are not absolutely suspended.").

2. Application to HUD's Motion to Dismiss

HUD contends that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action and must dismiss the case under Rule 12(b)(1). (See HUD Mem. at 5). The basis for HUD's position is that the "United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued." United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980). Further, "the United States may not be sued without its consent, and . . . the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction." United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). Sovereign immunity can be waived by statute, but "[a] waiver of the Federal Government's sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text." Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996).

Sovereign immunity is not waived under § 1983. See Harrison v. Potter, 323 F. Supp. 2d 593, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Doe v. Torrres, No. 05 Civ. 3388, 2006 WL 290480, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2006). Similarly, sovereign immunity is not waived under the URA. See United States v. 249.12 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Stephens and Cotton Counties, State of Okla., 414 F. Supp. 933, 935 (W.D. Okla. 1976) ("The URA does not expressly waive sovereign immunity."). Sovereign immunity is also not waived under the HCDA. Moll v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, No. 92 Civ. 2464, 1993 WL 119712 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1993.) ("Congress did not intend to create a private right of action under the HCDA.").

The APA does contain a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. 5 U.S.C. § 702. However, the APA cannot provide subject matter jurisdiction where another statute "expressly or impliedly forbids the relief sought." (Id.). The URA expressly allows federal agencies to transfer their URA responsibilities to a state agency "by accepting a certification by a [s]tate agency that it will carry out such responsibility." 42 U.S.C. § 4604(a).

Here, HUD has discharged its legal responsibilities under the URA. Specifically, HUD has accepted the certification of New York City Deputy Mayor Daniel Doctoroff that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 4604(a), HPD would assume HUD's responsibilities under the URA with respect to acquisition and relocation projects such as the renovation of the Building. (Bainton Decl. Ex. A). Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the complaints brought by Plaintiff against HUD.

Even if the Court had subject matter jurisdiction, the Complaint would be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). It is a well-settled principal that vicarious liability cannot exist without direct liability. See Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (1983) ("It is well established that traditional vicarious liability rules ordinarily make principals . . . vicariously liable for acts of their agents."). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against HPD. Because HPD is not liable for Plaintiff's claims, it follows that there is no claim for which HUD could be vicariously liable to Plaintiff.

3. Application to HPD's Motion to Dismiss

HPD contends that Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim under Rule 12(b)(6) because the URA unequivocally grants the "displacing agency," here HPD, the discretion to determine the extent to which it will provide advisory services. (See HPD Mem. at 7 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 4625(f)). On March 16, 2006, Plaintiff moved for an Order to Show Cause against HUD and HPD, seeking to enjoin HPD preliminarily from evicting him from the Building. (Order at 1). On April 20, 2006, the court held a conference to decide the issue. At the conference, Plaintiff conceded that he was offered temporary housing by HPD. (Tr. at 14/23-15/2). Nevertheless, Plaintiff maintained that he was entitled to additional services to minimize further the hardship of his temporary relocation. (Tr. at 15/7-9). Plaintiff provides no support for his assertion that he is entitled as a matter of right to the additional services and there is none. Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim, the case against HPD must be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

SO ORDERED: