Summary
In Roberts, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that if the cross-appeal is dependent on the original appeal for jurisdiction, it is dismissed.
Summary of this case from General Motors Corp. v. New Castle CountyOpinion
71901, 71902.
DECIDED MAY 22, 1986.
Action for damages. Richmond Civil Court. Before Judge Mixon.
Allen W. Johnson, for appellant.
John L. Creson, for appellee.
The instant main appeal was taken from a judgment awarding damages of $1,340 plus attorney fees in the amount of $300.
1. Since this was an action for damages in which the judgment was less than $2,500, appellant was required to file an application which it did not do. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6); City of Brunswick v. Todd, 255 Ga. 448 ( 339 S.E.2d 589) (1986); Brown v. Assoc. Fin. Svcs. Corp., 255 Ga. 457 ( 339 S.E.2d 590) (1986). The main appeal is therefore dismissed.
2. The cross-appeal by Roberts suffers from the same infirmity. Although OCGA § 5-6-48 permits a cross-appeal to survive the dismissal of a main appeal this is true only where the cross-appeal can stand on its own merit. This court has no jurisdiction to entertain a cross-appeal "which must derive its life from the main appeal." Steele v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 167 Ga. App. 550 (2) ( 307 S.E.2d 44) (1983), reversed on other grounds, Steele v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 252 Ga. 58 ( 311 S.E.2d 470) (1984), and cases therein cited. Here there was no application for discretionary review by cross-appellant so the cross-appeal cannot stand in its own right.
Main appeal (Case No. 71901) and cross-appeal (Case No. 71902) dismissed. Deen, P. J., and Benham, J., concur.