Summary
In Johnson v. Stackhouse Oldsmobile, Inc. (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 140, 56 O.O. 2d 78, 271 N.E.2d 782, to which appellee makes reference, the court was not speaking of equitable actions generally, but of actions based on fraud seeking equitable relief which the court indicates requires a special degree of proof, and continues by saying, "`* * * there is no doctrine of the law settled more firmly than the rule which authorizes issues of fact in civil cases to be determined in accordance with the preponderance or weight of the evidence.'"
Summary of this case from In re Appeal of Single County Ditch No. 1537Opinion
No. 70-601
Decided July 7, 1971.
Damages — Action for money only — Punitive damages may be awarded, when — Proof necessary — Preponderance of evidence — Charge to jury.
In an action for money only, the elements necessary to entitle a plaintiff to an award of punitive damages must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County.
Appellant's evidence revealed that a salesman employed by Stackhouse Oldsmobile, Inc., in Youngstown, Ohio, stated to him that a used car which was "practically a new car" was available. The salesman told appellant that the car had been sold to one of their customers, driven only about 4,000 miles, and traded for another model because the customer's wife did not like it. Appellant traded in his automobile, and bought the car.
Appellant later learned that the car had been purchased in Connecticut; that it had been driven about 12,000 miles; that it was almost a year old; that it had been wrecked; and that the owner had traded it in on a new car.
The car appellant purchased was returned, and he demanded the return of the car he traded. The demand was refused.
Johnson brought suit against appellee, Stackhouse Oldsmobile, Inc., on August 28, 1967, alleging in his petition that appellee's salesman had sold him a used automobile, making false representations of material facts concerning the auto's previous usage and condition; that such misrepresentations were intentionally made for the purpose of misleading appellant into reliance thereon; and that he did rely on them. Appellant alleged further that he had stopped payment on his check for $2,442.85, the payment given appellee as the difference between the allowance on his "trade-in" and the price of the automobile purchased; that he had returned that automobile to appellee; but that appellee refused to return to him the automobile he had "traded in." The reasonable market value of the "trade in" was alleged to be $1,850.
Claiming that appellee practiced fraud and deceit, compensatory damages were prayed for in the amount of $1,900, the reasonable market value of the "trade in" car, plus a $10 per day rental fee, and 6% interest on $1,850 from the date of the transaction. Appellant also prayed for punitive damages of $20,000, and reasonable attorney fees.
Appellee's answer denied the material allegations of the petition, and set forth a counterclaim for the amount of $2,442.85, which amount represented the sum that appellant owed on the purchase of the automobile.
In instructing the jury at the close of the trial, the trial court stated that the jury could award punitive or exemplary damages should it find "by the greater weight of the evidence that the injury inflicted by the defendant was wanton or malicious or actual malice, that is with the feeling of hatred or ill will or something like that which was committed in a reckless and willful disregard of the rights of the plaintiff." Appellee objected to the reference to the greater weight of the evidence.
The jury returned a verdict for appellant in the sum of $1,850 as compensatory damages, and $3,000 punitive damages. Judgment was entered upon the verdict. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, holding that the instruction to the jury was erroneous, and that the proper degree of proof required for the award of punitive damages was the "clear and convincing" evidence standard. The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Messrs. Manchester, Bennett, Powers Ullman and Mr. John H. Ranz, for appellant.
Mr. Edward Roberts and Mr. John Vaporis, for appellee.
The sole question presented by the parties for our determination is whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could award punitive damages upon the basis of a finding of malice by the greater weight of the evidence. We believe that such instruction was correct.
In Roberts v. Mason (1859), 10 Ohio St. 277, this court stated in the first paragraph of the syllabus, in part, as follows: "In an action to recover damages for a tort which involves the ingredients of fraud, malice or insult, a jury may go beyond the rule of mere compensation to the party aggrieved and award exemplary or punitive damages." See, also, Saberton v. Greenwald (1946), 146 Ohio St. 414.
Though this burden of proof issue is one of first impression for us, we find guidance in Household Finance Corp. v. Altenberg (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 190. There, this court articulated the distinction between actions based on fraud seeking equitable relief, and those seeking only money damages. The former requires "clear and convincing evidence" to sustain an equitable action. Other civil actions, however, even if their basis is in fraud, require proof only of a preponderance of the evidence, as "there is no doctrine of the law settled more firmly than the rule which authorizes issues of fact in civil cases to be determined in accordance with the preponderance or weight of the evidence." Jones Stranathan Co. v. Greaves (1874), 26 Ohio St.2d 4.
In Enger v. Karazia (1929), 8 Ohio Law Abs. 69, the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County decided that punitive damages will not be assessed except on clear and convincing evidence. We do not share the opinion expressed in that case that the award of punitive damages is so akin to a criminal sanction that reason dictates that a higher than ordinary standard of proof in such civil cases is required.
Notwithstanding there are certain instances when a trial judge is required to charge the same jury concerning more than one standard of proof, a rule of law which tends to minimize rather than promote confusion is desirable — if such a rule does not do violence to the judicial product. We believe that a jury has the ability to determine whether the facts necessary to support punitive damages are present — by the greater weight of the evidence — without the loss of their reason to passion or prejudice.
The elements necessary to entitle a plaintiff to an award of punitive damages in an action for money only must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The creation of a special rule for the proof of facts to justify an award of punitive damages as an exception to the general rule requiring a preponderance of evidence in a civil action for money only is not tenable. In so holding, we find our view consistent with that taken by other courts which have passed on this specific issue. See Eutaw Ice, Water, and Power Co. v. McGee (1919), 16 Ala. App. 652, 81 So. 144; St. Ores v. McGlashen (1887), 74 Cal. 148, 15 P. 452; Elliot v. Van Buren (1875), 33 Mich. 49, 20 Am. Rep. 668.
We note that the trial court charged on the burden of proof necessary to establish the rescission of a contract. It is difficult to appreciate the relevancy of this aspect of the charge. In any event, the record does not reveal it to be prejudicial.
Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
Judgment reversed.
O'NEILL, C.J., SCHNEIDER, HERBERT, CORRIGAN, STERN and LEACH, JJ., concur.