Summary
holding that engaging in sexually violent criminal behavior was not a "major life activity" under ADA
Summary of this case from Hardeman v. SandersOpinion
No. C 02-3279 SI (pr)
September 5, 2003
JUDGMENT
The action is dismissed without prejudice to plaintiff filing a complaint in state court in which he alleges his state law claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL INTRODUCTION
Joseph Johnson, Jr., currently housed at the Santa Clara County Jail, filed a prose civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and applied to proceed in forma pauperis. Following review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court identified several deficiencies in the complaint and dismissed it with leave to amend. Johnson then filed an amended complaint, which is now before the court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
BACKGROUND
Johnson is in custody pending proceedings to civilly commit him under California's Sexually Violent Predators Act, see Cal. Welf Inst. Code §§ 6600-6609.3 ("SVPA"). He was civilly committed under the SVPA in 2000 for two years. As the 2000 commitment approached its end, Johnson was returned to Santa Clara County Jail from Atascadero State Hospital on May 14, 2002 for proceedings to commit him for another two years. Under the SVPA, a commitment lasts for two years and then another commitment proceeding must be held to again commit the sexually violent predator ("SVP") for another two years. An SVP is defined as "a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior." Cal. Penal Code § 6600(a)(1). There is no indication in the record that the reason for Johnson's commitment as an SVP has changed since his original commitment.
Johnson's amended complaint includes a summary description of various conditions he did not like at the Santa Clara County Jail, where he has been housed since May 2002 during the pendency of his second civil commitment. He alleges, among other things, that he was improperly treated like the pretrial detainees and convicts at the county jail, when he was only being held for civil commitment proceedings.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard Of Review
The court must dismiss an in forma pauperis action at any time if the court determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue, the action is frivolous or malicious, the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't. 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. -See West v. Atkins. 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
B. The Amended Complaint
When the court reviewed Johnson's initial complaint, it found it far too vague and nonspecific to meet the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) that the complaint set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The court wrote that the complaint was "so generalized and so lacking in detail that requiring defendants to attempt to frame a response to it would be unfair. The lack of detail also prevents the court from determining whether the complaint warrants service on defendants" Order Of Dismissal With Partial Leave To Amend, p. 3. The court directed Johnson to state each claim separately and allege facts showing his entitlement to relief from the defendants. Using Johnson's claims of unsanitary food service and religious interference as examples, the court wrote: "For example, Johnson complains that the food was served under unsanitary conditions; litigating the adequacy of every meal ever served to Johnson would be extremely wasteful if Johnson's real grievance is directed at only certain meals. Similarly, Johnson complains that he is not able to participate in religious programming; defendants would be hard-pressed to respond to the claim because Johnson does not identify who denied him such access, when it occurred, and what the desired religious activity was." Id. The court also cautioned Johnson that he had to identify each involved defendant by name and link each of them to each claim by explaining what each defendant did or failed to do that caused a violation of his constitutional rights.
Johnson's amended complaint did not cure the deficiencies addressed by the court in its Order Of Dismissal With Leave To Amend. With the exceptions discussed below — as to which enough information was provided for the court to analyze the claims — Johnson has presented a pleading that once again is full of generalities and fails to connect any particular defendants to any particular violation of his constitutional rights. Requiring defendants to respond to Johnson's conclusory allegations would be unfair, especially in light of the fact that Johnson has been in custody for over a year; one would have to pore over jail records for every day Johnson was in custody to even begin to determine which particular events could have formed the basis for the allegations in the amended complaint. Further leave to amend will not be granted because the court has already explained the deficiencies in the complaint and Johnson was unable to cure them in his amended complaint.
Johnson complains that he should not have been placed in county jail with felons and pretrial detainees because he is facing only civil commitment. The placement of Johnson in county jail pending the SVPA commitment proceedings did not per se violate his right to due process. A state law may give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, see generally Meachum v. Fano. 427 U.S. 215, 225-27 (1976), but the SVPA did not create a liberty interest in avoiding county jail. The SVPA requires that a person be housed in a" secure facility" before the civil commitment trial and might actually prohibit the SVP's retention in a mental hospital after the 2-year term is completed and another term has not been ordered. See Cal. Welf. Inst. Code §§ 6601.5, 6604. The court finds the reasoning of Munoz v. Kolender. 208 F. Supp.2d 1155 (S.D. Cal. 2002) persuasive. That court found no controlling authority to suggest that temporary detentions in county jail incident to the conduct of an SVP proceeding were unconstitutional. Id. at 1144. That court noted that, as a practical consideration, the "need to safely produce dangerous detainees for judicial proceedings and associated logistical challenges support the use of local law enforcement detention facilities." Id. at 1143-44. Because the SVPA requires a civilly committed SVP to be housed at Atascadero, it would be impractical to continue to house the SVP there during the civil commitment proceedings and to drive him to the court (which might be hundreds of miles from Atascadero) for every hearing and every day of the civil commitment trial and return him to Atascadero each night. The claim that temporary detention in county jail is per se unconstitutional is dismissed.
In light of the absence of authority that the constitution completely precludes the placement in a county jail of a person awaiting civil commitment under the SWA, it appears that the analysis of Johnson's conditions of confinement claims would be comparable to that for similar claims made by pretrial detainees. Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16 (1979). That is, the proper inquiry is whether the conditions amount to punishment in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. The state may detain a pretrial detainee "to ensure his presence at trial and may subject him to the restrictions and conditions of the detention facility so long as those conditions and restrictions do not amount to punishment or otherwise violate the Constitution." Id. at 536-37. If a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective it does not, without more, amount to "punishment". See id. at 539; cf. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997) ("The State may take measures to restrict the freedom of the dangerously mentally ill. This is a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective and has been historically so regarded").
For example, states must be able to take steps to maintain security and order at pretrial facilities, and restraints that are reasonably related to a facility's interest in maintaining jail security are not, without more, unconstitutional punishment. See Bell 441 U.S. at 540. The Bell court refused to find constitutional violations in routine double-celling practices, cell searches, and strip searches with body cavity exposure. Although Johnson pleads that his daily activities have been restricted in county jail, his allegations (which for the most part are of a sweeping and generalized nature) are of restrictions generally applicable at the county jail (e.g. routine strip searches, cell searches and restricted freedom) not involving punishment and do not state claims for constitutional violations.
Johnson also alleges that he is being denied equal protection because he is being treated differently from other people being civilly detained and points repeatedly to differences for persons facing commitment under California's Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, see Cal. Welf. Inst. Code §§ 5000 et seq. ("LPS Act"). "'The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center. 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). Johnson's claim fails because persons facing commitment under the SWA are not similarly situated to those under California's other civil commitment schemes, such as the LPS Act and the mentally disordered offender law,see Cal. Penal Code § 2962 ("MDO law"). See Munoz, 208 F. Supp.2d at 1136; People v. Buffington. 74 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1158-59 (Cal.App. 1999) (not all persons committed under California's various civil commitment statutes are similarly situated in all respects); see also id at 1162-63 (persons committed under MDO law and SVPA are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes regarding treatment: "Prisoners who suffer from conditions that may with treatment be kept in remission are the target of the MDO Act, whereas the SVPA covers prisoners whose conditions pose a risk of future sexually violent criminal behavior and who may never be completely treated"). One notable difference is that an individual may not be committed as an SVP unless he has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims. Cal. Welf. Inst. Code § 6600(a), whereas it does not appear that an actual past violent crime is required for fan an individual facing LPS Act commitment proceedings. The existence of past violence affects the prediction of future violence, see Hubbart v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1157 (Cal. 1999), and the likelihood of future violence is a legitimate governmental interest custodians may take into consideration in making custody determinations. Because SVPs are not similarly situated to those facing commitment under other provisions, a necessary element for an equal protection claim is missing. The claim is dismissed.
Johnson also claims that he is being kept in a facility where treatment was unavailable. The U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that involuntary commitment is permissible even assuming the statutory provisions mean that effective treatment does not exist and is not offered under the commitment statutes. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366 ("While we have upheld state civil commitment statutes that aim both to incapacitate and to treat . . . we have never held that the Constitution prevents a State from civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is available, but who nevertheless pose a danger to others"); Hubbart, 19 Cal.4th at 1165. It is important to note what this claim is not about: Johnson does not allege that he has a mental illness for which he has sought and been denied treatment but instead alleges that he has a right to be placed at a facility at which treatment is available (apparently even if he does not want it). Under these circumstances, Johnson has not stated a cognizable claim for a due process violation based on his temporary housing in the county jail without a treatment program.
The sincerity of Johnson's emphasis on the absence of treatment as a problem at the county jail is dubious in light of evidence in another case he filed that indicates he has consistently refused treatment while in Atascadero State Hospital. See In Re. Johnson, No. C 03-3292 SI. In a forensic report dated July 10, 2002, attached as Exhibit H to the habeas petition, the clinical psychologist addressed Johnson's progress: "Mr Johnson has participated in no treatment during the past two years that he has been enrolled at the state hospital. He has consistently declined substance abuse treatment as well as sex offender-specific treatment . . . During the first year in the hospital, Mr. Johnson declined treatment with the argument that he had given himself to God and thus did not need any change. . . . During his second year of hospitalization, Mr. Johnson apparently decided that he did need to change himself and developed what he called a 'spiritual 12-step plan,' which he requested to substitute for the Sex Offender Commitment Program (SOCP) treatment. His treatment team declined to accept Mr. Johnson's request that his 12-step plan replace the SOCP."
Johnson also alleges that his rights under the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") have been violated. He does not identify specifically what his disability is, although it appears that he wants to count as a disability his mental disorder prompting the SVP determination, i.e., his "diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior." Cal. Welf. Inst. Code § 6600(a)(1). Title II of the ADA protects "a qualified individual with a disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. In the context of the ADA, the term "disability" means: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of the person; (B) having a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." Id. § 12102(2). Engaging in sexually violent criminal behavior is not a major life activity, and a mental disorder that impedes refraining therefrom does not substantially limit one or more of the. major life activities of the person. Additionally, people who pose a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be ameliorated by means of a reasonable modification are not "qualified individuals" covered by Title II. See Bay Area Addiction Research and Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch. 179 F.3d 725, 735 (9th Cir. 1999). The ADA claim is dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Johnson has not stated a Section 1983 or ADA claim for relief. Because there are no adequately pled federal law violations, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. The court therefore will not consider the adequacy of the pleading of the state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The action is DISMISSED without prejudice to Johnson filing a complaint in state court in which he alleges his state law claims. The clerk shall close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.