HOWELL, J.

HOWELL, J.

This is a products liability case in which plaintiff seeks to recover damages for injuries he sustained while operating a forklift truck manufactured and designed by defendant Clark Equipment Company and sold to plaintiff's employer by defendant Topline Equipment Co. Plaintiff appeals from a jury verdict for defendants.

Plaintiff assigns as error the giving of certain instructions relating to the concept of strict liability as well as those concerning assumption of risk. The plaintiff also assigns as error the court's failure to give his requested instructions on those issues.

Plaintiff was employed as a forklift operator at the Warrenton Lumber Company in Warrenton. His job entailed moving bundles of lumber about the Warrenton plant. Because of his various responsibilities, the job was a rather hectic one. The accident occurred on June 24, 1971, shortly after plaintiff's shift began and while he was engaged in feeding the random planer. Plaintiff was in a hurry and was carrying two banded bundles of 2 x 4's which were to be placed on the chains leading into the planer. Before the bundles could be placed on the chains, it was necessary to cut the metal bands around them. Normally, these bands were cut either by the forklift driver himself or by another Warrenton employee. On the day of the accident, plaintiff had no one to help him by cutting the bands. Although he normally dismounted his machine and moved to the front to cut the bands, on this occasion plaintiff remained in the cab of the forklift and reached through the uprights with the cutters. While he was cutting the bands, his body came in contact with the ascent/descent lever controlling the movement of the forks. The forklift carriage descended and severed his arms just below the elbows.

Essentially, the forklift consists of a cab attached to uprights along which the forks are raised and lowered. The uprights consist of inner and outer masts: the inner mast is hydraulically raised and lowered within the outer mast. The forks themselves are attached to a chain and sprocket device which causes them to follow the movements of the inner mast. Each mast is tied together at various points with horizontal crossbars. As the inner mast moves within the outer mast, the crossbars of the inner mast pass within 3/8 of an inch of the crossbars of the outer mast. At the time of the accident, plaintiff's arms were between the uprights, and, as the forks descended, the horizontal crossbars of the inner mast sheared plaintiff's arms against the crossbars of the outer mast and severed them.

The ascent/descent lever which caused the inner mast to descend when plaintiff's body came in contact with it is one of three levers controlling the movement of the forks. These levers are located at the front of the cab and to the right of the steering wheel. The ascent/descent lever is the nearest of the three to the steering wheel. The operator pushes this lever forward to raise the forks and pulls it back to lower them. Once the lever is released, a spring device returns it to a neutral position. Whenever the ascent/descent lever returns to a neutral position, the movement of the inner mast and forks ceases, and the load remains in mid-air.

In his complaint, plaintiff alleged faulty design and manufacture of the forklift. He charged that the forklift was defective and unreasonably dangerous in that (a) the uprights and cross members were positioned in a manner which allowed them to sever plaintiff's arms; (b) no guard or screen was placed between the cab and the uprights; (c) the ascent/descent lever was located so as to permit the operator's body to unintentionally come in contact with it; (d) the lever was not designed to remain in a neutral position until manually released; and (e) no adequate signs were included to warn the operator of the dangers posed by the machine. At the trial, there was conflicting evidence as to each of these alleged defects as well as to their combined effect.

As a preliminary matter, we note defendants' contention that any error committed in the instructions given concerning the concept of strict liability and the defense of assumption of risk was harmless because defendants' motions for a directed verdict and for an involuntary nonsuit should have been granted. In Roach v. Kononen/Ford Motor Co., 269 Or. 457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974), we recently outlined several of the factors which the court should consider before submitting a design defect case to the jury. Applying that criteria to the conflicting evidence presented in this case, we believe that there was a jury question as to the existence of the alleged defects and as to whether such defects rendered the forklift dangerously defective.

Plaintiff presented substantial, credible evidence indicating that (a) the machine's cautionary warnings were inadequate; (b) a wire screen should have been placed across the uprights to physically prevent an operator from coming in contact with the moving crossbars and rollers of the carriage; (c) the crossbars should have been positioned differently so as to lessen the danger of injury; (d) the control levers were inadequately guarded so as to prevent accidental movement; and (e) the combination of these factors made the machine potentially hazardous and constituted a design defect. Defendants, in turn, presented their own testimony which conflicted with much of plaintiff's evidence.

Applying the criteria set forth in Roach, we do not believe that this conflicting evidence can be conclusively resolved so as to avoid the necessity of a jury verdict as to whether this forklift was dangerously defective. See also Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 498-501, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); compare Askew v. Howard-Cooper Corp., 263 Or. 184, 502 P.2d 210 (1972). Similarly, we do not believe that the defendants established their affirmative defense of assumption of risk as a matter of law. There is evidence in the record that the plaintiff never actually knew or appreciated the danger presented by the alleged defects. Moreover, there is evidence that his decision to encounter the danger was not unreasonable. Consequently, the trial court's denial of defendants' motions was proper.

Concerning the issues raised by plaintiff in this appeal, we will discuss only those assignments of error which relate to the assumption of the risk defense since our dispositon of that issue makes consideration of plaintiff's other assignments of error unnecessary.

The concept of assumption of risk in a products liability case differs somewhat from the traditional tort doctrine of assumption of risk. Accordingly, in Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 265 Or. 300, 509 P.2d 28 (1973), we adopted the definition of assumption of risk for products liability cases which is contained in Comment n to § 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2d (1965). In contrast to the more traditional defense which includes only two elements — subjective knowledge and voluntary encounter — Comment n sets forth three elements which must be shown before the plaintiff can be barred from recovery. The defendant must show, first, that the plaintiff himself actually knew and appreciated the particular risk or danger created by the defect; second, that plaintiff voluntarily encountered the risk while realizing the danger; and, third, that plaintiff's decision to voluntarily encounter the known risk was unreasonable. If the trier of fact finds that any one of these elements did not exist in a particular case, the defense cannot be sustained. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1097 (5th Cir 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).

In this case, although the trial court properly began by distinguishing assumption of risk from contributory negligence, the court's definition of assumption of risk was not complete. There was no discussion of the element of unreasonableness as it relates to plaintiff's decision to encounter the risk. Although the court did at least mention the other two elements, proof of all three elements is essential to the assumption of the risk defense outlined in Comment n of the Restatement of Torts 2d, § 402A, and adopted by this court in Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., supra. See also Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., supra at 1107 ("continued use of a product known to be defective would be a defense to a strict liability action only when the continued use was `voluntary' and `unreasonable'").

Although plaintiff excepted to the court's instructions on this issue, his exception did not point out the inadequacy as to the unreasonableness element and, therefore, was not sufficient to apprise the court of that deficiency. Consequently, without more, we would not reverse this case on the basis of the court's instructions relating to the assumption of risk. However, plaintiff did request a further instruction on this issue which would have explained to the jury that, when determining whether plaintiff should be held to have assumed the risk, they were to consider all the surrounding circumstances and conditions — including the working conditions at the time of the accident. Plaintiff excepted to the failure to give his requested instruction, and no comparable instruction was given. We feel that the court's failure to give the instruction was error.

The reasonableness of any decision to encounter a known danger must depend upon the circumstances surrounding that decision as well as on the relative probability and gravity of the risk incurred. Whenever the jury attempts to ascertain whether a plaintiff's decision to encounter a known risk was reasonable, it will be necessary for them to consider the conditions which motivated the decision, the pressures which were operating on the plaintiff, and the amount of time which he had to make the decision.

It should be emphasized that this element of unreasonableness pertains only to the nature of plaintiff's decision to encounter the known danger. We are not concerned with the apparent reasonableness or unreasonableness of the physical conduct through which plaintiff encountered the danger, but rather the reasonableness of his decision to do so. This distinction, while seemingly theoretical, is significant. The actions through which one encounters a known danger may appear unreasonable — such as reaching through the uprights of a forklift — and yet the decision to so act still could be found to be reasonable when the circumstances surrounding the incident are considered. See, e.g., Messick v. General Motors Corp., 460 F.2d 485, 493 (5th Cir 1972) ("Thus, if there was some reasonable necessity or propriety which justified [the exposure], or if by the exercise of care proportionate to the danger Plaintiffs might reasonably have expected to have avoided the danger, * * * then Plaintiffs cannot be found to have voluntarily exposed themselves to the risk."); Devaney v. Sarno, 125 NJ Super 414, 418-19, 311 A.2d 208 (App.Div. 1973), aff'd 65 NJ 235, 323 A.2d 449 (1974) ("Under such circumstances, it was for the jury to say whether Devaney, conscious of the risk of driving without a seat belt and the possibility of being involved in an accident, acted unreasonably in driving his car on the day in question."). See also, Keeton, Assumption of Products Risk, 19 Sw L J 61, 69, 71 (1965); Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 La L Rev 122, 154-59 (1961). Compare, Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask — Restructuring Assumption of Risk in the Products Liability Era, 60 Iowa L Rev 1, 43 (1974).

We feel that working conditions and related circumstances are a particularly relevant consideration in an inquiry into the reasonableness of a decision to encounter a job-related danger. Such factors often will have a strong influence on that decision, and, in some cases, they may represent the most important motivational factors. For example, a worker might fear that a slowdown in his individual production would slow down the entire production team and thereby draw the attention of his boss. If he has a history of such slowdowns, or of causing excessive spoilage or ruining machine parts, he may have good cause to fear dismissal. The job market could be tight, and he may have little hope of being able to find a new job. Moreover, the situation may demand an immediate, hurried decision. It is certainly possible that, under such circumstances, a reasonable jury could find that his decision to encounter a known risk was not unreasonable. See Twerski, supra at 22; Walsh v. Miehle-Goss-Dexter, Inc., 378 F.2d 409, 414 (3d Cir 1967) ("In determining the standard of conduct of one who is injured in the performance of his employment, the working conditions and all of the circumstances incident thereto, including his obligation to do his job, must be considered."); Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wn.2d 833, 836, 454 P.2d 205 (1969) ("It could never be said as a matter of law that a workman whose job requires him to expose himself to a danger, voluntarily and unreasonably encounters the same."). Cf. Rhoads v. Service Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp. 367, 381 (ED Ark 1971) ("The `voluntariness' with which a worker assigned to a dangerous machine in a factory `assumes the risk of injury' from the machine is illusory."); Mumma v. Reading Co., 247 F. Supp. 252, 257 (ED Pa 1965) ("[P]laintiff must be declared free of contributory negligence as a matter of law because the risk of harm itself was not so imminent, nor was the likelihood of injury so great that, in view of the interest plaintiff sought to advance, no prudent man would face it."). See also Kessler v. Bowie Machine Works, Inc., 501 F.2d 617, 621 (8th Cir 1974); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., supra at 1098; Greco v. Bucciconi Eng. Co., 407 F.2d 87, 93 (3d Cir 1968); Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 (1966). But cf. Ralston v. Illinois Power Co., 13 Ill. App.3d 95, 299 N.E.2d 497 (1973).

Hindsight is always better than foresight, and the reasonableness of a decision to encounter a risk should be determined as of the time that decision is made. In this case there was considerable testimony about the hectic nature of the forklift driver's job from both the plaintiff himself and from a former driver who had been doing the same work plaintiff was doing at the time of the injury, and who had asked for another position when he found that he was no longer able to keep up that job's demands. Plaintiff indicated that if his forklift had been able to keep up with the heavy loads and the fast pace which he was required to maintain, he would not have been in a rush, time would not have been so important, and he would have been able to get off the machine to cut the wire bands. Plaintiff testified that all he was thinking of at the time of the accident was "[t]he time that I had to do the job in, and the job I was doing." He also stated that if he had had time to think about it he would not have reached through the uprights. Significantly, the defendants' brief concedes that plaintiff encountered the risk only because of his working conditions, and at trial defendants even argued that such factors were the sole cause of plaintiff's injury.

Therefore, even if the jury disbelieved plaintiff's testimony and concluded that he knew and appreciated the danger that the carriage might somehow start to descend while his arms were through the uprights, and, further, that his actions in reaching through the uprights were voluntary, there would still remain an issue for the jury's consideration — whether, under the evidence in this case, his decision to do so was unreasonable. The issue is not whether it might have been more reasonable to have selected another method of cutting the bands around the lumber but rather, whether it was unreasonable, under all the circumstances, for plaintiff to have selected the method he did.

Thus, considering all these circumstances, we find that the requested instruction should have been given. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., supra at 1098; Messick v. General Motors Corp., supra at 494; Greco v. Bucciconi Eng. Co., supra at 93. Moreover, it is apparent from a review of the evidence in this case that the issue of assumption of risk was a matter of vital importance and may well have been the issue upon which the jury based its verdict for the defendants. Therefore, we conclude that this case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.