MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE (#113)

MAUREEN M. KEEGAN, JUDGE.

This is the second motion to strike brought by the defendants against the complaint. The defendants have moved to strike counts thirteen and fourteen of the amended complaint, which allege claims for tortious interference with business relations, on the ground that "there is no allegation that a third person was induced to end a contract or business relationship with the plaintiff." In the plaintiffs' tortious interference with business relations counts, they allege that the defendants — Partyka Chevrolet, Inc. (Partyka), d/b/a Lee Partyka Chevyland-Mazda, and its employee, Seth Brown — defrauded the plaintiffs into leasing a 2008 Chevrolet Impala from Partyka based on the understanding that the plaintiffs were trading in their 2006 Nissan Pathfinder; that the defendants falsely represented that Partyka would pay off the remainder of the Pathfinder lease and return it to Nissan-Infiniti LT NILT, Inc. (Nissan-Infiniti); and that, as a result, Mrs. Johns defaulted on the lease for the Pathfinder.

FACTS

On November 19, 2008, the plaintiffs, Mr. Morgan Jones and Mrs. Maria Johns, filed a sixteen-count complaint against the defendants bringing claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), civil theft, conversion, "defamation of credit" and unjust enrichment as to both defendants, as well as claims for negligent supervision and breach of contract as to Partyka. On April 8, 2009, the court granted the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiffs' defamation of credit claims.

On April 23, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a sixteen-count amended complaint, replacing the defamation of credit counts with counts alleging tortious interference with business relations. On April 27, 2009, the defendants filed a motion to strike the tortious interference with business relations counts. On May 7, 2009, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion to strike, and on May 14, 2009, the defendant filed a reply to the plaintiff's objection.

DISCUSSION

"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). The court must "construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc., 277 Conn. 113, 117, 889 A.2d 810 (2006).

"[F]or the purpose of a motion to strike, the moving party admits all facts well pleaded." RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 383 n. 2, 650 A.2d 153 (1994); see also Ferryman v. Groton, 212 Conn. 138, 142, 561 A.2d 432 (1989). Accordingly, "[i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Batte-Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public Health, 281 Conn. 277, 294, 914 A.2d 996 (2007).

The defendants argue that the plaintiff's allegations in count thirteen and fourteen of their amended complaint "fail to allege a legally sufficient claim for interference with a contract or business relationship because there is no allegation that a third person was induced to end a contract or business relationship with the plaintiff." The plaintiffs counter that they have pled "the necessary elements as outlined by Connecticut's appellate courts," and although they have "not alleged that a third person was induced to break a contract with them . . . such an allegation is not necessary to succeed on their claims."

Our Supreme Court has recently explained that "[a] claim for intentional interference with contractual relations requires the plaintiff to establish: (1) the existence of a contractual or beneficial relationship; (2) the defendant's knowledge of that relationship; (3) the defendant's intent to interfere with the relationship; (4) that the interference was tortious; and (5) a loss suffered by the plaintiff that was cause[d] by the defendant's tortious conduct." Rioux v. Barry, 283 Conn. 338, 351, 927 A.2d 304 (2007).

In the plaintiffs' tortious interference with business relations counts, they allege that:

(1) "Mrs. Johns's lease of the Pathfinder constituted a business relationship between Nissan-Infiniti and herself";

(2) the defendants "knew or should have known about the existence of that business relationship";

and

(3) the defendants "intentionally and improperly interfered with that business relationship" by:

(a) promising the plaintiffs that they would not have to make any further payments on the Pathfinder lease if they purchased the Impala . . . thereby inducing Mrs. Johns not to make her regular lease payments on the Pathfinder;

(b) promising the plaintiffs that Partyka would pay off the balance owed to Nissan-Infiniti on the Pathfinder lease as part of the purchase of the Lmpala . . . thereby inducing Mrs. Johns not to make her regular lease payments on the Pathfinder;

(c) failing to pay off the balance of the Pathfinder lease to Nissan-Infiniti;

(d) failing to turn over the Pathfinder to Nissan-Infiniti in a timely manner;

(e) inducing the plaintiffs to remove the Pathfinder from their automobile insurance policy; and/or

(f) actively concealing the fact that the Pathfinder was not accepted as a `trade-in' for the Impala and that Partyka did not ever pay off the remainder of the Pathfinder lease.

The court concludes that, construing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, they have alleged the requisite elements of a tortious interference with business relations claim.

The defendants argue that a claim for tortious interference with business relations requires an allegation "that a third person was induced to end a contract or business relationship with the plaintiff," citing Amatulli Imports, Inc. v. Nargezian, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV-92-0309084 (January 19, 1993, Moraghan, J.) ("[o]ne who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract . . . between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability"); Hiers v. Cohen, 31 Conn.Sup. 305, 310, 329 A.2d 609 (1973) (holding "the complaint fail[ed] to state a cause of action" where it did not "contain any allegation that the plaintiffs had a contract with `other persons' . . . or that the defendant induced `other persons' to break any contact with the plaintiffs"); and D. Wright, J. Fitzgerald W. Ankerman, Connecticut Law of Torts (3d Ed. 1991) § 165, p. 439 ("there must be an allegation that there was a contract with a third person and that such third person was induced to break that contract with the plaintiff").

The court is not persuaded by these factually distinct, nonbinding decisions. More recent appellate authority has held that "the tort of interference with contractual relations" merely requires an allegation that "a third party adversely affect[ed] the contractual relations of two other parties." Wellington Systems, Inc. v. Redding Group, Inc., 49 Conn.App. 152, 168, 714 A.2d 21, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 905, 720 A.2d 516 (1998); see also Suffield Development Associates Limited Partnership v. National Loan Investors, L.P., 64 Conn.App. 192, 205-06, 779 A.2d 822 (2001), rev'd on other grounds, 260 Conn. 766, 802 A.2d 44 (2002) (same). The plaintiffs have met this requirement by pleading that the defendants' actions "induc[ed] Mrs. Johns not to make her regular lease payments on the Pathfinder." Accordingly, the court rejects the defendants' argument and concludes that the plaintiffs' claims are legally sufficient.

CONCLUSION

The court denies the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiffs' tortious interference with business relations claims, counts thirteen and fourteen of the amended complaint.