Benjamin Castillo, Austin, David Jay Campbell, Kevin T. O'Hanlon, Austin, Audra Welter, for Real Party in Interest.

Cynthia Akatugba, Bill Davis, Emily Ardolino, Jeffrey C. Mateer, Austin, Atty. Gen. W. Kenneth Paxton Jr., Philip A. Lionberger, Austin, Kyle D. Hawkins, Esteban M. Soto, Kyle Highful, Ryan Lee Bangert, for Relators.

Justice Guzman delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Lehrmann, Justice Boyd, Justice Devine, Justice Blacklock, Justice Busby, Justice Bland, and Justice Huddle joined.

When a state agency or department head files a notice of appeal, enforcement of an adverse judgment or order is automatically suspended without bond or other security. Section 22.004(i) of the Texas Government Code provides that this supersedeas right "is not subject to being counter-superseded" under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.2(a)(3) "or any other rule" except in "a matter that was the basis of a contested case in an administrative enforcement action." In this ultra vires dispute, state regulators appealed an adverse temporary injunction, but the trial court allowed the plaintiff school district to counter-supersede the injunction so the regulators could not undertake any unauthorized actions absent success on appeal.

The court of appeals reversed the counter-supersedeas order as contrary to Rule 24.2(a)(3) and Section 22.004(i). But to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm, the court issued its own temporary order continuing the injunction pending disposition of the appeal. The purely procedural question presented in this mandamus proceeding is whether the appellate court's temporary order conflicts with Section 22.004(i). We hold it does not and therefore deny mandamus relief. Section 22.004(i)'s prohibition against counter-supersedeas is textually limited to the supersedeas context and does not purport to constrain an appellate court's power to issue temporary orders under other authority. The court of appeals' temporary order may have the same practical effect as denying supersedeas of the trial court's injunction, but it is not counter-supersedeas relief within the meaning of the statute.

I. Background

In the underlying suit, the Houston Independent School District (HISD) seeks a declaration that the Texas Education Agency (TEA), Commissioner Mike Morath, and Dr. Doris Delaney (collectively, Relators) lack authority to assume control of the entire school district to rectify performance deficiencies at 1 of the district's 280 schools and to address concerns about open-government compliance and discord among HISD's publicly elected board of trustees. Among the actions HISD challenges are Commissioner Morath's decision to (1) install Dr. Delaney as a district-level conservator, (2) replace HISD's elected trustees with an appointed board of managers, and (3) lower HISD's accreditation status. HISD contends these actions would be ultra vires and, on that basis, seeks injunctive relief barring their implementation.

After a hearing, the trial court temporarily enjoined the proposed actions, finding (1) HISD established a probable right to recovery on its claim that the challenged actions are without legal authority and ultra vires, (2) HISD made a sufficient showing that the alleged ultra vires actions would irreparably harm HISD, and (3) injunctive relief is necessary to maintain the status quo pending a final judgment. The trial court set a prompt trial date on HISD's request for permanent injunctive relief and denied supersedeas on interlocutory appeal. In allowing HISD to counter-supersede the interlocutory order if the Relators appealed, the court stated that unless the temporary injunction remained in force on appeal, Commissioner Morath would be free to engage in ultra vires conduct that, once undertaken, would constitute final, unappealable administrative action.

After perfecting an interlocutory appeal, Relators filed a motion to vacate the trial court's counter-supersedeas order, citing Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.2(a)(3). Relators argued that their notice of appeal automatically superseded the trial court's temporary injunction and, under Rule 24.2(a)(3), trial courts have no discretion to deny supersedeas to a state agency or the head of a state agency. HISD opposed Relators' motion to vacate the counter-supersedeas order and, in the alternative, filed a cross-motion urging the court of appeals to exercise its authority under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.3 to "make any temporary orders necessary to preserve the parties' rights until disposition of the appeal." HISD argued that temporary relief was necessary to protect the parties' rights during the appeals process and to prevent Commissioner Morath from taking a final and unappealable administrative act that would divest the court of jurisdiction to reach the merits.

The court of appeals granted Relators' motion and vacated the portion of the trial court's order granting HISD's counter-supersedeas request. The court agreed with Relators that the trial court's denial of supersedeas violated Rule 24.2(a)(3). However, to preserve the status quo, to prevent HISD from suffering irreparable harm, and to protect its jurisdiction to decide the appeal on the merits, the court also granted HISD's cross-motion and ordered that the trial court's temporary injunction would remain in effect pending disposition of the interlocutory appeal. The court explained that,

under the particular circumstances presented here, where the appellee alleges irreparable harm from ultra vires action that it seeks to preclude from becoming final, to effectively perform our judicial function and to preserve the separation of powers, we must exercise our inherent authority and use Rule 29.3 to make orders "to prevent irreparable harm to parties that have properly invoked [our] jurisdiction in an interlocutory appeal."

The court emphasized, "We are not allowing the trial court to counter-supersede the temporary injunction; we are exercising our power to issue temporary orders."

The court of appeals has since ruled on the merits of the temporary injunction, affirming the trial court in a split decision. But prior to disposition of the interlocutory appeal, Relators filed this original proceeding seeking to vacate the appellate court's order temporarily continuing the injunction. The validity of the court of appeals' temporary order remains live and mandamus relief remains effective because the court has not lifted its temporary order.

II. Discussion

This original proceeding presents our first opportunity to consider the meaning and reach of Section 22.004(i) of the Government Code, which prohibits this Court from adopting procedural rules authorizing counter-supersedeas of orders and judgments against certain governmental defendants except as to a narrow class of administrative cases. Relators contend Section 22.004(i) creates a right to supersedeas that is substantive, absolute, and unavoidable. HISD argues to the contrary, finding support for interim appellate relief in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.3, Texas Government Code provisions authorizing courts to protect their jurisdiction, and the judiciary's inherent authority. HISD further urges that the statutory scheme and the rules of appellate procedure cannot be construed as neutering judicial power in the way Relators suggest without violating the separation-of-powers doctrine established in Article II, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution.

We hold that the court of appeals' temporary order does not conflict with Section 22.004(i)'s limitation on procedural rules authorizing counter-supersedeas. The temporary order is not counter-supersedeas relief within the meaning of the statute even though the order may have the same effect. "Supersedeas" is a trial-court process for suspending enforcement of the judgment. Under the rules of appellate procedure, supersedeas is subject to review by the appellate courts, but the supersedeas process occurs in the trial court. Section 22.004(i) does not purport to limit the power of appellate courts, including this Court, to issue temporary orders under other authority, like the Rule 29.3 order issued here.

It is not uncommon for procedurally different processes to produce the same substantive effect. That is the case here where an injunctive effect may be achieved in multiple ways, but Section 22.004(i) uses precise and technical language to prohibit only one of those procedural mechanisms. We cannot presume the Legislature intended Section 22.004(i) to carry broader preclusive force than the enacted language describes. Rather, "[w]e must take the Legislature at its word, respect its policy choices, and resist revising a statute under the guise of interpreting it." Judicial restraint in this regard is all the more important if expanding a statute's reach has the potential to impermissibly encroach on the judiciary's constitutionally separate domain.

A.

The purpose of supersedeas is "to preserve the status quo by staying the execution or enforcement of the judgment or order appealed from pending the appeal." Supersedeas not only prevents a judgment creditor from levying execution on a judgment while an appeal is pending but also prevents a judgment, injunction, or other order from being enforced by contempt. When superseded, compliance with an injunction is not required until all appeals have been exhausted and the mandate has issued.

Merely appealing an interlocutory order does not suspend enforcement "unless ... the appellant is entitled to supersede the order without security by filing a notice of appeal." TEA and Commissioner Morath fall within the stated exception because Section 6.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code exempts a department of the State of Texas and the head of such department from filing "a bond ... for an appeal ... in a civil suit." Accordingly, the notice of appeal automatically suspended enforcement of the trial court's order. Instead of preserving the status quo, however, suspension of the temporary injunction would, in this case, have the contradictory effect of permitting the status quo to be altered, because if compliance with the injunction were not required, HISD's manner of governance and accreditation rating could be changed from "the last, actual, peaceable non-contested status [that] preceded the pending controversy."

For reasons like this, the extent to which the state's "automatic" right to supersedeas is also "absolute" has been the subject of much debate centered on the text of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.2(a)(3), which governs suspension of orders "for something other than money or an interest in property." In a former iteration of the rule, trial courts generally had discretion to deny supersedeas if the judgment creditor filed a counter-supersedeas bond, but it was unclear whether the discretion to deny supersedeas extended to orders and judgments against governmental defendants the Legislature has exempted from filing an appeal bond. We settled the issue in In re State Board for Educator Certification by holding that the former version of Rule 24.2(a)(3) gave trial courts discretion "to decline supersedeas if the judgment creditor posts security."

In that case, the State Board for Educator Certification revoked a schoolteacher's teaching certificate after a contested-case hearing, but in a subsequent judicial-review proceeding, the trial court reversed the revocation and refused to allow the board to supersede the judgment pending appeal. Construing the language in Rule 24.2(a)(3) as it existed at the time, we said:

TRAP 24.2(a)(3) gives the trial court discretion, quite sensibly, to prevent the State from re-revoking Montalvo's certification—the ultimate professional sanction—while it spends years appealing the court's reversal of the State's first revocation, something the trial court found "arbitrary and capricious." The State—as yet unsupported by a victory on the merits in any court—wants to strip Montalvo of his livelihood while the appellate process grinds on, and if he manages to regain his professional license after having been kicked out of his profession for years—well, bygones. [Enforcing administrative orders a trial court has reversed would be] a striking assertion of unbridled executive power [and] TRAP 24.2(a)(3) recognizes the judiciary's authority to say no.

A few years later, the Texas Legislature instructed this Court to adopt rules curbing judicial discretion to issue "counter-supersedeas" orders. Adopting Section 22.004(i) of the Texas Government Code, the Legislature required the Court to adopt rules ensuring that the right of select governmental entities "to supersede a judgment or order on appeal [without bond] is not subject to being counter-superseded under Rule 24.2(a)(3), Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, or any other rule." Under Section 22.004(i), the only permissible exclusion to the general prohibition is for "[c]ounter-supersedeas ... in a lawsuit concerning a matter that was the basis of a contested case in an administrative enforcement action." This exception encompasses the situation that existed in In re State Board for Educator Certification , so our holding that the trial court had discretion to grant counter-supersedeas relief in that case remains intact.

Responding to Section 22.004(i)'s directive, we amended Rule 24.2(a)(3) to its current form, which deprives trial courts of authority to deny supersedeas for non-monetary, non-property-interest judgments "[w]hen the judgment debtor is the state, a department of this state, or the head of a department of this state." As to those governmental actors, "the trial court must permit a judgment to be superseded except in a matter arising from a contested case in an administrative enforcement action." Notably, we did not view Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29 as involving the supersedeas or counter-supersedeas process and thus made no changes to that rule in response to Section 22.004(i)'s directive.

B.

The dispute here is whether the legislatively mandated prohibition on counter-supersedeas grants Relators a substantive right to supersedeas that constrains courts of appeals from effectively granting the same relief under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.3 or otherwise. Relying on Government Code Section 22.004(i) and the conforming revision to Rule 24.2(a)(3), Relators claim an unequivocal and unconditional supersedeas right that cannot, under any circumstances, be denied through counter-supersedeas or any equivalent action. Relators contend that the court of appeals' temporary order directly conflicts with Section 22.004(i) because the statute explicitly prohibits denial of supersedeas under any procedural rule, not just counter-supersedeas orders issued by the trial court. And because a rule of procedure can never take precedence over a statute—especially a statute that expressly disallows incompatible rules—Relators take exception to the court of appeals' reliance on its authority under Rule 29.3 to issue temporary orders.

HISD's central argument to the contrary is that neither Section 22.004(i) nor Rule 24.2(a)(3) circumscribes an appellate court's authority to issue temporary orders under (1) statutory grants of authority to preserve jurisdiction, (2) the court's inherent authority to protect the status quo and preserve the parties' rights, or (3) Rule 29.3, which it argues is inclusive of the court's statutory and inherent authority to issue temporary orders. HISD maintains that, at a minimum, Section 22.004(i) does not prevent courts from exercising their statutory authority to prevent Commissioner Morath from taking actions that could moot the appeal and divest the court of the jurisdiction he invoked by filing a notice of appeal in the first instance. HISD warns that construing Section 22.004(i) as carrying the prescriptive force Relators advocate would allow governmental defendants to orchestrate a favorable outcome, not on the merits but by evading review entirely—victory achieved by procedural gambit rather than under the law.

Due to Section 22.004(i)'s prohibition against counter-supersedeas under "any other rule," the parties focus on the court of appeals' reliance on Rule 29.3, which governs an appeals court's authority to issue temporary orders preserving the rights of the parties on interlocutory appeal. This rule of appellate procedure states that "[w]hen an appeal from an interlocutory order is perfected, the appellate court may make any temporary orders necessary to preserve the parties' rights until disposition of the appeal and may require appropriate security." HISD contends the court of appeals' broad authority to preserve the parties' rights is materially distinct from a trial court's supersedeas authority, as described in Rule 24.2(a)(3) and as circumscribed by Section 22.004(i). And rather than conflicting, HISD describes supersedeas and the temporary order here as deriving from distinct reservoirs of power that are directed to different concerns, even when they would have the same effect. Relators acknowledge that appellate courts are generally empowered to issue orders protecting the parties' rights and preserving their ability to resolve the dispute on appeal, but they view Section 22.004(i) and Rule 24.2(a)(3) as specific and unqualified constraints on this power, even in aid of a court's jurisdiction.

Both parties find support for their respective arguments in our recent opinion in In re Geomet Recycling LLC . That case involved an appellate court's Rule 29.3 temporary order partially lifting a statutory stay of all trial-court proceedings for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to conduct a hearing on the plaintiffs' request for a temporary injunction and motion for contempt, which asserted Geomet had violated the trial court's temporary restraining order. We held that the language of the interlocutory-appeal statute, Section 51.014(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, unambiguously stays all trial-court proceedings and admits of no exceptions. As "procedural rules cannot authorize courts to act contrary to a statute," Rule 29.3 did not authorize the court of appeals to lift the stay to allow further proceedings in the trial court, even to the limited extent requested. We explained, however, that plaintiffs had recourse and the possibility of a remedy from the appellate court under Rule 29.3. And because the statutory stay imposed by Section 51.014(b) only applies to trial-court proceedings, the statute did not prohibit the court of appeals from preserving the plaintiffs' rights under Rule 29.3 in other ways. The plaintiffs' error was that they asked the court of appeals to allow the trial court to take an action the interlocutory-appeal statute specifically prohibited.

Relators argue that, similar to Geomet , the court of appeals here lacked authority to issue a temporary order under Rule 29.3 that violates a statute, Section 22.004(i). In the Relators' view, the court of appeals' temporary order strikes at the heart of Section 22.004(i)'s protection of a governmental entity's supersedeas right, because the order effectively allows the temporary injunction to be enforced pending disposition of the Relators' appeal.

HISD asserts that the court of appeals' action is entirely consistent with the ruling in Geomet . Instead of enforcing the trial court's counter-supersedeas order, which the court of appeals agreed was impermissible, the court issued its own order preserving HISD's rights on the separate basis of preserving the status quo and protecting the court's own jurisdiction, which it is authorized to do not only under a general rule, but also by statute. HISD maintains that the temporary order is not a counter-supersedeas order merely because it has the same effect as an order denying supersedeas. But if Section 22.004(i) were construed as abrogating judicial authority to issue orders protecting the parties and preserving the status quo, HISD argues the statute would violate the Texas Constitution's separation-of-powers mandate, a concern we alluded to in Geomet .

This case is quite dissimilar from Geomet but it shares the same root question: what does the statute actually prohibit? The precise question we must answer is whether the Legislature intended to restrain the specific process identified in the statute—the supersedeas process controlled by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24—or whether the Legislature intended to constrain any judicial power that could produce the same effect.

C.

The polestar of statutory construction is legislative intent, which we determine from the enacted language. In doing so, we construe the Legislature's chosen words and phrases within the context and framework of the statute as a whole, not in isolation. We apply the plain meaning of statutory language unless (1) the Legislature has prescribed definitions, (2) the words have acquired a technical or particular meaning, (3) a contrary intention is apparent from the context, or (4) a plain-meaning construction leads to nonsensical or absurd results. We presume the Legislature knows the law and drafts statutes with care, choosing each word for a purpose and purposefully omitting all other words. That being the case, we endeavor to afford meaning to all of a statute's language so none is rendered surplusage, but we remain ever mindful of our obligation to avoid constructions that give rise to constitutional infirmities.

Applying these well-established principles, it is clear that Section 22.004(i)'s language evinces the Legislature's intent to restrict the supersedeas process and is silent about appellate-court orders issued under other authority that might have the same effect. Section 22.004(i) provides in its entirety:

The supreme court shall adopt rules to provide that the right of an appellant under Section 6.001(b)(1), (2), or (3), Civil Practice and Remedies Code, to supersede a judgment or order on appeal is not subject to being counter-superseded under Rule 24.2(a)(3), Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, or any other rule. Counter-supersedeas shall remain available to parties in a lawsuit concerning a matter that was the basis of a contested case in an administrative enforcement action.

The statute's terms refer specifically to the supersedeas process, as prescribed by Rule 24.

As an initial matter, we note that the Legislature limited the statute to ensuring the rights of appellants under Section 6.001(b)(1)-(3), which generally exempts the state and certain state agents from filing cost and appeal bonds. Under the appellate rules, the trial court determines the amount and sufficiency of an appeal bond in accordance with the requirements outlined in Rule 24, subject to modification only through appellate review of the trial court's supersedeas order.

Further, and more notably, the statute references the right to "supersede" a judgment or order and prohibits the same from being "counter-superseded." At the same time, the statute allows "counter-supersedeas" in a specified circumstance. Supersedeas and counter-supersedeas are terms of art that refer to a particular process for suspending enforcement of a trial court's judgment or order. Neither term refers to appellate-court orders that have the same practical effect.

The statute also references Rule 24.2(a)(3), a specific subsection of the rules governing the supersedeas process. The express citation to Rule 24.2(a)(3) reinforces the Legislature's singular focus on that process. While we cannot ignore the legislative prohibition against counter-supersedeas under "any other rule," that phrase cannot be read in isolation. Construed in connection with the linguistically precedent context, the phrase refers to rules applicable to the supersedeas process. The court of appeals' temporary order preserving the status quo and ensuring the court's ability to decide the case on the merits is not a supersedeas order. The order's effect does not change its nature.

The distinction between supersedeas and temporary orders suspending enforcement of a judgment may seem a fine one, but the processes are distinct, and the appellate rules, both currently and at the time Section 22.004(i) was enacted, make the same distinction. Rule 29, which applies to orders on interlocutory appeal, treats the supersedeas process in the trial court under Rule 24 differently from an appellate court's temporary orders. Rule 29.2 refers to trial court orders "supersed[ing]" an interlocutory order on appeal, while Rule 29.3 permits an appellate court to enter temporary orders except one that "suspends the trial court's order if the appellant's rights would be adequately protected by supersedeas or another order made under Rule 24." Importantly, Rule 29.1 exempts from the supersedeas process those appellants who are not required to file an appeal bond, but does not exempt those same appellants from being subject to an appellate court's temporary orders, a materially different process with materially different inquiries and objectives. We presume the Legislature was aware of this distinction in enacting Section 22.004(i), and we must give effect to the Legislature's choice to prohibit counter-supersedeas and not all types of orders that might have the same practical effect.

This result derives directly and necessarily from a text-based review of the statutory language. Though applying text as written can sometimes give rise to an outcome that appears punctilious, reading the statute exactly as it is written in this case has the salutary effect of a reasonable result that avoids raising separation-of-powers concerns. The reason the Legislature might take such a nuanced approach would be mere supposition on our part, and it cannot change what the statute says in any event. But one obvious motivation for limiting only the supersedeas process could be concern that a single judge could stymie the state from exercising its lawful powers and from representing the public as it sees fit during the course of an appellate process that might take years to conclude. Such a concern is less acute when a multi-judge panel, subject to mandamus review by this Court, issues temporary relief.

Giving effect to Section 22.004(i)'s plain language, we conclude the statute only prohibits counter-supersedeas orders, which occur within a specific procedural context, and does not apply to orders issued by an appellate court under separate and distinct procedural mechanisms. The dissent reaches the opposite result by isolating the words "any other rule" in Section 22.004(i) to advance a presumed but unarticulated statutory purpose. This runs counter to bedrock statutory construction principles, which require us to discern legislative intent from the statutory language construed as a whole.

D.

We are sensitive to Relators' concerns that protracted litigation without suspension of the temporary injunction could delay remedial measures designed to protect students and improve academic achievement. However, Relators were not without options for hastening conclusion of the litigation on the merits. Relators could have asked the court of appeals for an expedited briefing schedule and ruling, but they elected not to request either. Relators sought expedited disposition of their motion to set aside the trial court's counter-supersedeas order but did not seek expedited disposition of the appeal even after the court of appeals granted temporary relief. To the contrary, they sought, and were granted, a briefing extension. Relators then waited nearly a month to seek mandamus relief from this Court and even then did not request a stay of the court of appeals' temporary order or expedited disposition of the mandamus petition.

Notwithstanding Relators' strategic decision not to seek expedited relief here or in the court below, the dissent chides the court of appeals for granting temporary relief in lieu of sua sponte expediting disposition on the merits. While courts certainly have authority to do so, the dissent's argument is confounding because (1) the power to expedite proceedings is irrelevant to whether appellate courts are empowered to issue temporary relief; (2) the availability of an expedited disposition does not change what Section 22.004(i) means; (3) courts have no obligation to expedite the proceedings on their own initiative; and (4) the dissent does not explain how expediting relief would have adequately protected HISD from unreviewable executive action and irremediable harm.

More to the point, Relators had every opportunity and incentive to seek a stay or expedited disposition on their own accord but, for whatever reason, chose not to do so. As the dissent notes, on the same day this original proceeding was filed, Relators' counsel filed a mandamus petition in this Court challenging a Rule 29.3 order in another case involving the State's supersedeas rights and sought an emergency stay of that order, which we granted. In a separate mandamus proceeding involving a different issue filed two days earlier, Relators' counsel requested expedited disposition on the merits, which we also granted. In stark contrast, Relators' counsel did not request either in this case, nor did this Court expedite the proceedings on our own initiative. The dissent incorrectly asserts that we sua sponte expedited disposition of one of the aforementioned mandamus petitions, but that is simply untrue. The relators in that case expressly requested expedited disposition. Here, Relators have never done so at any point.

E.

The dissent devotes more attention to collateral issues that require no response than it does to the statutory text. Even so, we would be remiss if we did not address the dissent's misrepresentation that the Court "reached a conclusion exactly the opposite of the one it reaches today in another petition for mandamus that, coincidentally, was filed on the very same day." Whether by design or inadvertence, the dissent presents two separate and distinct mandamus proceedings as one, and in doing so, distorts the public record to support a contention that is demonstrably inaccurate. Our construction of Section 22.004(i) and the outcome in this case is in no way inconsistent with our disposition of In re State of Texas , Cause No. 20-0394, which presented a statutory-construction issue under the Texas Election Code that we decided on the merits, or our disposition of In re State of Texas , Cause No. 20-0401, which involved a procedural issue that we dismissed on the State's motion without reaching the merits. These cases were unrelated to each other with different parties, distinctly different legal issues, and materially different procedural postures.

Cause No. 20-0394, which we will refer to as State 1 , was a mandamus petition filed in this Court in the first instance. There were no prior proceedings in the lower courts and thus no Rule 29.3, supersedeas, or injunction issues. The only question was the proper construction of the Election Code, and the relators requested expedited disposition of the petition in light of impending run-off elections. None of the issues overlapped with this case.

Cause No. 20-0401, which we will refer to as State 2 , was a mandamus petition that arose from pending litigation that had been instituted in the trial court and was then on appeal in the Fourteenth Court of Appeals. The underlying case involved the same Election Code issue as State 1 , but the trial court in State 2 had issued a temporary injunction that was both prohibitory and prescriptive. The temporary injunction there did not merely maintain the status quo like the temporary injunction and Rule 29.3 order in this case; rather, the temporary injunction ordered the State to undertake certain actions with respect to the elections.

The day after State 1 was filed in this Court, the court of appeals in State 2 issued a Rule 29.3 order maintaining the trial court's injunction pending disposition of the appeal. In the State 2 mandamus petition filed here the following day—the same day this original proceeding was filed—the appellate court's authority to continue the injunction under Rule 29.3 was the only issue. We granted the State's motion for temporary relief in State 2 , but we never reached the merits of the mandamus petition because our opinion on the Election Code issue in State 1 resolved the merits of the underlying dispute in State 2. As a result, the State 2 litigation was nonsuited in the trial court; the court of appeals dismissed the underlying appeal as moot; and we granted the State's unopposed motion to dismiss the mandamus petition.

As the dissenting justice is fully aware, neither State 1 nor State 2 decided the merits of any issue presented in this case. Nor have Relators asked the Court for temporary relief, as the relators in State 2 did. It is thus impossible for any inconsistency to exist between this case and those cases, let alone any "opposite" conclusions.

III. Conclusion

We deny Relators' request for mandamus relief because Section 22.004(i)'s prohibition on counter-supersedeas refers to a particular procedural process, not an appellate court's temporary orders under other authority. Accordingly, the court of appeals was not without power to issue temporary relief.

Chief Justice Hecht filed a dissenting opinion.

Chief Justice Hecht, dissenting.

After years-long investigations, the Texas Commissioner of Education has found serious, longstanding, and ongoing deficiencies in the quality of education provided by several schools in the Houston Independent School District, as well as violations of law in the District's operations. The Commissioner has proposed measures for improvement, including appointing a conservator for the District and installing a board of managers to oversee its operations. The District sued, contesting the findings and the process used to reach them and challenging the remedial measures as unlawful.

The trial court took just three weeks to temporarily enjoin the Commissioner's remedial measures. By statute and Rule of Appellate Procedure, the Commissioner was entitled to suspend, or supersede, enforcement of the temporary injunction by appealing it. The trial court could not allow the District to counter-supersede—to reinstate enforcement by posting security. The Court evades these clear statutory and rule-based provisions by holding that the court of appeals could simply reissue the trial court's exact same order as its own. In other words, using one Rule to give the District the very relief another Rule expressly denies, and not calling the effect "counter-supersedeas", even though it is. This not only creates a conflict in the Rules; it directly violates state law. Even if it did not, the delay cannot be justified under the Rules. This case has been on appeal for more than a year, with the wellbeing of school children in limbo. And the end is not in sight.

The result flaunts the Legislature's will. I respectfully dissent.

I

For years, several District schools have underperformed academically—which means, translating from bureaucratese to plain English, that students were denied the education promised by state law, dimming their futures and injuring society. In 2016, the Commissioner appointed a conservator for one school campus. While that helped a little, it was not enough. A statutory Special Accreditation Investigation of the District turned up multiple violations of state and federal laws. Not only were schools failing to educate students to acceptable standards, and officials allegedly violating the law, but racial tensions and chaotic outbursts among the District's Board of Trustees, which Houston's Mayor called "destabilizing and unacceptable", were playing out in the media too. In November 2019, the Commissioner issued his proposed decision to enlarge the conservator's responsibilities to cover the entire District and to suspend the Board and appoint a board of managers to oversee the District.

While that proposed decision was pending final review by the Commissioner, the District sued on June 27, 2019, to enjoin the Commissioner from taking any of the proposed regulatory actions against it. Defendants immediately removed the case to United States District Court. In December, the federal court issued its final judgment, dismissing the District's federal-law claims and remanding the state-law claims to the state district court. On January 8, the trial court issued a temporary injunction prohibiting the Commissioner "from appointing a board of managers to oversee operations" of the District and "from imposing any sanctions or interventions on [the District] based on [the] Special Accreditation Investigation". The trial court also enjoined the conservator "from acting outside her lawful authority to ensure and oversee district-level support to low-performing campuses and the implementation of the updated targeted improvement plan on those campuses".

The next day the Commissioner appealed.

II

Rule 24 governs, as its title states, "suspension of enforcement of judgment pending appeal in civil cases" —that is, supersedeas. If the judgment is for money or property, the judgment debtor must post a bond, deposit, or other security in an amount determined by the trial court. If the judgment is for something other than money or property, the trial court still sets the amount and type of security the judgment debtor must post to "adequately protect the judgment creditor against loss or damage that the appeal might cause." But Rule 24.2(a)(3) provides that even if that security is posted, a trial court has discretion to deny supersedeas if the judgment creditor counter-supersedes—that is, posts security against any loss to the judgment debtor if he wins on appeal.

Section 6.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code exempts certain governmental entities and officers from filing a bond for an appeal in a civil case. Such an entity's notice of appeal automatically supersedes a judgment against it. But does a trial court have discretion under Rule 24.2(a)(3) to deny the governmental entity supersedeas, as it would a private entity, if the judgment creditor counter-supersedes? In In re State Board for Educator Certification we answered yes. The Legislature promptly countermanded our decision as it applied to three of the governmental entities covered by Section 6.001 : the State, a department of the State, or a department head. It did so by enacting Section 22.004(i) of the Texas Government Code, which states: "The supreme court shall adopt rules to provide that the right of [those three entities] to supersede a judgment or order on appeal is not subject to being counter-superseded under Rule 24.2(a)(3) ... or any other rule." The Court complied by adding this sentence to Rule 24.2(a)(3) : "When the judgment debtor is the state, a department of this state, or the head of a department of this state, the trial court must permit a judgment to be superseded".

Accordingly, the Commissioner's appeal superseded the temporary injunction. But despite the clear language of Section 22.004(i) and amended Rule 24.2(a)(3), the trial court allowed the District to counter-supersede the suspension. The court found "that the $200.00, previously deposited by Plaintiff with the Travis County District Clerk, constitutes sufficient security, in lieu of bond, for any foreseeable harm or compensable damages that may result from the granting of this Temporary Injunction". The court of appeals granted the Commissioner's motion to vacate the counter-suspension but at the same time "order[ed] that the trial court's temporary injunction remain[ ] in effect to preserve the parties' rights until the disposition of this appeal." The court relied in part on Rule 29.3, which states: "When an appeal from an interlocutory order is perfected, the appellate court may make any temporary orders necessary to preserve the parties' rights until disposition of the appeal and may require appropriate security."

The Commissioner seeks mandamus relief directing the court of appeals to withdraw its reissuance of the temporary injunction. The Court denies relief.

III

The Court reasons thusly: True, the court of appeals' order "may have the same practical effect" as counter-supersedeas, but it is "a materially different process with materially different inquiries and objectives." For one thing, the court of appeals' order is not labeled "counter-supersedeas", which is a "term[ ] of art". For another, the court of appeals' order is issued, well, by the court of appeals, while counter-supersedeas is ordered by the trial court. And besides, the court of appeals' order and counter-supersedeas "are neither procedurally nor functionally equivalent" because the trial court and the court of appeals could both enforce a counter-superseded temporary injunction, while only the court of appeals can enforce its order. Also, the court of appeals' order is governed by Rule 29.3, while counter-supersedeas is governed by Rule 24.2(a)(3). "While we cannot ignore the legislative prohibition [in Section 22.004(i) ] against counter-supersedeas under ‘any other rule,’ that phrase cannot be read in isolation." It is "textually limited". "Construed in connection with the linguistically precedent context, the phrase refers to rules applicable to the supersedeas process." Actually, "[t]he distinction between supersedeas and temporary orders suspending enforcement of a judgment may seem a fine one" —okay, "punctilious", even. But "reading [ Section 22.004(i) ] exactly as it is written in this case has the salutary effect of a reasonable result". Otherwise,

a single judge could stymie the state from exercising its lawful powers and from representing the public as it sees fit during the course of an appellate process that might take years to conclude. Such a concern is less acute when a multi-judge panel, subject to mandamus

review by this Court, issues temporary relief.

The flaws in the Court's explanations are glaring. The practical effects of counter-supersedeas and Rule 29.3 "unsupersedeas", let's call it, are identical. The court of appeals simply "order[ed] that the trial court's temporary injunction remain[ ] in effect". The "inquiry and objective" of the two are also identical: to determine and alleviate the effects of appellate delay. The process of making that determination is essentially the same whether conducted in the trial court or in the court of appeals, as it was here. Each court issued its order to prevent the District from being, in the court's view, irreparably injured. Enforcement of each order is practically the same in either court. The distinction between counter-supersedeas and unsupersedeas is not merely "fine" or even "punctilious"; it is nonexistent.

The Court says it must read Section 22.004(i) exactly as written, but "any other rule", exactly as written, does not mean "any other counter-supersedeas rule". A phrase cannot be read exactly as written by changing it. The Court explains that it must add a word here because the phrase "any other rule" is "textually limited". Giving meaning to a statute based on its textually limited language channels the Court's recent decision in In re Xerox Corp. There we used a similar phrase, "textually constrained", to mean that the Legislature used a word in one statutory subchapter but not in another. The Court uses its canon today to mean that "any other rule" must be "[c]onstrued in connection with the linguistically precedent context". If that means text must always be read in context, then of course. But what the Court means is that because "any other rule" is used in a statute about counter-supersedeas, it is limited to any other counter-supersedeas rule. Even if that interpretation of the statute were reasonable, and it is not, it makes the statute nonsensical because there is no other counter-supersedeas rule . By reading an additional word into "any other rule", the Court reads the entire phrase out of the statute. It refers to nothing. Section 22.004(i) has exactly the same effect under the Court's reading, with or without "any other rule". Lacking the Court's expertise in the Rules but intending to ensure that its statute completely achieved its goal, the Legislature directed its mandate to a specific Rule and then to "any other rule". The Court's interpretation flaunts that intent.

While not a mainstay canon for interpreting statutes, recent legal literature has described courts' finding language textually constrained or limited as the "new purposivism" theory of statutory construction, or what one writer has labeled "backdoor purposivism". The point of this new theory is that meaning is not dictated by text. Instead, courts merely consider text as perhaps helpful, though nonbinding, while still deciding the case on purposivist grounds. The Court's description of Section 22.004(i)'s "any other rule" language as "textually limited" is consistent with new purposivism.

The Court concludes that its reading of Section 22.004(i) "has the salutary effect" of putting the decision whether to "stymie the state from exercising lawful powers and from representing the public as it sees fit during the course of an appellate process that might take years to conclude" in three pairs of judicial hands on the court of appeals under Rule 29.3 rather than one on the trial court under Rule 24(a)(3). But Rule 29.3 applies only, by its terms, "[w]hen an appeal from an interlocutory order is" pending. When the appeal is from a final judgment, Rule 25.1(h) provides that "[e]nforcement of the judgment may proceed unless ... the appellant is entitled to supersede the judgment without security by filing a notice of appeal." As already discussed, that exception applies to the governmental entities listed in Section 6.001. And Rule 24.2(a)(3) precludes counter-supersedeas. So the Court's "salutary effect" applies only in interlocutory appeals, not final appeals, which casts doubt on the Court's hypothesized three-judges-instead-of-one rationale it ascribes to the Legislature.

The Court certainly has the power to refuse to read Section 22.004(i) exactly as written. What it should not do is claim to read text exactly as written and then blatantly do the opposite. And what the Court cannot do is read Section 22.004(i) exactly as written and reach the conclusion it does.

IV

The Court denies that it reached a conclusion exactly the opposite of the one it reaches today in another petition for mandamus that, coincidentally, was filed on the very same day as the Commissioner's.

On March 7, 2020, the Texas Democratic Party and others sued for a declaration that fear of contracting COVID-19 was reason enough to apply for a mail-in ballot and injunctive relief to compel election officials to count those mail-in ballots. On April 17, after a hearing, the trial court issued a temporary injunction that enjoined the State from taking any actions preventing counties from accepting and tabulating such ballots. The State immediately appealed, superseding the temporary injunction. The appellees moved for an order under Rule 29.3 for the court of appeals to reinstate the temporary injunction. On May 14, a divided court of appeals granted the motion, citing as indistinguishable and binding the court of appeals' order in the present case that had issued 20 days earlier. Dissenting Chief Justice Frost argued that the relief sought under Rule 29.3 "conflicts with the Legislature's determination that the State automatically supersedes an order or judgment by filing a notice of appeal and that courts cannot countermand the State's ability to supersede".

The next day, the State petitioned this Court for mandamus relief and moved to stay the court of appeals' order. The State made exactly the same argument the Commissioner does here, which is hardly surprising since the Solicitor General filed both petitions, on the same day, from indistinguishable orders. After reviewing the response of the real parties in interest, we granted the State's motion a few hours after it was filed.

On May 13, the day before the court of appeals issued its Rule 29.3 order, the State petitioned this Court for mandamus relief prohibiting various election officials from misinforming voters that fear of COVID-19 was sufficient reason to request a mail-in ballot. While the appeal from the temporary injunction granting contrary relief against the State remained pending in the court of appeals, we conducted oral argument in the State's mandamus proceeding and decided the issue. Our opinion issued in In re State on May 20. The court of appeals later dismissed the appeal from the temporary injunction as moot.

Despite the Court's denial, the order, arguments, and authorities in the mandamus before us in connection with State were substantively the same as the Commissioner's here.

V

Section 22.004(i) and Rule 24.2(a)(3) prohibit the court of appeals from effectively imposing counter-supersedeas under Rule 29.3, but they do not foreclose all relief under that rule.

The court here could unquestionably have expedited proceedings. The mail-in voting issue in State was critical to the election process. This Court finally decided the issue, after merits briefing and oral argument, seventy-four days after it was first raised in the trial court, five days after the petition was filed here, and more than five months before voting started. We stayed the court of appeals' Rule 29.3 order after considering the opponents' response, about six hours after the motion was filed. By contrast, the present case was filed more than twenty months ago. Not quite six of those months were in the court of appeals, with only three weeks in the trial court. Every day this case pends affects the lives and futures of thousands of public-school children.

The Court faults the Commissioner for not moving for expedited consideration. But a court of appeals that undertakes to effectively counter-supersede a temporary injunction against a state official in the face of stated legislative policy to the contrary—or in the Court's words, to "stymie the state from exercising its lawful powers and from representing the public as it sees fit during the course of an appellate process that might take years to conclude" —ought to expedite its decision without being asked. No motion to expedite was filed in State .

A court of appeals can certainly consider other interim actions. It could issue stays for specific reasons and limited times. Or it could require that parties notify each other before certain actions are taken. But it cannot grant statutorily prohibited relief by renaming it.

* * * * *

For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent.